Literary Paternity, Literary Friendship by Richter, Gerhard

Literary Paternity, Literary Friendship
From 1949 to 2004, UNC Press and the UNC Department of Germanic 
& Slavic Languages and Literatures published the UNC Studies 
in the Germanic Languages and Literatures series. Monographs, 
anthologies, and critical editions in the series covered an array of 
topics including medieval and modern literature, theater, linguistics, 
philology, onomastics, and the history of ideas. Through the generous 
support of the National Endowment for the Humanities and the 
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, books in the series have been reissued 
in new paperback and open access digital editions. For a complete list 
of books visit www.uncpress.org.
Literary Paternity, 
Literary Friendship
Essays in Honor of Stanley Corngold
edited by gerhard richter
UNC Studies in the Germanic Languages and Literatures
Number 125
Copyright © 2002
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons cc by-nc-nd 
license. To view a copy of the license, visit http://creativecommons.
org/licenses.
Suggested citation: Richter, Gerhard. Literary Paternity, Liter-
ary Friendship: Essays in Honor of Stanley Corngold. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002. doi: https://doi.org/ 
10.5149/9780807861417_Richter
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Richter, Gerhard, editor.
Title: Literary paternity, literary friendship : essays in honor of Stanley
Corngold / edited by Gerhard Richter.
Other titles: University of North Carolina studies in the Germanic
languages and literatures ; no. 125.
Description: Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, [2002]
Series: University of North Carolina studies in the Germanic 
languages and literatures | Includes bibliographical references.
Identifiers: lccn 2001057825 | isbn 978-1-4696-5824-7 (pbk: alk.
paper) | isbn 978-1-4696-5825-4 (ebook)
Subjects: German literature — History and criticism. | Paternity in
literature. | Friendship in literature.
Classifications: lcc pt285 .l57 2002


. Introduction: Literary Paternity, Literary Friendship 
Gerhard Richter
 .   :   
. Good Willing and the Practice of Friendship—A Dialogue 
John H. Smith
 .   ():    
   
. Connotations of Friendship and Love in Schiller’s Philosophical Letters
and Hölderlin’s Hyperion 
Walter Hinderer
. German Classicism and the Law of the Father 
Peter Uwe Hohendahl
. Allusions to and Inversions of Plato in Hölderlin’s Hyperion 
Mark W. Roche
. How Fireproof You Are: Father-Daughter Tales of Loss and Survival 
Karin Schutjer
 .   ():    
   
. Mediation and Domination: Paternity, Violence, and Art in
Brentano’s Godwi 
John Lyon
. Old Father Jupiter: On Kleist’s Drama Amphitryon 
Gerhard Kurz
. Two Lovers, Three Friends 
Jochen Hörisch
viii : 
 .      
. The Love That Is Called Friendship and the Rise of Sexual Identity 
Robert Tobin
. Of National Poets and Their Female Companions 
Herman Rapaport
. Between Aufbruch and Secessio: Images of Friendship among
Germans, Jews, and Gays 
John Neubauer
. Women’s Comedy and Its Intellectual Fathers: Marx as the Answer
to Freud 
Gail Finney
 .     ,  
:     
. Friendship and Responsibility: Arendt to Auden 
David Halliburton
. On Friendship in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt Reads
Walter Benjamin 
Liliane Weissberg
 .    :
  
. Odysseus’s Tattoo: On Daniel Ganzfried’s The Sender and Binjamin
Wilkomirski’s Fragments 
Rafaël Newman and Caroline Wiedmer
. Of Friends and Mentors 
Donald Brown
. Shprintze, or Metathesis: On the Rhetoric of the Fathers in Sholem




. The Democratic Father (Credit and Crime in Metaphor) 
A. Kiarina Kordela




Selected Bibliography of Works of Stanley Corngold 
Princeton Dissertations in German and Comparative Literature









Literary Paternity, Literary Friendship
 
Ich glaube, Du hast es nicht genug begriffen, daß Schreiben meine einzige
innere Daseinsmöglichkeit ist.
—Franz Kafka, in a letter to Felice Bauer,  April 
From any perspective, Stanley Corngold, whose life and achievements
as a scholar, teacher, and friend the following essays celebrate, is an ex-
ception. He is an exception in these times of methodological dogma and
professed certainty not only because he approaches both his work and his
empirical life with an uncommon curiosity and infectious openness but
also because, more than most scholars, he works to keep his ideas and per-
spectives perpetually in strategic flux. This fluidity of thinking and writing,
which grows out of a sense of responsibility to the difficulty of his objects of
study, is only matched by the rigor and intellectual integrity that also have
come to be his trademark. Ian Balfour puts it well apropos of Corngold’s
most recent book, Complex Pleasures: Forms of Feeling in German Litera-
ture (), when he writes that ‘‘elegance and intelligence meet on virtually
every page,’’ while the ‘‘prose is pellucid, flexible, and sinuous at the same
time.’’1 From the perspective of the productive tensions that traverse all his
writings, the idea of a Festschrift is almost an oxymoron—at least when one
hears in this word not only the denotation of a worthy feast but also the
echoes of festschreiben, to arrest something in writing for good. After all,
one of the lessons of Corngold’s work is that there is very little that is fest-
geschrieben once and for all, that does not deserve to be carefully reread and
passionately rethought, again and again. This rereading and rethinking is
propelled by an ethical impulse—the cura, which Heidegger tells us lies at
the heart of all worry—that contents itself neither with the received wis-
dom of conventional disciplinary perspectives nor with the false promise of
closure offered by this or that system.
 :  
The essays gathered in this volume honor Stanley Corngold by focus-
ing on the twin problems of literary friendship and literary paternity. It is
appropriate that these twin themes should stand at the core of a volume
in his honor, both because he has addressed them in his variegated criti-
cal writings and because these tropes conspire to yield a perspective from
which many of his more general intellectual concerns come metonymically
into view. Corngold’s celebrated work on Franz Kafka, for instance, includes
meditations, directly or indirectly, on questions of friendship and paternity,
relation and offspring, proximity and distance. Moreover, honoring Corn-
gold, who has always been both highly aware of, and vigilantly guarded
vis-à-vis, the most recent developments in critical theory, with a volume
on these twin themes is particularly timely in the current critical situation.
Here, the problems of friendship and paternity occupy a central position in
discussions of ethics, politics, art, and literature, as well as the relationship
between the public and the private sphere. One could even say that with
the numerous publications of books and essays on these topics, paternity
and friendship have become privileged tropes in contemporary critical and
historical debates.2
While friendship has been a central issue in the history of Western ethi-
cal and political discourses in philosophy and literature—from Plato and
Cicero viaMontaigne, Bacon, and Kant all theway to Nietzsche, Freud, Sim-
mel, Blanchot, and beyond—it has only recently begun to become visible
as a sphere in which to consider the possibility of a subject that strives to
act ethically and responsibly, even without recourse to an essential ground-
edness or a stable metanarrative. The subject of friendship emerges in con-
temporary theory, for example, in Jacques Derrida’s recent The Politics of
Friendship, as constantly confronted with an otherness, an alterity that tra-
verses even the self. As such, it provides a prime territory in which to re-
articulate such contested notions as community, democracy, and responsi-
bility.
Paternity, like friendship, has a long literary and philosophical history,
from Plato’s Phaedrus—where it is discussed in its relation to writing—
through Nietzsche and Kafka to the postmodernists. Concrete and meta-
phoric paternity allows us to raise essential questions about the status of
the ‘‘origin,’’ the ethics and politics of responsible production, the status
of the ‘‘author,’’ the empirical versus the simulated or written personality,
the discourse of disowning, constructions of the self through an other, the
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concept of reproduction, the relation of failed (literary) paternity to the
sublimations of destruction, and the ideological attempts to differentiate
between proper offspring and bastard forms. Corngold himself has ener-
getically contributed to these debates, both in the form of regular semi-
nars at Princeton University, where students eagerly flock to his course on
‘‘Literary Paternity: Nietzsche, Kafka, Benjamin,’’ and in the form of essays
addressed to a wider scholarly community, most recently in his work on
‘‘Nietzsche, Kafka, and Literary Paternity.’’3 In this regard, the essays that
follow not only address but perform the topic of this volume: the texts writ-
ten by Corngold’s friends and colleagues implicitly enact what is at stake in
friendship, while the contributions by his former students, whether their
explicit topic is friendship or paternity, are implicated in the structure of a
certain literary paternity.
To pay tribute to Stanley Corngold with a volume addressing issues that
he has helped to define also means to celebrate more generally his distin-
guished career as an influential scholar and teacher. His career began when
he earned a doctorate in Comparative Literature from Cornell University
in  with a dissertation on The Intelligible Mood: A Study of Aesthetic
Consciousness in Rousseau and Kant. His studies at Cornell were preceded
by his college years at Columbia University, from which he graduated with
an honors degree in English in . He also studied at the University of
London, England, again Columbia University, and the University of Basel,
Switzerland. Since , he has taught at Princeton University, where today
he is a professor of German and Comparative Literature. The remarkable
accomplishments of his career have been recognized by a large number
of awards and distinctions, from National Endowment for the Humani-
ties fellowships to Guggenheim Foundation awards, and from election to
P.E.N. to membership in the Academy of Literary Studies. While Corngold
always has regarded himself first and foremost as an American scholar—
even during those times when German departments in this country still
saw themselves, in an inversion or internalization of the fatherly gaze, as
filial extensions of their putatively more powerful paternal departments in
Germany—he frequently has taught and lectured to appreciative audiences
around the world: among other sites, Germany, England, France, Belgium,
Hong Kong, Hungary, Mexico, Switzerland, Spain, the Netherlands, and
Israel. But all these achievements and external validations seem hardly ade-
quate to gauge Corngold’s influence on several generations of students and
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colleagues, who cannot imagine the German Department at Princeton or,
indeed, the field of German studies more generally, without his energy and
presence.
For Princeton undergraduate students from a variety of fields, it has long
been considered a special treat, for instance, to enroll in Corngold’s Ger-
man and Comparative Literature : ‘‘The Romantic Quest,’’ a course that
has become something of a cult phenomenon. Anchored in an innovative
consideration of central works of the modern European literary tradition,
this course includes, among others, detailed readings of works by Goethe,
Byron, Flaubert, Stendhal, Nietzsche, and Th. Mann, and the ways in which
each alludes to the others in their constructions of the self and their quest
for greatness. I had the good fortune of being invited more than once to
be a preceptor (what in the academic world outside of Princeton is called
a teaching assistant) for this course, and I recall vividly the unusual enthu-
siasm and depth of reflection that Corngold’s lectures inspired in his stu-
dents. It seemed that he would spend an equal amount of time and mental
energy worrying about the remarks and questions from a first-year under-
graduate student of literature as he would fielding questions from audiences
at his many national and international distinguished lectures. Yet in ‘‘The
Romantic Quest,’’ more was at stake than a rereading of a series of canoni-
cal works in masterful lectures. Students intuitively felt that, for Corngold,
reading these texts was not a sterile and detached academic exercise, but a
matter of great and immediate ethico-political relevance deserving of sus-
tained personal involvement and rational passion. Here was a teacher who
fussed and worried about each sentence, each word it seemed, and who
would not allow facile wisdoms of any sort to occlude the responsibility
and the calling he felt in relation to every text he caringly explicated with
students. After all, it became clear to all participants in this course that
this was not just the ‘‘Romantic Quest’’ but also, for several decades now,
Stanley Corngold’s quest. It was as though he enacted for his students what
Nietzsche once identified as his ‘‘epistemological starting point,’’ that is, the
‘‘[p]rofound aversion to reposing once and for all in any total view of the
world. Fascination of the opposing point of view: refusal to be deprived of
the stimulus of the enigmatic.’’4
From the wide range of Corngold’s graduate seminars at Princeton, per-
haps the most influential ones are those concerned with the work and intel-
lectual orbit of Kafka. Both in his teaching and his prolific writings on the
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Prague author, Corngold emphasizes the tension between Kafka’s relent-
less compulsion to write, what Kafka called his Schriftstellersein or ‘‘being-
as-a-writer,’’ and his growing awareness that this writing can never fully
achieve what it sets out to accomplish, falling short of its own goal with a
rigor, however, that delivers a self-reflexive commentary on its own internal
contradictions. Indeed, Corngold’s scholarship on Kafka continues to be
the most influential aspect of his work and, although there has sprung up
a veritable ‘‘Kafka industry’’ since the s, Corngold belongs to a hand-
ful of scholars worldwide who can be counted among the elite of Kafka’s
critics. In this country, his teaching and writing on Kafka have had a deci-
sive impact on generations of students and scholars, and on both lay and
scholarly audiences. His landmark  translation of Kafka’s TheMetamor-
phosis made available to readers of English a faithful yet lucid rendering
of Kafka’s peculiar German that is second to none among modern literary
translations. The recently sold -millionth copy of Corngold’s translation
speaks volumes, literally, about its usefulness to generations of readers.5
Yet simultaneously, on the more strictly critical side, the importance of
his far-ranging scholarly work from the  The Commentators’ Despair:
The Interpretation of Kafka’s ‘‘Metamorphosis’’ to the  Franz Kafka: The
Necessity of Form cannot be overstated. Such classic essays as ‘‘The Meta-
morphosis: Metamorphosis of the Metaphor,’’ one of Corngold’s best texts,
remain touchstones for all readers concerned with the properly rhetori-
cal dimension of Kafka’s writing. What draws readers to his work is the
rare combination of broad theoretical awareness and critical intensity that
allows his work not only to place theory and practice into a new and un-
expected constellation, but also simultaneously to transform both of these
terms. In Corngold’s work, there is no easy ‘‘application’’ of a preformulated
theory or system to a given text. His work enacts the ways in which every
text constitutes not simply an instantiation of a theoretical point, but rather
a subversive provocation to any attempt at systematic classification or ge-
neric closure. As Corngold once wrote, ‘‘Kafka’s most marked contribution
to modern art and culture is to the way in which the subject of writing has
become Writing, the way in which reflection on the act of writing has be-
come ontological, not psychological, ranging from metaphysical reference
to technical aspects of its production.’’6 Elsewhere, he teaches us that the
‘‘attitude of identifying with what originates in the act of writing even or
especially in spite of local intention suggests—mutatis mutandis—Kafka’s
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aesthetic of suffering.’’7 For those who are acquainted with Stanley Corn-
gold’s personality and biography, such sentences make it ever more difficult
to distinguish between him and Kafka. There is something within many of
us that wishes to claim that, in ways that far transcend the incidental or
even the scholarly, he is Kafka.
In a critical climate when ideological hostilities, critical Gleichschaltung,
and the dogmas of conformity reign supreme, Corngold’s approach to his
work defies classification. It is certainly a far cry from the philological pi-
eties of the traditional Germanist stance but, for all its theoretical rigor, is
not really at home in any of the critical fads or well-rehearsed newer idioms
either. His  The Fate of the Self: GermanWriters and French Theory, with
its provocative readings of Hölderlin, Dilthey, Nietzsche, Kafka, Th. Mann,
Freud, and Heidegger, is a good example of his innovation and subversion
of critical orthodoxies. But Corngold’s unusually individualistic perspec-
tive has never been an easy position to occupy. Precisely because he pledges
allegiance to no recognizable dogma, he has always precariously and rather
uncomfortably sat not only, as they say in English, between a rock and a
hard place, but also, as they say in German, zwischen allen Stühlen. Never
content with discipleship, Corngold has been criticized by proponents of
every conceivable critical school.
While he was decisively influenced by the rhetorical ways of reading laid
out by his doctoral adviser, Paul de Man, he also has significantly departed
from de Man’s manner of reading and has even written a series of texts ad-
dressing what he perceived as ethical and theoretical blind spots in his men-
tor’s œuvre and the ways of thinking it opened up.8 But at the same time, de
Man’s influence on his critical sensibilities remains visible, and his friends,
colleagues, and students often cannot escape the impression that it would
be hard to imagine anyone taking deMan’s workmore seriously or studying
it with greater care and urgency even today, when the fortunes of rigorous
rhetorical criticism have shifted and a more culturally-oriented hegemony
has installed itself. On a biographical level, then, Corngold experienced the
pleasures and tensions in relation to the paternal superego of his Doktor-
vater, or thesis adviser, that he subsequently would theorize in his scholarly
work on paternity in Nietzsche, Kafka, and others. It is as though he re-
mained close to de Man precisely by not following him. For Corngold, to
do justice to de Man’s deconstructive project, it too must be deconstructed.
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In the process, Corngold has done much to introduce contemporary rhe-
torical scholarship into a discipline that all too often exhibited an aversion
to the demands of close reading and a resistance to theory.
While all of Corngold’s works wrestle self-consciously with the relations
of rhetoric or figurative language and the larger philosophical claims that
the text in which they are embedded attempts to make, he explicitly thema-
tizes this vexed relationship in his  novel Borrowed Lives. Coauthored
with Irene Giersing, this ‘‘critical fiction’’ presents itself as an enactment
of various issues in literary criticism and philosophical aesthetics. It tells
the story of an uneasy history professor, Paul van Pein (in whose name the
empirical location of the Princeton German Department, East Pyne Hall,
resonates) and his quixotic quest in the South of France for creative origi-
nality, stable identity, carnal pleasure, and a readable life unmarred by the
threats of inauthenticity. Brilliantly allegorizing issues of contemporary lit-
erary theory and philosophy, the novel traces the vicissitudes of the written
self, satirizes the academic marketplace, and constantly points to the ways
in which ‘‘the honey of experience’’ cannot be thought in separation from
the postmodern chiastic reversal that links identity and its absence in the
space of language. The novel situates itself in the interstices between the
writing self and its narrative presentation in a self-conscious gesture that
inscribes it in the critical metafictions produced by literary theoreticians
such as Steiner, Eagleton, Sontag, Eco, and Burgess. At times, it even rivals
David Lodge’s acclaimed academic romance Small World.
The spirit of Borrowed Lives, which ineluctably intertwines the demands
of the theoretical with the passion of the personal, animates Stanley Corn-
gold’s entire perspective on intellectual life. This critical stance is not simply
a matter of subjective predilection, it was also shaped by the political cir-
cumstances and the social milieu in which he came of age.9 When Corn-
gold began studying Yeats with Lionel Trilling at Columbia in the s,
the Cold War was already in full swing in the United States. Having grown
up in Brooklyn with a mother who was born to Ukrainian parents during
their ship journey to New York harbor and a father hailing from Harlem,
Manhattan, he decided to enroll in the Regular Naval Reserve Officers
Training Corps. This program, which would help to finance his college
education, turned out to be in the Cold War business of producing not
critical thinkers but nationalistic scholar-warriors, or ‘‘scholwars,’’ as Corn-
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gold calls them for short. As a nonconformist Jewish intellectual in the
militaristic, brutal, and often arbitrary environment of Columbia’s schol-
wars, he was early on sensitized to the absurdity of what amounted to what
he calls the American ‘‘military-educational complex.’’ Here, he got an early
taste of the Eisenhower era, since the later American president was already
president of the university where Corngold’s intellectual persona initially
was shaped. Because graduate school at that time seemed like an extension
of military service and U.S. Cold War indoctrination, he decided finally to
realize his long-held dream of living in Europe, albeit under the patronage
of the Army. Stationed at an Army base near Heidelberg as a drill sergeant
and English instructor, Corngold experienced firsthand the absurd logic
by which it seemed to have ‘‘become necessary in an age of increasingly
complex warfare to raise the technical consciousness of the officer class;
but another consideration was in play: legislators believed that a generally
heightened literacy among officers and soldiers would be pleasing and im-
pressive to the semi-occupied countries in postwar Europe, supposing that
it is better to be ordered about by a scholwar than by some thug who can-
not tell ‘Lapis Lazuli’ from a Bofors gun.’’ Here, Corngold was repulsed by
the ‘‘merger of values of the university and ‘military’: American expatriates
teaching at such camps could not fail to confuse the authentic content of
their work (rhetoric and composition) with its inauthentic circumstances—
the fact that their workplace, the classroom, was enclosed by barbed wire
and guarded by bayonets.’’10 In the early s, the U.S. National Defense
Education Act, created in part in response to the perceived threat of the
Soviet Union, which, since the  Sputnik success, had made giant leaps
forward in technology and education, made it possible for Corngold, as for
many others of his generation, to attend graduate school. But even in gradu-
ate school the subterranean structures of power and domination, both in
the Army and in the educational milieu of the time, continued to provide
the impetus for a restless critical mind and an ever-vigilant reader of the
textual and political networks that work upon us as human agents. This
critical stance, and the oppositional spirit lodged within it, has never left
Corngold.
In some of his more recent work, such as ‘‘The Melancholy Object of
Consumption,’’ Corngold explicitly applies this oppositional spirit to an
analysis of the properly cultural phenomena of consumption and the capi-
talist exploitation even of such seemingly private emotions as depression.
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By way of penetrating and exposing the political logic of such productions
of the cultural text as Omaha Steaks and Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, he comes
to the following conclusion: ‘‘All complex industrial societies rule by non-
coercive coercion, whereby political questions become disguised as cultural
ones and as such become insoluble. I have been talking about a prevalent
and ubiquitous melancholy (in its radical form, satanism) under capitalism
in an age of technical reproduction. This is a political question. Its osten-
sible cure proceeds today by means of further commodification—indeed,
even the commodification of melancholy (or satanism) itself. But this solu-
tion, occurring through commodities—pseudospecifics which are actually
generics—in this way becomes a cultural one and hence, in its own terms,
insoluble. At this point what is called for, in the West as well as in the East,
is an exercise of radical political thinking.’’11 In this more recent work, the
traditions of rhetorical and cultural-political criticism meet in unexpected
and fruitful ways. Indeed, Corngold here sets the conceptual standards for
what a future critical analysis of culture and textuality, conceived politically
and theoretically in postmimetic terms, might look like.
It is this kind of irreverent critical urgency, combined with the far-
reaching insights abundantly offered by his scholarship and his unusual
dedication to and encouragement of his students’ and colleagues’ intellec-
tual development, that have made Stanley Corngold one of the most in-
fluential and admired American literary scholars of his generation. In this
spirit, the purpose of the current volume is to celebrate and pay tribute to
this remarkable life and œuvre by rigorously revisiting the twin themes of
literary friendship and literary paternity. The first section of the book is a
conceptual meditation on the very idea of friendship. In John H. Smith’s ex-
perimental dialogue, some of the main philosophical positions concerning
friendship are creatively laid out in the form of a fictional dialogue among
friends embracing conflicting theoretical viewpoints. In this way the philo-
sophical dialogue on friendship both casts into sharp relief and enacts the
central issues it raises. Smith’s conceptual dialogue clears the way for the
following parts of the volume.
The second section, ‘‘Literary Archaeologies (I): Codes of Friendship
and Paternity in German Classicism,’’ devotes itself to modern forms of
friendship and paternity as they emerge in what arguably remains the key
period of German literature. Here,Walter Hinderer explores the concepts of
friendship and love in Schiller and Hölderlin, analyzing the ways in which
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these themes were not only created as discursive ‘‘codes,’’ as Niklas Luh-
mann’s systems-theoretical studies have argued, but also the ways in which
these themes carried within themselves the tools to challenge these domi-
nant codes. The dynamic tensions that Hinderer sets into sharp relief are
exemplified and further explored in Peter Uwe Hohendahl’s reflections on
the formative role of the father in German Classical literature, specifically
in plays by Goethe and Schiller. Hohendahl demonstrates that their liter-
ary production is interlaced with the contemporary discursive formations
surrounding the notion of the father and that their imbrication with con-
temporary codes can be traced on the linguistic and structural levels of
Iphigenie auf Tauris and Die Braut von Messina. While Hohendahl focuses
on the figure of the father in concrete literary terms, Mark Roche explores
a more mediated form of paternity. He investigates the paternal role that
Plato plays for one of German Classsicism’s central and enigmatic texts,
Hölderlin’s Hyperion. Analyzing the ways in which Hölderlin mobilizes a
number of previously unrecognized allusion’s to Plato, Roche shows how
Hölderlin both appropriates and inverts a number of positions found in his
literary ‘‘father’’ in order to construct his own variety of Idealism. The cre-
ative tensions that traverse the relationship between Hölderlin and Plato
are recast in more concrete terms in Karin Schutjer’s analysis of a specific
relation of literary paternity, that of Goethe, the ‘‘father’’ of German litera-
ture, and his ‘‘literary’’ daughter Bettina Brentano von Arnim. Cunningly
intertwining the story of Goethe and his ‘‘daughter’’ with a contemporary
account of a father-daughter conflict, Schutjer explores issues of differenta-
tion, agency, and the internalization of the other from a psychoanalytically
inflected perspective.
The third section, ‘‘Literary Archaeologies (II): Codes of Friendship and
Paternity in German Romanticism,’’ extends the historical and conceptual
range of the previous section by revisiting a number of key texts of German
Romantic authors writing in the uneasy wake of Classicist paradigms. As a
piece of Romantic writing, Brentano’s Godwi is characterized, as John Lyon
demonstrates, by a movement toward a form of aesthetic mediation that is
inseparable from the possession of the father, even when it seems mater-
nally focused on the surface. Gerhard Kurz’s analysis of Jupiter as a father
figure in Kleist’s Amphitryon confirms this predominance of paternity in
post-classicist writing, and Jochen Hörisch’s witty analysis of the discourses
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on the undecidability of love and friendship in Romantic writers such as
Achim von Arnim adds these two concepts to the orbit of predominant
concerns.
While the gender- and sexuality-specific dimensions in discourses of
friendship and paternity resonate through several of the essays in the pre-
vious parts of the book, the fourth section, ‘‘Languages of Friendship and
Sexual Identity,’’ confronts these issues head-on. Robert Tobin’s historical
account of the development of friendship in relation to the rise of sexual
identity usefully sets the stage for the three essays that follow: Herman
Rapaport’s Heideggerean meditation on the concept of national poets in
relation to their female companions; John Neubauer’s analysis, centered
on Hans Blüher, of images of friendship in the often conflictual relations
among the problematic categories of Germans, Jews, and Gays; and Gail
Finney’s examination of women’s comedy between Marxian and Freudian
analyses. Together, these essays suggest that there can be no thinking of
friendship and paternity that does not strive to come to terms with the
elusive dimensions of sexuality and gender that traverses these concepts.
The fifth section, ‘‘Simulations of Friendship and Paternity, Claims of
Responsibility: The Case of Hannah Arendt,’’ presents two studies that
focus on Arendt as a key thinker of the responsibilities that these con-
cepts entail. David Halliburton strategically traces themes in Arendt’s work
that speak directly to the issue of responsibility and friendship, such as
the neighbor, the brother, the comrade, the enemy, and even ethics itself.
Liliane Weissberg then performs a kind of case study for Arendt’s ideas of
friendship when she illuminates the complex relations between Arendt and
Walter Benjamin.
The sixth and final section of the volume, ‘‘Textual Paternity and Friend-
ship: Figures of Reading,’’ convenes a number of projects that allow us to
rethink issues of friendship and paternity after Arendt. Here, Rafaël New-
man and Caroline Wiedmer confront questions of paternity versus auto-
creation in terms of quests for authenticity, alternate memory, and wit-
nessing in the controversial Holocaust writings of Binjamin Wilkomirski
and Daniel Ganzfried. Donald Brown’s reflections on friends and men-
tors brings into a suggestive constellation significant moments in Dante,
Proust, and Nietzsche that speak to the ‘‘infinite distance’’ without which
no friendship can be thought. And while Howard Stern’s rhetorical read-
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ing of Sholem Aleichem’s Tevye the Dairyman focuses on the tropes that
inscribe this novel deeply into the heart of the joys and sorrows of father-
hood, Laurence Rickels explores issues of paternal transference, the gift,
and the horror of the middlebrow, with an emphasis on Paul de Man and
the reception of Goethe’s Faust. Taking up such psychoanalytic categories,
Kiarina Kordela meditates on the possibility of the democratic father within
figurative speech as she places Freud and Sophocles into a fruitful constel-
lation. Finally, Mark Anderson focuses on what he calls a ‘‘sadomasochis-
tic model of aesthetic pleasure’’ that becomes visible as the enduring yet
rarely acknowledged signature of the paternities of Enlightenment. This
semiotic paternity of the Gothic, in which knowledge and its undermining
are inexorably intertwined, becomes especially urgent in the juxtaposition
of Stoker’s Dracula and Kafka’s Der Verschollene. Together, the essays col-
lected in this volume, then, offer both comprehensive conceptual discus-
sions and specific analyses of certain key texts that have played a deci-
sive role in shaping our modern culture’s engagement with friendship and
paternity.
What Stanley Corngold’s life and work, along with his good humor, wit,
and critical engagement, will have meant for those who have come into con-
tact with them remains to be fully understood. The selected bibliography of
his publications as well as the list of Ph.D. dissertations that he has directed
in German and in Comparative Literature, both appended to this volume,
are impressive registers that speak to this meaning. But, at the same time,
these lists are hardly adequate to convey the deep friendship and admiration
that students and colleagues feel for Stanley Corngold or to acknowledge
the many debts to him that cannot be repaid. Yet it is precisely through the
vexed logic of the gift—the many gifts he has given us, but also the gifts
that can never be repaid without canceling themselves—that we here record
our gratitude and affection for him.
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 Good Willing and the Practice of
Friendship—A Dialogue 1
 . 
Four friends from graduate school—Ida (the Idealist), Cynthia (the
Synthesizer), Dee (the Deconstructionist), Skip (the Skeptic)—meet in the
basement restaurant where years before they used to gather at least once a
week.
: It’s been quite a while since we’ve sat together around a pitcher of
beer. Just being here brings backmemories of the arguments we had after
St.’s2 seminars. Nothing like a good argument.
: I recall some of the last meetings were particularly heated. St. even
came along sometimes to continue the debates. What I appreciated was
the way there was something at stake in those discussions, like the fate
of the self or the status of misreading.
: Youmight have liked them, but after a while they got so tedious. I re-
member the old St., that is, the young one, before your time, when hewas
more playful, when signifiers slipped and tropes reigned everywhere.
: I can’t say I fully share your appreciation of those good old days,
but I agree they got a lot of us thinking in new and interesting direc-
tions. The important thing for now, though, is that we’re here, after all
these years, having gone our different directions yet nonetheless sharing
some common experiences that make it possible for the conversation to
continue. It’s almost as if we’re picking up where we left off. A toast to
friendship! And to St.!
: Speaking of friendship, have you seen Derrida’s Politics of Friendship?
: Sure. But talk about tedious. Hundreds of pages of ramblings. I con-
fess that I read more than I wanted, always hoping that the next page
might develop a sustained argument.
: If there are hundreds of pages it’s because Derrida was pursuing hun-
dreds of the possible ‘‘infinite interpretations’’ that, as he says, Nietzsche
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opens up for us, interpretations in keeping with the ‘‘great unending ma-
ieutic tradition of Lysis.’’3 For Derrida it’s a question of filiation, gene-
alogy, and problematic paternity that can’t be traced without questions
arising.4 After all, it’s the very heritage of a long discourse, a wander-
ing course, a ‘‘zigzag . . . history-without-history’’5 of friendship from
Heraclitus to Schmitt, Plato to Blanchot, that Derrida is exploring.
:Wandering, rambling, discourse. . . . The point is, can you actually say,
on the basis of your reading of the text, what friendship, not to mention
the ‘‘politics of friendship,’’ is according to Derrida. If there is no clearer
concept at the end, if we are left in the undecidable realm of the ‘‘per-
haps,’’ then we can neither accept nor argue the case. Seems like a dark
night with lots of gray cows to me.
: It’s ironic that you, with your Platonic leanings, would criticize Der-
rida for this, but, I assume, not reject the Lysis for coming up with the
same basic point—friendship is perhaps best approached without any
expectation of developing a clear concept of what it is. This openness
makes for a good dialogue—and I remind you that even Derrida dabbles
at one point in a minidialogue6—and a challenging hermeneutics. The
impossibility of providing a definition doesn’t mean there’s no friend-
ship. After all, Socrates ends with an ironic gesture, pointing out that the
dialogue partners are in the situation of considering themselves friends
even though they have a difficult time explaining what that actually
means.7
: You fail to mention that Plato refers to this situation as ‘‘ridiculous,’’ a
characterization I take more seriously than you. This particular dialogue
of Plato’s might be commonly celebrated for its open-ended character;
but I would read that as Plato’s indication that the real work must now
begin—namely development of a positive understanding of the issue or
concept at hand since it’s ‘‘ridiculous’’ to go about our business without
a clear idea of what it is. You seem to be comfortable with talking about
something that is; you just can’t say what it is?
:Maybe that’s the paradox that Derrida is getting at every time he opens
a seminar with the apostrophe: ‘‘O friends, there are no friends.’’8
: But Dee, it seems to me that you are yourself not being consistent.
After all, if you want to criticize the notion that there is some concept
‘‘out there,’’ some ‘‘ideal friendship’’ that could be optimally defined,
then you really need to abandon that idea fully. You seem to leave it
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hanging, as if Derrida wants to say that it’s out there but he just despairs
at grasping it. If you want to avoid the Ding an sich completely, then
you have to drop the philosophical fiction that some ‘‘it’’ is the topic of
conversation—whether it can be depicted clearly or not.
: In which case Derrida is left with nothing to talk about? That would
explain why it’s so tedious.
: No. He has himself to talk about. Sure he is always mentioning the
great maiuetic tradition, Aristotle’s heritage, etc., as if that were the ob-
ject of his discussion. But the filaments and threads that make up his
text—and it is a very richly woven one, I must admit—are his own.We’re
following his mind, his thinking, his associations, his questions.
: And why would we want to do that? Shouldn’t we rather focus on the
matter at hand, the res, or Sache, and not the person?
: Well, there’s one reason I could give that’s associated with the very
topic of his text: you do it because you’re tolerant of a ‘‘friend’s’’ dis-
course. Almost every great thinker has pointed out that friendship is
about complete openness and communication. The possibility of ‘‘mu-
tual self-disclosure’’ could even be said to be at the heart of all friend-
ship, so what better way for Derrida to deal with the topic and to try
to engage the reader than to offer his text as an example of such self-
revelation?9 Of course, there’s also the cynical reason (indicated in the
title of his text): the ‘‘politics’’ of the academy give him the status of the
‘‘to-be-read’’ whether we want to or not. Even you, Ida, seemed to imply
that you continued reading almost against your own will. To be honest,
I’m not sure we can rule this out—or that Derrida wants us to rule out
the implications of power. Given the context of power, some authors just
have more authority.
: But aren’t you just bringing back some kind of metaphysics of subjec-
tivity by implying that we are to treat the book ‘‘like a friend,’’ whereby
he/it speaks to us and we get to know the contours of his/its mind? You
seem to be relying on an unacceptable notion of the text as the vouloir-
dire of the author. I would say, rather, that the discourse tying the text
and reader, or, to continue your analogy, the friends together, is itself not
a product of the speakers’ individual minds. We see less Derrida’s inten-
tions or vouloir-dire than the traditions of statements about friendship
(or enmity) as they intersect with or cite each other through the cen-
turies, forming a network of ‘‘it is said’s’’ that come together in a Mon-
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taigne or Nietzsche. We make the choice to read a text within a certain
context (called tradition in the old days) that actually limits the choice
we made. The individual author and individual reader play a much less
significant role than you imply. Rather, it’s a massive discursive knot,
not a subjective trajectory, which we follow in the text. Precisely this
hermeneutic model—if it still counts as hermeneutics—would provide
a different analogy for friendship, which is itself a way to ‘‘tie the knot.’’
: Let me get a word in. I like the ideas that both Dee and Skip
are suggesting, but we need to be more careful about the terms we use.
Otherwise Dee’s critique would overshoot its mark, striking more than
it should. She’s right to question an overly individualistic interpretation
of either reading or friendship. But depending on just how we see the
‘‘tolerance of a ‘friend’s’ discourse’’ or the vouloir dire, we may or may
not fall into the metaphysics of subjectivity.
:Good, someone has finally called for conceptual clarification here. Can
we begin with the simple question since the possibility has been raised
of a ‘‘friendly’’ reading of Derrida: Just what’s involved with friendship?
That’s the issue he’s supposed to be addressing, but in fact skirts.
: Or explodes?
: Or debunks?
: Or explores, but without the proper tool?
:Whoa! I can’t stand these pithy phrases that might get the like-minded
to nod but which don’t offer any real content for the rest of us. Let’s slow
down just a bit and work this through. I get to start. Derrida himself
refers to Aristotle, but, interestingly, never manages to mention the defi-
nition offered in the Nicomachean Ethics; namely, friendship is mutually
recognized good will. I offer this as a powerful conceptualization that
we need to address. Doesn’t this idea function as a kind of sine qua non
of the friendship relation?
: Obviously Derrida doesn’t want to address this definition since that
would bring us back to the metaphysics of subjectivity.
:Hewould also have his reservations about the ‘‘goodness’’ of that will.
: I wish he had developed it since it would raise. . . .
: Sorry for cutting you off, Cynthia, but I’m not going to let Dee and
Skip dismiss the definition so fast.What’s wrong with this definition? Be-
ginning with Aristotle, who insists that friendship must rely on proairesis
and bouleusis, on the faculty of decision, of deliberation or reflective
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choice.10 There’s a lot of meaningful reflection on this. It takes into ac-
count some of the obvious aspects of friendship. For example, it is a
‘‘willed’’ relationship in the sense that people enter into it of their own
free wills (as opposed to parent-child or legally defined ones). No one
would want to call a relationship a friendship if the individuals were
being compelled to interact. Indeed, loss of freedom to be in a friend-
ship, because of the other’s claims, or needs, or expectations, would be
a typical reason for its demise.
: That sounds fine, but I don’t see how you could possibly want to re-
introduce the notion of free will into a discussion these days. Even the
great philosophers of the will, from Augustine through Schopenhauer
and Nietzsche, end up disputing the notion of its ‘‘freedom.’’ You seem to
be implying that the individual agent stands ‘‘outside’’ all relationships,
or at least stands outside those that are not imposed on him or her, and
then ‘‘chooses’’ to enter into friendships. But the deconstruction of the
subject, the rejection of a notion of the ‘‘doer behind the deed’’ (to cite
Nietzsche), makes this untenable. For example, is the individual outside
the relationship, waiting to choose to enter into a friendship, ‘‘friendly’’
already or not? If so, then the relationship of friendship in fact preexists
the friendship in a way that’s problematic for you. If not, then the gap be-
tween being outside and inside a friendship seems, if not infinitely wide,
infinitely deep and unbridgeable. That is, I just don’t understand how a
nonfriend could then will to be a friend. Derrida makes the point that
we may not even be able to speak about a ‘‘self,’’ or in your terms, a will,
before there is a friend—or enemy.11 No friends (or enemies) without the
notion of the self, but no notion of the self without the others with whom
we stand in a friendly or hostile relation.When the self is always already
implicated in a discursive relationship with the other, how can there be
a free will? So friendship is indeed a self-deconstructing paradox.
: But you shouldn’t stop there, Dee. I think it is possible to account for
the existence of friendship, but not in the way Ida implied. The prob-
lem with her starting point is not necessarily with the notion of ‘‘will,’’
but with such attributes as ‘‘free’’ or ‘‘good.’’ Nietzsche, after all, does
proclaim that there is no such thing as the ‘‘free will,’’ but nonetheless
remains the philosopher of the will to power. Let me remind you of
the exchange between Derrida and Gadamer in Paris in .12 Gadamer
claimed that the ‘‘good will’’ was necessary for understanding to take
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place, whereas Derrida implied that one could never rule out the will
to power in any interaction. Applied to our context, the individual, as I
suggested, is not ‘‘free’’ to choose a friendship or not. On this we agree.
But then what does make the supposed friendship happen? I’d say there
is always a will to power operating that draws people into relationships
that then get defined in any number of ways. If the will to power gets sat-
isfied in a certain way, it gets the designation ‘‘friendship.’’ And as odd
as this might sound, my view does account for the intuitive experience
so many of us have that our friendships are/were ‘‘inevitable.’’ As in fall-
ing in love, becoming friends often happens to us—less a matter of our
good will than being willed by the interaction.
: But neither of your positions get us anywhere. Dee leaves us still with
the fact of this relationship and, like Derrida, with a whole lot of ques-
tions but no clarification for how it happens. She can merely shift words
around, but in the end, the statement that we can’t choose friendships
because we’re always already friends (or however you want to formu-
late the paradox) doesn’t explain anything. And you, Skip, who would
otherwise sniff out metaphysical assumptions in others, have a strong
ontological odor yourself since you imply some kind of substratum of
‘‘will to power’’ underlying the subject and object (the two friends) and
the relation between them (their friendship).
: This is like old times—the same old positions are getting played
out here that we rehearsed, for example, when we argued about the pos-
sibility of Bildung after St.’s seminar on Wilhelm Meister. Ida has done
us a service by raising Aristotle’s definition, but let’s make sure you all
mean the same thing when you refer to the terms used there so that we
can understand the nature of the value judgments you’re making about
those terms. Dee, why the charge of the ‘‘metaphysics of subjectivity’’?
This seems to be a critique that can quickly silence an opponent, but
might thereby close off avenues for exploration.
: I suppose I should let Ida speak. I’m assuming that she sees this ‘‘good
will’’ as something like an intentional state of mind, that is, a subjective
condition of the friend, an attitude one ‘‘possesses.’’ Am I right?
: That’s basically right. I’d see the will as a fact of individual beings en-
dowed with consciousness. It is what is, so to speak, dearest to us. This is
why Epictetus argued for our own good will as the only thing we can be
sure of in a friendship.13 Epictetus rejects all outward signs of friendship,
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leaving him only the inner goodness of the individual as the guarantee.
As Kant says, the will allows human beings to pursue and make real ob-
jects that they represent to themselves as desirable.14 Like the cogito, the
volo is indubitable since even if you wanted to doubt it. . . .
: Yeah, we get the point. That’s an old argument that also seems to
silence all opposition. But there are equally old arguments that quickly
show the groundlessness of your supposedly solid ground; towit, doesn’t
the individual have to will his or her own will, since if I don’t want to
want, then I’ll never want some thing, and then that will needs in turn
to be willed, and so. . . .
: Fine, we get your infinite-regress argument already. But where
does that lead you (except to silence your opposition, as if Ida could be
silenced!). The groundlessness of willing (or what Schelling called the
Abgrund and Ursein of the free will)15 doesn’t make it go away. All you
show is that we can’t define it merely subjectively. That’s why the meta-
physics of subjectivity has been undermined for a good two hundred
years. But don’t we get a clue from Ida herself that willing is, by defini-
tion, never just the state of the individual’s mind since, in Kant’s defini-
tion, it is always implicated with some object and some representation
of the object and some representation of the (future) self as having that
object and maybe some reason why the self wants that object (because
of prior experience or experience of others), etc. This seems much more
complex than a ‘‘state of mind.’’ German has the nice distinction between
Wille andWillkür, the latter being the kind of arbitrary, willful freewill to
choose that has been shown to be an insufficient starting point for think-
ing about the self. That metaphysics of subjectivity is rightly criticized
by means of variations of Dee’s argument; but. . . .
: And this is where I come in. I waited for you to deconstruct the sub-
ject, the way Nietzsche followed upon fifty years of arguments against
Cartesian dualism. And now the ground is clear for some nonsubjective
principle (if we want to call it that) to emerge, hence the ‘‘will to power.’’
The individual’s ‘‘good will’’ can always be reduced to forces and power
relations that exceed the mind of the individual. Hobbes already argued
this. The consequences might not be pleasant since ‘‘friendships’’ and
other forms of social interactions are created out of fear or greed, that
is, out of the play of forces into which the individual is placed and where
he or she must survive, and not out of some ‘‘good will.’’16
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: I think you’re jumping the gun on the will’s demise since I’m not
sure the ground is cleared in that way. Just because willing and good will
are not only subjective (that is, can’t be grounded in a subjective prin-
ciple and shouldn’t be reduced to Willkür) doesn’t mean that they are
not at all subjective. Good will can be co-constitutive of the self insofar
as it is a state that we are in in the double sense of that phrase. It is a
condition that exceeds our intentionality but then disposes us to be a
certain way. Good will is neither independent of the ‘‘play of forces’’ nor
reducible to them. Dee’s circular reasoning above—can’t have a friendly
disposition without a friend but can’t have a friend without a friendly
disposition—should be embraced dialectically, not used as grist for a
deconstructive mill. Derrida himself implies this when he refers to the
‘‘heteronomic trust’’ that makes up friendship, a trust that exceeds the
cogito.17 But it is ‘‘trust,’’ or ‘‘good will,’’ nonetheless and the origin of a
subjectivity mixed with otherness. After all, anyone with an appreciation
for the trials of adolescence can see how the individual wills of youth
emerge only out of a complex and intimate exchange of wills with their
friends.18 The subject is not there from the start ‘‘radiating’’ good will,
so to speak; but once good will is there, the subject takes on a certain
formation that allows a self to interact differently, differentially (not just
in conformity) with the environment.
: What kind of adolescence did you have? Once you rather define the
‘‘intimate exchange of wills’’ as peer pressure, a different view of the tenu-
ous origins of selfhood emerges.
: Fine, both of you show me that I have to modify my position. But you
should know me better than to assume I would adopt a position that we
know from St.’s seminars was abandoned in the early nineteenth cen-
tury. That is, my statement might have looked like that of a subjective
idealist, but that can’t have been my real intention since I would insist
that the will (or ego) is actually transcendental, that is, a condition of our
being. That’s where my argument above was going before you cut me off.
People critique the Cartesian ego as if it were the actual one Descartes
found sitting alone in his dark room. Rather, he found the principle that,
as Kant says, the ‘‘ ‘I think’ must be able to accompany’’ all my acts of
consciousness—so, too, the ‘‘I will.’’ And it’s this that is the ‘‘ideal’’ be-
hind the great discussion of friendship. These a priori conditions of our
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subjective condition are not themselves subjects. Nor are they objects in
the world.
: But that removes it from the world of temporality in which our con-
sciousness actually unfolds. If there’s one thing we’ve learned from phe-
nomenology through poststructuralism, it is the need to account for the
differing/deferring effect of time. And friendship, of all things, is radi-
cally temporal. In fact, the temporal structure of friendship is incred-
ibly complex, so much so that far from being ‘‘timeless,’’ this ‘‘good will’’
is overburdened with all sorts of time. Friendship seems to be in the
present, but in fact is always being projected or put off into the future; for
example, the notion of fair-weather friends implies that real friendship
can only exist at some point in the future when it can be tested. Derrida
even shows, based on Cicero’s reference to a projected friend’s eulogy,
that there is a bizarre (and impossible) future perfect tense involved: You
are my friend because you will have demonstrated your friendship in
what you say about me after I die. Not to mention the nostalgia attached
to discussions about past friendships, the ones that most often do get
discussed.
: Ergo, the subject’s will, good or not, dissipates into a nonentity.What
Dee’s argument shows is that we’re barking up the wrong tree by think-
ing of friendship and the will in subjective or transcendental terms. The
temporality that unfolds in a friendship is neither determined by the
individual subject nor accounted for by some transcendental will; rather
it arises out of the power conditions and relations that shift differen-
tially. We only register them après coup, by which I mean that when we
find ourselves in a particular arrangement, we say ‘‘We are friends.’’ This
might appear to be a statement of our being (who we are), but in fact
describes the condition we are in.
: Temporality is in fact a key feature, and it’s good we bring it in.
But even if it does have serious consequences for Ida’s argument, I don’t
think it’s as serious as you two claim. I know that the word ‘‘will’’ might
tempt us to think of the, rightly discredited, view of a faculty psychol-
ogy, and it’s this view that temporality wreaks havoc on. There is no part
of the mind called the ‘‘will’’ that just exists outside of time. This is why
it’s probably best to think more in terms of ‘‘willing’’ as a process or ac-
tivity or practice. Such a notion of practice might also allow us to avoid
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Skip’s tendency to reduce everything to states and conditions. Let’s play
this out with an example: Two kids on the shore, each daring the other
to enter the cold water first, until they decide that they’ll enter together.
A familiar scenario, right? I’d like to see it as a model for how friendship
and good willing get enacted.
: A scenario that shows the way the transcendental is not some spooky
metaphysical thing, but a precondition that inheres in the most concrete.
After all, if there were not a good will to cooperate between the two—
and I stress ‘‘between’’ since it enjoins both without being ‘‘in’’ either—
then the agreement or understanding (in the sense of Einverständnis)
would not work. We see this whenever one of the kids in fact acts out
of malevolence, letting his or her ‘‘friend’’ run off alone into the water
while he or she stands on the shore laughing at the gullible (and cold
and wet) other. Such an act is a betrayal, which implies that a priori a
bond or pact has been broken.
: And how would you purport to explain this all-to-often and very
painful experience of the failure of the compact to work? Is it not the
very disparity in the power between the two that allows the one to hold
back at the expense of the other? If I can refer to one of your favorites,
Ida, even Hegel bears me out indirectly. Echoing Aristotle, he says to his
young students in the Nuremberg Gymnasium that friendship rests on
equality and the common interest in some task.19 This implies the pri-
ority of the real conditions, interests, goals—in short, power. That is,
where there is a balance of power between the two, or a common inter-
est (overcoming the fear of the cold water), there will be a state in which
they will jump together and that state will be interpreted as good will,
friendship, etc.
: I hate these kinds of examples. Concocted to give an air of concrete-
ness to the discussion, they remove the complex linguistic interplay of
social relations from the example only to say: ‘‘So you see, we can do
without language. . . .’’ They remind me of analytic philosophy, a game
I’m not interested in playing.
: For all your talk about temporality, your ad hominem gesture
doesn’t do a very good job allowing us to see how possibilities for friend-
ship unfold. Let’s work with the example some more (and not as analytic
philosophers, necessarily). Sure, one kid could trick the other by hold-
ing back and laughing. Happens all the time. But how often could he
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get away with it? The bond I spoke of is not just there, but must de-
velop over time and can indeed be disrupted, as when the one ‘‘friend’’
betrays the other all of a sudden because of the presence of a third per-
son he wants to impress at the ‘‘friend’s’’ expense. If that happens too
often, the friendship comes to an end. The fact that these scenarios un-
fold over time, and that they are repeated—iterated, with variations—
doesn’t undermine the significance of friendship, but, on the contrary,
shows why friendship has so often been considered paradigmatic for
understanding human nature and relationships. Precisely the complex
temporality being played out on the beach—each kid thinking about the
past experiences, the amount of faith to be placed in the present, and
the projections for the future—is the key to understanding the status
of good willing and friendship. It’s wrong to reduce the friendship to
any one aspect or to assume that this complexity undermines friendship
itself.
: I again offer my feeble protest to the entire construct of the example.
You want to say something here about the ‘‘will’’ of the kids involved
here and think you can do so without appealing to the innumerable ges-
tures and interpretive acts that take place in this little dance between
‘‘friends’’ on the shore. They can only surmise the other’s will by ‘‘read-
ing’’ the other’s language, even if only body language. If you rule that
out, you’re getting as abstract as Ida.
: Yes, the example is simplified, but your points don’t destroy its
value. We just need to be clear that the kind of good willing I’m talking
about is not latent, simply needing to be expressed as if it were some
pure potentiality. That strikes me as the movie fantasy version. Rather,
it is developed (gebildet?) over time and only exists in its being ‘‘spread
out’’ over time and between the subject and others. Unfortunately, we’re
lulled into believing that it’s conceivable that someone really ‘‘has’’ good
will, inside, but just can’t show it for some reason, and so it needs to be
‘‘brought out.’’ Not by chance, one of the more popular movies recently,
which was structured with this all too typical narrative, was called, pun-
ningly, Good Will Hunting. I couldn’t agree more that it’s riskier than
this, however, because it involves the kind of intricate interpreting that
Dee’s talking about, and there’s nothing there. . . .
: Exactly. . . .
: No, wait. There’s nothing there except the activity of explor-
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ing the mutual recognition of the other. I suspect Aristotle would have
accepted this interpretation. Seen in this way, friendship becomes not
an entity or a relationship, but a practice. Hence, we also needn’t argue
about whether it’s an entity or a nonentity. Friendshipwould thus best be
understood in the broad anthropological terms of Bourdieu. Practices,
which he sees as accounting for the way people create social cohesion
andmeaning, serve to move between the false subjectivist and objectivist
dichotomy we’ve also been exploring. I like his understanding of the way
people begin relationships out of proximity, consistency, and effective-
ness and then develop practices that are flexible, yet, which over time
‘‘dispose’’ the agents to behave in certain ways. The relationships aren’t
fixed in stone, but need to be ‘‘maintained’’ and always reassessed.20
That’s what the kids on the beach are doing, and what adolescents are
consumed by. This ‘‘maintenancework’’ in the case of friendship involves
a certain give and take, an openness and intimate self-disclosure, that
we can call ‘‘good willing.’’ So my notion of good willing is not nearly as
abstract as Ida’s after all. But it also doesn’t dissipate into uselessness. On
the contrary, willing as practice is precisely what engages us with others
and the world. At one point Derrida talks about the way friendship is
often linked to habitat, the place where we are; but I prefer to see it as a
question of habitus, the way we live.21
: And yet, all this talk about practice doesn’t relieve us from the respon-
sibility of formulating guidelines. Kant says we need the good will to
be based on principles to guide our friendships, otherwise we’ll be like
the ‘‘uneducated,’’ those who move in and out of friendships, who break
up just in order to have the pleasure of reuniting.22 Sure it unfolds for
them over time, but randomly, contradictorily. Only a deeper kind of
understanding can avoid this kind of emotional imbalance.
: That’s all too harmonious for me, and in fact the apparent harmony
masks something. Note how Kant introduces class divisions into friend-
ship. Your appeal to ‘‘principles’’ is actually full of its own biases, and
the supposed rational will that would form the basis of ‘‘real’’ friend-
ship is thus nothing but the habitus of the middle class. Moreover, we
can use the example Cynthia raised, and the way it shows that friend-
ships can go wrong, to focus on another point. The rivalry that often
emerges in friendships is typically gender or sexually based. ‘‘Good will’’
is underwritten by desires that it can barely repress. We’ve left this out
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entirely, or I should say, we’re tending to hide it. Did you all notice
how Cynthia made the kids on the shore, at least the ‘‘betrayer,’’ male?
I don’t think that’s by chance. Even though he doesn’t seem to do much
with it, or about it, Derrida himself raises this issue a couple of times,
for example, reminding us that the couples that make up ‘‘ideal’’ friend-
ships are usually male-male or that the tradition on friendship is like
a ‘‘desert’’ filled with only men.23 It’s remarkable how blind the tradi-
tion has been to this basic structuration of friendship. I confess I could
hardly get through Kracauer’s Über die Freundschaft because it was all
coded male without the slightest awareness of its own gender bias. For
example, friendship is constantly being contrasted with romantic love
with a woman, the implication being that the real friends are straight
men. This blindness to gender in the conception of friendship goes hand
in hand with the blindness to the power that informs the friendships.
No wonder the will, with all its macho implications, plays such a major
role in the tradition. Moreover, even if I wanted to adopt the terms that
are being used for the moment, I’d have to insist that where there’s will
there’s desire, and that introduces much more than ‘‘good’’ will.
: But why should gender play a role? I agree that any implication that
real friendship is a male thing is problematic, as would any sense that
there’s some special status to female friendship. The transcendental con-
ditions for friendship are gender-neutral precisely because they are not
empirical. And to reduce everything to desire defeats all possible argu-
mentation—your own included—not tomention the fact that it becomes
a despicable approach to human beings. The model, by nomeans worthy
of emulation in my estimation, of such a reductive view of friendship
would be Freud, who in both theory and practice seems to have had
your notions in mind, Skip. For all of Freud’s insights into desire and
the unconscious, it didn’t do wonders for his friendships. He could only
look at friendship as displaced desire, something that serves a temporary
purpose but which then must be overcome if the self is to develop its
powers.24 And perhaps to his questionable credit, he acted accordingly.
: Both of you make me feel uncomfortable. Ida because she would deny
the categories of gender, Skip because he’d impose them. In both cases
there’s a kind of essentializing, either of a neutered will or of ‘‘male’’
and ‘‘female’’ desires. Your kind of exchange gets played out at our in-
stitutions as the paradoxes of identity unfold in identity politics and its
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neutralizing other. The reason to raise these categories of sexual differ-
ence, and they do need to be raised, Ida, is to demonstrate their dis-
ruptive power, not their absoluteness. As Derrida says, if friendship is
a fraternity, what happens when the ‘‘sister’’ is introduced? Does that
make her another ‘‘brother’’? Does it undermine the fraternal order?25
Such questions leave the debate over the essential nature or insignifi-
cance of gender categories behind. At that point, it’s not obvious just
what ‘‘brotherhood’’ or ‘‘sisterhood’’ even refer to, except for some dif-
ferential operation that can’t be stabilized. And I don’t see how a notion
of the will—male, female, neuter—would help you here since precisely
such ‘‘master concepts’’ (already a telling phrase!) can’t account for their
own internal complexity.
: All right, then let’s make the concepts more dialectically com-
plex. The interactive model I proposed would account for the change
that can occur in friendships and for the role gender plays. And by im-
plication, could even help us with the institutional debates you hint at.
So many of the great works on friendship point out that there are two as-
pects: there is the ‘‘enduring character’’ of ‘‘undying friendships’’ and the
‘‘changeableness’’ of even the most intimate and strongest relations. Un-
fortunately, most writers tend to think of these aspects as mutually ex-
clusive. Moreover, these two aspects are coded as male and female, so no
wonder that men and women have different kinds of friendship. It’s also
no wonder that the canonical tradition is blind to women’s interactions
that don’t fit into the codification of woman as fickle. But in their essence,
friendships display, or are sustained by, what Amélie Rorty called ‘‘dy-
namic permeability.’’ The ‘‘historicity’’ of friendships is granted, I would
say, by the necessarily temporal unfolding of good willing, which clearly
can’t be a one-time thing. After all, would it really be a sign of bad will to
imply to someone: ‘‘I need show you good will only once.’’ And because
it is expressed over time, this good willing is implicated in scenarios
and scripts and representations of possible interactions. These become
what Teresa de Lauretis has called the ‘‘practice of love.’’ Her interest in
such practices (a word she could make more use of than in the title of
her book!) leads her to pragmatic and semiotic theories that, in a way
that parallels Bourdieu, allow her to mediate between the subjectivism
of psychoanalysis and the objectivism of more structuralist approaches
to gender and sexuality.26 The nongendered phenomenon of willing (by
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which I don’t mean something ‘‘autonomous,’’ but that point where the
self interacts with the world) gets unfolded in gendered and sexual-
ized ways thanks to the interaction of the individuals with the scripts
they perform. Unfortunately, there is a tendency to see the performa-
tive nature of these interactions as abolishing the idea of the will, rather
than to understand good willing precisely as performance, or to avoid
inappropriate and distracting emphasis on the theatrical, on practice.
: But this unfolding over time nonetheless still needs a principle of regu-
lation. There are all sorts of ‘‘practices’’ or ways for people to interact.
But we want to understand, and maybe even foster, a particular kind,
namely, good will, and that presumes an ethical stance, which, I would
think, applies to men and women alike.
: You just want some way of controlling the power investments that
would otherwise lead at times to a dangerous interpenetration. But those
dangers are part of it.
: It’s not just power and danger. There must be a random element in
this temporal unfolding, some unpredicatiblity or, if you will, undecid-
ability, the Derridean ‘‘perhaps,’’ which is both a condition of friendship
and its undermining. This undecidability must permeate the decision
itself, ironically, if it is indeed to be a ‘‘free’’ decision at all. Otherwise,
the will that you would have as the basis of friendship becomes a vain
attempt to impose a rationality (will, in the sense of commanding) that
you clearly can’t intend.
: I can only partially agree with you two. First of all, let me point
out that you, Dee, also do seem to accept some notion of a free will that
you would have deconstructed earlier.27 Second, I think the dynamism
involves the unfolding of dangers vis-à-vis both the self and other, and
this is what makes the freedom relative, not absolute. I’d like to see good
will as an active state of ‘‘being-there-for’’ the other. It’s telling that Hei-
degger, for all his exploration of the ways human existence links both ac-
tivity and passivity (for example, his notion of Gelassenheit) doesn’t have
a notion of Dasein-für; it’s telling, that is, about his own moral character
that such an engagement with the Other is lacking. What Hume refers
to as the ‘‘benevolent or softer affections’’28 has no place in his thought.
: The will as active and passive. So you also embrace the paradox.
: Yes, dialectically. But my point is that the notion of will, always
in the sense of ‘‘willing’’ and never as a substantive entity or faculty, cap-
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tures best this duality, so there’s no reason to ‘‘deconstruct’’ it. When
I said earlier that I wished Derrida had introduced it in his analysis of
friendship, I meant that he seems occasionally, in those passages that I
like because they do provide cognitive content and not just the meander-
ings of his richly contouredmind, to be getting at such a notion. He coins
a term, you’ll recall, ‘‘lovence’’ (aimance) to get at the ‘‘middle voice’’ be-
tween activity and passivity that would be the basis of friendship ().29
He relates this to the act of making a decision (–), which exhibits
the precise structuration we are looking at. This point of intersection
and interaction between self and world, where we exhibit an ‘‘active pas-
sivity’’ that might be linked to ‘‘attentiveness’’ or, to use a term Derrida
has explored a great deal, ‘‘responsibility,’’ to the Other, is what I mean
by will. And a case could be made that most of the Western tradition
also, as a whole, develops such an interactional model.
: But responsibility can’t be isolated in the subject.
: I couldn’t agree more. That’s why willing here is a more complex
concept than subjectivity. Derrida and others always critique Kant on
the ‘‘good will,’’ accusing him of his fixation on autonomy, and rightly
so, to the extent that Kant himself overly stresses that. But if we look at
how Kant sees the will as having to be realized, carried out in reality, we
see he might not be so far off from Derrida after all. The good will that
is the basis of friendship, for Kant, makes us not just ‘‘in principle’’ but
also ‘‘practically’’ involved with the well-being of the other person.30 I
would emphasize the ‘‘practical’’ here. And Kant admits that this is not a
guarantee of happiness; things can (and will) gowrong; but this practical
and emotional openness can make one ‘‘worthy’’ of happiness.
: Doesn’t the ‘‘practical’’ imply interests? This is the kind of calculating
rationality that turns friendship into an imposition of wills.
: Right. You’ll recall that Derrida criticized Gadamer on precisely those
grounds. There’s a slippage between the ‘‘good will’’ and the ‘‘will to
power.’’ Kant, for all his insistence on the purity of the good will, slips in
here a pragmatic perspective that Adorno and Horkheimer saw all too
well in the Dialectic of the Enlightenment.
: I’ll defend Kant here against your misinterpretations. You’re wrong
to interpret ‘‘practical’’ in this reductive way; in fact, he means ethical.
The interest we should have in the well-being of the other, Kant is argu-
ing, is dictated to us by our ‘‘practical’’—not by ‘‘instrumental’’—reason.
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Ultimately, this could be seen as a maxim (‘‘Have and be good to your
friends!’’) that is justified by the categorical imperative, since if we didn’t
follow that maxim, that is, if no one did, we would find ourselves in a
state of pure self-interest that would in fact not be in our best interest.
: That may very well be Kant’s meaning here. But why not also
tease out a different reading, one that might not be so abstractly rational
as yours, Ida, but which avoids the pitfalls of Skip’s and Dee’s doubts.
I would see ‘‘practical’’ here in terms of practices. Good will does also
need to be objectified. Like practices, good willing inhabits a space be-
tween the subjective (since practices are directed by our intentions) and
the objective (since they can’t be just in our minds). My willingness to
work for my friend’s well-being must be enacted or embodied in prac-
tices. The reason is that we are human beings and our wills are endowed
with both a material and a rational side. Thus, Ida’s call (in keeping, cer-
tainly, with a legitimate reading of Kant) for ‘‘principles’’ is not enough.
It’s more a question of unsystematizable tact, or tactics. As Amélie Rorty
stresses, only the messy reality of our interactions, and not some abstract
principle of reason, can decide the fate of our friendship.31
: True. This is Hegel’s critique of Kantian morality in general. The good
will needs to be ‘‘played out’’ in the real world.
: Kant’s problem was that all too often he could only see noth-
ing but an impossible choice between chaos (pathology) or principles
(rules). Not unlike the two of you, Dee and Ida. Instead, one could con-
sider a mediating notion or function. De Certeau’s distinction between
strategies as calculated acts predicated on the attempt to gain a mastery
of will and power and tactics as interactions is useful. The former recall
a notion of the will that he finds very limited. And we all seem to concur
on that point. The latter, however, introduce a complex idea of agency.
Wemight strategize in the abstract, but tactics unfold only in interaction
with others in specific contexts. To use a word from Kant, they are always
‘‘heteronomous,’’ although this does not mean that we, as agents, don’t
have a role in their playing out.32 Here, in a way that brings me back to
Derrida, we have an interesting fusion of discussions of war (that’s where
‘‘tactics’’ play a role, as de Certeau points out) and friendship. And it’s
interesting that Derrida and de Certeau refer to some of the same issues
in Clausewitz.33 But I like the way de Certeau does it: not in order to de-
construct the relationship between friendship and hostility, but to bring
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out this ‘‘playing on the other,’’ or as he says, ‘‘making do’’ with the other.
That would be the very essence of good willing.
: I like it. Friendship is just something one does. Maybe that’s why we
speak of ‘‘making friends.’’ It’s an activity that can’t be grasped by any
vita contemplativa. We sit together, we drink, we talk. And if we do all
these things in a certain way, with a certain balance of power and inter-
ests, then we call the interaction ‘‘friendly.’’
:Your characterization of what ‘‘we’re doing’’ does indeed hit close
to home. The bottom line for me would be whether or not we can even
account for the very conversation and activities we are engaged in right
now. Otherwise, we fall prey to Habermas’s critique of Foucault and
much postmodern thought, namely its failure to apply its own terms to
its own activity.34 That’s what the notion of good will is trying to do—
account for what we’re up to. After all, if we didn’t show a certain amount
of good will toward each other, would we even bother to explore these
positions together?
: Excellent. I appreciate your call for transcendental grounding. I’d given
up on you, since you seem to be a mere pragmatist. The a priori condi-
tions of our ‘‘friendly’’ interaction could be carefully delineated. We all
share a set of experiences and ideas and common language that make
our communication possible.When I sense that Derrida no longer wants
to participate in a real dialogue, I close the book. His claim to want to
be misunderstood does strike me as a case of bad will.35
:Needless to say (and even that phrase demonstrates my point, as you’ll
see), your drive toward discursive self-reflexivity remains highly ques-
tionable for two reasons (at the least; I’ll control myself ). First, can we
really enunciate the conditions of our enunciations without falling into
the same old infinite regress that bored everyone earlier? Don’t we need
to have an agreement on some a priori in order to pursue the a priori
together, etc. And second, Cynthia’s rhetoric of the ‘‘bottom line’’ betrays
her in a significant way, since it shows how, despite the talk of ‘‘tran-
scendental’’ arguments etc., she’s working with a restricted economy that
would impose a stopping point, and precisely that effort undermines
itself. Derrida, on the contrary, is interested in tapping into an ‘‘economy
without reserve’’ in the history of friendship.36
: Right, so stop trying to ground your positions Cynthia and Ida. All
you’re doing is trying to silence the rest of us with your good will. But
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I would add to you, Dee, stop trying to lead us into infinite regresses.
Let’s just go about our business.
: I’m closer to you than you think, Skip, and I should be careful
about assuming my critique of the inability to account for our very ac-
tivity as a call for transcendentalism. My point is that we can still make
the effort to describe our business even as we’re engaged in it, can’t we?
Why can’t one of the practices we are engaged in be precisely the re-
flection on practices? There’s no reason for that ‘‘theorizing’’ to have
a qualitatively different epistemological or ontological status, or to at-
tain an absolute stability beyond all practice. Instead, it can grow out
of practices and itself be an ‘‘art’’ of theorizing.37 Those engaged in this
‘‘second-order’’ practice would be related to Gramsci’s ‘‘organic intel-
lectual’’—one engaged ‘‘in active participation in practical life, as con-
structor, organiser, ‘permanent persuader.’ ’’38 And with that reference,
we seem to come back to where we started, namely to the very basis of
our own conversation: to mutually recognized good will, or better, to
mutual good willing. There’s no reason to presume any real or ideal con-
sensus awaiting us at the end of our conversation or underlying it in any
special way. But we also don’t get anywhere if we presume some kind of
‘‘dissensus,’’39 a kind of underlying bad will. Rather, what I see operating
here is an openness to each other, an attentiveness and a drive for self-
disclosure that recognizes the potential for change and failure. Some-
times it works, sometimes it doesn’t. Sometimes it works for a while, and
then falls apart. Kind of like St.’s seminars. Practicing good willing takes
time and repeated efforts.
:And the fact that we’re willing to explore these positions together time
and again tells us something about our friendship—at least up to now.
I guess in the end we can be grateful that St. brought us together in this
spirit.
: Or in this spirit of ‘‘willingness,’’ even though we seem to be playing
out these ideas with a kind of repetition compulsion, willy-nilly, as it
were.
:Maybe we are carrying on his legacy. Our intellectual friendship is his
living will and testament.
 :  . 

. I would like to express my gratitude to my colleague, Ermanno Bencivenga (Phi-
losophy, UCI), for sharing his enthusiasm for philosophical dialogues.
. A fictional professor at a fictional Ivy League university.
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Literary Archaeologies (I):
Codes of Friendship and
Paternity in German Classicism

 Connotations of Friendship and Love
in Schiller’s Philosophical Letters
and Hölderlin’s Hyperion
 
Translated by Edward T. Potter
For Stanley Corngold, in friendship
Within the context of the German Enlightenment, love is often as-
sociated with the middle-class value of virtue. In the Introduction to Ethics
(Einleitung zur Sittenlehre), Christian Thomasius speaks of ‘‘sensible or ra-
tional love [vernünftiger Liebe]’’ or ‘‘true love [wahrer Liebe],’’ which alone
guarantees the intended goal: the ‘‘bliss of composure.’’1 In contrast to
French semantics, love in the German and the English contexts is spiri-
tualized, idealized, and moralized, and sexuality is sublimated. Gellert’s
novel Life of the Swedish Countess of G. (Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von
G.) is paradigmatic for the codification of love before , for the main
characters in this novel put the instructions of Thomasius into practice.
Strong emotions endanger not only reason (the central value in the middle-
class conception of morality), but also the ideal of courtly constantia, which
was transposed into the middle-class realm and which extends far into the
eighteenth century as the concept of Christian Stoicism (Justus Lipsius).
In order to steer ‘‘restless and passionate longing’’ in the right directions
and to alter the function of the energies of desires, love is bound tightly to
reason. Even Schiller’s Love and Intrigue (Kabale und Liebe) illustrates the
extent to which erotic and sexual love was primarily considered a courtly
phenomenon in the eighteenth century. The idealization of the semantics of
love clearly has a political facet as well.Within this context, it is remarkable
that Christian Fürchtegott Gellert, who functioned as a Praeceptor Germa-
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niae in addition to Gottsched, subjected the concept of ‘‘sensible or ratio-
nal love’’ to surprisingly fundamental criticism in an essay, although this
concept, not insignificantly, served to moderate desire.2 On the one hand,
he criticizes in this essay a ‘‘sensual love which concerns merely the body
[sinnliche Liebe, die bloß auf den Körper geht]’’ as the ‘‘preoccupation of
small and infertile souls’’; on the other hand, he denounces a ‘‘spiritual love
which is coupled only with the characteristics of the soul [geistige Liebe,
die sich nur mit den Eigenschaften der Seele gattet]’’ as ‘‘a fantasy of arro-
gant students who are ashamed that heaven has given them a body, which
they would not, if their words had to be backed up by actions, abandon
for ten souls.’’3 Christoph MartinWieland would later openly and furtively
smuggle ‘‘sexual love [Geschlechtsliebe]’’ as a topic into religious-pietistic
semantics. The codifications of love in the German context are, however,
not quite as clear and free of inconsistencies as Niklas Luhmann considers
them to be in his stimulating comparative study Love as Passion (Liebe als
Passion).4 It is especially in literature that functions that are critical of codes
and whose goal it is to change the socially sanctioned semantics, appear
side by side with code-forming functions.
What Luhmann observes in a corresponding development in England
can be claimed, however, for a particular phase within the German context
as well: ‘‘Love as duty is reformulated into love as fondness and brought
into line with the ideal of friendship,’’5 whereby the difference between the
genders seems almost to become blurred in the sphere of friendship rela-
tions. Even the chief ideologue of the Storm and Stress movement, Johann
Gottfried Herder, influenced by Rousseau, would eventually programmati-
cally recommend in his essay ‘‘Love and Selfhood’’ [‘‘Liebe und Selbstheit’’]
(): ‘‘Love is meant to invite us to friendship, love itself is meant to be-
come the most heartfelt friendship.’’6 Not insignificantly, this is also valid
for marriage. Goethe’s Werther and Jacobi’s Woldemar () demonstrate
that a dichotomy between marriage and spiritual friendship still exists in
the eighteenth century. Just as Lotte viewsWerther as her soul mate, so too
does Woldemar think of Henriette as his soul mate. Admittedly, in both
cases, the protagonists experience characteristic crises, which only serve to
demonstrate that, not insignificantly, it is sentimental tendencies that put
the connotation of friendship and love to a crucial test. Apparently, friend-
ship cannot permanently satisfy ‘‘the burning desire for a human heart’’7
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either. Werther, with his demand that the emotions be absolutely supreme,
becomes, in the end, the victim of his boundless passion. That does not,
admittedly, mean that the narrative strategy therefore favors ‘‘sensible or
rational love,’’ the view of Albert. Rather, rational love and sentimental
love are clearly being brought into a fictional course of conflict for which
there seems to be no solution other than suicide or murder, as is demon-
strated by the story of the love-stricken farmhand that was inserted into
the novel. ‘‘Love and faithfulness, the most beautiful human sentiments,’’
says the commentary, had in fact ‘‘transformed [themselves] into violence
and murder.’’8
How, on the other hand, love and friendship as sentimental social phe-
nomena move closer together within the emotional value of joy, the ‘‘sister
of humanity,’’ is illustrated by Klopstock’s Asclepiadic ode ‘‘Lake Zurich’’
(‘‘Der Zürchersee’’), which appeared in  and which had a paradigmatic
effect on the younger generation. From the aesthetic experience of nature
to the experience of ‘‘Haller’s Doris,’’ the poem leads up to the climax of
the last five stanzas, in which a reorganization of the codification of ‘‘ratio-
nal love’’ occurs. Friendship is placed above love and virtue as the supreme
value: ‘‘O, in this way, we build huts of friendship here!’’ it says in the last
stanza. ‘‘Eternally we lived here, eternally! The shady forest / Changed itself
into Tempe for us / That valley into Elysium!’’ Whereas Schiller later draws
a parallel and identifies love in its ‘‘utmost relevance’’9 with Elysium, it is
friendship here, as Albert Salomon explains in detail, that expands itself to
become the substratum of a way of life in the eighteenth century.10 There
can, however, be no question that, in the end, it is love and not friendship
that characterizes the code for intimacy. Luhmann is correct in assuming
‘‘that friendship, in spite of all the privatization of, and all the distinction
between, everyday and peculiar friendship (Thomasius), proves itself [im-
possible] to delimit or to be distinguished from other things.’’11 This con-
stellation was only to be plausible for a limited time and was, in the literary
and philosophical discourse on love, exposed again and again to attempts
that ultimately led to a ‘‘differentiation of differences’’ and, because of this,
to the expansion of the semantic code. In the following sections, I wish to
examine such attempts at differentiation more closely, using two examples:
Schiller’s Philosophical Letters (Philosophische Briefen) (I and II) and Höl-
derlin’s novel Hyperion (III).12
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Within the context of the German Enlightenment, friendship develops
as a code of interaction that can perform a social, intellectual-historical,
philosophical, pedagogical, or metaphysical function. In combination with
the discourse on love, the code places itself in the service of a strategy of
avoidance, which distinctly ignores sexuality and sensuality. As the example
of Klopstock’s ode demonstrates, the code implies a potential for emotion
in sentimentality that does not only make the old concept of ‘‘rational love’’
possible, but also transcends it and elevates it to the metaphysical. Not only
does the friendship of souls [Seelenfreundschaft] have a socializing func-
tion, it also has a religious one: it changes Tempe into Elysium.
Schiller’s Philosophical Letters, the beginnings of which extend back as
far as his days at the Karl’s School, represent a characteristic variant of this
change. In the ‘‘Prefatory Statement’’ (‘‘Vorerinnerung,’’) the young writer
remarks that ‘‘reason [has . . .] its epochs, its fates,’’ just as the heart does,
but ‘‘its history [is . . .] handled considerably less often.’’ In other words:
‘‘One seems to be satisfied with developing the passions in their extremes,
aberrations, and consequences, without taking into consideration how ex-
actly they are connected with the system of thoughts of the individual’’ (NA
:). The cause of moral deficiencies is located, for Schiller, in a one-
sided and false philosophy. It is not via the heart or the feelings that false
convictions are corrected, but rather through an ‘‘enlightened intellect.’’ In
short, this means that ‘‘the head must educate the heart [der Kopf muß das
Herz bilden].’’ The correspondence between Julius and Raphael is meant to
provide a paradigm for this. He begins with the portrayal of a sentimen-
tal friendship in which separation triggers an intellectual and psychological
crisis in Julius. While the ‘‘discourse of absence’’ is traditionally ‘‘held by
the woman’’ in the codification of love, as Roland Barthes emphasizes,13 the
‘‘always present I,’’ the Julius who remains behind, is constituted in view
of the ‘‘continually absent you.’’ The absent Raphael takes on the position
of the love object, and the lamentation of Julius, who remains behind, sig-
nals the situation: ‘‘I am loved less than I myself love.’’14 He roams lonely
through ‘‘the melancholy area,’’ which mirrors his inner state. One could,
in fact, suggest along with Barthes that the ‘‘man who is waiting there and
suffering because of it [. . . is] in a wondrous manner feminized.’’15 Absence
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leads not only to a yearning for the ‘‘physical presence’’ of the absent ob-
ject, but also ‘‘to the formulation of a fiction with diverse roles (doubts,
reproaches, impulses of desire and melancholy).’’16 The memory is called
upon metaphorically to translate the absence of the object, which is experi-
enced as painful, into presence even up to the ‘‘uneasy scene [of their] sepa-
ration’’ (NA :). Like a lover, Julius calls out the name of the absent one
and is enraged when he does not answer. The memory of past happiness,
of ‘‘the bold ideal [of their] friendship,’’ of their commonality, only makes
the loss more apparent. Even the act of writing as an attempt at mourning
does not seem to be sufficient. The letter from Julius is a failed love-text,17
inasmuch as the elegiac tone at the beginning, the Greek pothos, turns into
a litany of reproaches, the lament into accusation. ‘‘You have stolen from
me the faith that gave me peace. You have taught me to despise, when I used
to worship’’ (NA :).
Raphael has obviously recast Julius ideologically and turned him from
a self into an Other, which only functioned as long as the signifier of the
Other was present. In retrospect, Julius extols his earlier naive existence and
temperament, which now seem to him a ‘‘blissful, paradisiacal time,’’ since
he ‘‘still staggered through life blindfolded, like a drunkard’’ (NA :).
In other words, he ‘‘felt and was happy,’’ but Raphael had ‘‘taught [him]
to think,’’ and now he finds himself ‘‘on the way to mourning [the day of
his] creation.’’ Although his friend has, in this way, raised him from a lower
level of existence to a higher one, he struggles against his newly found in-
dependence, which throws him back onto himself. The paradigm shift from
childlike faith to rationalism has already been accepted and formulated in
a positive, confessional manner at the end of the first letter: ‘‘My reason is
everything to me now, my sole guarantee for divinity, virtue, immortality’’
(NA :). With the example of this friendship, which, as far as semantics
are concerned, is both emotionally and philosophically charged, Schiller
represents a person’s attainment of maturity as the most important process
within his or her individual history, as a leave-taking from the naive way
of thinking that characterizes the level of the child and the youth anthro-
pologically, via the transition to the sentimental level, to maturity. Raphael
led Julius, in the words of Kant, ‘‘out of the guardianship of nature into
the state of freedom.’’18 If he was previously merely ‘‘a good son [of his]
house, a friend to [his] friends, a useful member of society,’’ then Raphael
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has ‘‘transformed [him] into a citizen of the universe.’’ He now carries, as
he writes, his ‘‘imperial throne in [his] mind’’ and honors reason as the
supreme value, as ‘‘the sole monarchy in the spirit world’’ (NA :).
This position in the discourse of the letter soon undergoes a new re-
vision, however, by means of the sudden insight into the anthropologi-
cally qualified ‘‘dialectics of the Enlightenment.’’ Human beings, proceeds
Julius’s argumentation, are ‘‘bound [to] the rigid, unchangeable, clocklike
mechanism of a mortal body’’ in spite of their ‘‘free intellects which soar
upwards,’’ and he ascertains, ‘‘this God is expelled into a world of worms’’
(NA :). In the replies of Karl von Moor in The Robbers (Die Räuber),
the young Schiller had already formulated this fundamental criticism of the
principle of Enlightenment optimism as supported by Leibniz and Alex-
ander Pope. I have ‘‘seen people,’’ the robber explains to a follower, ‘‘their
beelike cares and their gigantic projects—their godlike plans and their
mouselike business dealings, the wondrously strange race for bliss . . . ; this
confused lottery of life . . . —Zeroes are what is drawn out—in the end,
there was no winner in it.’’19 The discrepancy between ‘‘expectations and
their fulfillment’’ and the restricted nature of human existence (NA :)
expose Julius to the ‘‘terrible abyss of doubts,’’ as well. It is precisely the
philosophy of reason that illuminates the dark dungeon like ‘‘a torch’’ and
which first made him conscious of the misery in which he finds himself.
Julius compares himself to the ‘‘disastrously curious Oedipus’’ and quotes
the oracle: ‘‘May you never find out who you are’’ (NA :). Nothing
lasts forever, he now argues; the ‘‘present moment is the gravestone of all the
past ones,’’ and ‘‘a lover’s rendezvous is a skipped heartbeat in a friendship.’’
The compulsion to recall impresses the loss even more distinctly upon his
consciousness as he reproaches Raphael: ‘‘You have torn down a hut which
was inhabited and set up a splendid dead palace in its place’’ (NA :).
Yet Raphael, in his reply, diagnoses Julius’s spiritual ‘‘crisis’’ as absolutely
necessary. A friendship without interruption would have been ‘‘too much
for the lot of a human being’’ anyway. ‘‘Deprivation,’’ he says, represents an
important element within the school of life, and the sickness from which
he suffers can be healed ‘‘only through himself alone,’’ ‘‘in order to be safe
from any relapse.’’ It is not a coincidence that he chose the most favorable
moment for his ‘‘enlightenment,’’ when ‘‘body and mind’’ found themselves
‘‘in the most marvellous bloom’’ (NA :). He was ‘‘instinctively good,
good from inviolate moral grace,’’ but the level of the graceful and naive
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way of thinking was ‘‘not worthy’’ of him, and Raphael demands notes from
him in order to be able better to judge the causes of his complaints. What
Raphael then receives from Julius is an idealistic essay, which he had drafted
in the ‘‘happy hours [of his] proud enthusiasm’’ (NA :) and whose
content had been called into question by his materialist afflictions. Julius
comments pessimistically on his ‘‘Theosophy’’ in the following manner: ‘‘It
is the wooden scaffolding of the stage when the lighting is gone. My heart
sought a philosophy for itself, and the imagination slipped its dreams in’’
(NA :). Julius confesses, in other words, that the materialist doubt re-
garding the imperial throne of ‘‘reason’’ triggered a reduction of the self
to such an extent that he himself lost faith in his own capabilities. On the
one hand, friendship led him to the high point of his life, to Kant’s ‘‘de-
parture of men and women from their self-induced mental immaturity,’’ to
an idealistic philosophy. On the other hand, this high point unexpectedly
changes into the low point, into a materialistic way of thinking, when his
friend leaves him. Julius finds himself in a similar situation to the one that
Max in Schiller’sWallenstein ascribes to the main character, even while the
themes are different:
The bonds of old love shall break,
[They will] not gently come undone, and you desire to make the tear,
The painful tear, even more painful for me!
You know I have not yet learned
To live without you— . . .
(Wallenstein’s Death [Wallensteins Tod], III.)
Julius experiences his separation from Raphael not only as a withdrawal
of love but also as a psychological and intellectual shock to his system of
meaning. Teaching and friendship are connected to Raphael’s person to
such an extent that Julius only believes himself to be an Other as long as
the Other is present. The very moment when Raphael leaves him is when
he discovers the other position to be an illusion, and he longs to return to
his original position.20 His ‘‘Theosophy’’ is not only an idealistic confession
of faith, but also a document of his friendship without which the ‘‘The-
osophy’’ would not have come into being. This clearly demonstrates that
friendship already connotes other values here such as love, education, and
ideals, just as will be the case later in Romanticism. In the ‘‘Letters on Don
Carlos’’ (‘‘Briefe über Don Carlos’’), Schiller was to represent the phenome-
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non from Carlos’s perspective in this manner: ‘‘Fate gave him a friend—
a friend in the decisive years, when the flower of the mind unfolds, when
ideals are received, and when the moral sense purifies itself. . . . This serene
humane philosophy, which the prince on the throne wants to bring into
practice, is thus a product of friendship’’ (HS :).
As Schiller himself explains, friendship, like love, is subordinated to a
higher purpose in this piece, that is, to the ‘‘dissemination of a purer, gentler
humanity,’’ and it is subordinated to such an extent that both love and
friendship must sacrifice something or sacrifice themselves. When Schiller
suggests that Posa ‘‘loves the human race more than [he loves] Karl,’’ this
could also be said of Raphael in relation to Julius. While Posa is primarily
interested in the idea of the human being, Raphael pleads in favor of the
idea of reason. For both, the friend is, to a certain extent, ‘‘the focal point at
which all his ideas of that composite whole are gathered.’’ In the ‘‘love of one
being,’’ Julius, too, experiences a ‘‘general, all-encompassing philanthropy
concentrated in one single jet of flame’’ (HS :f.). If friendship, accord-
ing to the perspective in the ‘‘Letters on Don Carlos,’’ affords the ‘‘com-
plete enjoyment [of the] ideal,’’21 then this applies to Raphael and Julius as
well. The ‘‘Theosophy’’ can, for this reason, also be read as an ‘‘enthusiastic
blueprint’’22 for friendship, for there is room neither for skepticism nor for
materialism as a way of thinking. The ‘‘huts of friendship’’ are meant to be
‘‘eternal dwelling places,’’ not ‘‘gravestones’’ of a moment (NA :). If the
texts of the letters reflect the crisis of friendship and of ideology, then the
philosophical text represents the birth of idealism from the spirit of friend-
ship. It is not coincidental that its actual addressee remains Raphael, the
Other, throughout.

The ‘‘Theosophy’’ reformulates theodicy as ‘‘an aesthetic conception of
the world,’’ ‘‘in which the imagination has become a person’s actual organ
of knowledge.’’23 It is the beginning of a development in which theodicy’s
legal battle for the rational institutions of the world is transferred onto the
philosophy of history, philosophical anthropology, and philosophical aes-
thetics.24 Odo Marquard summarized the facts in the following formula:
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‘‘The justification of the world depends henceforth on the justification of the
self and this, in turn, on its capacity for the resolution of antinomies.’’25 In the
‘‘Theosophy of Julius,’’ God is in fact still a point of reference, so that one
cannot yet speak of a ‘‘theodicy without God’’ as in the context of transcen-
dental philosophy.26 It is not merely being claimed here, as in mysticism,
that God is dependent upon the human self, it is virtually being propagated
that God is born by means of human powers. Already in Schiller’s youth-
ful philosophy, the person, the self, is the place where ‘‘an infinitely divided
God’’ (NA :) finds the way back to unity. When Schiller, even as early
as in his dissertation Philosophy of Physiology (Philosophie der Physiologie),
defines the destiny of the human being as ‘‘similarity to God’’ (NA :),
he raises the human being to the task of uniting once again ‘‘the divine self,’’
which has ‘‘broken [itself ] into countless feeling substances’’ (NA :f.)
in nature, the reproduction of the divine substance. The magical elemental
force that fulfills the task of ‘‘reversing the separation’’ (NA :) is pre-
cisely love. Love represents ‘‘the ladder,’’ as Julius comments, ‘‘upon which
we clamber upwards towards similarity to God’’ (NA :).
The ‘‘Theosophy’’ treats various subchapters (‘‘The World and the
Thinking Being [Die Welt und das denkende Wesen],’’ ‘‘Idea [Idee],’’ ‘‘Sac-
rifice [Aufopferung],’’ and ‘‘God [Gott]’’) on its way to the central theme of
the work, ‘‘Love’’ [Liebe]. Schiller took from the few philosophical writings
that he read around this time27 ‘‘always only the things,’’ as he writes in a
letter to Körner ( April ), ‘‘that allow themselves to be felt and treated
in a poetic manner’’ (J :). Admittedly, love and friendship belonged to
the concepts that particularly occupied Schiller from the Anthology for the
Year  (Anthologie auf das Jahr ) up until Don Carlos. Love is defined
by Schiller in the ‘‘Theosophy’’ as the ‘‘desire for someone else’s happiness,’’
as an ‘‘exchange of personality . . . a confusion of beings’’ (NA :).
Love is the precondition for the possibility of similarity to God. This ‘‘om-
nipotent magnet in the spirit world’’ unites the ‘‘entirety of creation’’ in the
personality (NA :), and it is stated in subjunctive potentialis: ‘‘If every
human being loved all human beings, then each individual would possess
the world’’ (NA :). By taking up Shaftesbury’s and Locke’s thoughts,
Julius consolidates this approach to a universal formula for a philosophy
of life based on the expansion and contraction of the self.28 ‘‘Egotism and
love,’’ we learn, ‘‘divide humanity into two extremely different races, the
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boundaries of which never run into one another. Egotism establishes its
focal point within itself; love plants it outside itself in the axis of the eternal
whole. Love aims at unity; egotism is loneliness’’ (NA :f.).
For Julius, ‘‘unselfish love [uneigennützige Liebe]’’ represents without a
doubt the supreme value, and he imagines himself to be lost without it. If
he had to give up his faith in love, then ideas such as divinity, immortality,
and virtue would be meaningless, for a ‘‘spirit that only loves itself is an
atom swimming in immeasurable empty space’’ (NA :). In the poem
‘‘Friendship’’ (‘‘Die Freundschaft’’), which specifically refers to a projected
novel made up of letters from Julius to Raphael, the following lines, which
are also quoted in the ‘‘Theosophy,’’ are most relevant:
—Dead groups are we—when we hate;
Gods—when we lovingly embrace each other!29
Here, friendship is declared to be a ‘‘jubilant alliance of love,’’ in which the
self gazes in admiration at itself in the ‘‘you,’’ as the world and the universe
are mirrored ‘‘more beautifully’’ and ‘‘more charmingly’’ in the Other.30
In his interchanges with Raphael, Julius acquires the former’s ‘‘great senti-
ments,’’ and he thus becomes enriched by the qualities of the love object
(NA :). ‘‘With satisfaction, I recognize my sentiments in the mirror of
your own,’’ Julius comments on the process, ‘‘but with fiery longing, I de-
vour the higher ones, which I am lacking in’’ (NA :). In other words,
friendship and love seek to compensate for deficiencies and to promote de-
velopment toward perfection, toward the restitution of the lost totality. For
this reason, Julius also wants to raise ‘‘brotherly love [Bruderliebe],’’ friend-
ship, to a program for humanity, for it is only through love, as expressed
in the chorus of ‘‘The Triumph of Love,’’ that ‘‘people [become] like gods’’
and that ‘‘the earth [becomes] the kingdom of heaven.’’31 In addition to
this, love can achieve effects that seem to contradict human nature. Julius
would definitely be capable, he maintains, for example, in the section called
‘‘Self-Sacrifice,’’ of increasing his ‘‘own happiness by means of a sacrifice’’
for ‘‘someone else’s happiness,’’ that is, to sacrifice his life for his friend. At
this early level of his philosophical reflections, Schiller wants to demon-
strate the independence in principle both of the magnetic power of love as
well as of the human self. Toward the end of the ‘‘Theosophy,’’ Julius also
calls his program a ‘‘confession of faith [of his faculty of] reason,’’ which was
prompted by Raphael (NA :). This may seem all the more astonishing
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since it is precisely ‘‘love’’ and ‘‘friendship,’’ rather than ‘‘reason’’ that are
declared in the various sections to be the most important powers in human
existence. Strictly regarded, however, they are functions of the self, too—
as much of one’s own self, in fact, as of the other’s self.
Toward the end of his essay, the writer emphasizes its speculative outline
character and its subjective perspective to his correspondent: ‘‘The world,
as I have painted it here, is perhaps not real anywhere except in the mind
of your Julius’’ (NA :). In view of the fact that all knowledge amounts
‘‘to a conventional deception’’ anyway, he insists, however, upon the gen-
eral validity ‘‘of every exercise of the power to think,’’ for ‘‘every product
of the mind, each thing woven by the wit [has] an irrefutable right in this
greater meaning of creation’’ (NA :, ). Julius is making a plea here
for pluralism, the variety of interpretations that, after all, can be traced back
to the diversity of the Creator, and Julius claims sententiously: ‘‘Each of
reason’s skills, even in error, increases its skill in receiving the truth’’ (NA
:).
Yet strictly speaking, a secret goal lies behind the outline of the ‘‘The-
osophy’’: the birth of the powers of imagination, which basically fulfills all
the conditions attributed to love and friendship. It is not coincidental that
Schiller declares in a letter to Reinwald on  April : ‘‘Every work of
literature is nothing other than an enthusiastic friendship or a Platonic love
for a creation of our own head’’ (J :). In this sense, friendship and love
are nothing other ‘‘than a sensual confusion of beings.’’ Just as God loves
Himself ‘‘in the outline, the signified in the sign,’’32 and perceives ‘‘His great,
infinite self strewn throughout infinite nature’’ (J :), so too do poets
love and perceive themselves in their outlines, in their creations. Friend-
ship and love are, when understood in this way, only ‘‘a different effect of
the power of literature.’’ In other words: ‘‘That which we feel for a friend
and what we feel for a hero in our literary works is precisely that. In both
cases, we lead ourselves through new situations and paths, . . . we see our-
selves in other colors, we suffer for ourselves in other bodies’’ (J :). In
anticipation of early Romannticism, love and friendship in the ‘‘Theoso-
phy’’ become a sign, a linguistic ‘‘outline’’ of nature. Just as the ‘‘thought
of God’’ writes itself out in its diversity in nature, so too is it the task ‘‘of
all thinking beings’’ ‘‘to recognize the original sign [in this diversity] . . . ,
the unity in the arrangement’’ (NA :). The first section of the ‘‘The-
osophy’’ is thus about the readability of the world33 or the ‘‘hieroglyph of
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a power’’ that makes people godlike (NA :). With the help of nature,
world history, and art, the ciphers of the ‘‘thinking being,’’ allow themselves
to be deciphered (NA :).
Körner’s commentary on the ‘‘Theosophy’’ continues the Philosophical
Letters and, at the same time, ends them. As Raphael, he uncovers the weak-
nesses of the outline yet nonetheless rates it an important step on the path
‘‘towards a higher freedom of the spirit’’ (NA :). He now also considers
Julius-Schiller capable of accepting the Kantian critique of pure reason.34
He does, however, vent noticeably harsh criticism on the sentence ‘‘that it
is the supreme destiny of humanity to gain a premonition of the spirit of
the Creator of the world in his work of art.’’ Raphael, alias Körner, insists
upon the fundamental difference between the universe and a work of art:
‘‘The universe is not a pure copy of an ideal like the completed work of a
human artist. The latter rules despotically over the lifeless material which
he needs in order to make his ideas perceptible to the senses,’’ while ‘‘in the
divine work of art[,] . . . the characteristic value of each of its components
[is] protected’’ (NA :). The divine creation characterizes ‘‘life and free-
dom’’ [‘‘Leben und Freiheit’’] to the greatest possible extent, and it is ‘‘never
more sublime than when its ideal seems to be most unsuccessful.’’ Yet, in
a letter in which he discusses Körner’s statement on the ‘‘Theosophy’’ in
detail, Schiller responds that their views are by nomeans as different as Kör-
ner assumes (J :). In the fourth letter On the Aesthetic Education (Über
ästhetische Erziehung), Schiller would later modify this aspect of his early
statement of belief by making almost word-for-word use of reflections of
his friend Körner, alias Raphael. The discourse on friendship in the Philo-
sophical Letters will thus be continued both in aesthetic discourse as well as
in poetic practice.

Hölderlin’s epistolary novelHyperion,which appeared in two volumes in
 and , stands without a doubt in the tradition of Goethe’sWerther
and Rousseau’s New Heloise, but it radicalizes and clearly carries on the
beginnings of Schiller’s projected novel ‘‘made up of the letters of Julius
to Raphael.’’35 Like Schiller in the Philosophical Letters, Hölderlin tells the
story inHyperion of the development of his protagontist. The role of teacher
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—in Schiller, it is the correspondent Raphael—is taken on by Adamas for
Hyperion. Whereas Raphael educates his pupil Julius to maturity, Adamas
introduces Hyperion ‘‘to Plutarch’s world of heroes [one moment], and
to the magical land of the Greek gods the next.’’ (B :). In both cases,
the story of the development of the protagonists is presented in an ele-
giac tone arising from the difference of historical distance. A fundamental
philosophico-anthropological concept of Schiller’s can, moreover, be dis-
cerned in the structural principle of Hölderlin’s novel, which the younger
compatriot in the fragment of Hyperion defines as ‘‘an eccentric path’’ in
the following manner: ‘‘There are two ideals of our existence: a state of
supreme simplicity, in which our needs harmonize reciprocally with them-
selves and with our powers and with everything with which we are con-
nected by means of the very organization of nature without our assistance,
and a state of supreme education, in which the same thing would take place
with infinitely duplicated and intensified needs and powers by means of the
organization which we are capable of giving ourselves’’ (B :f.).
If Raphael refers to ‘‘reason’’ as the highest level, then Adamas introduces
not only the example of the ‘‘beautiful ancient world,’’ but he also familiar-
izes his pupil with the ‘‘God within us’’ (B :), a central anthropologico-
metaphysical term that appears both in Wieland and especially in Schil-
ler’s work On Grace and Dignity (Über Anmuth und Würde).36 Already in
Schiller, friendship and love fulfill an educative function, which Hölder-
lin, along with the Romanticists Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel, and Schleier-
macher, takes up. The loss of friendship and love throws the protagonists
Julius and Hyperion back into their own interiority and exposes them to
despair. Hyperion, too, laments the loss of original unity: ‘‘I have become
so properly rational here with you, have learned to distinguish myself thor-
oughly from that which surrounds me, am now isolated in the beautiful
world, am thus thrown out of the garden of nature, where I grew and throve,
and am drying out in the midday sun’’ (B :). The state of supreme sim-
plicity is played off against the state of supreme education. As in Julius’s
case, doubt turns into despair, hope into hopelessness: ‘‘That people in their
youth believe the goal to be so close! It is the most beautiful of all the de-
ceptions with which nature helps to strengthen the frailty of our being’’ (B
:). Just like Julius, Hyperion sees everything through the lens of his
sentiments (B :), in the color of the state in which he finds himself at
the moment. The negative aspect of the world can be traced back to the
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inner deficiencies of the person as well. The destiny of humanity, charac-
terized precisely by the highest objective, suddenly leads to nothingness in
a moment of despair. ‘‘O you poor ones,’’ laments Hyperion, for example,
in a letter, ‘‘who feel it, who do not like to talk about human destiny, who
are utterly and so deeply moved by the nothingness that prevails over us,
so thoroughly recognize that we are born for nothingness, that we love a
void, believe in a void, slave away for nothingness, in order to gradually
pass over into nothingness. . . . But I [can] not overcome it, the screaming
truth. Have I not convinced myself twice? When I look into life, what is the
end of everything? Nothing. When I soar in spirit, what is the highest of all
things? Nothing’’ (B :f.).
The discrepancy of the human existence between worm andGod,37which
Albrecht von Haller and Klopstock thematize, just as Goethe and Schiller
do later, also belongs in Hyperion to the dissonances that await resolution.
The enthusiasm of friendship, combined with the decision in favor of politi-
cal activity, seems to be able to overcome the disastrous dichotomy. ‘‘What?
God is supposed to be dependent on a worm?’’ exclaims Alabanda, thirsty
for action, the ‘‘God in us, for whom infinity opens up to make a path, is
supposed to stay and wait until the worm gets out of his way?’’ (B :).
Friendship carries the connotation of the vita activa and the concept of
‘‘joy’’ here, the latter differing from the depiction in Klopstock’s ode in that
it is understood here in Hyperion, as in Schiller’s Don Carlos, as a correlate
of political intent (B :). Adamas refers his pupil Hyperion to his heart
as the location where the beautiful lost world can find a new place for itself,
and he holds up Apollo, the god of the sun, as his model,38 whereas Ala-
banda leads his friend, who is the same age and to whom he is bound in
an effusive youthful friendship, out from his internal world into the exter-
nal world of contemporary history. Adamas’s sentimental request (‘‘What is
loss, if human beings find themselves in their own world in this way? In us
is everything’’ [B :]) that one produce the lost world in oneself, as Schiller
demands in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (Ueber naive und sentimental-
ische Dichtung), is juxtaposed with Alabanda’s enthusiastic action, which is
similarly propagated by Fichte in his Science of Knowledge (Wissenschafts-
lehre). ‘‘The sons of the sun nourish themselves on their [own] deeds,’’ it is
said within the context of the friendly alliance; ‘‘they live on victory; with
their own spirit, they rouse themselves, and their strength is their joy’’ (B
:).
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Hyperion and his companion in combat, Alabanda, go into raptures like
the youthful heroes of Schiller about ‘‘colossal designs’’ and about a posi-
tive change in the social and political plight of their time. In the political
discourse of the two friends, it is, however, remarkable that they clearly dif-
fer in their conceptions of the projected new state. Alabanda even seems
to smile critically at the equally romantic and utopian plan of his friend,
which would grant the state less power, binding it to ‘‘love and the mind’’
and making it, to a certain extent, into a ‘‘new church’’ (B :f.). It is no
coincidence that soon afterwards the two friends engage in a major alter-
cation: They ‘‘destroyed the garden of [their] love by force’’ (B :). But
Hyperion experiences the loss of his friend and the disappointment as a
psychological crisis. The result is mourning and melancholia. It comes to a
‘‘withdrawal of interest for the external world’’ and to a ‘‘reduction of self-
esteem.’’39 In short, the loss of the object leads him to the loss of self. In a
letter to Bellarmin, Hyperion visualizes his situation thus: ‘‘There is a fall-
ing silent, a forgetting of all existence, where it seems to us as if we had lost
everything, a night of our soul where no glimmer of a star, where not even
a rotten piece of wood shines for us’’ (B :). Hyperion is commenting
here on the transition from the expansion of the self to the reduction of
the self, which, in contrast to the ‘‘Theosophy of Julius’’ (‘‘Theosophie des
Julius’’), stands in the pursuance of the eccentric path in the dialectics of
internalization and externalization, of extreme interior orientation to ex-
treme exterior orientation. Hyperion is attempting to formulate this as an
anthropological law. ‘‘If the life of the world indeed consists in the alter-
nation between unfolding and closing,’’ he supposes, ‘‘in flight from and
return to oneself, why not the human heart as well?’’ (B :).
If his friendship with Alabanda had aroused the hope for a better future,
for positive political change, then, with their separation, he lost ‘‘[his] faith
in everything great’’ (B :f.). On the other hand, the work of mourn-
ing releases the heteronomous self once again, and in the second book of
Hyperion, triggered by the context of Greece, the interior world of the pro-
tagonist receives a new impetus (B :f.). This positive phase reaches its
climax in the encounter with Diotima. Whereas in the relations between
friends, Adamas represents first and foremost internal moral concepts and
Alabanda represents external moral concepts, Hyperion’s love for Diotima
opens up a new means of access to the world: to nature and beauty. She
represents for him a sort of Lethe, from which he ‘‘drank the oblivion of
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existence’’ and through which his ‘‘disposition full of contradictions’’ found
peace (B :f.). This love becomes the most important thing in the world,
and he believes that he can do without gods or people. He pronounces ego-
centrically: ‘‘What does the shipwreck of the world concern me; I know of
nothing save my blessed island’’ (B :).
The classic code of the ‘‘language of the eyes’’40 is a part of Hölderlin’s
grammar of love, but the linguistic expressions fail in the face of the in-
tense experience. ‘‘One is ashamed of one’s language.’’ ‘‘One would like to
become a musical sound and merge in One Heavenly Hymn;’’ and further:
‘‘And what should we speak of ? We saw only each other. We shied away
from talking about ourselves’’ (B :). While Diotima’s original form of
communication is song (B :), Hyperion speaks in retrospect of ‘‘conver-
sations of the soul’’ as the principal discourse of love. In the course of their
togetherness, Diotima admittedly gains in linguistic skill. An ‘‘exchange of
personality, a confusion of beings’’ (NA :) takes place between them.
Diotima’s oneness with nature and Hyperion’s linguistic skill and sentimen-
tal inner conflict, ‘‘the holy, free, youthful life of nature’’ and the ‘‘gloomy
wandering’’ (B :f.) are interchanged, the Other made into the Own.
However, Hyperion’s mind, signaled metaphorically in the novel by fire,
will in the end destroy Diotima’s nature. As quiet as she was in life, so is
she ‘‘eloquent’’ in her death, as she herself comments in her final letter.
If the loss of the world and meaning has driven Hyperion into a crisis,
then love balances out the losses. Love generates a new world and a new
meaning, collects ‘‘the scattered powers . . . all into One golden Mean’’ and
makes one ‘‘all-knowing,’’ ‘‘all-seeing,’’ ‘‘all-transfiguring’’ (B :, ). Al-
though Hyperion makes these observations himself, he remains, however,
‘‘blind’’ in his love as well, in contrast to Diotima. Diotima understands him
better than he does himself, and she interprets his friendship with Adamas
and Alabanda completely correctly as compensatory actions. He was look-
ing for a ‘‘more beautiful world’’ and ‘‘embraced’’ this world in his friends.
‘‘You did not want any people, believe me,’’ explains Diotima, ‘‘you wanted
a world,’’ and she prophesies to him: ‘‘Your last place of refuge will be a
grave’’ (B :). She alludes to the temporal nature of friendship and love,
which he, in idealistic delusion, not only deems a concentrate made up of
‘‘golden centuries,’’ but he also raises the prevailing representative in ideal-
istic blindness to the status of a god. The ‘‘slightest doubt about Alabanda’’
drove him of necessity to desperation and changed his ‘‘great joy into dread-
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ful sorrow’’ (B :). Indirectly, she gives him to understand that he is with-
drawing the living foundation from their love out of idealistic exuberance.
In the end, she does in fact draw a connection between her death and this
course of events. She is of the opinion that Hyperion would have ‘‘had the
power to bind [her] to the earth. . . . One [of his] heartfelt glances would
have held [her] fast, One [of his] expressions of love would have made [her]
a happy, healthy child once again.’’ Without Hyperion, she can no longer
exist; she mistakenly believes him, forever separated from her, to be on the
way ‘‘to former freedom’’ (B :f.). It also becomes clear here that more
of Hyperion passed over into Diotima’s being than vice versa. At the end
of the novel, both Hyperion’s beloved and his friend sacrifice themselves
for him.
Diotima designates Hyperion as the educator of the people (B :), just
as Schiller’s Raphael referred his friend Julius to art. Hyperion preaches his
‘‘mysteries’’ of beauty, love, art, and religion (B :) and expands the dis-
course on love, art, and religion in this way to a political discourse: ‘‘without
such a love of beauty, without such religion, every state is a dried-out skele-
ton without life or spirit, and all thought and action are a tree without a
top, a column whose capital has been struck off ’’ (B :). This statement
refers back to both Schiller’s ‘‘aesthetic state’’ as well as to elements in the
‘‘Theosophy of Julius,’’ where love also carries a political connotation. In the
important reports in the first volume of the second book, an additional as-
pect of love presents itself. Love leads Hyperion to more profound insights,
which Diotima ‘‘premonitorily’’ apprehends.When he, taking up an ancient
example of friendship, sums up the function of love and friendship in the
formula, ‘‘Love gave birth to millennia full of living people; friendship will
give birth to them once again,’’ Diotima indicates her equally spontaneous
and instinctive understanding by condensing the formula slightly and re-
peating it, as it were, like an echo. While she succeeds in identifying herself
with Hyperion to such an extent that she endangers her own identity, suf-
ficient elements of his own self remain in effect in his exchange with her.
When Hyperion claims that he has become like her, Diotima answers with
superior insight: ‘‘But you must become a bit quieter for me’’ (B :).
For Hyperion, Diotima is the embodiment of beauty, of the ‘‘One dif-
ferentiating within itself ’’ (Heraclitus), and she is therefore, for him, the
guarantor of art and religion (B :ff., ). She helps him to attain the
self-knowledge that he is lacking. Rather than judging his deficiencies ob-
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jectively or evaluating his skills correctly, he misjudges himself continually.
For this reason, Diotima warns him at the end of the novel: ‘‘Don’t misjudge
yourself ! The lack of material held you back. It didn’t happen fast enough.
That cast you down’’ (B :).41 She therefore advises him to go to Athens,
Italy, Germany, and France in order to acquire what he is missing, that is,
knowledge of human nature and the stuff of life. She regards this type of
educational journey as a necessary prerequisite for his calling as an artist
and educator of the people (B :–). Although he at first concedes that
Diotima is correct (‘‘But I still must go away in order to learn. I am an art-
ist, but I am not skillful. I mold [things] in my mind, but I do not yet know
how to guide my hand’’) (B :) and seems to recognize that he is still in
need of a realistic basis for an idealistic aesthetic mission, he nonetheless
follows Alabanda’s call to take part in the political uprising almost without
any hesitation (B :) so that ‘‘the new world’’ can spring up from ‘‘the
root of humanity’’ (B :). Though he had just been praising his love for
Diotima as the supreme value for which he had forgotten everything else,
he now criticizes it: ‘‘I have become too idle, . . . too peace-loving, too heav-
enly, too lethargic!’’ (B :). Not only does love come into conflict with
friendship, but the vita contemplativa comes into conflict with the vita ac-
tiva, the aesthetic sphere (‘‘the holy theocracy of the beautiful’’) with the
political sphere. Diotima criticizes this sudden turnaround as ‘‘vain high
spirits’’ and prophesies shrewdly: ‘‘The wild combat will tear you to shreds,
beautiful soul; you will age, blessed spirit! And at the end, weary of life,
[you will] ask: where are you all, you ideals of youth?’’ (B :).
In Hyperion, Hölderlin is playing on variants of the sentimental classi-
cal and Romantic love codifications.42 Love is associated with nature, art,
religion, and knowledge. In his friendship with Alabanda, Hyperion falls
victim to the deception of being strong ‘‘like a demigod.’’ He feels himself
to be ‘‘like a conqueror’’ between Diotima and his friend and intends to
surround them like his prey (B :f.). Yet, the two friends celebrate Dio-
tima’s ‘‘festival’’ and the love between her and Hyperion.With Diotima and
Alabanda, two discourses on love are being presented that are in competi-
tion with each other in different phases of the eighteenth century. On the
one hand, friendship guarantees the ennoblement of love (Herder); on the
other hand, it constitutes a three-way relationship (Jacobi, Goethe), which
becomes anathema to the Romantic semantics of love with its binary dis-
tribution of roles. Schleiermacher summarized the difference between love
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and friendship in the following formula: ‘‘Love is intent on making one out
of two; friendship is intent on making two out of each one.’’43 This discrep-
ancy could also be claimed in Hölderlin’s Hyperion. Just as the protago-
nist offsets the loss of an ideal world in his friendship with Adamas and
Alabanda and projected a ‘‘better time’’ (B :) into each of these friend-
ships, so too does Alabanda admit to Hyperion in his confessions about
his life (B :ff.) that ‘‘only their friendship [was his] world, [his] worth,
[his] glory.’’ Strictly speaking, only Diotima attains the ‘‘oneness’’ of ‘‘I’’
and ‘‘you,’’ of the self and the Other in love, whereas, Hyperion misunder-
stands her again and again as a projection of his ‘‘beautiful dreams.’’ What
Diotima says about his friends also holds true for his love for her: ‘‘The loss
of all the golden centuries, just as you felt them, pressed together into One
happy moment, the spirit of all the spirits of a better time, the strength of
all the powers of the heroes, all this is supposed to be replaced for you by
one single person, one human being!’’ (B :).
Not insignificantly, love and friendship illustrate a tergo the faults and
deficiencies of Hyperion. The text signalizes how a hidden competition
comes into being among the people involved, not only, in fact, from Dio-
tima’s perspective (B :f.), but also from the perspectives of Hyperion
(B :f., ) and of Alabanda (B :).When Diotima exhorts her lover
not to forget how to love, Hyperion writes to her that Alabanda is flour-
ishing ‘‘like a bridegroom.’’ After the military action is fully defeated, Ala-
banda rejects a life together as a threesome because he fears that he will
fall in love with Diotima in his radical way. He describes the danger as fol-
lows: ‘‘I betrayed my obligations for the sake of my friend; I would betray
my friendship for the sake of love. For the sake of Diotima, I would betray
you and, in the end, murder Diotima and myself because we were indeed
not One’’ (B :). Although Alabanda considers himself, based on his
energetic nature, to be incapable of the oneness of love, the question posed
by Hyperion, who should actually know better, is nonetheless surprising:
‘‘O why can I not give her [Diotima] to you?’’ (B :). Would he really
have sacrificed his relationship with Diotima for the sake of friendship?
With regard to love and friendship, the end of the epistolary novel pre-
sents us with a chiastically arranged solution. Just as Diotima sacrifices her-
self for Hyperion and his friendship, so too does Alabanda sacrifice himself
for his friend and his friend’s love. Love and friendship, as differently as they
are codified in the novel, bring forth effects that, in the words of Schiller’s
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‘‘Theosophy,’’ ‘‘seem to contradict their nature’’ (NA :). Divested of
all temporality, life and death merge in the ‘‘eternal love’’ [‘‘ewigen Liebe’’]
that, according to Diotima, holds all natures together and links all beings.
This metaphysical codification of love gains acceptance above all within the
context of Romanticism. ‘‘Since the origin of life is, however, at the same
time the point of its return as well,’’ as Günther Dux describes the situa-
tion, ‘‘that unity comes into being which, more than any other unity, char-
acterizes Romanticism: the unity of love and death.’’44 Although the work
of mourning drives Hyperion to alienation from himself and to estrange-
ment from the world (B :), the end of the novel presents us once again
with a dialectic turnaround as well as with a sign of hope on a higher level:
‘‘We represent a finished thing in flux; we separate the great chords of joy
into changing melodies’’ (B :). This is the legacy of Diotima and, via
a more profound oneness with her, Hyperion finally does reach that ‘‘state
of supreme education’’ [‘‘Zustand der höchsten Bildung’’] (B :f.), the
level at which his love-text becomes a philosophy of life:
The discord in the world is like strife between lovers. Reconciliation
exists in the midst of the dispute, and all that has been separated finds
itself together once again.
The blood vessels divide and return to the heart, and Everything is
united, eternal, ardent life (B :).
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Poststructuralist critics have regularly targeted German classicism for
its presumed celebration of humanism, a position that, as the argument
goes, deliberately covers up the deeper concerns and problems of the his-
torical period around . Schiller’s idealism has been especially singled
out for polemical treatment directed against his mature plays as well as his
theoretical writings.1 But also Goethe’s understanding ofMenschlichkeit and
Bildung has come under severe criticism by scholars who feel that the con-
cept of development toward mature adulthood included unacknowledged
but fundamental losses in the formation of the subject.2 Indeed, the stakes
of this debate seem to be very high since it deals with the construction of
the modern subject, as the more insightful readers have pointed out.
Both historical and literary scholarship have shown that fundamental
social and cultural transformations occurred around  in Central and
Western Europe.3 Its most violent manifestation was the French Revolution
in its successful attempt to destroy the ancien régime and replace it with a
new social and political systemwhose ramifications went far beyond the rise
of the French bourgeoisie as the victorious new class. Clearly those coun-
tries that were not immediately touched by the political upheavals of the
Revolution, among them most of the German states, felt the impact and
had to come to terms with the political and social changes that occurred
in France.4 They extended to the areas of education and law, gender con-
struction and ethics, but also to literary production and aesthetic percep-
tion, areas in which the response of German intellectuals became especially
important and far-reaching. Although the ancien régime was allowed to
survive in Germany after  in varying degrees, the German principali-
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ties were confronted with the disintegration of established structures and
had to deal to some extent with ideas that were fundamentally hostile to
the traditional social and cultural order. In many instances the events of
 simply accelerated the impact of these discourses, forcing monarchs
and governments to articulate their responses in terms of new discursive
formations.
The field of education would be one example,5 but it would also per-
tain to the attempts at legal reforms and ideas to rethink the structure of
the family.6 The question of paternal authority had become controversial
under the regime of the Revolution.7 The analogy between the power of the
monarch and the authority of the father, firmly established in older political
theory, especially had lost its unquestionable validity in the revolutionary
republic. It was not accidental that the new concept of freedom and equality
was enunciated in the name of brotherhood. In this respect the execution
of the king was a decisive symbolic turning point of the French Revolution,8
a turning point that was duly and critically noted by the majority of the
German intellectuals who had initially sympathized with the struggle of
the revolutionaries to create a better and more humane society.9 The fall of
the king suggested a lack of law and the threat of anarchy.
I want to argue that German classicism, far from being the highly ele-
vated and socially free-floating literary style that historians have frequently
sought to construct, was very much intertwined with these larger contem-
porary issues. My argument does not propose, however, that this connec-
tion can be understood in terms of an immediate reflection or response,
not to mention a political intervention. These attempts do exist,10 but they
are less relevant for the understanding of the position of German classi-
cism than those works that follow their own poetic and aesthetic concerns
without regard for an immediate impact on the political discourse of the
time. I propose therefore to read two plays, more than once described as
the epitome of the classical style, by focusing on the role of the father. This
emphasis will foreground aspects of these plays that shed light on the fun-
damental structural changes that occurred between  and . The first
play, that is, Goethe’s Iphigenie auf Tauris, was conceived during the s
and completed in its final form by , in other words, before the French
Revolution. Schiller’s play, on the other hand, followed almost two decades
later. Die Braut von Messina, while mentioned by Schiller as a plan already
in  in a letter to his friend Körner, was finally written and published
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in .11 What these plays have in common, however, is an interest in the
revival of the Greek tragedy, an obvious element in the case of Iphigenie,
which relies for its material on ancient sources, among them Euripides, and
thereby also competes with the Greek author.12 In the case of Schiller, on
the other hand, the interest in Greek culture seems to be primarily a formal
one, namely the experiment of a modern author to write a tragedy that
deliberately makes use of the chorus since it was an intrinsic part of Greek
tragedy.13 With respect to the content, Schiller preferred to keep a distance
between his work and the myth that formed the basis of the ancient tragedy.
Yet this conscious decision did not remove him from the very concerns that
determined the core of Greek tragedy, just as Goethe’s decision to remove
the plot from the contemporary scene, did not detach him from modern
definitions of subjectivity.14 When we understand these plays as decidedly
modern explorations of premodern cultures (Greek and medieval) we are
in both instances confronted with the crucial role of the father, not simply
as a matter of plot structure and character analysis, but with his central
function as the embodiment of the law.
The fact that in both plays the real father (as a person) is dead when the
action begins does not diminish his importance for the drama. In fact, the
opposite seems to be true. On the symbolic level, his death increases his
relevance for the structure of the drama. Since the father figures, that is,
Agamemnon and the prince of Messina, are not foregrounded in the devel-
opment of the plot, interpreters have by and large focused their attention on
the interaction between the members of the younger generation, in particu-
lar on the feud between the brothers in Schiller’s play and the relationship
between Iphigenie and Orest in Goethe’s drama. Indeed, at the thematic
level, the father figures seem to belong primarily to the past: an older order
that was characterized by violence and abuse. The action of the drama, on
the other hand, appears to offer a different outlook. While this observation
is pertinent in the case of Iphigenie, it is less clear to what extent the genera-
tional difference implies a difference in attitude in Die Braut von Messina.
One could argue that the sons, Manuel and Cesar, while trying to overcome
the posture of their father, ultimately repeat the paternal pattern of violence
in their own actions. In fact, they are less successful in upholding the law
than their father. Still, as I will argue, the brothers make a serious attempt
to subdue the state of civil war through establishing a brotherly bond sug-
gested by their mother. It is the ultimate failure of this new maternal bond
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that marks the end of the play, where the sons are symbolically swallowed
by the still open grave of their father.
The transformation from an older, in this case, mythic law to a new
law of human communication through emotional transparency is openly
the theme of Goethe’s play, as a comparison with Euripides’ drama will
make clear.15 While Euripides places the emphasis on the difference between
Greek culture and the cruel customs of the barbarians, which have to be
defeated through cunning, Goethe shifts the emphasis toward the internal
conflict of Greek culture. Greek civilization is as much involved in the blind
repetition of crime and guilt that characterizes the barbarian order. The
extreme horrors of the family of Tantalus that Iphigenie discloses in her
dialogue with Thoas and the emotional pathology of Orest, who feels per-
secuted by the Erinyes for the murder of his mother, indicate the enduring
power of the old law. Ultimately there seems to be no fundamental differ-
ence between the culture of the Taurians and that of the Greeks. Therefore,
the defeat of the old law, the theme of Goethe’s play, cannot be structured
along the lines of a Greek identity that can be set off against a foreign, less
valuable culture. Thus we will have to address how Goethe’s play performs
the metamorphosis that Euripides’ play simply structures according to pre-
conceived notions of cultural difference.
There is no obvious parallel to this constellation in Schiller’s play since
the cultural and ethnic differences between the ruling princes, who are of
Norman extraction, and the mass of the indigenous population are used
in a very different way. The text points to an idyllic past determined by
peace and harmony with nature before the intrusion of the Normans. But
this state is no longer available in the contemporary world of feudal hierar-
chies and power struggles. Hence the Schillerian question is whether there
can be a future peaceful order without simple regression to the idyllic state.
Whether there is an answer to this question is controversial among Schiller
scholars. I will argue that the transformation actually does not take place.
The tragic ending defines the impossibility of establishing a new law. The
law of the dead father is questioned but not broken.
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Goethe’s drama shares with that of Euripides an untragic ending. Iphi-
genie and Orest are allowed to return to Greece. But there the similarity
ends.While in Euripides’ play the Greeks owe their rescue exclusively to the
intervention of Athena after the failure of the ruse, Goethe reconceives the
motivation for the decision of Thoas to let the Greek party leave. Pylades’
plan to flee with Orest and Iphigenie while Thoas and his army are waiting
for the ritual purification of the sacrificial victims fails because Iphigenie
decides to give the plan away (IV:). Her refusal to betray Thoas, to treat
him, as it were, not as a barbarian who deserves to be outwitted, but as
a subject of equal value, changes the development of the plot in the fifth
act. Thoas, after regaining control over the prisoners and his priestess, not
only must decide the fate of the prisoners, but he must make up his mind
about the significance andmeaning of traditional law. To sacrifice Orest and
Pylades, as he had menaced in anger, implies the return to the old order of
guilt and retribution that had characterized his culture before the arrival of
Iphigenie. The custom of human sacrifice that had already been abolished
under the influence of the Greek priestess threatens to return, seemingly
justified by the betrayal of Iphigenie and her relatives. Greek civilization, as
Thoas points out not without some justification, only gives the impression
of a higher degree of cultivation while its ground is as bloody and inhumane
as the world of the barbarians. But is is precisely not the old law of Greek
myth that Iphigenie mentions in her discussion with Thoas. When Thoas
invokes an old law that demands human sacrifce (V:), Iphigenie responds
by suggesting the existence of a prior law:16
Wir fassen ein Gesetz begierig an,
Das unsrer Leidenschaft zur Waffe dient.
Ein andres spricht zu mir, ein älteres,
Mich dir zu widersetzen; das Gebot
Dem jeder Fremde heilig ist.
(–)
We are most willing to appeal to laws
When we can make them weapons of our wishes.
I know another law, one still more ancient,
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Which tells me to resist you: by that law
All strangers are considered sacred.
(–)
In fact, the older law is older only in the sense of being more fundamen-
tal and therefore more demanding than the rule of ritual human sacrifice,
whether it is applied among the Taurians or among the Greeks, for instance,
when Agamemnon was prepared to sacrifice his own daughter for the bene-
fit of the Greek war expedition. Iphigenie’s plea to Thoas to spare the lives
of the prisoners therefore calls on her own experience as the victim of a
ritual killing in order to persuade the king of the futility of ritual violence.
(‘‘Beschönige nicht die Gewalt,’’ [] / ‘‘Enough! Why lend false colour to
an act / Of force . . .’’) The dialogue of the fifth act, dominated by the ex-
changes between Thoas and Iphigenie, brings about the change of mind in
Thoas that finally enables Iphigenie to leave the Taurians with her brother
and Pylades without fear of retribution. Yet it is only the consensus of the
king, his willingness to embrace and support Iphigenie’s departure with his
‘‘lebt wohl [fare well]’’ (), the final words of the drama that confirm the
acceptance of the new law.
This resolution of the dramatic conflict has been celebrated as the victory
of humanism because the heroine overcomes the forces of barbarism.17 But
can this solution indeed function as a model for a politics of humanism?
Its application in the social world might be deemed as naive at best when
real lives are at stake, for what is the likelihood that the king does not carry
out his threat to have the prisoners executed. Brecht’s play Der gute Mensch
von Sezuan reflects exactly on this dilemma of idealism when the heroine
can maintain her position of purity and goodness only by splitting herself
into two personae, where the ‘‘bad’’ cousin has to do all the unfriendly and
mean things to guarantee the survival of the good woman and her child.
In the ‘‘real’’ world, the claims of idealism do not carry much weight. But
it is precisely this pragmatism that points to the weakness of an interpreta-
tion of Goethe’s play that posits it as a model for political ethics. Iphigenie’s
near-fatal decision to abandon the agreed-upon plan of cunning by telling
Thoas the ruse responds to a different cultural and moral configuration,
clearly a modern one that Euripides could not have shared or even under-
stood. What is at stake here is the possibility of complete transparency in
the interaction between human beings and especially between members of
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a family. To be sure, Euripides’ play invokes family relations, in particular
the relationship between Orest and his sister. Yet they are not in the same
sense at the center of the tradegy as they are in Goethe’s Iphigenie, which
cannot conceal its proximity to the modern domestic tragedy.
It is not accidental therefore that Goethe introduces two elements that
are completely missing in Euripides: first, the love interest of Thoas in Iphi-
genie and second, Iphigenie’s attitude toward Thoas. These elements are
skillfully combined to move the action along. It is Thoas’s wish to marry
Iphigenie and her refusal to accept his proposal that bring about the deci-
sion of the angry king to return to the custom of human sacrifice. At the
same time, Iphigenie’s insistence to see in Thoas a second father motivates
her resolution to tell him the secret plan. In other words, for Iphigenie there
are two families, namely her family of origin, that is, the family of Tanta-
lus, and her filial relationship to Thoas, whose trust she has won and in
whom she has faith. While the first family depends on bonds of blood, the
second relies on a spiritual bond. In both instances Iphigenie is aware of
her filial duty, but there is a substantial difference in its nature: While the
bonds of the family of origin are imposed on her and leave her only the
role of the victim or unsuccessful rescuer, Iphigenie’s sense of duty in her
attitude toward Thoas empowers her to take action and to resist the return
of the old law through the very figure of Thoas, whom she had previously
persuaded to give up human sacrifice. The plot elements that Goethe added
suggest the need for a rereading of the play, in which the role of the father
receives greater emphasis.
In the context of Greek myth, the story of the family of Tantalus and in
particular the fate of Orest, who is called upon to revenge the death of his
father by killing his own mother, points to a shift from a matrilinear to a
patrilinear definition of the family.18 The power of the Erinyes, whose perse-
cution Orest cannot escape even after the ritual purification by the court in
Athens, represents an older matriarchal law, which then was superseded by
the patriarchal law of the Olympian gods (in Euripides’ tragedy embodied
by Pallas Athene). Now the killing of the father emerges as the most severe
crime, a crime for which neither Orest nor Iphigenie is responsible. Still,
the Greek myth, as it is represented by Euripides, does not fundamentally
challenge the law of guilt and retribution. It only shifts the emphasis from
the mother to the father.
I want to argue that Goethe’s drama, through its reconfiguration of the
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role of the father, does indeed challenge the concept of law as it is defined
in myth.19 For this reason, his play revises the concept of the imaginary as
well as the symbolic father, to use Lacanian terminology,20 by introducing a
second father figure. While Agamemnon and Thoas are initially similar—
namely, both grounded in the old law of sacrifice—they ultimately become
rather different figures. Iphigenie’s bond with the dead, murderous father,
which incidentally she never denies or rejects, is replaced by the attachment
to Thoas, the spiritual father, who finally grants her independence and free-
dom. Therefore, this transition, which begins to emerge in the first act and
comes to fruition only in the last scene of Act V, has to be considered in
more detail.
Iphigenie’s struggle with Thoas, first about his feelings toward her and
later about the fate of the Greek prisoners, involves more than the charac-
ter of the man who has held her as a prisoner in his country. In the cru-
cial scene (IV:), it becomes quite clear that Thoas figures as an imaginary
father as well, who has replaced the dark image of Agamemnon. By call-
ing him ‘‘mein zweiter Vater’’ () [‘‘my second father’’ ()], Iphigenie
invokes a different kind of relationship in which she becomes the subject.
For Iphigenie this new father image is closely linked to a new cultural and
legal order without human sacrifice and instrumental rationality. This is
precisely the instance where she differs from Pylades, who presents his plan
as justified by fate:
Du weigerst dich umsonst; die ehrne Hand
Der Not gebietet und ihr ernster Wink
Ist oberstes Gesetz dem Götter selbst
Sich unterwerfen müssen. Schweigend herrscht
Des ewgen Schicksals unberatne Schwester.
(–)
It is vain to resist; the brazen hand
Of stern Necessity, its supreme law
Must overrule us, for the gods themselves
Obey it. Silently it reigns, the sister
Of everlasting Fate, and heeds no counsel.
Bear what it has imposed upon you, do
What it commands.
(–)
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It is the image of the second father that encourages her to define her own
independent position in the conflict between the Greeks and the Taurians.
Against Pylades’ invocation of fate as the ultimate measure of human exis-
tence, she sets her claim for a subjective but irreducible ethical norm based
on her ‘‘Bild [image]’’ of the father and, by extension, that of the gods.
Contemplating her situation after Pylades has left her, she exclaims to the
gods:
Rettet mich
Und rettet euer Bild in meiner Seele.
(–)
Save me, and save your image in my soul!
()
It is noteworthy that the parental relationship is exclusively emphasized
by Iphigenie (Thoas prefers to see her as a woman and future wife). To put it
differently, the relationship is not a given one but rather a process. Iphigenie
has created the image of the second father in order to define her own ethical
identity, a ground that can no longer be destroyed by the law of fate. Hence,
in a reversal of the traditional pattern, the figure of the new father has to
be educated. Iphigenie has persuaded Thoas to relinquish the old custom
of sacrificing all foreigners. But in the play, Thoas resists the completion of
this education when his understanding of the relationship to Iphigenie is
not accepted by her. When Thoas questions her right to claim superiority
for Greek culture, Iphigenie replies:
Es hört sie [die Stimme der Wahrheit und Menschlichkeit, PUH] jeder
Geboren unter jedem Himmel, dem
Des Lebens Quelle durch den Busen rein
Und ungehindert fließt—
(–)
All men can hear it [the voice of truth and human kindness, PUH],
born in any land,
If they have hearts through which the stream of life
Flows pure and unimpeded—
(–)
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By shifting the argument fromThoas’s doubt about the supremacy of Greek
law to the claim of a universal concept of truth and humanity, which will
by definition include the barbarians as well as the cultivated Greeks, she
reinforces her definition of the father as a spiritual force. Thoas the man is
not at the center of her concerns, but the concept of Thoas as a generous
and feeling father.
O reiche mir die Hand zum Friedenszeichen.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Um Guts zu tun braucht’s keiner Überlegung.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Der Zweifel ist’s der Gutes böse macht.
Bedenke nicht, gewähre wie du’s fühlst.
(–)
Oh now make peace with me, give me your hand!
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Why need we ponder whether to do good?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
It is by doubt that good is turned to evil.
Do not reflect; give as your heart dictates!
(–)
By stressing the need for an emotional decision, Iphigenie blocks the re-
course to a form of rationality that is built on the old law as, for instance,
Pylades had invoked it. Now the trust of the daugther is expressed in terms
of a discourse of feeling. Yet we have to note that the content of this dis-
course is the universal claim for a humane order that replaces the mythic
law of guilt and retribution.
The symbolic father in whose name the law is imposed and who regu-
lates desire intervenes in Goethe’s play by virtue of someone incarnating
this function, but in a veiled fashion. In this instance, however, it is not the
discourse of the mother who mediates between child and law, but the dis-
course of the daughter, who finds herself in the position of an orphan in
search of her own imaginary father. Iphigenie’s wish to return to Greece
with her brother, who is the last surviving male descendant of the family,
reinforces the patrilinear symbolic order. At no point is she tempted to
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speak in the name of the mother or to take up the cause of the violated
mother against her brother. Still, there is a strong element of rejection in
Iphigenie’s actions, namely her stern refusal to yield to the demands of fate
as an inescapable power.

Schiller’s play, by contrast, moves toward a tragic ending with the sui-
cide of Don Cesar after he killed Don Manuel in a fit of jealousy. While
philosophically-oriented Schiller criticism has tended to view this ending
as an affirmation of a moral resolution of the play,21 a number of more re-
cent interpretations have taken issue with this reading and suggested that
Cesar’s state of mind before he takes his own life does not permit such
a conclusion.22 Yet this critical disagreement remains irresolvable as long
as the explications of the play focus exclusively on the interaction of the
characters. While references to other tragedies of Schiller such as Maria
Stuart and Schiller’s theoretical essays are helpful to support interpretative
claims, they are by no means compelling. One can with equal justification
advance another line of argument in which the concept of fate is given a
more prominent role: The tragic ending proves the intended proximity of
the drama to Greek tragedy (especially to Oedipus the King by Sophocles
as the quintessential analytic play). In this reading the characters are, of
course, perceived as objects of fateful connections rather than as subjects
who are called upon to make moral decisions.23 It may turn out, however,
that these interpretations are ultimately more compatible than commonly
assumed. The mediating element could be the very configuration that de-
fines Sophocles’ Oedipus play, that is, the Oedipal triangle.24 However, the
basic conflict between the father and the son who desires his mother, as
Freud has described the dramatic constellation in more abstract terms,25 re-
mains more hidden in Schiller’s play by the fact that the initial rivalry for the
love of the mother is shifted toward the brothers and then replaced by the
quarrel of Don Manuel and Don Cesar for the love of the mysterious young
woman, who turns out to be no other than their lost sister. The threat of
mother-son incest would be replaced by the menace of brother-sister incest
as the underlying violation of the law. Yet this potential infraction, which
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the dead father tried to avoid by his order to have the younger daughter
killed immediately after her birth, only repeats the act of the father, who
took away and married the bride of his own father. For this reason, the an-
cestor had cursed the family. This curse then is acknowledged in the play
by the dreams of the father and the mother about the future of the family.
While these dreams seem to stand in opposition (extinction of the family
in the dream of the father, and strengthening of the family in the mother’s
dream), they actually predict the same event: the fatal conflict among the
brothers over the love of their sister. The power of desire, at the center of
which is the mother, respectively the sister, drives the action to the expected
tragic ending.
Some Schiller critics have resisted this interpretation by arguing that its
affinity to a Greek concept of fate could not reflect Schiller’s understanding
of subjectivity as it is documented in his other dramas.26 I want to suggest,
however, that Schiller’s play derives its dramatic conflict precisely from the
underlying but unrecognized Oedipal triangle in which the protagonists
strive to overcome the curse of guilt by establishing a new and different
order for family and state. They ultimately fail in this attempt since they
remain entangled in the mire of desire. In other words, the point of depar-
ture for the reading of the play should be the dead father in his relationship
to his wife and his children.
All references in the drama to his attitude and his actions show him as
a strong but also reckless and self-centered ruler who does not hesitate to
exert his power in violent forms when he deems it necessary. The most egre-
gious deed is of course the decision to have his own daughter killed because
she might be a threat to the dynasty. At the same time, he is capable of
suppressing the destructive rivalry and hostility among his sons. It is not
accidental, therefore, that civil war breaks out immediately after his unex-
pected death. This is the situation at the opening of the play when Isabella,
his widow, has to consult with the elders about the present calamity. Her
summary of the former husband’s life places the emphasis on his function
as ruler:27
Nicht dreimal hat der Mond die Lichtgestalt
Erneut, seit ich den fürstlichen Gemahl
Zu seiner letzten Ruhestätte trug,
Der mächtigwaltend dieser Stadt gebot,
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Mit starkem Arme gegen eine Welt
Euch schützend, die euch feindlich rings umlagert.
(–)
The moon its luminous form has not yet twice
Renewed since I my princely spouse conducted
Down to his final resting place, the same
Who ruled this city with his strong arm against
A world that hemmed you hostilely about.
(–)
As it turns out, protection was needed as much against the actions of his
own sons, whose rivalry did not respect the bounds of the law:
Zwar weil der Vater noch gefürchtet herrschte,
Hielt er durch gleicher Strenge furchtbare
Gerechtigkeit die Heftigbrausenden im Zügel,
Und unter eines Joches Eisenschwere
Bog er vereinend ihren starren Sinn.
(–)
While yet their father, fear-inspiring, ruled,
He held their wayward turbulence in check
By the dread justness of his own impartial sternness.
Beneath a single yoke of iron weight
He bent their stubborn spirits to a union.
(–)
The forceful but violent law of the ruler could only repress, but not heal,
the hatred among his sons. Therefore, his death results in civil war leaving
the unprepared mother with the task of restoring peace and order. Her ap-
proach differs markedly from that of her husband. Where the latter used
force, she implores her sons to stop the fighting.
Ich warf mit dem zerrißnen Mutterherzen
Mich zwischen die Ergrimmten, Friede rufend—
Unabgeschreckt, geschäftigt, unermüdlich
Beschickt ich sie, den einen um den andern,
Bis ich erhielt durch mütterliches Flehn,
Daß sies zufrieden sind, in dieser Stadt
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Messina, in dem väterlichen Schloß,
Unfeindlich sich von Angesicht zu sehen,
Was nie geschah, seitdem der Fürst verschieden.
(–)
And with my shattered mother’s heart I threw
Myself between the madmen, crying Peace!
Undaunted, eagerly, and tirelessly
I sent word to them, first one then the other,
Till I prevailed with my maternal pleas
That they consent to meet each other in
Messina and in their paternal castle
Without hostility, a thing which had
Not happened since the Prince their father died.
(–)
Although she has chosen the ‘‘väterliche Schloß’’ as the appropriate place
for the restoration of peace, her diplomatic procedure relies on suggestions
and supplication, thereby preparing the stage for a peaceful resolution of
the conflict, but also, as it turns out, unknowingly preparing the ground
for the return of the hatred.
Isabella appears to succeed in bringing her sons together and thereby
ending the civil war because she follows a more personal strategy. Where
the father used force, she appeals to the heart and calls on the natural bonds
among the members of the family.
O meine Söhne! Feindlich ist die Welt
Und falsch gesinnt! Es liebt ein jeder nur
Sich selbst; unsicher, los und wandelbar
Sind alle Bande, die das leichte Glück
Geflochten—Laune löst, was Laune knüpfte—
Nur die Natur ist redlich! Sie allein
Liegt an dem ewgen Ankergrunde fest,
Wenn alles andre auf den sturmbewegtenWellen
Des Lebens unstet treibt—
(–)
The world is hostile, o my sons! and false
Of disposition. Each man loves himself
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Alone; uncertain, loose, and changeable
Are all the bonds that Fortune ever wove,—
Caprice disjoins what by Caprice was joined,—
Nature alone is honest. She alone
Stands fast on the eternal anchor-bottom
When all things else upon the storm-tossed waves of life
Unsteadily go drifting.
(–)
In fact the strong emotional ties of love among members of the core family
(in this instance the mother and the sons) seem to prevail over the negative
emotions that resulted in civil war. Isabella suggests that the hatred between
Manuel and Cesar can be broken because it went back to their childhood
and therefore was not the decision of adults. This rationalization, of course,
underestimates the ambivalence of these feelings and therefore the possi-
bility of their reoccurrence as soon as a new object of desire comes into view
that would renew the rivalry.
What remains unexplored in this celebration of harmonious union is the
involvement of the mother as the underlying cause of the rivalry. As the
agent of family diplomacy, she cannot see that the search for her affection
was the mysterious, unexplored cause of the hatred in the first place. For
this reason her words must remain conflicted. While she means to restore
the law of the father in the public realm, her desire for reconciliation among
her children is built on bonds of love.
In eures Vaters Gruft werft ihn hinab,
Den alten Haß der frühen Kinderzeit!
Der schönen Liebe sei das neue Leben,
Der Eintracht, der Versöhnung seis geweiht.
(–)
Into your father’s tomb cast down the ancient
Hatred of your early childhood years!
To love let your new life be dedicated,
To harmony, to reconciliation.
(–)
Of course, the development of the action proves her wrong. As soon as
the brothers realize that they are in love with the same woman, they fall
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back on their familiar pattern of rivalry and hatred. Therefore, the question
has to be raised why there was a moment at all when they could love and
respect each other. The answer has to do with another element of the plot
Schiller criticism has for the most part treated as a conventional element,
namely the fact that both brothers had independently discovered and fallen
in love with their unknown sister before they met. The reconciliation was
possible, I want to suggest, because the sons had shifted their desire from
the mother to the sister. In other words, we are dealing with a displace-
ment of the original Oedipal conflict. Since the father is already dead, the
rivalry is carried out among the sons themselves who found another image
for their original desire, that is, the sister. Hence the reason for the possi-
bility of peace is also the reason for the later continuation of the hostility.
The brothers cannot escape their own fixation.
In the critical literature, the figure of Isabella has been judged as a prag-
matic, and to some extent manipulative, politician who wants to save the
rule of her dynasty. There is no doubt that she means to bring back order
to the city of Messina. But the exact nature of this order is rarely consid-
ered. While she invokes the name of the father, it is by no means certain
that she simply wants to restore the order of the dead ruler. The textual
evidence seems to point to a different direction, for the invocation of the
family ties under the concept of nature [Natur] restructures the political
order along the lines of feelings rather than decisions based on rational self-
interest. Again, this means, as it did in Goethe’s Iphigenie, that the structure
of communication has to be transformed. Since the disorder of civil war is
grounded in the personal animosity of the brothers, the political solution
seems to lie in the overcoming of these feelings, as well. Isabella’s under-
standing of the new order, I would argue, is significantly different from that
of her dead husband. It would be a politics of personal bonds and love.
Emotional transparency among members of the family appears to be at the
center of this idea of a peaceful rule where the mother mediates between
her sons. Thus it is not without significance that Isabella urges her sons to
throw their mutual hatred into the open grave of the father.
Schiller’s tragedy demonstrates, however, that this new order cannot ma-
terialize sinceManuel and Cesar resume their antagonistic stance when they
find out that they are in love with the same woman. The reason for the
failure has to be carefully considered. At the psychological level, the tragic
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ending is motivated by the rigid and blind jealousy of the brothers. In the
context of the logic of fate, the murder of Don Manuel is the unexpected
but consistent fulfillment of the omen (for which no individual is respon-
sible). In psychoanalytical terms, the Oedipal conflict, seemingly resolved
by the end of the first act, returns in its displaced form in act II and radi-
cally undermines the plans of the mother. It is noteworthy that Isabella fails
to persuade her son Cesar that in her role as his sister, Beatrice cannot be
his lover or wife. The law of the father, which prohibits not only incest be-
tween mother and son but also marriage between sister and brother, is not
respected. What ultimately happens after the murder of Don Manuel is a
return to the old law of the father. Isabella realizes that her hopes for a new
era of peace built on love and trust have been crushed.
Da liegen meine Hoffnungen—Sie stirbt
Im Keim, die junge Blume eures Friedens,
Und keine schöne Früchte sollt ich schauen.
(–)
There lie my hopes. And it has died a bud,
That tender blossom of your harmony,
And I shall not live to behold fair fruits.
(–)
Even her desperate attempt to embrace the murderous Don Cesar as the
heir and ruler fails. For Don Cesar, a similar breakdown of hopes and aspi-
rations occurs. His initial shock results from his mother declaring his dead
brother to be the favorite son. Moreover, Beatrice does not show the hoped-
for sympathy with his dilemma. In short, he realizes that he can neither
be the favorite son nor the lover of Beatrice. This insight prepares him for
the final step, namely his self-execution for the murder of Don Cesar. The
realization of his guilt is the final turning point in his struggle to distance
himself from mother and sister and accept solidarity with his dead brother.
Nein, Bruder! Nicht dein Opfer will ich dir
Entziehen—deine Stimme aus dem Sarg
Ruft mächtger dringend als der Mutter Tränen
Und mächtger als der Liebe Flehn—
(–)
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No, Brother, I shall not deprive you of
Your sacrificial victim—From your coffin
Your voice more strongly calls than Mother’s tears,
More strongly than the plea of love.
(–)
Ultimately Cesar andManuel will share the grave with the father, which had
been left open after the ceremonial burial because of the warring among
the brothers. The final lines of the chorus seal and affirm Cesar’s decision
and thereby the law of the father: ‘‘Das Leben ist der Güter höchstes nicht, /
Der Übel größtes aber ist die Schuld ’’ (–). ‘‘Of all possessions life is
not the highest, / The worst of evils is, however, guilt’’ (–).

While both Goethe and Schiller took the material for their plays from
historically distant periods, they foregrounded a modern element, namely
the centrality of the core family. What we observed in the case of Iphigenie
auf Tauris, that is, its proximity to the modern domestic drama, can be
extended to Die Braut von Messina. The feudal setting allows Schiller to en-
large domestic conflicts in which the nature of the family can be tested.
This family, however, is not, as one might expect, the ‘‘ganze Haus’’ of the
corporate society;28 instead, the new family restricts itself to parents and
children and, moreover, redefines its purpose in pedagogical terms. In this
context the father functions primarily as the teacher and spiritual adviser
of his children, while the mother is left with the task of primary care. The
restructuring of the family, which occurred in the second half of the eigh-
teenth century, shifted the expectations and the tasks of its members.29 The
more the family lost its traditional economic functions, the more it assumed
nurturing and pedagogical functions, some of which became the preroga-
tive of the father. In Gellert’s novel Das Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von
G., for example, the education of the young heroine is taken over by a pater-
nal figure as soon as she is old enough to receive formal instruction.30 For
the adolescent, as Lessing’s plays demonstrate with great clarity, it is the
father rather than the mother who becomes the central parental relation.
Consequently, the mother is either absent (Miß Sara Sampson, Nathan der
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Weise) or plays a minor and problematic role (Emilia Galotti). Unlike the
love of the mother, which remains possessive, the love of the ideal father is
oriented toward a final step of setting the adolescent free. The young person
is ultimately encouraged to leave the family of origin. As Friedrich Kitt-
ler has pointed out, in Lessing’s plays, the father assumes the function of
cultural reproduction.31 In this process, his spiritual nature (which mani-
fests itself in his pedagogical concerns rather than his natural, biological
character) is important. Thus, Nathan takes over the education of his step-
daughter Recha, leaving only the primary-care function to Daja, the surro-
gate mother. In the discourse of the Enlightenment, the preponderance of
the spiritual father, who is not necessarily identical with the natural father,
determines the ideal order of the family.
Around , however, we witness a second transformation. As Kitt-
ler and Rüdiger Steinlein have argued,32 the discourse about the internal
structure of the nuclear family began to shift in such a way that now the
mother is assigned the function of nurturing and educating the child. The
network of interaction, especially its emotional side, is based on the inter-
face between the mother and the small child, thus relegating the father to
the margins. The mother-child dyad becomes the central axis because its
prerational nature compensates for the losses that occurred in the child’s
experience when the members of the larger household became more and
more excluded from interaction with the family.While the pedagogical dis-
course of the Enlightenment did not fully recognize these shifts and favored
the father as the chosen educator, as can be gleaned from the children’s lit-
erature of the late eighteenth century, the pedagogical ideas of the Romantic
generation stressed the primary role of the mother.33 The Romantic notion
of education is mother-centered.
In the context of this social and cultural transformation, the classical
plays of Goethe and Schiller deserve special attention. For one thing, they
obviously do not fit neatly into the historical scheme developed by Kittler
and Steinlein. It would be difficult to describe Iphigenie as mother-centered.
In fact, there seems to be an avoidance of any serious exploration of Kly-
temnestra’s fate. Iphigenie is much more interested in the well-being of her
brother, the murderer of her mother, than in a discussion of her death.
Goethe’s play seems to continue, therefore, the tradition of Lessing’s Na-
than, where the resolution of the conflict lies in the hands of the spiritual
father, who is distinct from the deceased biological father. Yet there is also
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an important, even crucial, difference. Goethe’s daughter-father relation-
ship is decidedly more complex, for Iphigenie has to confront contrasting
father images: on the one hand, the murderous father in Agamemnon and,
on the other, the generous, benevolent father in Thoas. The process of edu-
cation, however, is not controlled by Thoas; instead, it is Iphigenie who as-
sumes the function of cultural reproduction. By transferring the moment of
agency from the father figure to the daughter, a revision of the law itself be-
comes possible. At the end of the drama, Thoas not only sets Iphigenie free,
thereby demonstrating that he has overcome his initial desire to possess her,
but he accepts and hence confirms a new formulation of the paternal law,
which is now grounded in bonds of love and mutual recognition among
the family members. To put it differently, the norms of the idealized core
family become universal laws.
One might possibly argue that Schiller’s play is mother-centered. After
all, Isabella appears as the mediator between the feuding sons. But the
scheme miscarries because she ultimately fails in her new role as educator.
She cannot permanently inscribe the new moral and political order based
on feelings of love and recognition into her sons since she remains herself
a possessive mother who is unable to set the sons free. Through the attach-
ment to the daughter, who replaces the function of the mother, DonManuel
and Don Cesar stay fixated in their desire. Hence the old patrilinear order
reasserts itself after the murder of Don Manuel as the only law available to
Don Cesar. He dies in fulfillment of this law, rejecting both mother and sis-
ter/bride. Yet this ending does not contain the innovation we observed in
Goethe’s Iphigenie. The tragic ending ofDie Braut von Messina affirms, even
celebrates, the old paternal law, but it closes off the revisions that can be
recognized in Goethe’s play. Schiller, it seems, chose a traditional resolution
to the conflict. One alternative would have been a drama in which Isabella
became the heroine who supplanted the law of the dead husband with a new
order based on familial bonds of love and recognition.Why did Schiller re-
sist this recoding that the Romantics embraced? It appears that Schiller was
unwilling to radicalize the configuration to an extent that it would affirm
incestuous relationships, as Novalis did in Klingsohr’s fairy tale in Heinrich
von Ofterdingen. In such a reconfiguration, the erotic desire would reach
an extrafamilial goal, if at all, only through the mediation of the desiring
and desired mother. This model, however, basically undermines the cul-
tural reproduction as it was organized in a patrilinear order. Schiller was
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not prepared to support such a discursive shift. It is worth noting, how-
ever, thatDie Braut von Messina at least experiments with this constellation.
Only in the last act is this solution firmly rejected in favor of the paternal
law. The price of this return to a level of moral decisions, as it occurs when
Don Cesar declares that he can no longer live after his murderous deed, is
the loss of the utopian propensity that we find in the ending of Goethe’s
Iphigenie auf Tauris.
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 Allusions to and Inversions of
Plato in Hölderlin’s Hyperion
 . 
The importance of Plato for German idealism cannot be overesti-
mated. Whereas Kant’s ethics, with its principle of noncontradiction, owes
a great deal to Socrates, the influence of Plato is especially prominent in
the reemergence of objective idealism, with its claim that nature is neither
foreign to human consciousness nor the result of human consciousness,
but the manifestation of an objective principle that constitutes both nature
and human consciousness. Hölderlin believed in the existence of such ob-
jectivity, which represents not one sphere among others, but is itself the
essence of all spheres—nature, consciousness, and intersubjectivity. Höl-
derlin was greatly influenced by Plato, but he did not simply represent
Plato’s positions in modernity, he reworked and revised them, especially in
his novel Hyperion.1 As with many cases of literary paternity, Hölderlin’s
relationship to Plato is marked by both appropriation and differentiation.
Correspondingly, this paper has two parts: it discusses allusions to Plato in
Hyperion, including a number of previously unrecognized allusions (I), and
it analyzes the ways in which Hölderlin inverts some of Plato’s positions in
order to establish his own version of objective idealism (II).

‘‘I believe that in the end we’ll all say: sacred Plato, forgive us! You
have been gravely wronged’’ (:).2 Thus ends the preface to the penulti-
mate version of Hyperion.What does Hölderlin mean with this prominent
suggestion? In what way has modernity ignored Plato’s wisdom? The pref-
ace opens with a reflection on the greatness of Greek antiquity, including
its concept of beauty. Hölderlin redefines originality as depth of insight,
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not newness of creation: ‘‘I wouldn’t wish in the least that it be original.
Originality is for us novelty; and there is nothing dearer to me than what
is as old as the world. / To me originality is sincerity, depth of heart and
spirit. But nowadays one appears to want to know very little about this,
at least in art’’ (:).3 Hölderlin then develops his triadic notion of his-
tory: an original unity, ‘‘blissful unity, being, in the only true sense of the
word,’’ has been lost, and we must embrace this loss, if we are to achieve
the higher state of reconstituting unity through consciousness. Our goal is
‘‘the peace of all peace, which is higher than all reason.’’ Neither ‘‘knowl-
edge’’ nor ‘‘action,’’ the spheres of Kant’s first and second critiques and the
two modes Schleiermacher discusses in the second of his Speeches on Reli-
gion, will lead us there; knowledge and action are relegated to the sphere
of infinite approximation. Beauty differs: ‘‘that infinite union, that being,
in the only true sense of the word . . . is present—as beauty’’ (:–).
Hölderlin’s paean to Plato follows.
For Hölderlin, poetry is not the creation of what is new; it is a recollec-
tion of what is already present. The contemplation of beauty awakens this
recollection—both of originary unity and of the dissonance integral to a
higher harmony. Not poiesis but anamnesis is the guiding force. It is for this
reason as much as any other that Heidegger elevates Hölderlin in his cri-
tique of the verum-factum principle that dominates Western metaphysics:
for Hölderlin, in contrast to much of the Western tradition, truth is not
what is made. For Plato, as for Hölderlin, truth and beauty are not creations
of the subject, but objective forces already present. They must be uncovered
and recollected: like Heidegger after him, Hölderlin employs a concept of
truth derived from the Greek aletheia, or unconcealment.4 Both in the con-
cept of originary ‘‘all-unity’’ and in his emphasis on narrative recollection,
Hölderlin’s character aligns himself with the Platonic concept of knowledge
as recollection or anamnesis. Hyperion even evokes the Platonic concept of
a ‘‘pre-Elysium,’’ which is an equally mythic representation of preexisting,
rather than subjectively created, truth.5
The Platonic doctrine of anamnesis suggests that there is truth (or
knowledge) that precedes experience and is nonetheless not hypothetical.
Ideas do not have their origin in experience; on the contrary, experience
presupposes certain (eternal) ideas and itself strives to recognize them (cf.
Phaedo ff). What the doctrine of anamnesis captures mythologically,
Kant calls synthetic a priori knowledge. But where ideas have for Kant only
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regulative validity, for Plato and Hölderlin they have ontological valence:
they are not chimeras of consciousness, but present in experience. More-
over, according to Hölderlin, what is eternally valid, what is to be recol-
lected, is best grasped aesthetically.6 Through divine possession, or through
what Hölderlin likes to call intellectual intuition, the poet has an initial
grasp of preexisting unity and eternal truth.
Because truth already exists, our task is to uncover its essence. Plato ar-
gues that we can be virtuous because humanity is potentially already vir-
tuous; virtue as the essence of humanity is reached through reflection on
this essence. In a similar vein, Hyperion receives from Adamas in letter four
the invocation of his essence, through his name, in its parallel to the sun:
‘‘Be, like this! Adamas cried’’ (:), which is reinforced by Diotima in let-
ter twenty-eight: ‘‘your namesake, the glorious Hyperion of the heavens, is
in you’’ (:). This idea, also invoked by way of the concept of the ‘‘god
in us,’’ reaches back beyond the Stoics to the Platonic concept of a daemon
(:).7 Development for Plato and Hölderlin presupposes knowledge or
recollection [Erinnerung] as a path into oneself, into one’s essence, which
is ideally an analogue of the higher sphere.8
Hölderlin’s view of nature, which deviates from the subjective idealist
view, is related to this evocation of Plato. For Hölderlin, as for the father of
objective idealism, nature is not an extension of ourselves; it has, as a mani-
festation of objectivity, its own dignity and purposefulness and contains
within itself the ultimate harmony sought by humanity; it is to be honored
and embraced as an independent reflection of the absolute.9 The ‘‘divine
spirit that is particular to each of us and common to all’’ encompasses also
the Logos of nature (:). Hyperion’s hymns to nature in his second and
sixtieth letters must be grasped from this framework, which harkens back
not only to the Stoics, but also ultimately to Plato. Nature is not the prod-
uct of subjective thinking, but is itself an independent and sacred entity
(‘‘sacred earth! . . . blessed nature!’’ [:]) containing within it the objec-
tive laws of beauty and reason, and it is capable of triggering recognition
of the same.10
Most central in Hölderlin’s reception of Plato in Hyperion, beyond the
resurrection of anamnesis and the elevation of nature, is the integration of
his theory of eros, evident in the name Diotima, which comes from the
Symposium, and in allusions to the Symposium, as in Hyperion’s reflection,
‘‘I came back to Smyrna like a drunk returning from a banquet [wie ein
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Trunkener vom Gastmahl]’’ (:). It is also evident in two allusions to
Aristophanes’ myth of eros and in references, direct and indirect, to the
definition of love as the child of plenty (Poros) and want (Penia). In addi-
tion, Hölderlin reflects on parallels between beauty, including artwork, and
love, especially homoerotic love.
One of Plato’s great achievements in the development of Greek philoso-
phy is his ability to recognize unity and multiplicity not as two autono-
mous categories, but in their organic relation, as mutually connected. He
offers us thereby an ontology that synthesizes the positive and the nega-
tive.11 This unity behind all duality is especially prominent in Aristophanes’
myth in the Symposium. Plato’s concept of love, as told to us through Dio-
tima and Socrates, suggests that both irrational and rational moments are
integrated. The location of eros is in the soul, thus between the purely ideal
noetic realm and nature, between the one and the many. Eros is not pure
positivity—as Agathon suggests earlier in the dialogue—but a striving for
the good and the beautiful. It belongs to a sphere between the two—being
itself neither beautiful nor ugly—and so unites the two poles. Love is mid-
way between wisdom and ignorance. This mediary status also captures the
essence of humanity, which can be compared with both the sacred and the
abysmal, as in the opening of Hyperion’s tenth letter (:).
Hölderlin, like Plato, associates love with art. According to Plato’s Dio-
tima, both the initial catalyst for love and its ultimate telos is beauty. Hy-
perion, motivated by Diotima, acts precisely according to this structure.
Moreover, for the Plato of the Symposium, art performs a mediating func-
tion; like eros, it has an in-between status, being both material and spiri-
tual. Hölderlin, too, embraces both senses of mediation—from the gods to
humans and between the ideal and the sensuous. Love not only integrates
two diverse moments (the ideal and the sensuous), it is, if we read Aris-
tophanes’ myth symbolically, fully round (much like the perfect artwork).
Aristophanes’ myth is integrated into the novel at the conclusion of letter
fifteen when it takes on a cosmic dimension (the earth strives to reunite
with the sun) and in letter twenty-eight when Hyperion describes his bur-
geoning love for Diotima (‘‘Never before hadmy spirit strained so fervently,
so implacably against the chains that fate wrought for it, against the iron,
inexorable law that kept it divorced, that would not let it be one soul with
its adorable other half [nicht Eine Seele zu sein mit seiner liebenswürdigen
Hälfte]’’ [:]). Hyperion has often been analyzed in the light of circular
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structures: the hero passes through a dialectic, with the synthesis involving
a return to the origin; the narrator becomes conscious of himself, and the
subject reflects on itself as an object; the novel ends with Hyperion’s trip
to Germany (the final letter) and begins with an account of his return to
Greece (the first letter), so that on the story level, the final letter leads into
the first. Even the name of the novel and its titular hero, with its allusion
to the sun, evokes a circular image.12
In letter thirty, drawing on a quotation from Heraclitus in the Sympo-
sium (a), Hyperion defines beauty as the unity of opposites or, more spe-
cifically, as the unity that is divided within itself, the hen diapheron heauto,
which is also a classic idealist definition of love (:). The novel captures
the unity of opposites throughout, not only on the narrative level, with the
unity and diversity of the experiencing and the reflective Hyperion, but also
as a dominant theme, involving the interplay of dissonance and harmony,
of strife and reconciliation.
Central to the Platonic concept of love is its origin in wealth or plenty
and poverty or want.13 Hyperion refers to this dialectic when he shies away
from it in an early passage, preferring to see in Diotima no lack whatso-
ever: ‘‘Let not your beauty age in the trials of the earth. For this is my joy,
sweet life! that you carry within you the carefree heaven. You should not
become needy, no, no! You should not see in yourself the poverty of love’’
(:). Hyperion, echoing Plato, writes: ‘‘What makes us poor amidst all
wealth is that we cannot be alone, that the love in us, as long as we live,
does not perish’’ (:). In another passage he embraces this concept of in-
sufficiency or want by considering the untenability of its opposite: ‘‘Envy
not the carefree, the wooden idols who are in want of nothing . . . who do
not ask about rain and sunshine because they have nothing to cultivate’’
(:). The prose draft of the metric version is even more explicit: ‘‘when
poverty united with abundance, there was love. Do you ask, when that was?
Plato says: On the day Aphrodite was born’’ (:). Central to this dialec-
tic is the idea that eros is characterized by its never reaching fulfillment or
closure—so too Hyperion, with its concluding words, ‘‘More soon.’’14
Of interest for the integration of love and beauty is the elevation of
homoerotic love. Beyond the question of physical attraction, at least two
external reasons existed for the Greek elevation of homoerotic love. First,
the mentoring relationship between the older and more active partner or
lover, the erastēs, and the younger partner or beloved, the erōmenos, played
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a prominent role in helping future citizens develop intellectual and social
virtues.15 Second, in ancient Greece women tended not to be recognized
for their intellect or as equals; such recognition is essential for the depth
and symmetry of love.16 But there may have been an additional moment. A
dominant theory of the sexual act sees as its primary purpose procreation;
thus, its end is instrumental and is driven by nature. A competing theory
argues that the sexual act is primarily a physical analogue of the love re-
lationship and an end in itself. The Greeks may have elevated homoerotic
love—love without procreation, love outside of the oikos—not only for the
reasons noted above, but also because of an emerging valuation of the con-
cept of loving one particular individual as an end in itself.
The relationship between Hyperion and Alabanda is not exhausted by
the hyperbolic rhetoric characteristic of eighteenth-century friendship.
There are hints of a homoerotic relationship. Surprisingly, this has for the
most part gone unnoticed.17 Consider the following passages from letter
seven. The first three might be grasped within the innocuous rhetoric of the
age: ‘‘My horse flew to him like an arrow’’ (:); ‘‘Great one! I cried, wait
and see! you shall never surpass me in love’’ (:); and ‘‘We became ever
more intimate and happier together’’ (:). The cumulative effect of these
passages, however, if not the following passage by itself, seems to suggest
homoerotic, not to say homosexual, tendencies: ‘‘We came together like
two brooks that pour forth from the mountain . . . in order to clear the
way to each other, and to burst through until, now embracing and being
embraced with equal force, they are united in one majestic stream, begin-
ning the journey to the spacious sea [vereint in Einen majestätischen Strom,
die Wanderung in’s weite Meer beginnen].’’ After an account of the long-
ings of each, Hyperion continues: ‘‘Wasn’t it inevitable that the two youths
should embrace one another in such joyous and tempestuous haste?’’ (:).
And following a description of their reading Plato together, Hyperion con-
tinues with passages such as the following: ‘‘Alabanda flew to me, embraced
me, and his kisses penetrated my soul’’ (:). The double entendres are
unmistakable in a passage such as the following: ‘‘And yet I had been un-
speakably happy with him, had so often sunk into his embraces, only to
awaken with invincibility in my breast, had so often been hardened and
purified in his fire, like steel!’’ (:). Finally, Hyperion speaks of their
‘‘days of betrothal together’’ (:), and when he is betrayed, he writes, ‘‘I
felt like a bride who discovers that her betrothed is secretly living with a
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whore’’ (:). This is the same language Hyperion uses later in the letter
to describe, in analogy to the Alabanda-Hyperion friendship, the Achilles-
Patroclus friendship, which was seen in the post-Homeric era, for example,
in Plato’s Symposium (e, a), as having an erotic dimension (:).18
The novel’s simultaneous allusion to homoeroticism and veiling of it are
underscored by the opening of the fourth letter: ‘‘Do you know how Plato
and his Stella loved each other? / So I loved, sowas I loved. Oh, I was a fortu-
nate boy!’’ (:). In naming Plato’s lover, Hölderlin avoids the Greek Aster
or Stern in favor of the Latin Stella, which in German is a female name. Al-
though the possessive pronoun should identify the gender of Plato’s lover,
this marker might easily be overlooked in the light of Stella’s status as a
female signifier. By employing the Latin term, Hölderlin seems to veil the
gender to most of his readers, but the close reader and the student of an-
tiquity will catch the homoerotic allusion, which is then deepened in Hy-
perion’s later relationship with Alabanda.
Hyperion and Alabanda have the common purpose intrinsic to all love
relationships; in this case, it is heroic longing.19 The relationship, however, is
also an end unto itself, a structure, as I have suggested, that is privileged in
homoeroticism. An analogy exists with Hölderlin’s concept of art: the idea
of aesthetic education suggests that art serves a purpose, but the great art-
work is also an end unto itself, a position that Hölderlin shares with Kant.
The preface emphasizes the two Horatian moments of prodesse and delec-
tare. Art, like love, contains this double moment, and like love, it is always
incomplete. Thus, the novel ends with a reference to its fragmentary nature.
By integrating Alabanda, through the double moment of erotic love, into
his concept of art, Hyperion brings together in his writing not only his ex-
perience with Diotima, who essentially calls him to his artistry, but with
Alabanda as well. We see in the novel not only the Socratic analogy be-
tween love and art but also an analogy between love and education. This
is especially prominent in the fourth letter, which opens with the allusion
to Plato and his lover and devotes itself almost entirely to the education of
Hyperion through Adamas. According to Socrates, both love and education
are characterized by a lack, by the striving for what they not yet are.20 Edu-
cation, not unlike love, is a contradiction, born of resource and need. For
Socrates, education is consciousness of incompleteness and the desire for
fulfillment. Like philosophy, love strives toward the good and the beautiful
by overcoming its deficiencies. Each is a negation of negativity. Love and
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wisdom signal a reconstitution of original unity on a higher level. Here,
too, is a recognition of truth as revealedness. Education, always incomplete,
seeks originary unity. As further evidence of the parallel between educa-
tion and love, note a passage such as the following where Hyperion uses the
Platonic symbol of enlightenment in connection with love: ‘‘Yes! man is a
sun, all-seeing, all-illuminating when he loves, and when he doesn’t love,
he is a dark residence, where a smoking lamp burns’’ (:).21
Hölderlin, elevating his own artistry, views Plato on behalf of Hype-
rion, not first and foremost as a philosopher, but as a poet on a level with
Homer.22 Not insignificantly, the fourth letter, which addresses the theme of
aesthetic education, opens with Plato and closes with Homer. Clearly, the
two are invoked as the great artists of Greek antiquity, the last and the first.
The last comes first because the last seeks what is contained in the first, not
vice versa.

Even as Hölderlin expresses his veneration for Plato, he also offers a
different perspective on several fundamental questions. First, whereas for
Plato art is merely the imitation of an imitation, two steps removed from
the ideal, Hyperion, in his embrace of the sensuous moment, suggests that
thosewho believe they have experienced ‘‘joy,’’ but have not seen beauty, are
themselves twice removed from light: ‘‘You have yet to see even the shadow
of its shadow!’’ (:). For Hyperion, Diotima, the embodiment of beauty,
is not removed from the ideal, but its fulfillment: ‘‘I have seen it once, the
one thing my soul sought, and the perfection that we remove up there be-
yond the stars, that we put off until the end of time, I have felt it in its
living presence. There it was, the highest, in this circle of human nature and
things, it was there!’’ (:–). This ideal is still present, if hidden: ‘‘it is
now only more concealed in the world’’ (:). What Hyperion calls ‘‘the
highest and the best’’ and that which is sought by others in ‘‘knowledge’’
or ‘‘action,’’ in ‘‘the past,’’ ‘‘the future,’’ or the distant stars is beauty: ‘‘Do
you know its name? the name of that which is one and is all? / Its name
is beauty’’ (:). This echoes the conclusion of the penultimate preface,
with its reference to Plato’s Phaedrus and its idea that the higher reality is
accessible through beauty.
 :  . 
Plato’s view of art is complex. Though he is, as Hölderlin suggests, a great
artist, and though Plato recognizes that the artist is capable of integrating
truth, he sees that the artist, working instinctively rather than rationally,
can also deliver untruths and can isolate pure form at the expense of sub-
stantial content. Because of its unconscious and unpredictable nature, art
does not guarantee truth; truth is its chance product. Indeed, art contains
much untruth.23 This leads Plato, on the one hand, to dismiss art, and, on
the other hand, to sublate it into his philosophy. Art guided by philoso-
phy has its legitimacy. Similarly, Hölderlin sublates momentary enthusiasm
into the greater stability of reflection—thus the essence not only of Hype-
rion but of Hölderlin’s later reworkings of his earlier odes—and Hölderlin
recognizes the untruth within art that must be sublated into a higher, more
reflectivewhole (consider, for example, the positions of the Sophocles motto
or of ‘‘Hyperion’s Song of Fate’’ within the novel).24 But Hölderlin also gives
beauty a higher position as the source of all later reflection. Beauty has
cosmic and ontological status insofar as it represents originary unity and
harmony. Hölderlin extols beauty in contrast to a philosophy that elevates
analysis [Verstand] and infinite approximation [Vernunft], thus the essence
of his elevation of beauty and critique of contemporary philosophy in the
thirtieth letter. Hölderlin shares with Plato a valuation of beauty and re-
flection, but he deviates from him when he endorses the artist as the carrier
of beauty and embraces the sensuous and material moment within beauty.
Whereas Plato, not Socrates, would have us move upward on a heavenly
ladder to contemplation of a purely idealized form of beauty, Hölderlin em-
braces the sensuous moment—image, language, appearance.Whereas Plato
emphasized only the one movement, from the world of reality to that of the
forms, Hölderlin aligns himself with the neo-Platonic tradition, which, be-
ginning with Plotinus, stresses a complementary movement from the ideal
to reality, expressed as emanation or radiance.25 The idea that the ideal can
be made sensuous was of course reinforced through the Christian idea of
the incarnation. In contrast, Plato sees the human body as a prison,26 a posi-
tion invoked by the early Hyperion when he describes ‘‘the moments when
we are set free, when the divine bursts open the dungeon . . . when it seems
to us as if the unshackled spirit, its suffering and servitude forgotten, were
returning triumphantly back into the halls of the sun’’ (:). The elevation
of the sensuous also sets Hölderlin apart from his contemporary Hegel, who
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saw the sensuous as a sphere that must be left behind in the pure reflection
of philosophy.
A bold inversion of Plato is evident in Hölderlin’s short ode ‘‘Socrates
und Alcibiades,’’ where the original relationship is reversed: in the Sympo-
sium, Alcibiades loves Socrates, whose mind is focused on what transcends
the physical; in Hölderlin, Socrates, the intellectual, turns to the figure of
Alcibiades: ‘‘He who thinks most deeply, loves what is most alive [Wer das
Tiefste gedacht, liebt das Lebendigste]’’ (:).27 Indeed, Hölderlin’s ges-
ture is a double inversion, for not only does Hölderlin invert Plato, but the
Greek philosopher had himself transformed the common image of a homo-
sexual relationship initiated by the more mature partner.28 Socrates is be-
yond this relationship and must resist the advances of the younger and less
experienced Alcibiades, who of course had expected the more mature Soc-
rates to initiate the relationship.29 In Hyperion, Hölderlin does not simply
reaffirm the traditional Greek image of homoeroticism, with its link to an
educative relationship.30 To be sure, Hyperion opens the fourth letter with
an analogy between Plato and Adamas and Hyperion and Stella. This con-
forms to the traditional image of an asymmetrical, educative homoerotic
relationship that may have symmetry as its goal, but is itself asymmetrical.
The more pronounced homoerotic relationship in the novel, however, is
between Hyperion and Alabanda. Hölderlin thus lays on to the traditional
Greek structure the modern concept of symmetry. Hyperion and Alabanda
love each other as equals. This represents an inversion of the most promi-
nent paradigm of ancient Greek homoeroticism.
Plato’s signature image is that of the cave. Hyperion, not surprisingly,
is replete with allusions to the metaphor of light as the realm of truth and
beauty. For Hölderlin, beauty is higher than everyday reality; it touches an
essence, anticipates the ideal, and makes it once again present. This valua-
tion is behind the idea of aesthetic education, which draws indirectly on
the Platonic analogy between temperance (harmony of the soul), friend-
ship (harmony between individuals), and justice (harmony in the state),
suggesting that the harmony of art nurtures these virtues, which are in the
end all one. In letter forty-five Hyperion elucidates the connection between
Diotima’s harmony and the harmony of the state (‘‘our world is yours, too. /
Yours, too, Diotima, for it is the copy of you. O you, with your Elysian
repose, could we but create, what you are!’’ [:]), and already in letter
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twenty-six he invokes Harmodius and Aristogiton, who are celebrated in
Plato’s Symposium for their ideal friendship, which inspired them to free
Athens from tyranny (:; cf. c).
Here, too, however, is a nuance of difference. Plato was the first intel-
lectual to suffer what we might call the problem of the owl of Minerva.
Plato, like Hegel after him, believed that philosophy arrived too late and
could not change the world.31 Spirit became dominant only in an age of
decay when it was, tragically, too late to alter the course of events. For Hy-
perion, in contrast, insight into truth leads to change: thus, his mission as
an educator. The language of Hyperion as educator is analogous to the lan-
guage of the divine becoming human. Diotima again alludes to the essence
of his name: ‘‘You must shine down, like the ray of the sun, descend, like
the all-refreshing rain, into the land of mortality, you must illuminate, like
Apollo, shake and enliven, like Jupiter, otherwise you are not worthy of your
heaven’’ (:). Hölderlin’s rejection of Plato’s theorism derives from his
prolepsis of nineteenth-century this-worldliness, as it would be represented
by Feuerbach, Marx, and Nietzsche, among others.
Similar in a sense to Hölderlin’s revision of Plato’s concept of beauty
is Hölderlin’s reworking of Plato’s concept of nature. Plato believes that
nature has value because it is a reflection of the Idea. The Timaeus, cen-
tral to the revival of the objective-idealist view of nature in Hölderlin’s age
and well known to the poet, explicates nature as following the model and
essence of the Idea: the cosmos is a sensuously perceptible divinity, or ‘‘the
sensible God’’ (c). In a letter to Neuffer that alludes to the Timaeus, Höl-
derlin himself speaks of ‘‘the soul of the world’’ (:). Hölderlin, however,
believes that nature has value because in nature the Idea is real. Immanence,
not transcendence, is the dominant motif for the later thinker, who none-
theless holds to an integrative and organic, not a materialist or mechanical,
paradigm of nature. In his letter to Neuffer, as in the concluding sentences
of Hyperion, the world soul and nature are captured in the language of the
heart and its arteries, with their unifying separation and return.32
We recognize Hölderlin’s reevaluation of Plato also by studying the
Christological references in the novel. As Mark Ogden has argued, Hölder-
lin’s novel is characterized by a latent Christology, but Ogden has not rec-
ognized the extent to which Diotima’s death is part of a (Christian) dialectic
that embodies the moments of universality, particularity, and individuality.
Plato’s Diotima is characterized by stillness, the stillness of the pure forms.
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Her greater mysteries teach a sublimation that culminates in contempla-
tion of the immovable and eternal; ultimately she rejects life for intellectual
vision. Hölderlin’s Diotima undergoes significant (Christian) transforma-
tion, which allows her to embrace life. She is, if you will, an embodiment
of Socratic, not Platonic, eros.
Why does Diotima die? On the superficial level of external causality, her
death serves the plot: the death of Diotima and the departure of Alabanda
free Hyperion from the spheres of love and heroism so that he can enter
the sphere of poetry. But an immanent causality exists as well. First is the
idea that God has assumed human shape. Diotima affirms human essence
(God has become visible) not just by appearing in the world, but by passing
away as well.
Second, an idea Hyperion internalizes in the course of his reflections
is that death is an integral part of perfection: in death (or negativity) is
divinity, for without death, and correspondingly the limits and possibilities
of consciousness, divinity would be empty, barren, a waste.33 This is both
a revitalization of Plato’s idea of the dialectic of opposites in the Phaedo,
to which Hölderlin’s novel alludes,34 and an inversion of Plato’s concept
of the divine as removed from the vicissitudes and wants of humanity.35
Hyperion’s praise of Diotima as ‘‘free from want’’ and ‘‘divinely content’’
early in the novel (:) corresponds to Plato’s vision of the deity in the
Timaeus, where he speaks of ‘‘the self-sufficing and most perfect god.’’36 But
this concept is reevaluated in the course of the novel; the narrator deems
such pure and timeless bliss empty: ‘‘I want nothing better than the gods.
Must not everything suffer? And the more excellent, the more deeply! Does
not sacred nature suffer? O my Divinity! That you could mourn, as you are
blissful, for a long time I couldn’t grasp that. But the bliss that does not suf-
fer is sleep, and without death there is no life. Should you be eternal, like
a child, and slumber, as does nothingness?’’ (:).
Third, and this reflection moves Hölderlin toward his great final hymns,
Diotima has particularized divinity. She must die in order to release divinity
from her particular person so that it can be transformed into spirit through
Hyperion’s narrative. Divinity is no longer localized in one person but avail-
able to a larger community, which encompasses all recipients of beauty. This
idea will be more fully developed, first in The Death of Empedocles and then
in the hymn ‘‘Patmos,’’ but its seeds are already apparent in Hyperion.
The complexity of Hölderlin’s relationship to Plato is clearest in his de-
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velopment of Diotima. Hölderlin’s stress on Diotima’s immanence, on the
incarnation of divinity, would have been alien to Plato; here, the influence
of Christianity and that of Spinoza are dominant. Nonetheless, the telos of
Diotima is the death of her body as the transformation of her essence into
spirit, a concept as Platonic as it is Christian.

Plato influenced Hölderlin in many ways during his writing ofHyperion,
most prominently in his theory of objective idealism, with its recognition
of preexisting truth and elevation of nature, and his theory of eros. Höl-
derlin integrates the former into his reflections on the triadic structure of
history and his critique of the subjective idealism of Fichte, which draws as
well on the writings of Spinoza.37 Through Hyperion’s accounts of educa-
tion and beauty and his friendship and homoerotic relationship with Ala-
banda, we recognize elements of the Platonic eros, including the intercon-
nections between art, education, and love. Despite the contemporary stress
on a fragmentary, anti-organic Hölderlin, the poet, successful or not, was
an integrative thinker, for whom the good, the true, and the beautiful were
one.38
But Hölderlin does not merely represent Plato for the present. First, Höl-
derlin does not disparage art as twice-broken mimesis, but elevates it in
the form of beauty as the origin and telos of all thought. Plato, too, ele-
vated beauty in this way, but only after removing its sensuous dimensions.
Hölderlin affirms along with the principle of sublimation the sensuous mo-
ment, and he recognizes along with the movement of human consciousness
toward the absolute the complementary movement of the absolute into the
world. This, too, colors Hyperion’s view of nature. Like Plato, Hyperion
sees in it a reflection of the ideal, but Hyperion in his pantheism affirms
the reflection along with the Idea and in some moments even sees the re-
flection and the Idea as one and the same. Also moving beyond Plato, Höl-
derlin gives Diotima a Christian ontology: where Plato viewed Diotima as
the disembodied spokesperson for the ideal forms, in Hölderlin’s novel she
becomes a Christ figure, who enters the world, giving particular shape to
the universal, and passes away, releasing divinity from her particularity and
allowing it to be reshaped for the community as art and spirit.
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If aesthetic value, as Hölderlin suggests, is defined by the interplay of
intellectual content and sensuous form, then reflection on the reception of
Plato in Hölderlin’s novel enlightens us not only with regard to intellectual-
historical reception and inversion, it also brings into focus aspects of the
work’s aesthetic value. And it does so in a way that tells us not only what
Hölderlin wanted to show, but why he wanted to do so, for Hölderlin, like
Plato, philosopher and poet in one, wroteworks that ask questions that have
increasingly shifted from philosophy to art itself: what is the relationship
of art to philosophy, and what are the intrinsic and extrinsic merits of the
artwork? It speaks for Hölderlin that he is able to answer these questions
in ways that exhibit neither the hubris of philosophy, with its claim that
its sphere is in all respects superior to others, nor the despair common in
contemporary art, with its never-ending search not for meaning but for the
value of its own creation. Hölderlin’s model of objective idealism freed him
of both dangers, first by affirming the absolute in the world (and not just
in spirit), and second, by recognizing that aesthetic merit is as objective as
it is elusive.

. Much of Plato’s influence on Hölderlin has been documented in critical edi-
tions, occasional references, and a few devoted studies. The most important study in
English is R. B. Harrison, Hölderlin and Greek Literature (Oxford: Clarendon, ),
–, which, besides its references to earlier literature on the topic, focuses on the
biographical development of Hölderlin’s encounters with the Greeks, including Plato.
Harrison cites numerous works besides Hyperion, but sees the novel as the most
central text for Hölderlin’s reception of Plato. Stephan Lampenscherf in his article,
‘‘ ‘Heiliger Plato, vergieb . . .’ Hölderlins ‘Hyperion’ oder Die neue PlatonischeMytho-
logie,’’ Hölderlin-Jahrbuch  (–): –, also focuses on Hyperion and brings
forth some interesting insights: the mediation of Plato through the writings of Carl
Philipp Conz and the fictional travelogue of Abbé Barthélemy; analogies between
Plato and Adamas and Stella and Hyperion; and Hyperion’s embodiment of elements
of eros, including his being awakened to love through beauty. Inversions of Plato do
not play a role for Lampenscherf. Neither study integrates all the themes or passages
I do, nor does either study relate the various themes to one another. If further evi-
dence were needed for a closer examination of the topic, consider that several of the
allusions I present below have not been recorded in the as yet most extensive criti-
cal apparatus to the novel, which was created by Jochen Schmidt in his comprehen-
sive edition of Hölderlin (Friedrich Hölderlin, SämtlicheWerke und Briefe, ed. Jochen
Schmidt. [Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, –]). Note for ex-
ample, overlooked allusions to the Symposium in letters , , and  or the missed
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reference to Plato’s mimesis doctrine in letter . Finally, for the most recent gen-
eral discussion of Hölderlin’s reception of Plato, without extensive reference to Hy-
perion, see Michael Franz, ‘‘ ‘Platons frommer Garten.’ Hölderlins Platonlektüre von
Tübingen bis Jena,’’ Hölderlin-Jahrbuch  (–): –.
. Hölderlin is cited, according to the Schmidt edition, as the edition most likely
to be both in libraries and on scholars’ private shelves. The translations from German
are my own, although I consulted and benefited from the translation of Hyperion by
Willard Trask (Friedrich Hölderlin,Hyperion or the Hermit in Greece, trans.Willard R.
Trask [New York: Ungar, ]).
. The passage anticipates Gottfried Keller’s programmatic redefinition of origi-
nality in the preface to his Stories of Zurich as that which ‘‘deserves to be emulated’’
because of its excellence and uncommonness, ‘‘even if it is not something unprece-
dented and ultra-inventive’’ (Gottfried Keller, Züricher Novellen. [Frankfurt amMain:
Insel, ], ). These two authors, not normally linked, have in common an extraor-
dinary respect for the accomplishments of their predecessors.
. On Hölderlin’s use of truth in the Greek sense of aletheia, or unconcealment,
see for example, ‘‘Bread and Wine,’’ v. – and ‘‘Germania,’’ v. –.
. :; see also :; compare Phaedo e and Meno e.
. See Hölderlin’s letters to Schiller of  September  and to Niethammer of
 February .
. Compare, for example, Phaedrus b. Note in particular Hyperion’s use of the
concept in letter , ‘‘the god in us, the loving one’’ (:), with its allusion to the
Symposium (e).
. Note Hegel’s gloss on ‘‘Erinnerung’’ or recollection as ‘‘making oneself intro-
spective, turning inward [Sich-innerlich-machen, Insichgehen]’’ in his discussion of
Plato (G. W. F. Hegel,Werke in zwanzig Bänden, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Mar-
kus Michel [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, ], :).
. In the first great comprehensive study of Plato in German, Tennemann under-
scores the contemporary recognition of Plato as an objective idealist who recognizes
a higher reason in both humanity and nature. See, for example, M. Wilhelm Gottlieb
Tennemann, System der Platonischen Philosophie,  vols. (Leipzig: Barth, –),
: and :–.
. In the Phaedrus (d), Plato portrays Socrates—not unlike Hölderlin’s later
depiction of Hyperion—as being transfigured (divinely possessed) by his experience
of nature.
. See, above all, Hösle’s magisterial account of Plato as the culmination of the
logical development of Greek philosophy. Vittorio Hösle, Wahrheit und Geschichte:
Studien zur Struktur der Philosophiegeschichte unter paradigmatischer Analyse der Ent-
wicklung von Parmenides bis Platon (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog,
).
. On the novel’s complex circularity (which is not without moments of both lin-
earity and openness), see Lawrence Ryan,Hölderlins Hyperion. Exzentrische Bahn und
Dichterberuf (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, ), Friedbert Aspetsberger, Welteinheit und
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epische Gestaltung. Studien zur Ichform von Hölderlins Roman ‘‘Hyperion’’ (Munich:
Wilhelm Fink, ), and especially Howard Gaskill, Hölderlin’s Hyperion. (Durham:
University of Durham, ), –.
. Symposium b–c.
. For commentary on this passage, see Mark William Roche, Dynamic Stillness:
Philosophical Conceptions of Ruhe in Schiller, Hölderlin, Büchner, and Heine (Tü-
bingen: Max Niemeyer, ), –.
. Eva Cantarella, Bisexuality in the Ancient World, trans. Cormac Cuilleanáin.
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, ), .
. Ibid., viii–ix.
. The only exceptions I could find in the vast Hölderlin literature were, first,
Derks’s reference to Hyperion in a broad survey of homosexuality and German litera-
ture (Paul Derks, Die Schande der heiligen Päderastie: Homosexualität und Öffentlich-
keit in der deutschen Literatur – [Berlin: Winkel, ], –) and, second,
Bertaux’s allusion to the novel within his highly speculative thesis of a homoerotic
relationship between Hölderlin and Sinclair (Pierre Bertaux, ‘‘Hölderlin-Sinclair: ‘ein
treues Paar’ ’’? Homburg vor der Höhe in der deutschen Geistesgeschichte: Studien zum
Freundeskreis um Hegel und Hölderlin, ed. Christoph Jamme und Otto Pöggeler.
[Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, ], –).
. Note in this context also the following passage from Hyperions Youth: ‘‘Finally
one spoke also of the many wonders of Greek friendship, of Achilles and Patroclus,
of Dion and Plato, of all the lovers and loved ones, who ascended and perished, in-
separable like the fraternal stars’’ (:).
. The danger of this common bond is that heroism will turn into violence, and
so the friendship between Hyperion and Alabanda eventually falls victim to one-
sidedness. Hyperion, having learned from Alabanda both the advantages and dis-
advantages of the heroic, tempers this sphere with what Diotima teaches him of still-
ness. Compare Gregor Thurmair, Einfalt und einfaches Leben. Der Motivbereich des
Idyllischen im Werk Friedrich Hölderlins (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, ) and Roche.
. For a fuller account of the Socratic analogy between love and education, see
Laszlo Versényi, Socratic Humanism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, ).
. Compare letter : ‘‘Magnanimous one! Things have never gone as well for me,
as when I felt the light of your love on me’’ (:).
. Plato was known in the late eighteenth century for both his poetic genius
and philosophical acumen, but the weight of Hölderlin’s emphasis can be measured
against the contemporary view of Plato in Tiedemann’s study, which opens with a
reflection on the proximity of ‘‘poetic genius and philosophical mind’’ (Dieterich
Tiedemann, Geist der spekulativen Philosophie, vol. . [Marburg: Neue Akademische
Buchhandlung, ], ) but then leaves behind any additional references to Plato’s
poetic power and attends in the remaining  pages only to his philosophy. Simi-
larly, Tennemann acknowledges Plato’s poetic power, but rejects the idea that Plato
is ‘‘more poet than philosopher’’ (:) and likewise devotes his study to Plato as a
thinker.
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. For a discussion of Plato’s view of art’s potential untruth, with references to
the dialogues, see Hösle –.
. Compare Roche –, especially –. In this context, see also Hölderlin’s
letter to his mother of  July  and the following passage from ‘‘Reflections’’: ‘‘Only
that is the truest truth, in which even error becomes truth, for truth posits error in
the totality of its system, in its time and place. Truth is the light that illuminates itself
and the night as well. This is also the highest poesy, in which even the unpoetic be-
comes poetic, for it is said at the right time and in the right place within the whole
of the artwork’’ (:).
. Compare Plotinus, for example, III:., IV:., V:., V:.–, V:.–, V:.–
, VI:..
. For example, Phaedrus c, Phaedo b, Cratylus c.
. For an earlier illustration of Hölderlin’s inversion of Plato, whereby the poet
integrates movement not only upward to the forms but also downward to reality—
and with this, recognition of the absolute in the world, see ‘‘Hymn to Beauty.’’ The
theme continues to surface in the late works, for example, in ‘‘The Only One.’’
. ‘‘The homosexual relationships that were conventionally approved by classical
Greek society were strongly asymmetrical. A younger male was desired by an older,
but did not himself desire the older; mutual desire between peers was not recognized’’
(K. J. Dover, ‘‘Greek Homosexuality and Initiation,’’ The Greeks and their Legacy: Col-
lected Papers Volume II: Prose Literature, History, Society, Transmission, Influence [New
York: Blackwell, ], .)
. Symposium, c; see also e–e.
. On the connections between pederasty and pedagogy in Greek antiquity, see
especially Bernhard Sergent, L’Homosexualité initiatique dans l’Europe ancienne (Paris:
Payot, ) and William Armstrong Percy III, Pederasty and Pedagogy in Archaic
Greece (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, ).
. For an analysis of Plato’s view of philosophy as being too late, see Hösle –
.
. In this letter Hölderlin writes of the ‘‘divine hours, when I returned from the
bosom of blissful nature or from the grove of the plane trees by the Ilissus river, where
I laid down among the students of Plato, watched the flight of the magnificent one,
as he traversed the dark distances of the primeval world, or followed him dizzily into
the deepness of the depths, to the most remote ends of the spiritual world, where
the soul of the world sends its life into the thousand pulses of nature and to which the
forces that have streamed out return after their immeasurable cycle’’ (.). At the
end of Hyperion we read: ‘‘O soul! soul! beauty of the world! you indestructible one!
you enchanting one! with your eternal youth! you are; what then is death and all the
lamentations of men?—Ah! Those strange creatures have spoken many empty words.
Yet from delight all comes, and all ends in peace. / Like the discord of lovers are the
dissonances of the world. Reconciliation is present in the midst of strife, and all things
that are parted find one another again. / The arteries separate and return to the heart,
and all is one eternal, glowing life’’ (:–).
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. On Hyperion’s rejection of static divinity and his paradoxical recognition of
incompletion as intrinsic to perfection, or the most desirable state, see Roche –.
. See Harrison.
. Harrison (–) sees in Hölderlin’s references to ‘‘aging and rejuvenation’’
(:) an allusion to the idea of the reciprocal generation of opposites in the Phaedo.
Harrison stresses thereby the Platonic-Hölderlinian theme that death belongs to life,
that everything is part of one big cycle. Lampenscherf, in contrast, argues that the
passage refers to the myth of the reigns of Cronus and Zeus in the Statesman. Lampen-
scherf emphasizes the depravity of the age of Zeus, when divinity is absent, and the
possibility of returning to the age of Cronus, an age of divinity and peace, which,
however, is the result of divine not human action. Schmidt reads the passage as an
allusion to the discussion of immortality and palingenesis in the Meno (:–).
He comments thereby on the theme of death and rebirth in nature and society. Each
interpretation preserves elements of plausibility. Harrison’s general suggestion of the
importance of Plato’s theory of the alternation of opposites for Hölderlin is not re-
futed even if one sides with Lampenscherf or Schmidt.
. Timaeus e. Translation from Plato, The Collected Dialogues including the Let-
ters, ed. Edith Hamilton andHuntington Cairns (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, ).
. See Uvo Hölscher, ‘‘Hölderlins Umgang mit den Griechen,’’ Jenseits des Idea-
lismus. Hölderlins letzte Homburger Jahre (–), ed. Christoph Jamme and Otto
Pöggeler (Bonn: Bouvier), – and Margarethe Wegenast, Hölderlins Spinoza-
Rezeption und ihre Bedeutung für die Konzeption des ‘‘Hyperion.’’ (Tübingen: Max
Niemeyer, ). In rightly elevating the influence of Spinoza, Wegenast nonetheless
underestimates the influence of others, including Plato.
. Consider in this context Hyperion’s description of the ideal of Greek antiquity:
‘‘In the Olympus of the divinely beautiful, where out of eternally young springs, the
true arises with all that is good’’ (:).
 How Fireproof You Are:
Father-Daughter Tales
of Loss and Survival
 
As I considered writing about literary paternity, I became determined
to tell a certain kind of story—one about a strong collaborative relation-
ship between a father and daughter that would not end in tragedy or defeat.
The challenge was finding the material for such an account. I looked first to
the ‘‘Classical’’ German literary canon I knew best. Here, daughters seem
decidedly secondary. As Gail Hart has argued concerning family politics in
German bourgeois tragedy, female figures so often seem to show up only in
order to be removed, and through their removal, to reinforce male bonds.
I experimented with several conventional German literary topics, but grew
increasingly frustrated.
What if I looked closer to home? Perhaps some contemporary American
source would provide the model of father-daughter reciprocity I sought.
But while it is obvious that father and daughter roles have evolved im-
mensely over the last generation, many old cultural patterns die hard. Sur-
veys indicate, for example, that American men generally prefer sons.1 Such
gender preference can color father-daughter relationships from the outset.
One recent study vividly illustrates this point. Even in the first few days of
the infant’s life in the hospital, fathers were observed to respond more to
the vocalizations of sons than daughters. These patterns continued at home.
While fathers tended to hold girls more closely and snugly, they actively en-
couraged their boys’ development: ‘‘In a play situation, fathers consistently
stimulated their sons more than their daughters. Fathers touched their sons
and visually stimulated them by showing them a toy more often than their
daughters. Fathers even looked at their boys more often than their girls.’’2
From infancy on, then, many girls must fight fiercely for full recognition
from their fathers.
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So what sort of account could convey both the troubled past and the
evolving possibility of the father-daughter relationship? I realized finally
that I needed to tell more than one story, to hold out more than one pos-
sible outcome. I therefore offer two. Both are stories of reading and writing.
As a daughter enters this ‘‘literary’’ sphere, her struggle for paternal recog-
nition becomes particularly acute. Through reading and writing, she moves
into new communities, tries out new subjectivities, discovers a universe of
traditions and possibilities. Since it is the father who still often stands as
the gatekeeper to this public, linguistic realm beyond the family, his recep-
tion of his daughter at this juncture is of great consequence for her sense
of self. The delicate drama of paternal recognition plays itself out not only
between real fathers and their young daughters but also in all sorts of sur-
rogate relationships throughout life.
The two stories I present here form a quite unconventional pair. I con-
sider the relationship of Goethe, the paradigmatic father of German lit-
erature, to his literary, rather than literal, daughter Bettina Brentano von
Arnim. But I precede it with a quite remarkable drama of father-daughter
conflict and reconciliation, broadcast as an interview on Public Radio Inter-
national’s This American Life in . Both accounts involve a crisis of dif-
ferentiation as the daughter, as reader, discovers her own agency in rela-
tionship to her father. Both turn on the issue of the father’s recognition
of that separate agency. Yet they produce almost inverse models of subjec-
tivity. The first account ends with differentiation but sustained connection;
the second ends in a severed relationship, a fractured internalization of the
other. My analysis of the dynamic of intersubjective recognition at work
in these relationships is inspired by the psychoanalytic theories of Jessica
Benjamin. I turn first to outline Benjamin’s basic model.3
For Jessica Benjamin, recognition—indeed a mutual recognition—is the
very key to healthy child development. She explicitly draws her model of
mutual recognition fromHegel’s master-slave dialectic. In brief, in attempt-
ing to experience one’s own reality, one seeks affirmation from another. But
in order for this external affirmation to be meaningful, one must recognize
the other, too, as a subject, both like and unlike oneself. She further elabo-
rates this model of mutual recognition through D. W. Winnicott’s notion
of destruction. Destruction is the mental negation through which the other
emerges as separate. In a drive to assert omnipotence and affirm his or her
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own reality, the child (or adult) may fantasize about destroying the other.
Yet when the other refuses to disappear, or indeed retaliate, the self rejoices
in the survival of this stubborn measure of reality outside itself. Winnicott
describes the response of the self toward its object, the other: ‘‘ ‘Hullo ob-
ject!’ ‘I destroyed you.’ ‘I love you.’ ‘You have value for me because of your
survival of my destruction of you.’ ’’4 Through the drama of destruction,
then, one replaces one’s own, ultimately empty fantasy of omnipotence with
the knowledge of a real other, capable of limiting oneself as well as affirming
one’s own autonomy.
Benjamin thus emphasizes the pleasure one takes in discovering the sepa-
rate existence of other human beings. While traditional ego psychology
views the other instrumentally, as a source of need gratification that one
learns to internalize, Benjamin writes of ‘‘the joy and urgency of discovering
the external, independent reality of another person.’’5 The thrust of healthy
maturation is therefore not merely internalizing the comfort one originally
receives from without, but also sustaining connection to another subject
who resists total assimilation, who remains outside the self. Where mutual
recognition succeeds, there can emerge a pleasurable interdependence be-
tween self and other, where both identification and differentiation are in
play.
In the accounts below, we witness the fragility of this essential develop-
mental process as it plays itself out between father and daughter. The emer-
gence of a healthy subjectivity depends on the response of a real other hu-
man being who lovingly persists through conflict. Mutual recognition (in
Benjamin’s model) is so precarious, then, precisely because it is not merely
an internal psychic phenomenon: it takes two real people.6
Act four of the Father’s Day edition of This American Life consists of an
interview by host Ira Glass of New Yorker writer Lawrence Weschler and
his articulate eleven-year-old daughter Sara.7 Several years earlier, father
and daughter had experienced a conflict, what Glass describes as ‘‘an odd
breach of trust’’ as a consequence of their practice of reading together. Early
on, a kind of dramatic play had evolved out of their story readings. Sara
would interrupt, say, in the middle of Little House on the Prairie and insist
the pages be turned back so she could prepare an Indian character to meet
Laura. She might say: ‘‘Indian, now look, in a few pages you’re going to
meet Laura. You gotta understand: I know she’s taking your land, but it’s
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not her fault, she’s just a kid.’’ Her father would then take on the role of the
character. ‘‘Who’s that talking?!’’ the surprised Indian might reply.
One book in particular captured Sara’s imagination, The Borrowers by
Mary Norton. Norton’s book describes a clan of four-inch-high people who
live under the floorboards, eluding the sight of human beings and ‘‘bor-
rowing’’ small objects left around, a stamp here, a pocketwatch there, to
furnish their miniature homes. One day when she was seven, an exuberant
Sara announced to her father that they had Borrowers living in their house.8
With her own eyes, she had seen a tiny girl in a pink taffeta skirt in the base-
ment. Sara began leaving behind small practical gifts, such as toothpicks,
for the Borrowers to take. Every morning she would race to check whether
the supplies were gone. Her father, observing her ‘‘disappointment verging
on desolation’’ as the offerings remained untouched day after day, finally
took the fateful step of pocketing them himself. With their disappearance,
Sara was, according to her father, ‘‘transported with delight’’ and decided
to leave a note for her little tenants. When her father secretly penned his
own reply to the note under the pseudonym Annabellie, Sara was, in his
words, ‘‘over the moon.’’ Thus began an extended correspondence between
Sara and her father in the guise of a four-inch girl.
What comes out clearly in the interview is just howmuch creative energy
Weschler brought to his role as Annabellie. In his notes, for example, he
dropped hints that put Sara on an elaborate genealogical trail linking Anna-
bellie’s family to the Borrower family in the book. Thus Sara quickly became
emotionally and intellectually absorbed in this imaginary world, into which
she soon introduced her friends as well. Indeed, this adventure, Weschler
realized at some point, was ‘‘the main thing going on in her life.’’ Yet de-
spite his concern about his daughter’s level of investment in the fantasy,
he could never quite bring himself to end the game. He might send Anna-
bellie’s family on a vacation, but when Sara anxiously anticipated their re-
turn, he would indeed bring them back. The program’s Web site includes
a cut segment from the interview in which Weschler discusses an ‘‘epic let-
ter’’ from Annabellie relating a grand battle with raccoons that served to
explain why Sara had not heard from her friend for several weeks.Weschler
explains ‘‘. . . in a way I was going and back and forth. I would cut it off cold
turkey, and then I would kind of binge on the other side.’’ ‘‘It’s important
to understand,’’ he says, ‘‘that I was as consumed by this as Sara was, at a
certain point.’’9
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Meanwhile, Weschler kept hoping that Sara would make the association
between this correspondence and the role playing they used to do when
reading. Then perhaps she could simply take pleasure in the game. But his
daughter did not make this association consciously, even when she recog-
nized a similarity between Annabellie’s writing and her father’s, or noticed
that both used the same kind of pen. Instead, after many months passed,
it was the content of some of Annabellie’s letters that at last tipped Sara
off. She explains in the interview that at that time in her life she would
occasionally exaggerate to her father about things she had seen or heard.
When details of near encounters with the Borrowers that she recognized
as her own embellishments showed up in Annabellie’s letters, she realized
something was wrong. Finally one day (she was now eight), Sara sought out
her father, who was working in the basement and confronted him with her
doubts. Her father describes the painful encounter:
: . . . And she began, her lips were trembling, her lower lip was trembling,
and she looked at me very firmly, as she is quite capable of doing, and
she said, ‘‘Daddy, I am going to ask you a question now and you have
to tell the truth because it’s a sin for daddies to lie to their daughters.’’
And my heart just sank. And she said, ‘‘Daddy are you the one who’s
been writing Annabellie’s notes?’’ And I looked at her and she looked
at me and there was like silence for five or six seconds and then I said,
‘‘Um, you know it’s kinda complicated, uh, can we talk. . . .’’ And she
said, ‘‘Daddy, it’s not complicated, it’s simple. Are you the one?’’ And I
said, ‘‘Well, can we talk about it later?’’ And she said, ‘‘No, just tell me,
are you the one or not?’’ And I took a big breath and I said, ‘‘Yes, it is
me.’’ And she broke into . . .’’
: [inaudible . . .] crying. I was so sad.
: Oh God, she was sobbing, she started sobbing. It was easily the most
wrenching thing that had happened in my parenthood up until that
point. I mean I had totally blown it, I just felt total disaster and I was
crying and she was crying and you know we were both kind of clutching
each other and holding each other. And it was . . . we were really in a
trap there, we were down the hole at that point, we were in big trouble.
And Sara . . . and suddenly this kind of calm came over Sara’s face. It
was kind of like the sun rising in the morning, and her forehead stopped
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being furrowed. It became smooth. And she just looked at me and she
said ‘‘Daddy, don’t you realize you ruined everything, because there are
Borrowers and you were taking the letters before they were able to get
them.’’
The moment when Sara recovered, Weschler refers repeatedly to her as
‘‘saving us.’’ He never fully explains the meaning of this ‘‘saving,’’ offering
at this juncture only that Sara had come up with an explanation she could
tell her friends so that they might all laugh together about her crazy father.
Yet the great import he attaches to the ‘‘saving’’ becomes clear when Glass
asks him how he might handle the same situation differently if given the
opportunity.
: [laughing] I mean, I’d like to say that had I to live it over again I
wouldn’t do it this way but I’m not so sure, because it was a . . . it started
so naturally, and in the end, by the way, what I’d have to say is, prob-
ably the most poignant, closest, amazing moment I’ve had as a sing—
. . . you know, the moment I’ll remember of a particular phase in my life
is that: the holding onto each other in the basement, both of us crying,
but . . . but Sara not running away and Sara saving us. And that kind of
cemented our relationship in a really kind of wonderful way. So, uh, I
mean I don’t . . .
: It might not end that way for everybody.
Sara indeed remains firm in her conviction that her father made a mis-
take. When asked what she would have done had she been the parent,
she shows understanding for her father’s dilemma, but concludes that she
would not pick up the notes no matter how disappointed her child might
be, because it is wrong to lead someone on. In a diary entry included on
theWeb page, Weschler quotes Sara on the day of the confrontation as say-
ing: ‘‘. . . Daddy why couldn’t you have just let it run its course, Daddy.
Sometimes you have to just let things run their course.’’
Yet even as she insists upon her father’s misstep, Sara emphasizes the
bond between them. She cherishes the letters which she now knows are not
from Annabellie, but from her father:
:When we pulled out the box last night of letters did it bring you plea-
sure to look at those letters?
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:Well actually I look at them a lot.
 : You look at them a lot? And what do you think when you look
at them?
:Well, I just think it was sort of, now looking back, it was sort of nice
of him to do. That’s because, when it was happening, I mean after I fig-
ured out it was him, I had asked him, well can we still sort of write to
each other? We never really wrote to each other after that, but I just sort
of thought after a while it was a nice thing and that even though maybe
there was no Borrower writing to me there was, um . . . having my dad
make up this whole family with me is just as special, or maybe almost
as . . . as special as having actually been writing to a Borrower.
Sara ultimately agrees that the confrontation in the basement became a mo-
ment of special closeness, but adds, ‘‘I’m very close to my dad all the time.’’
This account of an ‘‘odd breach of trust’’ between Sara and her father seems
to me very close to the delicate process of identification and differentiation
that Benjamin describes. From the beginning, Sara’s father shapes a rich
reality for his daughter. If fathers typically serve as gatekeepers of the sym-
bolic order, of the unyielding world outside the nursery, Sara’s father also
plays the role attributed to manymothers—of creating an environment that
responds to the child’s own imagination.10 The linguistic, literary order Sara
enters with her father is a realm of play. When Sara speaks to the books,
the books speak back to her.
Yet this early relationship between father and childmay, not surprisingly,
still be based on something closer to omnipotence than mutual recogni-
tion. By animating the world around her according to her fantasies, Sara’s
father empowers his daughter’s imagination, yet ultimately remains the au-
thor and source of his daughter’s delight. Within this magic world, indeed
both daughter and father can feel all-powerful: Sara as her imagination is
gratified (the book talks back), her father as he creates a hermetic world in
which his child’s imagination is stimulated and sheltered. At this stage, Sara
might not even distinguish clearly or consistently between her own imagi-
nation, her father’s inventions, and a reality independent of them both. This
could explain why she is so slow to realize that her father, and not Anna-
bellie, wrote the letters, despite clues such as the handwriting and the pen.
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There may be no sharp contradiction in her mind between her father’s par-
ticipation and the real existence of Annabellie. Reality may simply have the
mark of her father on it.
A discrepancy emerges for Sara only as she discovers herself as a separate
source of invention; she discovers that her embellishments of her experi-
ences, which she had related to her father, began appearing in Annabellie’s
letters. In this way, she begins to discern her own creative contribution to a
world that had appeared to emerge magically around her father. That Sara’s
undifferentiated fantasy relationship with her father comes to an end is thus
a testimony to her developing sense of her own agency and self.
Yet both father and daughter have difficulty relinquishing this stage. In
Sara’s mind, her father’s misstep is that he did not let things ‘‘run their
course’’ because he could not face her pain and disappointment. He could
not let go of a relationship in which he could make appearances conform
to his child’s imagination. He was, as he admits, ‘‘as consumed by this as
Sara was.’’
Now the meaning of the ‘‘saving’’ becomes clear: Sara saved her father by
not letting his overextended fantasy of control destroy her.When it became
clear that her father not only did not really believe in the Borrowers, but
had in fact also fabricated the family himself, Sara took ownership of her
own belief, insisting that there were Borrowers—her father had just inter-
cepted their mail. In this moment, as he watched her recover ‘‘like the sun
rising in the morning,’’ Weschler recognized his daughter’s own strength
and independence. The Web site includes a quotation from his diary entry
on that day: ‘‘Sara walks in and confronts me in this astonishingly mature
voice—the voice she will have on her best days thirty years from now—
centered, level, serious, solemn.’’ That is,Weschler perceived in Sara not his
little girl, nor the sexualized young woman many fathers anticipate in their
daughters, but a thirty-eight-year old woman, an adult at the height of her
powers.
Clearly the survival was reciprocal: Sara’s father was also not destroyed
in her eyes when she exposed him as having deceived her. Rather he took
her distress seriously, admitted the truth, hugged her, and even cried along
with her. What she lost was an omnipotent father who could make reality
match her imagination; what she gained was a fallible parent who had gone
through great effort to help her create an imaginary world. The outcome
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of this drama of destruction and survival for Sara is that she continues to
feel ‘‘close to my Dad all the time.’’
And yet Sara, with remarkable wisdom, notes that ‘‘It might not end that
way for everybody.’’ With this warning, Sara echoes Jessica Benjamin, whose
book largely concerns how this relationship goes awry. According to Benja-
min, one of the worst consequences of traditional family and social arrange-
ments is the breakdown ofmutual recognition between father and daughter.
Within a social structure where the mother is still identified with a domes-
tic sphere in which she is at once all-controlling and yet dependent on her
child for her sense of self worth, the father quickly comes to represent es-
cape and ‘‘a pathway of individuation’’ to both male and female children.11
Through identification with the father, the child imagines his or her own
agency, autonomy, and competence in the outside world. Yet as the study
mentioned earlier suggests, at even the earliest stages of child development,
fathers often fail to recognize their daughters as like themselves and indeed
repel their identification. The result for many girls is not the sense of healthy
interdependence that mutual recognition brings, but instead a polarized
relationship between self and other in which the girl masochistically sub-
mits herself to an all-powerful father figure in order to share vicariously in
his subjectivity. Power and agency remain concentrated in one end of the
dyadic relationship rather than shared.
To this intersubjective and intrapsychic breakdown, Benjamin applies
the psychoanalytic term ‘‘splitting,’’ which ‘‘indicates a polarization, in
which opposites—especially good and bad—can no longer be integrated; in
which one side is devalued, the other idealized, and each is projected onto
different objects.’’12 Rather than see both herself and her father as simulta-
neously strong and weak, simultaneously independent and dependent, the
girl sees herself as only weak, and only strong through her father or lover.
Such splits fracture Bettina von Arnim’s relationship with Goethe, whom
she views in her writings as her literary father and her source of spiritual
development. In reconstructing this relationship, we have a more compli-
cated set of documents with which to work: among them, an original cor-
respondence between the two (–); Goethe’s novelWilhelm Meister’s
Apprenticeship (–), which provides von Arnim with a model for their
relationship; and von Arnim’s fictionalized version of the correspondence,
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Goethe’s Correspondence with a Child (). In the original correspondence,
Goethe’s participation appears unsteady and at times half-hearted. In her
literary version of the relationship, von Arnim creates a much more in-
volved, responsive Goethe, whose painful abandonment of their friendship
ultimately helps her—as if it were part of some benevolent strategy—to de-
velop her own authorial subjectivity. (To distinguish the protagonist and
author of letters and journal entries in this literary account from the his-
torical woman Bettina von Arnim, I will refer to the character as ‘‘Bettine,’’
as the name appears in the Goethe book.)
While Goethe’s letters offer little examination of his relationship to her,
Bettine takes Goethe’s novel Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship as a source:
his fictional charactersWilhelm and Mignon,Wilhelm’s adopted daughter,
offer Bettine a paradigm for her father-daughter relationship with Goethe.
As Konstanze Bäumer has explored at length, allusions to Mignon, both
explicit and implicit, abound in Bettine’s Goethe book.13 Clearly a chief at-
traction of this role for her is its promise of the kind of spiritual transfigu-
ration [Verklärung] that Mignon undergoes in the novel. Throughout the
book, Bettine expresses her longing to have, through Goethe, her fleshmade
spirit. I will look, then, at transfiguration as a trope for the father-daughter
transaction.
We turn first to Goethe’s novel. What is the nature and meaning here of
Mignon’s transfiguration? Certainly it involves a process of differentiation
from Wilhelm. When the odd, orphaned little acrobat first attracts Wil-
helm’s attention, she clearly is linked in some way to the marionettes that
were his favorite toys and theatrical inspiration as a child.14 Thus Mignon,
while mysterious and uncategorizable, seems in the beginning a being not
wholly independent of Wilhelm’s fantasy. Under his care, she seems to blos-
som and reveal herself. Meanwhile, in her strange movements and dis-
jointed poetry, she provides him with an aesthetic stimulus that leads him
to become more deeply engaged in the theater. Initially then, Wilhelm and
his adoptive daughter seem to exist in an imaginative symbiosis, where she
is at once both his muse and his creation.
Yet as Mignon emerges into adolescence, Wilhelm clearly begins to fear
the force of her separate desire. In one episode, the truth of which is only
revealed much later in the novel, Mignon plans to sneak intoWilhelm’s bed,
‘‘without any further thought than a fond, peaceful nestling.’’15 Yet she is
devastated when she witnesses another female character, Philine, slipping
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into his room ahead of her, and Mignon suddenly bites Wilhelm in the
arm as he approaches. The next morning he ‘‘is frightened’’ by her changed,
more serious demeanor (HA :; CW :). Soon, despite her pleas to
be allowed to remain with him, he sends her off to be educated by a female
friend. Rather than face the strange changes in her, the fury and desire,
Wilhelm in effect withdraws from Mignon and hands her off to others.
With this withdrawal,Wilhelm fails the test of his daughter’s aggression and
desire. For Mignon, the path of a healthy differentiation has been blocked.
Now a strange, alternative psychic dynamic ensues. Separated fromWil-
helm and given over to the care of Natalie, Mignon grows at once more
sickly, more feminine and more spiritual. After playing the role of the angel
at Christmastime, she refuses towear anything but her white angel costume.
She sings on her zither that she wishes to wear the white dress until she
leaves the earth and no clothing ‘‘surrounds the transfigured body [den ver-
klärten Leib]’’ (HA :). At last, Mignon’s weakened heart fails and she
expires in Wilhelm’s presence. Her body is artfully preserved and interred
in the Hall of the Past, a funerary building that is itself a grand work of art.
As she is lowered into the marble, a choir of youths sings: ‘‘The treasure
now is well preserved, the beauteous image of the past. Unconsumed, in
marble it rests; in your hearts it lives and works’’ (HA :; CW :).
Mignon is memorialized and rendered into art.
Mignon’s ‘‘transfiguration’’ is therefore as much a matter of her internal-
ization within Wilhelm as her differentiation from him. Kathryn Edmunds
has argued that mourning is the psychic process driving all of Wilhelm’s
strong attachments within the novel, including his relationship to Mignon,
as he seeks to recover from the loss of his initial love object Mariane.
Mourning is in effect internalization: ‘‘the process of restoring or recreating
the lost object in the inner psychic world of the bereaved.’’16 But Edmunds,
drawing on the work of Melanie Klein, distinguishes from a true, integra-
tive mourning, a false or manic mourning involving splitting and idealiza-
tion of the lost other. Rather than integrate in one’s memory the good and
bad aspects of both oneself and the other, one creates an internal image
of the other that is wholly good and idealized—and thus unstable. This
false, splintered mourning is, according to Edmunds, ultimately the kind
of mourning toward which Wilhelm tends.
If then we are to read Mignon’s death in the novel as a fantasy of de-
struction—and Wilhelm indeed refers to her as ‘‘the child . . . that I killed’’
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(HA :; CW :)—the outcome of this process is quite unlike what
Benjamin and Winnicott describe. In the course of her decline and demise,
Mignon clearly emerges as separate fromWilhelm, but she does not survive
this differentiation as a complex, externally real other for him. Instead the
actual connection to her is severed, and she becomes an idealized internal
object—an object of and for art. We can perhaps identify here then a drive
opposite to the one that finds joy in discovering the real existence of the
other, one that prefers loss and mourning because of the opportunity to
shape and own the image of the other internally.
Clearly Goethe intends Wilhelm as an ironic figure, subject to our criti-
cisms, yet Goethe may be simultaneously recognizing a tendency in himself
to prefer separation and memory to sustained connection.17 In the follow-
ing passage from Poetry and Truth,Goethe acknowledges in himself an early
preference for creation in solitude: ‘‘As I reflected on my natural gift and
found that it was truly mine alone and that it could be neither furthered
nor hindered by outside forces, I inclined toward making it the basis for my
whole intellectual existence. . . . I felt very strongly that one could only pro-
duce something significant by isolating oneself. My works, which had found
so much favor, were children of solitude.’’18 In order to produce his liter-
ary ‘‘children of solitude,’’ Goethe appears to have often broken connection
with the real people—so often women—who were his inspiration.
How then does Bettine fare in her role as Mignon in the Goethe book?
Does she seek a ‘‘transfiguration’’ at the price of such a break? Von Arnim’s
own identification with Mignon clearly stopped short of death or removal.
Her brother Clemens quotes her response to her first reading of the novel:
‘‘only into death I could not follow [Mignon].’’19 In the Goethe book, Bet-
tine describes a dream in which she dances in front of Goethe, as Mignon
dances before Wilhelm. Dressed as an angel, she rises aloft where she sees
that Goethe’s eyes still follow her. But unlike Mignon whose apotheosis is
her death, Bettine floats back down to earth into Goethe’s arms.20
Bettine’s longing to be transfigured into art, to have her flesh made spirit,
amounts more simply to a desire to have Goethe lend weight and import to
her words and actions, to recognize her as a poetic, spiritual being. At one
point in the book, Goethe uses Bettine’s letters as the source for poems, an
exchange he calls ‘‘translation.’’ Bettine is overjoyed that Goethe treats her
offering ‘‘as if it were of ever so much worth.’’ His hand renders her words
immortal: ‘‘But I see with joy how you take me up into yourself; how you
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hold these simple flowers, which would fade in the evening, in the fire of
immortality, and you give them back to me’’ (WB :).21
But Bettine represents Goethe as not only the recipient and transformer
of her naïve reflections but also as the origin of everything poetic in her.
In a letter to Goethe’s mother, she describes Goethe as her creator: ‘‘. . . I
feel, that only through my love to him I am born in the spirit, that through
him the world unlocks itself to me, where the sun shines to me, and the
day divides from night’’ (WB :–; GCC ). Her sense of connection
to Goethe extends so far that after another dream about Goethe, she con-
cludes that her happy fantasy must be an indication of his feelings: ‘‘From
this dream I awoke today, full of joy, that you are kindly disposed to me. I
believe that you take part in such dreams that in such moments you love;—
whom else could I thank for this happy existence, if you did not give it to
me?’’ (WB :; GCC ).
In the course of the Goethe book, Bettine’s fantasy of perfect psychic
symbiosis with Goethe turns out to be just that—her own fantasy driven
by desires that originate in herself. The reader easily imagines Goethe’s sur-
prise at the force of his young correspondent’s longings for, and indeed de-
mands of, him. In describing a fantasy encounter, for example, she directs
Goethe’s imagination: ‘‘and [you] must kiss me; for that is what my imagi-
nation grants to yours’’ (WB :; GCC ). Indeed, he once seems to
reproach her for the voraciousness of her imagination: ‘‘actually one cannot
give you anything because you either create/procure [schaffen] everything
for yourself or you take it’’ (WB :).
The forcefulness of Bettine’s imagination pushes the relationship into
crisis. Like Wilhelm in the novel, Goethe eventually balks at his ‘‘daugh-
ter’s’’ assertion of an independent desire, but does little to act as a real limit
to her fantasies about him. Instead, he gradually withdraws and grows cold.
Bettine begins to long for Goethe’s deceased mother, who (unlike Goethe)
never hesitated to counteract her feelings, both calming her and teaching
her toughness toward herself (WB :). Goethe at last falls into complete
silence (the fight between Goethe’s wife and von Arnim that is the cause
of the actual break is left out of the book). Bettine feels self-disgust and
remorse: ‘‘I feel now that it was not easy to endure me in my passionate
behavior, indeed I cannot endure myself and with terror I turn from all
the pain that this thought stirs up in me’’ (WB :; GCC ). She is left
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to believe that her overextended emotions have made the man she adored
disappear. Rather than offer sustained resistance to Bettine’s omnipotent
fantasies, rather than chart out their real differences, Goethe lets the rela-
tionship collapse.
In Bettine’s first letter to Goethe after the break, dated some six years
later in , she describes in great detail a scene of fiery destruction and
expresses an exultant hope that he might survive, might show himself fire-
proof, just as she intends to survive for him. This seems very much the
fantasy of destruction that Benjamin and Winnicott describe.
The very day on which I had written this the theater took fire; I went to
the place where thousands with me enjoyed this astonishing scene . . .
The fire descended into the inner rooms, and from without frisked
here and there on the edge of the building; the timber of the roof in an
instant tumbled down, and it was splendid. Now I must also tell you,
that meanwhile there was an exulting within me, I also was glowing; the
earthly body consumed itself, and also the false splendor was consumed
with it . . .
In this other world, into which now I was raised by mind, I thought of
you, whom so long already I had forsaken; your songs, which for a long
time I had not sung, moved on my lips; I alone, perhaps, among those
thousands who stood there shuddering and lamenting, felt in delight-
ful solitary enthusiasm, how fireproof you are; a problem was resolved,
better and clearer could the pain, which often in former times stirred
within me, not be elucidated. Yes, it was good!—with this house a moldy
building was burnt down,—so free and bright it grew in my soul, and
my fatherland’s air blew on me . . .
Will you again reach me your hand over all this rubble; will you know
me to be warm and loving to you to the end; then say one single word to
me, but soon, for I am thirsty. (WB :–; GCC –; italics mine)
Goethe rejects Bettine’s plea, however, and remains silent. In Bettine’s sub-
sequent letter dated four years later, we see signs of the splitting that ac-
cording to Benjamin can ensue when the other does not ‘‘survive.’’ Bettine
now addresses herself only to a memory of a loving Goethe: ‘‘It is with you
I have to speak, not with him who has pushed me from him, who has not
cared about tears and, miserly, has neither curse nor blessing to spend—be-
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fore him thoughts recoil. With you, genius! protector and inflamer!’’ (WB
:; GCC ).22
Now that she has cast off the ‘‘bad’’ Goethe who has abandoned her, Bet-
tine moves to internalize and own through art her ‘‘good’’ Goethe; she starts
designing a heroic marble statue of Goethe for the city of Frankfurt. The
inscription she chooses ‘‘This flesh has become spirit’’ (WB :) suggests
an ironic twist to her dream of transfiguration.While Bettine places a figure
of her alter-ego Mignon on the monument, the object of this apotheosis
into spirit may not at last be herself or Mignon but Goethe. Just as Wil-
helm trades the real Mignon for an idealized memory, Bettine, faced with
Goethe’s rejection, now replaces Goethe in the flesh with a heroic image.
The ‘‘good’’ Goethe, whom she now artistically controls, can serve as an in-
ternal source of power and authority for her—albeit a necessarily unstable
one.
In her ‘‘Diary,’’ the last part of the Goethe book, Bettine suggests that her
creation of the monument has brought about a reconciliation with Goethe.
(In fact Goethe did accept occasional visits from von Arnim in the last years
of his life, but never replied to any of her letters, nor certainly, developed
into a reliable friend.) In the book, Bettine has Goethe, upon seeing the
design for the first time, call it with approval ‘‘a transfigured product [ver-
klärtes Erzeugnis] of my [Bettine’s] love’’ (WB :). I would argue that
the transfiguration of love into art in this story stands rather for the loss of
love, understood as a sustained mutual connection. The real other becomes
supplanted by the work of art, Goethe’s ‘‘child of solitude.’’ While one can
admire Bettine’s resourcefulness and resilience, the tone of triumph at the
end of her book seems premature if she is left, like her literary father, to
create in isolation.23
One need not question the actual artistic accomplishments of Goethe
or Bettina von Arnim to wish for a different model of literary paternity
from the one that emerges through the Goethe book. A hopeful alterna-
tive to the breakdown between Goethe and Bettine is the relationship of
Sara and her father. While Bettine mirrors Goethe’s example of a splintered
mourning for an other that did not survive, Sara and her father discover
with elation their mutual survival. The story of Sara and Lawrence Wesch-
ler suggests the joy of a sustained relationship and holds out the promise
of a less lonely, though not necessarily conflict-free, literary realm for both
father and daughter.
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. Tragedy in Paradise: Family and Gender Politics in German Bourgeois Tragedy
– (Columbia, S.C.: Camden House, ). ‘‘Both mothers and fathers prefer
boys, not just in the United States and Britain, but in India, Brazil, and a variety of
other countries as well. This preference is particularly strong in men; between three
and four times as many men prefer boys as prefer girls.’’ Ross D. Parke, Fatherhood
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, ), . There is, however, some anec-
dotal evidence to suggest that this overall parental preference could be changing. In
a cover story for the New York Times Sunday Magazine, Lisa Belkin reports that fer-
tility clinics engaging in sex selection are seeing a much higher rate of request for
daughters than for sons. Ronald J. Ericsson, who has licensed his sex selection method
to twenty-eight American clinics, attributes this trend to ‘‘feminism’’ and the influ-
ence of mothers in fertility decisions: ‘‘Women are the driving force, and women want
daughters,’’ he says. Thus Belkin’s evidence may not reflect a change in male prefer-
ence. ‘‘Getting the Girl’’ New York Times ( July ), Sunday late ed., sec. : ff.
. Parke reports here on his own research ().
. Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem
of Domination (New York: Pantheon, ). I say ‘‘inspired,’’ for my analysis here will
not follow Benjamin’s theory of developmental stages in all its detail.
. Quoted in Benjamin, .
. Benjamin, .
. In this respect, Benjamin’s model of mutual recognitionmay differ fromHegel’s,
since in Hegel the material status of the other is never entirely clear.
. Episode , dated  June , was made available as a Real Audio recording
(copyright Saturday,  June  by KCRW) through the program’s archive on the
Web site, www.thislife.org. All of my quotations from the interview are my transcrip-
tions from this Internet recording. It is worth stressing that the radio segment is itself
a work of art—an edited reconstruction rather than unmediated presentation of a
conversation.
. I gather from the context that this was her age when the correspondence began.
. These and other supplementary notes to the interview appear at www.thislife.
org/pages/iraborrow.html.
. See Benjamin’s description of mutuality in the mother’s play with her young
infant, –.
. Benjamin, . Benjamin is, however, careful not to present identification with
the father as by itself a viable substitute for recognition of the mother: ‘‘For women,
then, failures in the struggle for recognition cannot be fully repaired by using a male
identification to revolt against the mother’’ (). Indeed: ‘‘The search for the sub-
ject of desire—the ideal father—is part of a broader search for the constellation that
provides not only the missing father but the reconciliation with the mother who ac-
knowledges this desire . . .’’ (). The father’s rejection can in the meantime only
hinder this search.
. Benjamin, fn.
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. Konstanze Bäumer, Bettine, Psyche, Mignon: Bettina von Arnim und Goethe
(Stuttgart: Akademischer Verlag, ), –.
. Helmut Ammerlahn, ‘‘Wilhelm Meisters Mignon—ein offenbares Rätsel:
Name, Gestalt, Symbol, Wesen und Werden,’’ Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift  ():
–.
. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Goethes Werke [Hamburger Ausgabe],  vols.
– ed. Erich Trunz (Munich: C. H. Beck, ), :. Hereafter references
to this edition will appear in the text parenthetically as ‘‘HA.’’ Translation: Johann
Wolfgang von Goethe, Collected Works, ed. Victor Lange, Eric Blackall, and Cyrus
Hamlin.  vols. (New York: Suhrkamp, –), :. Hereafter references will
appear parenthetically as ‘‘CW.’’ Where not otherwise noted, translations are my own.
. Kathryn Edmunds, ‘‘ ‘Ich bin gebildet genug . . . um zu lieben und zu trauern’:
Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship in Mourning,’’ Germanic Review : (): .
. While one does not want to identify the historical figure Goethe too closely
with his novel character Wilhelm, with the protagonist of his own autobiography, or
certainly with the character Goethe in von Arnim’s book, these various sources can
help mutually interpret each other.
. Quoted in Hart, .
. Clemens Brentano, Briefe,  vols. (Nuremberg: Hans Carl, ), :.
. Bettine von Arnim, Werke und Briefe,  vols., ed. Walter Schmitz and Sibylle
von Steinsdorff (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, ), :. Here-
after references to this edition will appear parenthetically in the text as ‘‘WB.’’ On this
passage, see also Bäumer, .
. Translation based on: Bettina von Arnim, Goethe’s Correspondence with a Child
(Boston, Mass.: Ticknor and Fields, ), . Hereafter ‘‘GCC.’’ I have made frequent
alterations in translations for stylistic reasons. If not otherwise noted, translations are
my own.
. The term ‘‘inflamer’’ of course repeats the fire image we just saw in Bettine’s
description of the burning theater. In fact she uses the image of fire throughout the
book to describe the force of love emanating from either Goethe or herself. Clearly,
it is her fantasy that she and Goethe might ignite each other without consuming or
annihilating.
. One, however, can see this book, Bettine’s first, as a preliminary stage in Bet-
tine’s development of an artistic intersubjectivity. It is here, according to Marjanne E.
Goozé, she first establishes ‘‘the keynote of her style—the dialogic form.’’ ‘‘Ja, ja, ich
bet’ ihn an’’: Nineteenth-century Women Writers and Goethe,’’ The Age of Goethe
Today: Critical Reexamination and Literary Reflection, ed. Gertrud Bauer Pickar and
Sabine Cramer (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, ), .
 .
Literary Archaeologies (II):
Codes of Friendship and Paternity
in German Romanticism

 Mediation and Domination:
Paternity, Violence, and Art
in Brentano’s Godwi
 
For Stanley, with gratitude
It might seem misguided to discuss in a Festschrift devoted to pater-
nity a novel that foregrounds maternity as obviously as does Clemens Bren-
tano’s Godwi (/), but a close analysis of the novel invites one to
read it as concerned with the far-reaching influence of the father and the
qualities he represents. The novel’s subtitle, The Stone Image of the Mother,1
underscores the prominent role of the mother in Brentano’s first novel. The
marble statue of the protagonist’s deceased mother, a focal point of the
estate and of the novel, embodies Godwi’s yearned-for ideal of totality, for
he states: ‘‘Everything was confining to me, except when I sat by that white
image in the garden, then it seemed to me as if everything that I lacked was
embraced in it’’ (). The mother mediates her son’s desire for totality—
she promises liberation from all that confines him as well as compensation
for lack and inadequacy. In Romantic writings, mothers typically function
as an iconographical sign for the experience of inwardness and intimacy.2
According to one critic, the desire for the mother corresponds to the desire
for cosmic order, totality, and harmony, emblematic of the thought of this
period.3 Kittler, drawing on examples from Novalis, Brentano, Friedrich
Schlegel, Tieck, Arnim, andHoffmann, argues that in Romanticism amatri-
linear order replaces the patrilinear order of the Middle Ages.4
Yet much Romantic scholarship, reading the mother as the mediator of
the protagonist’s ideal of totality, overlooks one crucial theoretical issue at
the heart of Romanticism: the problem of mediation. In Godwi, Brentano
posits the defining characteristic of Romantic art as biased or tainted me-
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diation. He states: ‘‘Everything that stands as a mediator between our eye
and a remote object to be seen, and brings the remote object closer, but
simultaneously gives to it something of its own, is Romantic’’ and ‘‘. . . the
Romantic is thus a telescope [Perspectiv], or much more the color of the
glass and the distinguishing [Bestimmung] of the object through the form
of the glass’’ (). Romanticism instills a heightened awareness of artistic
mediation, for in mediating our perceptions, it also colors and shapes them
with its own particular interests.5 This heightened awareness of mediation
draws our attention not only to the mediated object, but also to that which
mediates it. In this move from the mediated to the mediator, we recognize
that although the mother is the focus of mediation, the father controls me-
diation. This is evident in the passage cited earlier, in which Godwi speaks
of his mother’s statue. Notice that Godwi relates not to his mother immedi-
ately, but instead to a statue of her commissioned by his father. The son
experiences totality through his mother, but experiences his mother (who
died in his infancy) only through the medium of art. Closer attention to this
novel purportedly about mothers reveals paternity as a force more influen-
tial and sinister than maternity. Aesthetic mediation, if not all mediation,
ultimately reveals itself as the domain and possession of the father. Thus,
although Romantic art is maternally focused, it is at a deeper level subject
to the strict command of the father.
Godwi inherits both his name and his estate from his father; on the estate
sits a chapel-like structure that his father built to house the numerous art-
works he commissioned. Godwi associates this structure itself and the artis-
tic creations commissioned by his father with violence. Most of these art-
works represent women who were objects of violence, and include women
who were kidnapped, seduced, deceived, and deserted. The statue of his
mother represents her shortly before her death (she drowned herself due
to his father’s deceit), and for Godwi the pain in the statue is evident; he
describes it as follows: ‘‘[She] cannot cry, for the eyes / And the tears are
stone. / Cannot sigh, cannot breathe, / and nearly resounds with pain. /
Alas, the entire image wants to explode from painful forces’’ (). Just as
Godwi projects a notion of totality onto this statue, so, too, does he project
onto it physical and emotional pain.
Godwi learns from his father that art and violence are inseparable. This is
evident not only in the subject matter of the artworks, but also in his father’s
relation to the artist. One of Godwi’s earliest childhood memories recalls:
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‘‘In my childhood this church lay before me as an unbearable secret, and I
always shuddered whenmy father went in with one of the strange [fremden]
artists, and came out again alone, as if he had murdered him’’ (). Young
Godwi’s concept of paternity becomes entangled with both aesthetics and
violence—his father is both commissioner of the artwork and murderer of
the artist. This paternal violence encourages similar acts on the part of the
son, but as I will demonstrate, it also inhibits the son from becoming a
father himself. In other words, for Brentano, paternity perpetuates violence
and art rather than genetic material and a family name.
Brentano’s association of paternity, violence, and aesthetics is most strik-
ing when Godwi explains his father’s motivation for commissioning these
works of art: ‘‘My father’s eccentricity [Bisarrerie] was the beautiful eccen-
tricity to make beautiful the evil that can never be made good; his idea was
that good is in time and beauty is in space and the possibility of compen-
sation for a depraved youth would be to give it form in one’s more mature
years. He said, every action becomes a memorial that condemns me, and
that I can never overturn, but I can compel this stone to become a beautiful
image of the act that it marks’’ (). Godwi’s father makes an apparently
Kantian distinction between ethics and aesthetics: moral concerns do not
encumber pure beauty, for beauty is exclusively formal. Yet the closer one
examines this, the less it looks like Kant, for where Kant would abstract
from this form a purposiveness and a supposed general agreement among
perceivers, and from that deduce both a sensus communis in humans as well
as a higher principle, even a higher being,6 Godwi’s father relies on beauty
to excuse himself from all higher principles and all connections to com-
munity. He wishes to sublimate his moral guilt into aesthetic production
and thus avoid the pain or responsibility of restitution or reparation (‘‘that
can never be made good’’). Art, for the father, is a purely private phenome-
non—Godwi notes that his father built the chapel that houses his art ‘‘in
a condition of the greatest secrecy and concealment . . . and only for him-
self alone’’ ()7—void of all connections to others, to higher principles,
higher beings, and to morals.
Yet in pressing beauty into his service, the father must force (‘‘compel’’)
the artistic medium to be beautiful (artistic production becomes fundamen-
tally violent). Art, for Godwi’s father, is not a moral escape from violence,
but is rather an amoral representation and aestheticizing of it. In fact, for
Godwi’s father, beauty is only a secondary consideration in art, as the fol-
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lowing passage indicates: ‘‘My father . . . did not want the beautiful in art,
he wanted only its power. It should serve him by giving in all ways [auf alle
Arten] the same impression that he wanted. It should present on all sides
of him something that he would have liked to have forgotten and was never
able to forget, in spite of his unattainable wish’’ (). The father desires not
beauty, but rather a singular, powerful impression from art. In other words,
for the father, art mediates the past in its multiple manifestations (‘‘in all
ways’’), yet this mediation should produce an identical impression (‘‘the
same impression that he wanted [denselben Eindruck, den er wollte]’’) in
all observers. And, as Godwi’s father tells the reader, violence is the only
means by which he can remember his past: ‘‘I have done all sorts of things,
had many friends, spent much money, loved many maidens, lost many eter-
nities, and that is all past, nothing remains but the scar, and that pains me
whenever the weather changes’’ (). All that remains of his wild, younger
years is a metaphorical scar, a symbol of wounding and physical violence,
such that recollection is intimately linked with pain. In other words, re-
minding himself of the past is not only a reminder of past violence, but
also an act of violence itself, causing pain in himself as observer. Thus the
impression he hopes to generate with art is neither moral nor educational,
for it is precisely such forces that the father avoids by turning to art. I ar-
gue that art is a constant reminder not only of the father’s guilt but also of
his power, of the violence he perpetrates, and of the pain he can endure.
Art involves the observer only insofar as the observer is willing to acquiesce
to the violent power of the father. The reception of art is not democratic,
where individuals are allowed the freedom to develop their own impres-
sions; rather it is totalitarian, where the father controls all responses and
forces them into a uniform reaction.8
In a novel combining textual representation of several nontextual art
forms (sculpture, painting, architecture, music, drama, etc.9), the reader
must rely wholly on Maria’s (the male narrator’s) description of these art-
works. Yet Maria reads and depicts these works as if under the direction of
Godwi’s father, focusing on his own impressions rather than on the work
of art itself. For example, when Godwi shows Maria a painting of Annon-
ciata Wellner (a young woman who was kidnapped and seduced and later
went insane), Maria pours forth a stream of impressions that culminate in
‘‘Pain, Pain! burning desire, whowill break for you the seal of the heart, and
to whom are you sent?’’ (). Godwi interrupts him and covers the pic-
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ture, stating ‘‘It was enough, dear Maria, the painter fulfilled his obligation,
and you were well on the way to observing the impression of the image on
you and not the image itself ’’ (). Godwi identifies his father’s desired
mode of artistic reception—one in which the violence and pain associated
with art overwhelm the observer—and thus implicitly accuses Maria of fall-
ing subject to his father’s desire to represent violence and pain. To borrow
Brentano’s metaphor cited earlier, the impression that the lens creates is so
powerful that one no longer sees the object it mediates.
Therefore I agree with critics such as Bernd Reifenberg who identify the
father’s main artistic impulse as follows: ‘‘. . . he differentiates things from
each other, destroys their coherence and preserves them in their indepen-
dence [Eigenständigkeit].’’10 The father reifies, even petrifies, instances of
violence and fragmentation. Yet I disagree with Reifenberg who posits this
impulse as a contrasting pole to the ‘‘all-unity of Nature, that is the pre-
sumed authenticity of motherly-womanly discourse and sensation,’’11 for
this suggests a balanced polarity between maternal totality and paternal
fragmentation. Instead, I view this relationship as unbalanced: the father’s
fragmentation does not counterbalance the mother’s authentic totality, for
the father mediates the mother’s totality through a representation of vio-
lence against her. The impression of totality and authenticity that the moth-
er’s statue presents is an intentional construct by the father and was created
to elicit a response that ultimately reminds the viewer of the father’s disrup-
tive and destructive power. The Romantic ideal of the mother is grounded
in paternal violence and control.
One might read the father’s activities through a Freudian lens and as-
sert that his actions represent efforts to control the mother and to interrupt
the child’s desire for her. Yet such a reading assumes a stable, bourgeois
family structure. The novel justifies no such assumption. On the contrary,
for Brentano, paternity dismantles such a model. At one point in the novel,
Godwi Sr.12 states: ‘‘I would find it quite agreeable to have a wife and a
child, but to desire the wife of one’s father or of one’s own, bores me, and
stealing is forbidden’’ (). Brentano undermines here the basic premise
of the Freudian Oedipal triangle,13 for not only does the father not desire
the mother, but also the father (as son) does not desire his own mother.
As the narrator gradually unravels the intricate web of relationships in the
course of the novel, the reader soon realizes that there are few examples of
a traditional family structure.14
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This is clearest toward the end of the novel, where Godwi relates the re-
union and reconciliation of his father with Joseph (also known as Werdo
Senne), from whom he had taken Marie (Godwi’s mother). Werdo and
Godwi Sr. joinMolly Hodefield, with whomGodwi Sr. had fathered Godwi’s
half brother Karl, to travel to Italy, and with them travel Werdo’s daugh-
ter Otilie (whose mother had died many years earlier), her husband Fran-
zesko Fiormonti, and Franzesko’s son from an earlier relationship, Eusebio.
Godwi describes this ‘‘procession to Italy’’ as follows: ‘‘At the front [an der
Spitze] flew Eusebio, behind him Franzesko and Otilie, and behind these
my father with old Joseph, but between them Molly von Hodefield, in a
pyramid-like manner, just as storks fly . . .’’ (). This ‘‘family’’ creates a
pyramid, a form with apparent stability, and the comparison with storks,
the mythical bringers of children, suggests this as a familial model. Yet this
form does not rely on the stability of bourgeois familial structures, for no-
where in this ‘‘pyramid’’ do we find a father-mother-child relationship—
one member is always absent, either the child (for example with Godwi Sr.
and Molly) or the mother (withWerdo and Otilie Senne or Franzesko Fior-
monti and Eusebio). The father, however, is always present, whether as
Godwi Sr.,Werdo, or Franzesko. Male figures—here Godwi Sr.,Werdo, and
Eusebio—form the ‘‘points’’ of this pyramid; they ground it and give it sta-
bility. For Brentano, the father and his son literally form the family; the
mother is either absent (as are the mothers of Otilie, Franzesko, and Euse-
bio) or simply fills in the spaces along the lines defined by the male figures
(as do Molly and Otilie). Brentano thus posits a family structure in which
mothers are significant only insofar as they adapt to a form that the father
determines.
This drive away from the personal and individual and toward the formal
typifies the father’s role in Godwi. For example, Godwi observes that his
father directs his desire against all human relations and toward abstractions:
‘‘Hence he was very unhappy, because he yearned for love and friendship,
but not for people’’ (). For the father, people become simply means to
an end; they mediate his desired ideals. ‘‘Friendship’’ and ‘‘love’’ are thus
ideals void of correlates in the world of experience. In fact, we learn that
forms and representation, as violent as they may be, threaten the father less
than actual interpersonal relations. In the first volume of the novel, we read
of Godwi’s extensive travels and we learn from his half brother Karl Römer
why his father not only allows but also funds these travels. Although he
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misses his son deeply and feels concerned that Godwi might not love him,
Godwi’s father also tells Römer: ‘‘. . . a secret lies over [Godwi’s] childhood,
and it would kill me, if I had seen him around me for much longer’’ ().
We learn later that this secret is Godwi Sr.’s deceit of Godwi’s mother, which
led to her death, the moment that his father preserved in the stone statue.
In other words, although the statue reminds Godwi Sr. repeatedly of his
guilt, he does not feel as threatened by it as he does by his son’s presence.
The father can represent images of violence because, although they have
aesthetic impact and force, they do not threaten him and do not demand
active and dynamic involvement of him. Paternity for Brentano entails flee-
ing personal relationships and moral responsibility.
Yet how can this practice of paternity perpetuate itself ? In Godwi, it per-
petuates itself on the formal and abstract level, but it cannot perpetuate
itself biologically. Godwi, like his father, has a rather wild youth and ex-
ploits numerous women without much concern for their well-being, and
he, too, makes an artistic representation of one of them. However, unlike
his father, he himself has no children. The form of paternity represented in
this novel inhibits offspring from becoming parents; instead, this type of
paternity maintains the infantile status of its offspring.15
Throughout the novel, we find instances where Godwi either loves an
ideal instead of a person or shuns personal interaction and responsibility
altogether. For example, when Godwi first meets the Countess of G (dis-
guised as a man), he tells her: ‘‘Well, I would very much like to love and
be loved, without necessity and fear, without apprehensions and toil, for I
fear nothing more than affection. You cannot imagine a more sworn enemy
of the sentimental world . . .’’ (). The resonance with the description
of his father cited earlier (‘‘he yearned for love and friendship, but not for
people’’) is unmistakable. Godwi desires love, but shies away from the reali-
ties of interpersonal relationships and of intimacy and tenderness. The re-
sult is that Godwi is incapable of establishing an enduring relationship with
any woman; even Violette, whom he deserts but later rescues, dies shortly
after their reunion. Godwi is incapable of establishing even basic familial re-
lationships, for when Godwi sees the ‘‘family’’ reunion of his father, Molly,
Werdo, Franzesko, Otilie, and Eusebio, he remarks: ‘‘People were never so
wonderfully united as these were, but I felt that I did not belong to them’’
(). Godwi recognizes a unique, even fairy-tale-like connection (‘‘won-
derfully connected’’) in this family, yet his only impression is that he does
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not belong to them. Apparantly Godwi has learned from his father to seek
ideals of love and relationship in representation rather than in reality. Since
Godwi claims to find complete fulfillment only in a statue of his mother,
one must assume that the world of empirical reality estranges and distances
him. Like his father, Godwi finds a relationship to a stone statue far superior
to one with an actual human being.
In fact, Godwi portrays his own disposition in terms of two statues: the
statue of his mother and the statue of Violette that he commissioned. He
states: ‘‘The path seems long from the monument of a mother to that of a
prostitute; it isn’t, but nonetheless it constitutes my disposition [Gemüth]’’
(). Rather than discuss the relation of the mother figure to the prosti-
tute,16 I conclude by focusing on Godwi’s relationship to their stone images.
It will become evident that Godwi, like his father, constructs representa-
tional art as an expression of violence and as a means of distancing himself
from interpersonal relationships.17
Godwi first meets the subject of the statue, Violette, when he begins a
torrid affair with her mother, the Countess of G. Violette falls in love with
Godwi, but he only pities her at the time without returning her affection.
Godwi eventually ends his affair with the Countess, fearing that the experi-
ence of free love was becoming too confining.18 He knows that in leaving
the Countess, he also leaves Violette to a lifestyle that will destroy her.19
Indeed, the Countess opens up ‘‘the free tent of her pleasure’’ (–) dur-
ing the Napoleonic wars and enlists Violette’s assistance; by the time Godwi
findsViolette again, she has wasted away and is near death. Godwi and Vio-
lette join together briefly (‘‘No priest united us, but nor did life; it was love
alone . . .’’ []), but she dies after a very short time. Godwi memorializes
her with a statue of her apotheosis in which a god-like figure with a lyre in
one hand and a flying swan pressed against his breast pulls her up to him
by the hair.
The reader learns of the statue from Maria, who quickly slips from a
description of the statue itself into—as earlier—the impression the statue
has on him. He writes: ‘‘In the middle of the image, where the hand en-
twines itself in her locks, his lust and his love, which had surged up with
the maiden, die, and his pride and his grandeur, that floats down from the
head of the soaring genius, dissolves, and opens up like a wound, that gives
unity to the whole, and in which they both beautifully interpenetrate [in
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der sich beide schön durchdringen] and it is beautiful how the swan nestles
against this wound, and soothes the pain of the spectacle’’ (). Maria sees
a wound in this statue. As Marlies Janz rightly points out, this wound is not
actually on the statue, but is projected there by Maria.20 Maria thus again
perceives in the paternally determined mode: he allows himself to be over-
whelmed by the impression of the statue and envisions a wound. Precisely
this wound, this mark of physical violence, gives the statue unity. Maria
goes so far as to associate this wound with beauty in describing how the
swan alleviates the pain of the wound. Maria thus sees in Godwi’s statue a
constellation of beauty and violence, similar to that which Godwi saw in
the statue his father constructed.
Maria’s attempts to mediate this wound to the reader continue as he de-
scribes with an extendedmetaphor ‘‘where onewould find the image in life’’
(). He speaks in the second person, stating that if ‘‘you’’ walk through
beautiful gardens on a spring evening, find a sleeping woman there, over-
come your inhibitions, and begin to disrobe her, and then attempt to re-
move the hand that covers her breast:
. . . if the beautiful, pleasing breast then speaks to you with the bloody
lips of an open wound . . . if all your pleasure sinks into this wound, as
into her grave, and seeking for help you pull down the robe from the
entire beautiful body and look upward from the painful wound, towards
the head, to draw in prayer [Gebet zu holen], and down over the en-
chantments of the beautiful body, with the dream of earthly rapture, to
soothe your pain, . . . and if you must return to this wound eternally
until all of this runs together in it, and pleasure and pain and grandeur
blossom from the wound—then you have the complete impression of
the image, then you stand before Violette’s monument, and if you turn,
and step into the narrow, dark house to those people who you are used
to calling ‘‘yours,’’ then you feel what you feel when you turn away from
the image. ()
In this disturbing aestheticizing and eroticizing of violence—of male voy-
eurism and potential rape—the father’s impact on both Godwi and Maria
becomes most acutely apparent. This passage abounds with typical roman-
tic tropes, the conflation of the erotic and the religious (‘‘to draw in prayer,
and down over the enchantments of the beautiful body’’),21 the invocation
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of the grave in connection with desire (‘‘if all your pleasure sinks into this
wound, as into her grave’’),22 the conflation of ‘‘pleasure,’’ ‘‘pain,’’ and ‘‘gran-
deur,’’23 and the organic language (‘‘blossom’’) associated with this wound.
In the sense that the passage enacts Maria’s mediation of his impression of
the statue to the reader, it is quintessentially Romantic, at least according
to Brentano’s definition cited earlier.
The problem with this quintessential Romanticism becomes evident in
the last phrases, in which Maria demonstrates that the impression of Vio-
lette’s statue is so overwhelming that, like the statue of Godwi’s mother, it
promises a totality unattainable in empirical reality. For Maria, all personal
and familial relations are merely impoverished alternatives to the totality
of art. The house where one lives is ‘‘narrow’’ and ‘‘dark,’’ and one’s family
becomes people associated with you only because you call them yours, not
because of a common emotional or biological bond. The impression made
by Godwi’s statue of Violette is similar to the one Godwi’s father’s artworks
produce: the conflation of beauty, eros, and violence evokes a desire for
totality in art and encourages a turning away from human relationships.
AsMaria’s impression of Violette’s statue resonates in so many ways with
Godwi’s impression of his mother’s statue, it seems clear that both Maria
and Godwi perceive life similarly and also that Godwi has inherited from
his father the tendency to conflate beauty and violence in representational
art while simultaneously having inherited the yearning to flee genuine re-
lationships for the sake of aesthetic ideals. Godwi’s desire for totality in
art corresponds to his inability to sustain interpersonal relationships in the
empirical world. Paternity, as presented in Godwi, uses the mediation of
art both to enforce paternal power and to evade moral responsibility. The
extremes to which paternal mediation exerts itself inhibit its own perpetua-
tion and thus ensure its own demise. The result is a Romanticism that turns
against itself, subverting the totality associated with the mother through the
fragmentation and violence associated with the father’s mediation.

. Das steinerne Bild der Mutter. All translations are mine, unless indicated other-
wise. Parenthetical page references cite Clemens Brentano, Godwi oder das steinerne
Bild der Mutter, ed. Werner Bellmann, vol.  of Clemens Brentano. Sämtliche Werke
und Briefe, ed. Behrens, Frühwald, and Lüders (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer,
).
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. Hannalore Schlaffer, ‘‘Mutterbilder, Marmorbilder: Die Mythisierung der Liebe
in der Romantik,’’ Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift Neue Folge . (): .
. Heide Christina Eilert, ‘‘Clemens Brentano: Godwi (/),’’ in Romane und
Erzählungen der deutschen Romantic, ed. Paul Michael Lützeler (Stuttgart: Reclam,
), .
. ‘‘The All-Mother, who eternally gives birth, intensifies sensations, and produces
incest-phantasms, takes the place of the symbolic father, who divided into genders
and generations.’’ Friedrich Kittler, ‘‘Der Dichter, Die Mutter, das Kind. Zur roman-
tischen Erfindung der Sexualität,’’ in Romantik in Deutschland. Ein interdisziplinäres
Symposion, ed. Richard Brinkmann. (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, ), .
. Note that Brentano’s definition of Romanticism is much broader than, for ex-
ample, Friedrich Schlegel’s, who in theDialogue on Poetry defines romantic art as that,
‘‘which presents a sentimental theme in a fantastic form.’’ Friedrich Schlegel,Dialogue
on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms, trans. Ernst Behler and Roman Struc (University
Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, ), . Schlegel is likewise aware of
the significance of mediation, but unlike Brentano, prescribes both form and content.
. See Kant’s Critique of Judgment, for example, § ‘‘On Taste as a Kind of sensus
communis,’’ and §  ‘‘On What Kind of Assent There Is in a Teleological Proof of
the Existence of God.’’ Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, ).
. Note, however, that Godwi’s father places the statue of his deceased wife in plain
view. For art that claims to be private and personal, it has an almost exhibitionist
quality about it. For example, we learn early in the second volume of the novel that
the people of the nearby town are quite familiar with the sculpture on the estate—
that it is anything but private ().
. Compare Janz: ‘‘The artworks should judge him, but only insofar as his atti-
tude of submission confirms to him that he is master of the situation.’’ Marlies Janz,
Marmorbilder: Weiblichkeit und Tod bei Clemens Brentano und Hugo von Hofmanns-
thal (Königstein/Ts.: Athenäum, ), .
. See Eugene Reed’s ‘‘The Union of the Arts in Brentano’s Godwi,’’ The Germanic
Review . (): – for a discussion of textual and nontextual art, as well as
Ingrid Mittenzwei’s ‘‘Kunst als Thema des frühen Brentano,’’ in Clemens Brentano.
Beiträge des Kolloquiums im Freien Deutschen Hochstift, ed. Detlev Lüders (Tübingen:
Max Niemeyer, ), –, and Ursula Regener’s ‘‘Arabesker Godwi: Immanente
Kunsttheorie und Gestaltreflexion in Brentanos Roman,’’ MLN . (): –
for the theoretical significance of art in the novel.
. Bernd Reifenberg, Die ‘‘schöne Ordnung’’ in Clemens Brentanos Godwi und
Ponce de Leon (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, ), . Janz makes a similar
observation: ‘‘The work of the fathers is represented as the gravedigging of one’s own
life. The lords of creation produce nothing but the reproduction of their own finitude:
the pile of rubble next to their own grave’’ ().
. Reifenberg, .
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. Since Godwi and his father share the same name, I refer to the novel’s protago-
nist as Godwi and to his father as Godwi Sr.
. In An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, Freud describes the Oedipus complex as the
child’s sexual desire for the mother, which the father prohibits. The child’s ‘‘early
awakened masculinity seeks to take his father’s place with her; his father has hitherto
in any case been an envied model to the boy.’’ Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psycho-
analysis, trans. James Strachey. (New York: Norton, ), . Implicit in this model
is a family where both father and mother are present, and where both father and son
desire the mother. Neither the former nor the latter conditions obtain in Godwi, for
Godwi Sr. does not desire his wife, and Godwi Jr. does not have a mother to desire.
. Rolf Spinnler’s insightful analysis compares Godwi to the ‘‘Bildungsroman’’
genre, insofar as this genre represents the process of socialization. Spinnler notes that:
‘‘Brentano’s novel contains implicitly the basic model of a pathologically developing
process of socialization, which is told in always new variations, and he traces this pa-
thology back to deficiencies in the early childhood socialization within the family, to
damaged families that can no longer correctly perceive their pedagogical function.’’
Rolf Spinnler, Clemens Brentano oder Die Schwierigkeit, naiv zu sein (Frankfurt am
Main: Verlag Anton Hain, ), .
. Spinnler notes that in this failure to relinquish childhood, Godwi cannot fulfill
the project of the ‘‘Bildungsroman’’ and that this motivates Brentano after this novel
to turn to the genre of the ‘‘Märchen’’ [fairy tale], which privileges childhood rather
than adult life (Spinnler, –).
. For further analysis of these issues, see Hannalore Schlaffer’s ‘‘Mutterbilder,
Marmorbilder,’’ Marlies Janz’s Marmorbilder, and Rolf Nägele’s Die Muttersymbolik
bei Clemens Brentano (Winterthur: P. G. Keller, ).
. Janz notes: ‘‘The petrified women of Godwi, the monument of the mother and
of Violette, symbolize the silencing of the female body through patriarchal violence,
but simultaneously the seductive power of female images, whose promise of happi-
ness appears to lie beyond all possibility of realization and thus appears to be linked
to death’’ ().
. ‘‘Free love is beneficent, but a constrained unruliness that bridles mewith licen-
tiousness [mit Zügellosigkeit zügelt] is most pernicious of all and everything good is
ruined by it’’ ().
. ‘‘The Countess may have been however she wanted to be, but together with
her child, she was bad’’ ().
. ‘‘. . . the statue of Violette does not have a wound, rather the wound ‘appears’
to Maria’’ (Janz, ).
. See Gabriele Brandstetter, Erotik und Religiosität (Munich: Wilhelm Fink,
). One example in Romantic literature is in Bonaventura’s Die Nachtwachen von
Bonaventura, trans. Gerald Gillespie (Austin: University of Texas Press, ): ‘‘People
chased me a few times from churches because I laughed there, and just as often from
houses of pleasure because I wanted to pray in them’’ (–).
. See, for example, the experience at the grave in the third of Novalis’s ‘‘Hymns
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to the Night:’’ ‘‘There the earthly splendor fled and my sadness with it—misery [Weh-
mut] flowed into a new, unplumbed world.’’ Novalis, Hymns to the Night, trans. Dick
Higgins (New Paltz, N.Y.: McPherson, ), .
. Recall, for example, a similar conflation in the fourth of Novalis’s ‘‘Hymns to
the Night:’’ ‘‘I float over there, / And each pain / Is somehow a sting / Of delight’’ ().
 Old Father Jupiter:
On Kleist’s Drama Amphitryon
 
Translated by Eric Jarosinski

Kleist’s drama Amphitryon was published in Dresden in  by his
friend Adam Müller and first performed in . The complete title reads
Heinrich von Kleist’s Amphitryon, ein Lustspiel nach Molière. Written dur-
ing Kleist’s French internment, it was the first work to appear under his
name. (Die Familie Schroffenstein was published in  without mention
of the author.) It is thought that Kleist worked on the Amphitryonmaterial
beginning in , with the main impetus for the project coming from his
acquaintance Johann Daniel Falk, whose adaptation Amphitryon, Lustspiel
in fünf Aufzügen had appeared in .1
Contemporary critics highly praised the piece. Friedrich von Gentz, for
example, read it with ‘‘complete admiration.’’ He had only one complaint:
the use of the expletive ‘‘Saupelz.’’2 Already the first reviewers understood
the drama from the perspective of the epoch-defining discussion about the
divisions between classical antiquity andmodernity, classicism and Roman-
ticism, and French and German culture.3 Paving the way for this reception
was Adam Müller’s preface to the play, in which he characterized Kleist’s
work as overcoming the ‘‘frivolity of Molière’s Amphitryon’’ through Ger-
man ‘‘meaning’’ and as forming a bridge between antiquity and the mo-
dernity: ‘‘This Amphitryon strikes me as neither a classical nor a modern
adaptation; likewise, the author does not demand any crudely mechanical
connection between the two. Instead, he attempts to realize a certain poetic
actuality. When this is some day achieved, classical antiquity and moder-
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nity—as subordinate to this poetic present as they may be—will exist in
harmony, much as Goethe had projected’’ ().4 Müller’s preface surely
must have irritated Goethe, who in his  treatiseWinckelmann had newly
separated antiquity from Christian modernity. After reading Amphitryon,
he wrote in his diary: ‘‘I read and was astounded, as if by the strangest sign
of the times.’’ He objected to the ‘‘Christian construance of the fable,’’ the
‘‘overshadowing’’ of Alcmene by Maria.5
Indeed, Kleist truly had translated ancient mythology into the terms of
Christianity. Through numerous allusions to, and quotations from, scrip-
ture, the mythological procreation of a divine child by a god and an earthly
mother is equated with God’s coming to earth as man.6 There are, for in-
stance, allusions to Maria’s Immaculate Conception and to the Annuncia-
tion when Jupiter proclaims: ‘‘To you there shall be born / a son, and Her-
cules his name’’ (..). From Christian religion come such terms as reve-
lation, devil, sinner, saint, hermitage, idol, creation, God, and father. As
Jupiter once remarks: ‘‘Isn’t all that we see happening around us here a
miracle?’’ (..). Amphitryon curses in a manner both ancient and Chris-
tian: ‘‘Lightning, hell, the devil!’’ (..).
Goethe also emphasized the radical ways in which Kleist’s drama, be-
longing to its time, treats the problem of perception and self-certainty, and
thereby also of religious certainty: ‘‘The significance of classical antiquity’s
treatment of Amphitryon involved the confusion of the senses, the conflict
between the senses and conviction. . . . Molière emphasizes the distinction
between spouse and lover, which is actually an object of the intellect, the
wit, and gentle reading of the world. . . . The contemporary Kleist takes as
his starting point the emotional confusion of the main characters.’’7 Already
in the first reviews an interpretive stance was taking shape that still holds
today; the drama was read as if it were called Alcmene. As Uvo Hölscher re-
cently put it: ‘‘The traditional comedy of Amphitryon has instead become a
drama of Alcmene.’’8 There is of course good reason for this reading. Con-
sider, for instance, the play’s conclusion: Kleist has Alcmene speak the last
word, ‘‘Ach!’’ which had already fascinated the play’s first audiences. In the
adaptations by Plautus and Molière, however, Alcmene does not even ap-
pear in the last act. Still, there are also good reasons to take the title char-
acter seriously.9 Only at the outset of Kleist’s play is Amphitryon the coarse
husband who demands his marital rights. This is how Molière, too, has him
appear. At the end of Kleist’s play, however, he is no longer the hollow cad
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that Jupiter makes him out to be in front of Alcmene. He, too, is a tragic
figure, and he alone perceives Alcmene’s unhappiness—‘‘Lord of all / my
life! Unhappy woman!’’—and remains convinced of her virtue, even after
she ridicules his body (..). ‘‘Every word she utters / is the truth—not
gold ten times refined / is truer’’ (..). Amphitryon’s last word is not paid
to glory or to Jupiter, but rather to Alcmene!
I will now approach this drama as if it were experimentally entitled Jupi-
ter orGott!My thesis is that Kleist’s ‘‘contemporary’’ drama does not present
God’s power, but instead his powerlessness under the conditions of moder-
nity—it is the drama of a twilight of the gods or of God. In this regard, I
view Jupiter as a tragic figure. To the extent that he is tragic, he no longer
is a god. The drama’s concluding ‘‘Ach!’’ is spoken not only by Alcmene,
but also by Amphitryon, Jupiter, and, not to be forgotten, by Sosia as well.
In brief, my analysis asks what Mercury’s jovial Christian-classical formu-
lation ‘‘old father Jupiter [alter Vater Jupiter]’’ actually signifies within the
context of the drama (..). In Greek mythology, Zeus is considered the
father of the Gods, and in Christianity, God is considered the father. This
is not the only image of God or Zeus, but one that is significant and, in the
Old Testament, dominant.10

Most frequently, commentary on the play has focused on Alcmene’s
‘‘emotional confusion,’’ a line of inquiry still pursued today. Broadly speak-
ing, there are two main interpretive positions regarding the relations be-
tween mortals and the gods in the play.11 On the one side, Müller-Seidel,
Gadamer, Ryan, and others view the gods as an absolute, transcendent
power, in line with classical and Christian conceptions of God.12 The gods
have descended to earth to punish humans for their wrongdoing. As evi-
dence of this, it is noted that Alcmene ascribes Jupiter’s arrival to her having
worshipped her husband as ‘‘her idol’’ (..). A variation on this argu-
ment (for example, Jauß and Michelsen) views Jupiter as a zealous, awful
god, as an ‘‘evil demon,’’ who drives man into delusion much like Descartes’
evil genius.13 Following conceptions of God prevalent in German idealism,
still another variation (Stierle) depicts Jupiter as a tragic god, who longs
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to shed his omnipotence and come into contact with humans on their own
terms.14
By contrast, the second position reads the drama as staging a human re-
bellion against the authority of the gods. Wittkowski makes this argument
themost strongly.15 Among other things, he bases his argument on the scene
in which Jupiter informs Alcmene that a god appeared to her in their night
of passion, and she will love him so that she will have to weep if he returns
to Olympia without allowing her to follow. To that Alcmene replies:
No, never think that, my Amphitryon.
If I could turn back time one single day,
I’d bolt my closet shut against all gods
and heroes, yes, I would—
(..)
Jupiter’s response, ‘‘Damn the deluded hope that tempted me down here!’’
entails a repudiation of God. In choosing between the love of God and that
of man, Alcmene decides in favor of human love. It is often overlooked,
however, that Alcmene’s decision in favor of Amphitryon is a decision for
her ‘‘image’’ of Amphitryon. As his words indicate, she would lock herself
in her ‘‘cell’’ not only to shut out Jupiter, but also the real Amphitryon. After
all, Amphitryon is himself a hero. He is a descendent of Perseus, the son of
Zeus and of a king’s daughter. Even those who adhere to this interpretive
position assume that although the god loses his game, his divine power re-
mains untouched. As far as I can determine, only Arthur Henkel, Jochen
Schmidt, and, most recently, Hans-Jürgen Schrader have expressed doubt
about these positions and pointed to the fact that the drama demytholo-
gizes the myth.16 With my analysis, I wish to add to their reading.17 Along
with Goethe, I read the play as a ‘‘contemporary’’ or ‘‘current [gegenwär-
tiges]’’ drama, as a drama about the ‘‘aging’’ of religion.

Kleist’s drama Following Molière stands in a long tradition of a literary
recycling of the Amphitryon myth.18 Homer was the first to mention it,
and Pindar likewise assumes an acquaintance with the material. In Benja-
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min Hederich’s Gründliche Mythologisches Lexikon of , the myth is re-
corded in a version of the Hesiod School (the so-called Shield of Herakles)
as follows:
Amphitryon, the grandson of Perseus, had helped the King of Mikinai
against the robberly teleboans. In exchange, he received Alcmene, the
princess, as his wife. Alcmene follows Amphitryon to Thebes, when he
has to leave Mikinai due to the murder of her father. Yet Amphitryon
will not have the marriage take place until he has avenged the murder
of Alcmene’s brothers. He therefore leads his army into battle against
Pterelas, King of the teleboans.
In the meantime, however, Alcmene has caught the eye of Zeus. Dur-
ing the night he assumes the shape of Amphitryon and sleeps with her.
In the same night Amphitryon returns, seeking the consumation of the
engagement. Impregnated both by the god and the hero, she gives birth
to twin sons. To Zeus, she bears Herakles; to Amphitryon, Iphicles.
The dramatic versions range from Sophocles (not preserved) to Plautus,
fromMolière and Kleist to Giraudoux and Peter Hacks. In Homer’s version,
a son is born, part human and part god. According to the Hesiod School
there are two sons, one human and one a god. Following Uvo Hölscher, this
division illustrates an act of rationalization of a numinous occurence.19 In
both Molière and Kleist, the coupling of a god with a human again results
in one son. In Kleist’s drama, Amphitryon demands, as a sort of restitution
from Jupiter, one child:
What you did for Tyndareus, do for
Amphitryon too: bestow a son on him
as great as are the two Tyndarides.
(..)
This comparison, to be sure, brings about the possibility of a doubling of
the child itself, for the Tyndarides are the twins Castor and Pollux.
The plot structure and character constellation is typical of mythology—
the dieu à femmes Jupiter, the confusion of the wife, the horned husband
—these generate a classic love triangle situation and readily lend them-
selves to mythological comedy. Incidentally, the courting Jupiter also plays
a role in Kleist’s Das Käthchen von Heilbronn. There, in a secular variant of
the Jupiter-Alcmene model, the emperor fathers a child with a bourgeois
   : 
woman. In the love scene, Jupiter ‘‘rises in the east with his glittering light’’
(V.–).
In the history of the reception of the Amphitryon myth, which, accord-
ing to Jauß, is one of the ‘‘richest among all basic mythological motifs,’’20
some versions focus on the doubling and the confusion, some on the rela-
tionship between Jupiter and Alcmene, and some on the miraculous birth.
All of these versions, however, share a common trajectory traced by the
question of the possibility and assertion of personal identity.
In the Amphitryon myth, personal identity is doubly split: in the con-
nection of the human to the godly and in the figure of redoubling. ‘‘They’ve
doubled you,’’ says Sosia to Amphitryon (..). Or, as an army general
comments: ‘‘No eye / can tell apart two creatures so exactly / like each
other’’ (..). In this regard, the myth contains not only a comic but also
a tragic potential. Kleist’s drama exploits both possibilities. Like Der zer-
brochne Krug, Amphitryon is simultaneously a comedy and a tragedy.21 With
its motif of the redoubling or confusion of identities, this myth strongly
resonated with Kleist. It appears, for instance, in Agnes and Ottokar’s
clothes-swapping scene in Die Familie Schroffenstein, in Der Findling (Ni-
colo and Colino), in Michael Kohlhaas (Elisabeth and the gypsy), and in
Das Käthchen von Heilbronn (Käthchen and Kunigunde). Considering this
long line of Romantic Doppelgänger, one can speak of an epoch-defining
interest in such redoublings and Doppelgänger.22
In his examination of the social function of Greek tragedy, René Girard
interprets the character of the Doppelgänger as the expression of a social
crisis in which differences between people are lost, and with them, their
personal identity.23 The self has the terrifying experience that it is also some-
thing else, or that it is split and encounters itself as something foreign.
The theater provides one way of confronting this threat through its ca-
thartic play with masks and roles. With a kind of aesthetically sublimated
terror, wearing masks and playing roles, even to the point of identifica-
tion—‘‘Sean Connery is James Bond’’—allow for the possibility of the re-
doubled self, the divided self, the loss of the self, and the transformation of
the self. This, too, is why Kleist’s play is called A Comedy after Molière. The
double meaning of the preposition ‘‘after [nach]’’ has long been noted. The
preposition indicates, first of all, a comedy in immitation of Molière’s. In
this way the drama itself ironically becomes that which it is about, namely a
redoubling. It is also ‘‘after’’ Molière in the same way that Jupiter takes after
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Amphitryon and Mercury after Sosia, just as the dramatic action of Sosia
and Charis doubles that of Amphitryon and Alcmene. Hence also the con-
spicuous description in Molière’s cast of characters, ‘‘Jupiter, sous la forme
d’Amphitryon,’’ and, in Kleist’s, ‘‘Jupiter, in the shape of Amphitryon.’’
That roles are being played is indicated throughout the play by the use of
terms such as ‘‘play [Stück]’’—also ‘‘Heldenstück,’’ ‘‘Freundschaftsstück,’’
and ‘‘Höllenstück’’—as well as ‘‘scene’’ and ‘‘role.’’
The confusion that has seized humans in Molière’s play also torments
Kleist’s Jupiter, who exclaims ‘‘Damn the deluded hope that tempted me
down here!’’ (..). To be sure, Jupiter, unlike Alcmene, does not lose
confidence in his self or his perceptions, but he does lose his power. While
Molière still grants Jupiter the role of a feudal lord, Kleist has the god ab-
dicate completely. It is in a state of powerlessness that he must learn of
Alcmene’s choice for the love of man above that of the god. He, the lover,
is her ‘‘God.’’ This resignation is in accordance with Christian theological
teaching of God’s becoming man. His desire to be loved as God in the figure
of Amphitryon, that is, to appear as God in Amphitryon, is deflected by
Alcmene’s love for the mortal Amphitryon, no matter how much she de-
picts him as a god. Sosia comments on this utterly tragicomic game with
the question: ‘‘Since the world began, did you ever hear of such a thing?’’
(..). Similarly, the ‘‘miracle’’ of God’s becoming man is parodied in the
game between Sosia and Charis.
Szondi and subsequently Jauß have written that in comparison to Mo-
lière, Kleist downplays the social circumstances of the comedy in favor of
the problems of identity and perception.24 While Molière’s dialogue be-
tween Mercury and Sosia reads:
‘‘Qui va la?—Moi.—Qui, moi?’’ ()
Kleist renders it as:
‘‘Halt! Who goes there?—Me.—Me? What me, man?’’ (..)
Mercury’s question is impossible to answer, because as opposed to a person
or a thing, about which one can ask what kind of person or what kind of
thing, the I is an indexical pronoun that cannot be specified. Simply answer-
ing the question would lead to a division of the I. It is just this question that
leads to Alcmene. To her love for Amphitryon, one may pose the question:
‘‘Which Amphitryon?’’
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Between Mercury and Sosia, and later between Jupiter and Alcmene,
as well as between Alcmene and Amphitryon, a battle for the ‘‘fortress’’
of consciousness takes place, in which not only the other’s name but also
the entire I is stolen and robbed (..). As a result, Sosia and Am-
phitryon are ‘‘de-Sosialated’’ and ‘‘de-Amphitryonitized’’ by their doubles
(..).
All certainty of the I is systematically destroyed. While at the outset,
Sosia retreats to the certainty of ‘‘I am, because I am’’—a biblical allusion
to the ‘‘I am that I am’’ of God’s name,25 which Jupiter with objective irony
turns into ‘‘Yes, it was me. But it’s no matter who it was’’ (..)—he loses
not only this self-affirmation, but also that of his own name and body.26
Yet the bodily pain fromMercury’s blows restores his sense of self, together
with his name.
The loss of Alcmene’s identity is even more radical. She calls into ques-
tion the singularity of her own name, the image of her body in the mirror,
and her sense of self. She acquires her sense of herself in and through the
other, her lover. She would rather be mistaken in herself than in him. But
it is exactly in her amorous cognition that she will be mistaken, and has,
in fact, already erred. The Amphitryon of their night of passion was actu-
ally not Amphitryon. Struck by the strange initial on the diadem, a ‘‘J’’ for
Jupiter, instead of an ‘‘A’’ for Amphitryon or Alcmene, she realizes that she
has deluded herself:
Oh Charis! As soon mistake myself,
I would! As soon imagine I’m a Persian
or a Parthian, in spite of that profoundest feeling,
sucked in with my mother’s milk, which tells
me I am I, Alcmene. Look, this hand,
Does it belong to me? This bosom? My
reflection in the mirror? He would have had
to be stranger to me than my own self !
Put out my eye, still I would hear him; take touch away
I’d breathe his presence in; take all my senses,
every one, but only leave my heart,
that bell—its note is all I need to find
him out, wherever, in the world.
(..)
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Alcmene’s ‘‘innermost feeling’’ misled her. She decides, as if trivially, for the
more beautiful, yet false Amphitryon.
The redoublings and divisions of the I, the ‘‘wish-wash’’ of identities, as
Amphitryon calls them, are not depicted in the play simply as actions of the
gods, but rather as those planned and carried out by mortals. The appear-
ance of gods in the form of humans appears as a realization, personification,
or in any case, a continuation of the roles that the mortal actors are already
playing.
The connection between role playing and problems of identity is evident
already in the exposition.27 Sosia enters and plays a role, namely himself
and Alcmene, who then receives him. Incidentally, he begins his depiction
of Alcmene with the interjection that Alcmene will utter at the play’s con-
clusion: ‘‘Ach!’’
To the extent that Sosia plays himself and Alcmene, he plays himself as
an other:
And now it’s time, my friend, to give some thought
to your commission.
. . . . . . .
If you practiced up your part beforehand,
What do you think? Right Sosia, what a good idea!
(..)
In a way much like judge Adam in Der zerbrochene Krug, he comments
on his acting with a pleasure for language and the role: ‘‘What a fellow I
am, hear my silver tongue!’’ (..). ‘‘A plague on me if I know where I get
my wit!’’ (..). The subsequent entrance of Mercury in the form of Sosia
divides into two the role that Sosia had been playing on his own.
Amphitryon’s redoubling is likewise prepared, namely in Alcmene’s
love for him. For her, Amphitryon unites two roles within himself, ‘‘both’’
(..) the husband to whom she must ‘‘pay’’ the ‘‘debt’’ of her love, and
the lover, whom she freely loves (..). She allows Jupiter to bring her to
the point of separating husband from lover in the figure of Amphitryon. She
loves Amphitryon not just as himself, but also as the ‘‘son of the gods.’’ Just
like Penthesilia loves Achiles, the Marquise of O. loves the Duke, the Prince
of Homburg loves the ‘‘image of glory and happiness,’’28 or Elvire loves the
‘‘image’’ of the young knight in Der Findling, so she loves her ‘‘image’’ of
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Amphitryon.29 In this ‘‘image’’ or ‘‘portrait’’ she has already deified the real
Amphitryon:
I might have thought he was
a portrait of himself, a painting by a master’s
hand showing him exactly as
he is, yet transfigured, like a god!
Standing there he seemed, I don’t know what,
a dream; unspeakable the bliss I felt,
whose like I’d never known before, when he,
Pharissa’s conqueror, radiant
as if with Heaven’s glory, appeared to me.
Amphitryon it was, the son of the gods!
I would have asked him if he had descended
from the stars, except he seemed in my eyes
already—starborn, from the skies.
(..)
To this Charis comments, ambiguously: ‘‘It was imagination, dear—love’s
way of seeing things’’ (..).What love sees is the ‘‘portrait’’ that it creates.
Because Alcmene loves her ‘‘portrait’’ or ‘‘image’’ of Amphitryon, when she
decides between the two Amphitryons, who resemble each other as if they
were two ‘‘drops of water,’’ she chooses the wrong one.
This delusion [Einbildung], this deification, is equated in the drama with
a loving and aesthetic act of Alcmene, in which she divides the flesh-and-
blood Amphitryon from a ‘‘painting . . . showing him exactly as he is,’’ that
is, an image after Amphitryon. She perceives the real-life Amphitryon only
as an image. At the same time, her choice of words betrays the fact that in
his rendering [Verzeichnen] as a god, there is included a human imperfec-
tion.30 The verb verzeichnen can assume several meanings: among them to
enter, to write down, to characterize, to display pictorially, or to illustrate
in an incorrect, distorted, or unrealistic manner. Throughout the drama,
there are repeated reminders of the aesthetic influence on the characters’
perception of the world through Verzeichnen, in all its valences. A complex
associational field thereby arises, consisting of terms such as zeichnen, ver-
zeichnen, auszeichnen, ziehen, and Zug. (Zugmeans a movement or a form;
asthetically, it can refer to a certain style, or a Kunstgriff; the term can also
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mean a move, such as in a game of chess. The word also appears in the term
Namenszug [monogram or initial], which appears on the diadem).
Alcmene’s words shed light on the scene of Jupiter’s ‘‘arrival.’’ While
spinning yarn in her cell, she dreams about Amphitryon and his battle. Yet
she does not dream about ‘‘him,’’ Amphitryon, but instead about ‘‘it.’’ She
repeats this pronoun twice. Amphitryon’s request had set the stage:
. No, later on will do. As I just said,
I’d like to hear, before I go indoors,
your account of my homecoming yesterday.
. It’s quickly told. The dark had come, I sat
inside my closet at the wheel, the humming
of the spindle lulled me off into the field,
among armed warriors, when I heard a loud
exulting shout from from the direction of the farther gate.
. Who was shouting?
. Our people.
. And?
. And promptly I forgot it, for even in
my dreams it never crossed my mind what pure
joy the gods in all their graciousness
had destined for me. But just as I took up
the thread again, a tremor ran through all
my limbs—
(..)
This picking up of the thread, which in this context also refers to Alcmene’s
dreaming about Amphitryon, is placed in direct connection with the arrival
of the god. Hence, Amphitryon will later speak of the ‘‘web’’ that he wishes
to tear apart (..). Jupiter appears [erscheint] to Alcmene now during
‘‘nightfall’’ (..). The ‘‘appearance [Erscheinung]’’ of Jupiter in the form
of Amphitryon materializes or personifies Alcmene’s delusion or imaginary
construction [Einbildungen] of love.
With this questioning of the certainty of perception or of the I, Kleist is
clearly reacting to contemporary philosophy. In a letter dated , Kleist
addresses the ‘‘newer, so-called Kantian philosophy’’ and states as its re-
sult: ‘‘We cannot determine if what we call truth, truly is truth, or if it only
seems that way to us’’ (March ).31 Perception and cognition are biased
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and are necessarily dependent upon perspective.What we perceive is some-
thing that we consider to be something, an ‘‘appearance [Erscheinung],’’ a
‘‘portrait [Bild],’’ and we make, for ourselves, something of this object of
our perception. Related to this is Kant’s concept of Erscheinung, by which
he clearly does not mean Schein, but rather the object of possible experi-
ence. In Kleist, the meaning of Erscheinung changes to that of ‘‘revelation’’
(..), to apperance as the production of semblance, as ‘‘delusion.’’ Every-
thing that happens in the drama is insistently related to the perspective of
subjective perception and validity. The formulation ‘‘Es gilt [it is valid]’’
(rendered in context in the English translation as ‘‘What does it matter?’’
[..] and ‘‘Agreed’’ [..]) takes on the meaning both of an arrange-
ment as well as a description of the perception of reality. This perspective is
indicated throughout by use of the pronouns ‘‘me’’ and ‘‘you’’ (the German
datives ‘‘mir’’ and ‘‘dir’’). Amphitryon is Amphitryon to Alcmene; he is her
Amphitryon. Everything that approaches her, says Jupiter, is Amphitryon.
Jupiter has to submit himself to this truth claim and cannot flee from it:
. But now suppose
I were, for you, the god—?
. Suppose that you—
my head is spinning!—were, for me, the god?
Should I go down before you in the dust, or shouldn’t
I? The god—it’s you, it’s you?
. For you
to say. Myself, I am Amphitryon.
. Amphitryon—
. For you, Amphitryon,
oh yes.
(..)
Charis also speaks this way:
‘‘What a scene that was!’’ (..)
As the drama is enacted through the character of Alcmene, the identity of
being [Sein] and validity [Geltung] falls apart and completes the portrait as
a Verzeichnung, a distortion, or a delusion. For this reason, Jupiter attempts
to hold Alcmene to the Old Testament commandment against making like-
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nesses of God.32 Jupiter accuses Alcmene of actually having paid homage,
when praising him, to Amphitryon:
. Yes,
you flung yourself down on your face—but why?
I’ll tell you why—in the lightning’s bright electric
flourish you read a well-known letter.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
Am I supposed to pray to marble
walls? Well, I need features I can see
if I’m not to think of him.
(..)
The force of validity in perception and feeling is also the reason that Alc-
mene snubs Jupiter in his desire to be loved as he is, rather than as a collec-
tion of ‘‘all those mad ideas [Wahn] / they entertain about him’’ (..).
For the experience of the power of validity, the word ‘‘Vorfall [incident]’’
or ‘‘Fall’’ [‘‘fall or eventuality]’’ is used, with its resonance with the German
word Sündenfall [the fall of man]. He would dwell in detachment from a
world in which God determines the being of each thing, bestowing upon
each one its name,33 through an anthropocentric world in which for only
validities are valid (‘‘nur noch Geltungen gelten’’) to the subjects.

The dialogues between Alcmene and Jupiter involve not only the ques-
tion of the identity of Amphitryon and Alcmene, and the identity of being
and validity, they also raise the question of the power and privileges of the
paternal god, that is, of the power of religion itself. These dialogues are
asymmetrical.
For the spectator/listener/reader, Jupiter speaks at many points as Jupi-
ter himself. Already in the nocturnal love scene he calls himself a ‘‘god.’’
Even at these moments, however, Alcmene believes him to be Amphitryon,
to the point that she denies her eventual acknowledgment of the god and
clings to her image of Amphitryon. Even long before this, she chooses for-
mulations that, in Jupiter’s words, have ‘‘more significance’’ than she may
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think (..). Yet the reader’s or spectator’s doubts about whether she
really knows what she is actually saying increase in the course of the dia-
logues. Similar to the Marquise of O., her consciousness limits her knowl-
edge of her own formulations. An example can be found already when she
first addresses the real Amphitryon after her armorous night with Jupiter:
‘‘Heavens, it’s Amphitryon!’’ [‘‘O Gott! Amphitryon!]’’) (..). Similarly,
in their night of passion, Jupiter called himself ‘‘a god’’ (..). The inter-
jection is simultaneously an address, as it is in her exclamation: ‘‘Now you
and I must separate, oh god, forever!’’ (..). The urgency of her request
is issued against her knowledge:
Oh my dear husband, please
do tell me, was it you or not? Speak, it
was you, it was!
(..)
Ambiguous, too, is her strange exclamation: ‘‘Oh, lost soul!’’ (..). That
is her reaction to Amphitryon, who in her eyes has committed sacrilegewith
his disclosure that it was Jupiter who appeared to her. With this, she also
reacts to Jupiter, whose attempt to become human is now negated. Amphi-
tryon uses the word ‘‘lose,’’ in that he speaks of ‘‘miracles’’ that are ‘‘appear-
ances in this world from another [die sich / aus einer anderen Welt hieher
verlieren]’’ (literally, ‘‘which lose themselves to here from another world’’)
(..). Alcmene realizes that the separation of lover from husband during
that night could be a ‘‘crime.’’ She will not ‘‘blurt out’’ this secret, how-
ever (..).34 Her revealing exclamation is reminiscent of Lessing’s Emilia
Galotti: ‘‘He himself ! He!’’ (..).
Needing love, Jupiter has appeared to Alcmene in the form of Amphi-
tryon in order to be loved as ‘‘him,’’ himself, instead of as a delusioniary
image. He tries repeatedly to get Alcmene to confess her love to him.35
In the critical literature, most recently by Jauß in his incisive essay, this
has been understood as a test of Alcmene. These are not tests, however,
but rather Jupiter’s powerless attempts at seduction to save his power and
rights. In this sense they are attempts (‘‘Versuche’’) and seductions (‘‘Ver-
suchungen’’). In these attempts too, the validity of traditional theological
models is staged.
In the first seduction, he attempts to sway Alcmene to differentiate be-
tween her husband and her lover. To the husband is ascribed the ‘‘law of all
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the world,’’ marital duty—and to the lover, ‘‘love’’ (..). Such formula-
tions allude not only to Molière’s courtly comedy, but also to the difference
between the Old (‘‘law’’) and New (‘‘love’’) Testaments. Alcmene accepts
this division, commenting: ‘‘Yes, / all right—I don’t know what to say!’’
(..). Jupiter fails to bring her any further, however, because for her Am-
phitryon is ‘‘both’’ at once (..).
The next attempt at seduction consists in the transformation of the ini-
tial ‘‘A’’ on the diadem (Amphitryon, Alcmene) into a ‘‘J’’ (Jupiter). This
change sends Alcmene into deep despair. She now loses her certainty. In
order to pull her out of this despair, Jupiter must level the differentiation
between lover and husband that he had earlier forced upon her.
. for nothing
not Amphitryon is ever able
to come near you.
. Oh my dear husband, please
do tell me, was it you or not? Speak, it
was you, it was!
. Yes, it was me. But it’s
no matter who it was. I beg you: make
an effort to be calm, for everything you saw,
you thought, you touched, you felt was me—and who
else should it be?
(..)
Jupiter presents himself as an omnipotent god, yet he must admit that he
fooled Alcmene and himself:
. How shamefully
deceived I was!
. He was deceived, my idol! His wicked
swindle took him in, not you, not your
unerring feeling! When he imagined it was you
he wound his arms around, all the while
you lay upon Amphitryon’s beloved
breast, and when he dreamt he kissed your lips,
your lips were pressed tight to Amphitryon’s.
Oh, he has got a sting, let me assure
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you, planted in his fevered bosom all
the skill the gods possess can’t pull out.
(..)
In this scene, Jupiter, the all-powerful god, undertakes a blasphemous trans-
formation into an utterly earthly being; he addresses Alcmene as ‘‘the wife
I hold in reverence’’ and as ‘‘my idol’’ (..). In order to restrain Alcmene
from the final ‘‘despair,’’ Jupiter reveals that it was ‘‘Zeus himself ’’ who
visited her. He must admit that he deceived her and stole Amphitryon’s
‘‘features’’ (..–).
But this time, too, Alcmene does not react as he would have wished.
Jupiter presents himself as a merciful god and portrays Alcmene’s honor in
words more befitting to a glory-seeking commander such as Amphitryon.
However, Alcmene cannot envy Jupiter’s chosen ones, such as Callisto and
Leda. She begins to anger Jupiter greatly as she instead speaks of the ‘‘pain’’
he has inflicted upon her, and later cries, ‘‘Oh, I’d be so frightened!’’ (..).
He now stylizes himself as a punishing and vengeful god. His descent
to man, portrayed earlier as an act of mercy, is now to be understood as a
penalty. Jupiter wishes to punish Alcmene, because she practiced idolatry,
in that she did not worship Jupiter himself on the altar, but instead Amphi-
tryon, the lover, in the figure of Jupiter. With that, Jupiter demands what
he had previously denounced: love as debt and duty. He wants to force her
‘‘to think him’’ (not to think of him)—a strange, helpless formulation, as
if god were only a product of thought. According to traditional theological
doctrine, God cannot be reached as God through the necessarily limited
and limiting process of thought because he is an absolute essence above all
thought.36 Jupiter justifies his right to love with a pantheistic argument:
. Is he a being who exists
for you? His glorious handiwork, the world—
do you have eyes for it? Do you see him in the sunset
glow that lights up the hushed underwoods?
Do you hear him in the pleasant noise of waters
and the nightingale’s voluptuous chorusing?
Don’t the mountains towering up to heaven
announce him to you all in vain, in vain
the cataract plunges from the steep to shatter
on the rocks below? When the sun aloft
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in his great temple sends his beams abroad,
when through Creation beats a pulse of joy
and all things hymn his praise, don’t you
descend into the mine shaft of your heart
to adore your idol?
(..)
This pantheistic argument, however, is thoroughly compromised by his in-
tention and by contradiction when he states that he descended in order to
seek revenge from Alcmene.
Alcmene promises him that she will distinguish between Amphitryon
and Jupiter, though rather casually: ‘‘Fine, good—you’ll see how satisfied
you’ll be with me’’ (..). In the first hour of each dawn she will think
only of Jupiter, but after that she will forget him. ‘‘Reverence’’ is due to ‘‘the
father’’—‘‘love’’ to man (..).
Consequently, Jupiter presents himself as a transcendent god with an
eternal countenance, that is, as anything but human. He prophesizes that
Alcmene will love this god unlike she has previously loved any man. She
will weep if not allowed to follow him back to the Olymp.
Alcmene again denies herself, responding: ‘‘No, never think that, my
Amphitryon’’ (..). She would prefer that this day had not come about
at all:
If I could turn back time one single day,
I’d bolt my closet shut against all gods
and heroes, yes, I would—
. You would? You really
would?
. Indeed I would, oh gladly.
 [aside].
Damn the deluded hope that tempted me
down here!
It is hence a delusion for a god to wish to be loved as a man.
Now Jupiter attempts another trick; he pleads for sympathy with a lonely
Olympian:
Olympus too, Alcmene, without love,
is desolate!
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Here, he stylizes himself as a father by addressing Alcmene as ‘‘my pious
child’’ whose duties include ‘‘sola[cing]’’ his ‘‘stupendous being’’ (..).
Earlier, he frivolously addresses her as ‘‘You darling child!’’ (..). Jupiter
once again admonishes his creation to ‘‘pay back’’ her ‘‘debt’’ with a single
smile (..–). The love he desires is not portrayed as love, however, but
instead as narcissistic self-reflection:
what he longs
for is to see himself reflected in a living
soul, his own image mirrored in a tear
of ecstasy.’’
(..)37
With that the drama puts the Old Testament passage ‘‘And God created
man in his image’’38 under suspicion of having been issued by a narcissis-
tic god, just as Alcmene’s love is suspected of being narcissistic. But again
Alcmene refuses: Jupiter is deserving of reverence, but Amphitryon of love.
In the form of hypothetical formulations, he resigns himself to Alcmene’s
perception and, as a last resort, reveals his identity: ‘‘But now suppose I
were, for you, the god—?’’ (..). In posing this question, however, he has
already disempowered himself as an all-mighty, pantheistic, or transcen-
dent god. By posing this question, he no longer is a god, but is instead only
considered to be [gilt als] one. This last attempt does in fact lead Alcmene
to the final realization that it is Jupiter who stands before her. Likewise, it
brings on sorrow that her feelings betrayed her, that she, as a narcissist,
loved her image of Amphitryon.
. . . .
But now suppose
I am the god embracing you, and lo,
Amphitryon appears—your heart, what would
it say to that?
. You were the god embracing
me, and lo, Amphitryon appeared?—
I’d be so very sad, oh so dejected,
and wish that he could be the god and you
would go on being my Amphitryon
forever, as you are.
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. My creature whom
I worship! In whom I am so blessed—in blessing,
blessed!
(..)
Still, Jupiter deludes himself yet again. Employing a hypothetical formula-
tion, Alcmene says that she would rather cling to her illusion, to her image
of Amphitryon, than to love the god as a god, that ‘‘you would go on being
my Amphitryon forever, as you are.’’ She does not say, ‘‘that you remain
the Amphitryon that you are.’’ In this love triangle, the god must assume
the role of the betrayed husband. Alcmene remains true to her likeness of
Amphitryon when she publicly identifies the false one, Jupiter. At the con-
clusion, Jupiter must accept his defeat:
Your husband, Lord Amphitryon,
and no one else has ever been allowed
within the precincts of your soul—
and I wish the world to know it.
(..)
Alcmene remains faithful to the imaginary construction [Einbildungen] of
her love, while failing the real Amphitryon. Her Verzeichnung into what is
godly, wronged Amphitryon, the man. She calls to the heavens for protec-
tion against Jupiter and faints into Amphitryon’s arms. As reparation and
reconciliation, Jupiter announces the birth of Hercules. This happy end-
ing is, however, clouded with black irony. It is not just Alcmene’s ‘‘Ach!’’
which makes this reconciliation a forced one. The annunciation of Her-
cules, with its blasphemous allusions to the Annunciation of Jesus, ends in
the pronouncement of an apotheosis, but does so with an image of death:
the pyramid. Especially in European architecture around , the pyra-
mid was used as the form of monuments for fallen heroes.39 The deeds of
the mythical Hercules can also be understood as a pyramid to heaven. His
death upon a funeral pyre freed him from terrible suffering, something the
audience knows. As Jupiter remarks:
And when the pyramid
is built at last, grazing with its top
the Empyrean’s cloudy fringe, heavenwards
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he’ll mount its steps and on Olympus I’ll
receive him then, a god.
(..)
The departure of the ancient-Christian father of the gods is described with
one phrase, a phrase with which Alcmene knowingly and unknowingly
characterized God’s becoming man: a losing of oneself. The stage direction
reads: ‘‘He loses himself in the clouds.’’ According to this stage direction,
the ‘‘Olympians’’ belong to a world or a setting that is no more: ‘‘He dis-
appears into the clouds, which meanwhile have opened overhead to dis-
close Olympus and the Olympians reclining at their ease upon its summit.’’
(.. )
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‘‘life saver for a positive interpretation,’’ Fischer ‘‘Wo steht Kleist im Amphitryon? ’’ .
 Two Lovers, Three Friends
 
Translated by Eric Jarosinski
Hollin and Oduardo arrived at school the same day and took an im-
mediate liking to each other. They managed to have the rector assign
them to the same shared room, which they occupied together until
leaving for the university. The former was superior to the latter in
age, wealth, and talent; this superiority was accepted as natural, how-
ever, and did not damage their friendship. Everything one does at
school they did together: they did their homework together, secretly
fried potatoes for each other, fought with their rivals at other schools
together, and secretly kept a fine suit, which they took turns wear-
ing at the variety or the coffee house; everyone at school knew them
as Castor and Pollux. Oduardo, who had spent some hard years with
his father, a doctor in G., had consequently attained more awareness,
caution, and cleverness. He became a sort of benevolent caretaker for
Hollin and saved him from countless foolish acts. In all other respects,
they became so much like each other [lebten sie so in einander über]
that the teachers had trouble telling their handwriting apart.
Thus writes Achim von Arnim in his  novel Armut, Reichtum,
Schuld und Buße der Gräfin Delores.1 The title, this passage, and the text
as a whole generate their allure by testing boundaries and deeming them
crossable (among others, the borders between poverty and wealth, guilt and
punishment, happiness and sorrow, life and death, and life and reading).
The boundary Arnim’s novel subjects to the most rigorous test is that of
dividing friendship from love. It is perhaps superfluous to point out that
Arnim thus transforms autobiographical moments into literature: namely,
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his cultically stylized friendship to Clemens Brentano, which began in ,
and his equally stylized love for Bettina, whom he first met in .
‘‘Draw a distinction’’: differentiate between love and friendship. Arnim
and many of his contemporaries around  had obvious difficulty with
this.2 Already in the opening passage of the novel, with its explicit theme
of friendship, the key word ‘‘love [Liebe]’’ manages to slip in: ‘‘Hollin and
Oduardo arrived at school the same day’’ and ‘‘took an immediate liking to
each other [gewannen einander sogleich lieb].’’ This moment is followed by
turns of phrase that invite clearly erotic, even conjugal, associations: ‘‘They
managed to have the rector assign them to the same shared room, which
they occupied together until leaving for the university.’’ Their connection is
so close that they even assume the female role for the other and play cook
for each other when they ‘‘secretly [!] fried potatoes for each other.’’ Further,
a passage filled with erotic words and symbols makes clear that the sym-
biosis between Hollin and Odoardo has not only friendly but also erotic
qualities. ‘‘In all other respects,’’ we read, ‘‘they became so much like each
other [sie lebten so in einander über], that the teachers had trouble telling
their handwriting apart.’’
The text makes no secret of the fact that in Germany around  the
distinction between a man’s love for a woman and his friendship to another
man is not yet the conceptual compass of emotional relationships between
those who are close in age. Despite the efforts of Matthias Claudius’s essay
‘‘Von der Freundschaft’’ to separate friendship from intimacy, a confusion
about the two concepts prevails and, by extension, a confusion in over-
all orientation. Ever since Beethoven’s musical sealing of Schiller’s pathos-
filled verses on friendship, only one thing could be said for certain: any-
one capable of neither friendship nor love gets short shrift, unless he
preempts this fate by first stealing himself away. To put it more elegantly:
those capable of neither friendship nor love are excluded, or exclude them-
selves, from social ties of all kinds.
Wem der große Wurf gelungen,
Eines Freundes Freund zu sein;
Wer ein holdes Weib errungen,
Mische seinen Jubel ein!
Ja—wer auch nur eine Seele
Sein nennt auf dem Erdenrund!
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Und wers nie gekonnt, der stehle
Weinend sich aus diesem Bund!
Whoever has had the great success
Of being a friend’s friend;
Whoever has won a lovely wife,
Share in his jubilation!
Yes, even who has only one soul
On this earth to call his own!
And he who could not attain this joy,
He, weeping, steal himself away from this union!
Thus not an exclusive ‘‘or,’’ but an inclusive one. One must have a relation
either of a close friendship or of love; having both at once is even better;
and having neither a friend nor a wife to call one’s own is tantamount to
social exclusion. It would not be difficult to name another of the many ex-
amples of the ways in which love and friendship were not clearly distin-
guished from each other around . Hölderlin, for one, begins what he
calls his  ‘‘Night Songs,’’ the last collection of poems that he was still
capable of publishing himself, with the note: ‘‘Dedicated to love and friend-
ship, Frankfurt/M. .’’
Here again, an inclusive ‘‘and’’ appears instead of an exclusive ‘‘or.’’ Evi-
dently, the combination of the four terms ‘‘love,’’ ‘‘friendship,’’ ‘‘man,’’ and
‘‘woman’’ is not adequately exhausted by the commonly sanctioned com-
pounds ‘‘heterosexual love’’ and ‘‘same-sex friendship.’’ After all, the possi-
bility also remains open for same-sex love and friendship with the opposite
sex. Of these four combinations, which are capable of being placed in a chi-
astic chart and as such have a clear layout, it is the last that has had the
least chance of being poetically represented in modern European literature.
If the friendship between a young man and a young woman is ennobled
through literary presentation at all, it is usually only to illustrate the failure
to transgress the border between friendship and the erotic (as, for example,
in Goethe’s novella about the strange neighbor’s children, Fontane’s novel
Schach von Wuthenow, or Thomas Mann’s early tales).
The second version ofHollins Liebesleben, quoted at the outset, appeared
as an addition to Arnim’s Delores novel on Easter , that is, eight years
after its separate initial publication. Goethe responded to Arnim’s early
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publication, as well as to many other ‘‘Romantic’’ stories about Eduarde
and Odoardo, with a grandiose and quite serious satire, his  novel Elec-
tive Affinities.3 The plot is well-known: Eduard, a wealthy baron in his best
years, invites an old friend to his castle for an extended stay. He does so
despite the quiet reservations of his wife, with whom the guest falls in love.
Likewise, Eduard himself falls passionately in love with his wife’s orphaned
niece, whom she had invited as a countermove to the visit of her husband’s
friend. It is strange and noteworthy, incidentally, that despite the great pas-
sion the young beauty stirs among men—such as the servant, the archi-
tect, the count, and her cousin’s fiancée—nothing flares between Ottilie and
the captain. Their relationship is that of a perfect nonrelationship, touched
neither by love nor friendship (and similarly, not even by dislike or hatred).
The constellation of Eduard and Ottilie is rather different. It begins as a
relationship between the most distant of relatives, quickly skips the friend-
ship phase, and, just as rapidly, assumes the most passionate dimensions.
The scene in which Eduard does not so much declare his love to Ottilie as
tell her to her face (or rather, to her hand) that she loves him, has a trigger:
in copying the papers of her ‘‘friend,’’ she had, in an act of perfect mimicry,
assumed Eduard’s handwriting:
Though he was pleased that she was doing something for him it dis-
tressed him keenly that he was not able to see her at once. His impatience
increased by the minute. He paced up and down in the big drawing-
room, tried all manner of things but could concentrate on nothing.What
he wanted was to see her, and see her alone, before Charlotte came back
with the Captain. It grew dark, the candles were lit.
At last she came in, radiantly lovable. The feeling that she had done
something for her friend had enhanced her whole being beyond itself.
She laid down the original and the copy on the table in front of Eduard.
‘‘Shall we compare?’’ she said with a smile. Eduard did not know what
to reply. He looked at her, he looked at the copy. The first pages were
written with the greatest care, in a delicate female hand; then the writ-
ing seemed to change, to become easier and freer; but how great was
his astonishment when he ran his eyes over the final pages. ‘‘In heaven’s
name!’’ he cried. ‘‘What is this? That is my handwriting.’’ He looked at
Ottilie, and again at the pages. Especially the ending was exactly as if
he had written it himself. Ottilie said nothing, but she was looking into
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his eyes with the greatest satisfaction. Eduard raised his arms. ‘‘You love
me!’’ he cried. ‘‘Ottilie, you love me!’’ And they held one another in a
tight embrace. It would not have been possible to say who first seized
hold of the other.4
The second version of Arnim’s earlier text is an obvious reaction to this
scene. Only here is the motif of the characters becoming each other, illus-
trated by their nearly identical handwriting, stressed from the beginning.
The first version, by contrast, downplays the significance of one’s respective
individual handwriting. As Hollin writes to Odoardo: ‘‘You are right, more
than handwriting or a Stirnmesser [as the Grimms’ dictionary explains,
‘Lavater’s physiological measuring device for determining one’s character
based on the size of the forehead,’ J. H.], the books we love reveal more of
our inner, secret side.’’5 In the second version, which ties the loving friend-
ship between Hollin and Odoardo so intimately to the motif of their shared
handwriting, Arnim reacts to Elective Affinities and thus, by extension, to
Goethe’s response to Romantic conceptions of Odoardo’s loves and friend-
ships. It is a defensive battle mounted against a newly prevailing conception
of love and friendship. To put it plainly, what Goethe includes under the
heading of ‘‘love’’ is what Arnim hopes to subsume still under the heading
of ‘‘friendship.’’ Being incapable of distinguishing between two persons and
their handwriting because they have grown so intertwined (‘‘ineinander
über leben’’)—that is the criterion either for friendship (Arnim) or for love
(Goethe).
Goethe wins, Arnim loses. Or in the sober words of Niklas Luhmann,
who, in his seminal book Love as Passion, argues—based on a wealth of his-
torical, semantic, and literary material—in support of the suspicion that ‘‘in
the valorization of sexuality . . . the competition between ‘love’ and ‘friend-
ship,’ too, becomes decisive as a basic formula for a coding of intimacy. Love
wins.’’6 That love wins in the long run had become evident in European
literature already long before . Consider, for instance, the examples of
Petrarch and Dante. Yet these are also texts that not only value love over
friendship, but simultaneously thematize the unobtainability of the deified
lover. It is just this motif of unrealizable love that Cervantes ironizes in the
character of Dulcinea. Love, as a literary genre, is to be rated higher than
friendship—but at the price that it is a love of letters [Letternliebe].
Shakespeare’s work is marked by a turn away from this highly literary
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and therefore unrealistic order of love. Shakespeare renders, sit venia verbo,
love literarily real. It can fail tragically (as in Romeo and Juliet) or succeed
in spite of all imaginable errors and confusion (as in AMid-Summer Night’s
Dream). Almost regularly, however, one encounters in Shakespearean texts
the motif of the precarious struggle between friendship and love. This is the
case, paradigmatically in The Merchant of Venice. The friendship between
Antonio and Bassanio clearly bears homoerotic traces, which helps explain
Antonio’s melancholy when Bassanio, his closest friend, turns toward a
woman. His turning toward her, however, also stands to be revised. After
all, as Bassanio says to Antonio at the end of the drama: ‘‘Antonio, I ammar-
ried to a wife / Which is as dear to me as life itself; / But life itself, my wife,
and all the world, / Are not with me esteem’d above thy life: / I would lose
all, ay, sacrifice them all, / Here to this devil, to deliver you’’ (.). Bassanio’s
wife is present at this declaration of love for the friend—as a judge, dis-
guised in men’s clothing. Her commentary is of remarkable sobriety: ‘‘Your
wife would give you little thanks for that, / If she were by to hear you make
the offer.’’
The ring episode allegorically illustrates the seriousness of Bassanio’s
offer. He parts with his recently obtained wedding ring upon the judge’s
prodding, handing it over to a man, who, luckily, turns out to be a woman,
his wife. Here, too, the maxim holds true: amor vincit. Yet this victory is
highly precarious, and it is a triumphant procession that reaches Germany
quite late. Shakespeare’s German contemporaries, the poets of the baroque,
continue to adhere for the most part to the higher valuation of friendship.
The German reception of Shakespeare does not commence until the end of
the eighteenth century, with translations by Wieland, and later by Schlegel
and Tieck, compensating, with its vigor, for its belatedness. The German re-
ception of Shakespeare likely played a decisive role in the delayed triumph
of amor in Germany. For good reason,Wagner’s musical drama Tristan and
Isolde is considered an almost unsurpassable celebration of ecstatic love. Yet
even in this work there is the strong undercurrent of a friendship that must
first be overcome.
The stammering of those whose lives have become intertwined [inein-
ander über lebenden],’’ Tristan and Isolde, the lovers who cannot survive
(‘‘überleben’’) their own ecstatic love, symbolizes the triumphant victory of
love over friendship: ‘‘I, not Tristan, I, Isolde . . . Thus we would die, to
remain inseperable.’’ Wagner’s construction of love’s triumph over friend-
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ship is remarkably radical. Through his love for Isolde, Tristan betrays the
clearly intimate, even homoerotic, pact of friendship with Melot and Kur-
wenal.7 Now fallen for Isolde, Tristan says of his relationship to Melot: ‘‘My
friend was the one, / Who loved me true and dearly.’’ This is how Tristan,
in love with Isolde, characterizes his own relation to Melot, who, in turn,
simply calls him a ‘‘traitor.’’ Melot ‘‘was’’ Tristan’s friend, with whom, as
Isolde complains, ‘‘the men all get along.’’ In turning away from the ties of
friendship in order to accept the ties of love, the most ecstatic of all lovers
conforms, to Melot’s dismay, to the law of regularity. Anyone in nineteenth-
century Europe still wishing to adhere to the connection of intimacy and
friendship can only find refuge in the subculture of men’s societies. And
yet, these are not even true subcultures (think, for example, of the fenc-
ing fraternities, the Wandervögel, or the clubs), in that they often facilitate
what is called an entrance into the ruling classes. Still, this has no effect on
the predominant semantic paradigm, according to which intimacy in the
nineteenth century is exclusively ascribed to love and, increasingly, fiercely
denied friendship.
Already in the first version of Arnim’s novel, Hollin, who has fallen in
love with Maria, tries to make clear to his friend Odoardo that this is and
must be the case. He insists ‘‘that love has to grant joyfully everything that
it can give which friendship cannot’’—that is, intimacy.8 Odoardo reacts to
this by remaining Hollin’s best friend, yet he also makes two new friends.
What one of them, Roland, tells him, he feels compelled immediately to
pass on to his Ur-friend. Roland ‘‘told me that, when he first fully enjoyed
a girl’s love, he called out within himself: ‘Is that all!’ ’’9 Yet this hint is not
heard. Hollin, responding to Odoardo, denies his friend—much like Tris-
tan saying to his Ur-friend Melot and King Marke: ‘‘What you would ask
about, / you can never experience the authority to talk about matters of
love’’—the competency to talk about matters of love: ‘‘You can’t under-
stand, Odoardo, if you’ve never felt the mysterious pulsating of blood when
near your female lover.’’10 Odoardo’s retort: ‘‘Though I do not quite under-
stand you anymore, I feel that you have not become a stranger to me.’’11
These friends of the early Romantic period remain friends, unlike Wag-
ner’s late Romantic male friends (even though one of them falls madly in
love). However, once intimacy is denied friendship and ascribed to love
instead, friendship itself undergoes deep transformations. The most impor-
tant one can be put bluntly: love becomes exclusive, friendship inclusive.
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The guiding ideal conception of love must follow the code ‘‘you, and no
one else.’’ ‘‘Is there still,’’ we read, ‘‘another Maria? Impossible, in all the
heavens, no!’’12 In such emphatic tropes, of course, there is always auto-
matically a touch of irony. Hollin surely must know that there are other
Marias ‘‘in all the heavens.’’ And even on Earth, one can encounter other
Marias in addition to the beloved Maria. It is no accident that Hollin takes
part in a performance of Maria Stuart. Still, there remains the deificatio of
the one beloved Maria (in the Petrarchian tradition): you and no one else.
Thus when Hollin encounters the ‘‘degeneration of modern femininity’’13
in the form of a young, rich widow, he must respond to the Countess Irene’s
overtures with a ‘‘friendly’’ rejection: ‘‘I spoke with her in a friendly way,
as if with a sister. . . . Touched, I told her that another possessed my heart,
but my friendship was hers. She kissed me.’’
Correspondences: all of this is written by aman to amale friend. ‘‘Friend-
ship,’’ we read, ‘‘also has its secrets.’’14 Among the open secrets of friendship
is the fact that a correspondence between men does not break off once their
intercourse with a female lover commences. This paradigm can be found
to the point of boredom in German literature around . Be it Werther
or Lucinde’s lover, Hollin or Hyperion, Franz Sternbald or Godwi and tutti
quanti: a man always writes to a male friend about his passionate love for
a woman. That is, he lets him take part in his love via correspondence, but
only via correspondence. In his tale ‘‘The Judgment,’’ even Kafka is indebted
to this model—and he brings it to a head. The fiancé finds himself in a
‘‘special relation of correspondence’’ with his friend:
As a result Georg merely contented himself with writing to his friend
of such unimportant events as randomly collect in one’s mind at ran-
dom when one is idly reflecting on a Sunday. His sole aim was not to
disturb the picture of the home town which his friend had presumably
built up during the long interval and had come to accept. Thus it hap-
pened that three times on three quite widely separated letters Georg had
announced the engagement of some indifferent man to some equally in-
different girl, until quite contrary to his intentions his friend began to
develop an interest in this notable occurrence.
However, Georg greatly preferred to write to him about things like
these than confess that he had himself become engaged, a month ago,
to a Fraulein Frieda Brandenfeld, a girl from a well-to-do family. He
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often talked to his fiancée of this friend of his, and of the special rela-
tionship which he had with him owing to their correspondence. ‘‘So he
won’t be coming to our wedding,’’ said she, ‘‘and yet I have a right to get
to know all your friends.’’ ‘‘I don’t want to disturb him,’’ Georg replied,
‘‘don’t misunderstand me, he probably would come, at least I think so,
but he would feel awkward and at a disadvantage, perhaps even envi-
ous of me, at all events he would be dissatisfied, and with no prospect
of ever ridding himself of his dissatisfaction he’d have to go back again
alone. Alone—do you realize what that means?’’ ‘‘Yes, but may he not
hear about our wedding in some other way?’’ ‘‘I can’t prevent that, cer-
tainly, but it’s unlikely if you consider the circumstances.’’ ‘‘If you’ve got
friends like that, Georg, you should never had got engaged.’’ ‘‘Well, we’re
both of us to blame there; but I wouldn’t have it any other way now.’’
And when, breathing faster under his kisses, she still objected: ‘‘All the
same, it does upset me,’’ he thought it really couldn’t do any harm to tell
his friend the whole story. ‘‘That’s how I’m made and he must just take
me as I am,’’ he said to himself, ‘‘I can’t fashion myself into a different
kind of person who might perhaps make him a more suitable friend.’’
And he did in fact report to his friend as follows, in the long letter
which he wrote that Sunday morning, about the engagement that had
taken place: ‘‘I have saved up my best news for the end. I have become
engaged to a Fraulein Frieda Brandenfeld, a girl from a well-to-do family
which only settled here some time after you left, so that you are unlikely
to know them. There will be opportunity later of giving you further de-
tails about my fiancée.’’15
It is indeed a ‘‘special relation of correspondence,’’ this epistolary inter-
course with a friend about the intercourse with a woman and the suspicion
that something might be wrong with this intercourse. Even Kafka funda-
mentally perpetuates (and fundamentally undoes—how could it be other-
wise in Kafka?) the differentiational scheme, established around ,
between friendship and love. A new relationship between exclusion and
inclusion opens up. Love becomes exclusive and anticommunicative (great
love cannot be had without the topos of the unspeakable), while friendship
becomes inclusive and remains communicative.16 Concretely, this means
that love is conceptualized in polemic counterdistinction to the economy of
the mistress, following the ideal schema of a folie à deux. Friendship, how-
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ever, becomes ever more frequently a bond among three people: ‘‘Please
grant me the wish of becoming the third member of your union [Ich sei,
gewährt mir die Bitte, in Eurem Bund der Dritte].’’ After all, even Odoardo
reports to Hollin that he has found a new pair of friends. Three friends,
this model quickly becomes popular: The Three Musketeers, Three Men in a
Boat, Die Drei von der Tankstelle (The Three From the Gas Station) as well
as many children’s and young people’s books with titles such as ‘‘Drei Fre-
unde auf großer Fahrt’’ (Three Friends on a Great Journey). These all testify
to the molding influence of the three-person model of friendship, which
distances itself from the two-person model of love in the epoch following
the triumph of love over friendship.
Arnim’s Ur-friend Brentano observes with remarkable clarity in his
‘‘wild’’ novel, Godwi, that new borders are drawn in order to immediately
have their permeability put to the test. Has ‘‘enamored frienship’’ in fact
been shattered by the ‘‘general affectation of love’’ that, with Werther, ex-
ploded like a supernova? This is one of the questions posed by the novel,
a text fully devoted to the incestous primal paradigm of conceptual wild-
ness. Brentano’s prose confronts the new exclusive cult of love with words
as harsh as those he employs for an amorous friendship:
The general affectation of love is, incidentally, the work of a Compli-
menteur, as Philander von Sittewald translates it; a compli menteur, a
complete liar.
The enamored friendship is, however, nothing other than either piti-
ful, sweet weakness, and complete unmanliness, or delusion. I am con-
fident that the friend, who lies long in my arms is either unconscious,
deathly ill, wounded, etc., or else he must think that I am some beautiful
girl or a secret, unobtainable lover, in whose arms he would so like to
lie so peacefully and free.
If then I should tolerate it that a friend should do such a thing, then
I am doing it out of sympathy. I let him think of his girl, and if possible,
I also think of one myself.
The essence of actual friendship is thereby disturbed, as it exists not
in substitution, intense involvement, and permeation, but rather in mere
sociability.17
The temptation to counter spurts of empathy with spurts of sobriety is
irresistible. But this work of sobering has its own analytical power. It ac-
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knowledges the social and semantic transformation that we can character-
ize either emphatically or in all sobriety. Friendship becomes ‘‘mere socia-
bility.’’ And sociability includes more than just two people. That means,
however, that friendship threatens to become, owing to the sociability that
inhabits it, inflationary and thus ceases to be friendship. Brentano himself
raises this objection when he writes: ‘‘Haber interrupted me here, saying,
‘In my opinion, mere sociability is not friendship by far. I know many so-
ciable people who are incapable of an actual warm friendship that emanates
truly from the soul. They do not possess the urge to hold their friend in an
embrace, heart to heart, eye to eye, lip to lip; to share pulse, vision, breath,
and voice.’ ’’
The terms used here to describe couplings, however, are actually no
longer available for the characterization of friendships. Evidently, they are
already taken—by the register of love. Thus, all that is left for friendship
are ironic, saracastic, even cynical perspectives. Looking back at the differ-
entiation between the love of two and the friendship or sociability of three,
one may turn to Oscar Wilde’s Dorian Gray:
‘‘Poor Lady Brandon! You are hard on her, Harry!’’ said Hallward, list-
lessly.
‘‘My dear fellow, she tried to found a salon, and only succeeded in
opening a restaurant. How could I admire her? But tell me, what did she
say about Mr. Dorian Gray?’’
‘‘Oh, something like, ‘Charming boy—poor dear mother and I abso-
lutely inseperable. Quite forget what he does—afraid he doesn’t do any-
thing—oh, yes, plays the piano—or is it the violin, dear Mr. Gray?’
Neither of us could help laughing, and we became friends at once.’’
‘‘Laughter is not at all a bad beginning for a friendship, and it is far
the best ending for one,’’ said the young lord, plucking another daisy.
Hallward shook his head. ‘‘You don’t understand what friendship is,
Harry,’’ he murmured—‘‘or what enmity is, for that matter. You like
every one; that is to say, you are indifferent to every one.’’
‘‘How horribly unjust of you!’’ cried Lord Henry, tilting his hat back,
and looking up at the little clouds that, like raveled skeins of glossy white
silk, were drifting across the hollowed turquoise of the summer sky.
‘‘Yes; horribly unjust of you. I make a great difference between people. I
choose my friends for their good looks, my acquaintances for their good
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characters, and my enemies for their good intellects. A man cannot be
too careful in the choice of his enemies. I have not got one who is a fool.
They are all men of some intellectual power, and consequently they all
appreciate me. Is that very vain of me? I think it is rather vain.’’18
One only has to compare these sentences by Wilde to Hartley Coleridge’s
 poem ‘‘To a Friend,’’ which, from a historico-semantic perspective,
fights rear-guard battles in order to highlight how the conceptions of friend-
ship have shifted.
When we were idlers with the loitering rills,
The need of human love we little noted:
Our love was nature; and the peace that floated
On the white mist, and dwelt upon the hills,
To sweet accord subdued our wayward wills:
One soul was ours, one mind, one heart devoted,
That, wisely doating, ask’d not why it doated,
And ours the unknown joy, which knowing kills.
But now I find how dear thou wert to me;
That man is more than half of nature’s treasure,
Of that fair Beauty which no eye can see,
Of that sweet music which no ear can measure;
And now the streams may sing for others’ pleasure,
The hills sleep on in their eternity.19
Gone are the days in which one could still orient oneself according to binary
terms such as love and friendship. There is much that indicates that, today,
these two terms have lost their competing powers because they have be-
come pluralized within themselves. In societies that characterize themselves
as postmodern, onewill no longer be able to talk of any one binding concep-
tion of love, or of any one culturally dominant understanding of friendship:
rather, mille plateaux, n-variations, an incomprehensibe number of com-
binations that no chiasmic chart can accommodate. That is the stuff that
new literary mixtures of love and friendship are made of. A paradigmatic
example is Thomas Meinecke’s novel Tomboy.20 What remains, however, is
the promise of literature to thematize ‘‘the unknown joy, which knowing
kills’’ in such a way that even the known, described, and dedicated pleasure
remains pleasure.
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Because this is so, there also exists the pleasure of the text with which
one is befriended and/or which one loves. Festschriften are meant to, and
should, pay tribute to such lovers of texts. Hamann writes:
In the temple of learning, there truly is an idol, not lacking in high
priests and Levites, whose image bears the inscription philosophical his-
tory. Stanley and Brucker have given us colossal creations, just as peculiar
and incomplete as the image of beauty that a Greek assembled out of the
allure of all beautiful creatures, which appeared to him either by inten-
tion or by coincidence. These are masterpieces, which are always gladly
admired and sought by studied experts of the arts. They are, however,
silently ridiculed by the learned as fantastic growths and chimeras, or
else are imitated out of boredom in theatrical illustrations.
Because Stanley is British, and Brucker is Swabian, both have earned
their fame by ridding the audience of its boredom. The audience also
[deserves] to be praised for the generosity with which it has overlooked
the unequal failings of these national authors.21
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 The Love That Is Called Friendship
and the Rise of Sexual Identity
 
In the eighteenth century, Western Europe witnessed a cult of friend-
ship that left literary traces admittedly difficult to understand at the end
of the twentieth century. As Michel Foucault stated in an interview with
Bob Gallagher and AlexanderWilson,1 the emergence of homosexual iden-
tity coincided with the breakdown of the cult of friendship; Foucault sub-
sequently locates the actual ‘‘birth’’ of the homosexual in .2 Because
of this sexual history, readers are cautioned not to project an excessive
amount of a modern homosexual identity into the texts of eighteenth-
century friendship. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, however, wittily parodies the
approach of many readers who are anxious not to project their own fan-
tasies onto such texts: ‘‘Passionate language of same-sex attraction was ex-
tremely common during whatever time period is under discussion—and
therefore must have been completely meaningless.’’3 The cautious approach
that Sedgwick critiques misreads a fundamental aspect of the literature of
friendship. Because the homosexual identity did not exist in the concrete
form that was to emerge in the following century, same-sex desire ambigu-
ously infused a broad range of texts that, after the emergence of clear sexual
identities, would have been less likely to be filled with erotic tension. Thus,
contrary to the prevailing critical assumption that modern readers are likely
to project sexuality into eighteenth-century friendships because of moder-
nity’s awareness of the categories of homosexuality and heterosexuality, it
is actually the case that the current categories of sexuality make it hard for
modern readers to understand the great extent to which same-sex eroticism
permeated eighteenth-century friendship. Modern friendships are asexual,
by virtue of the categories of friend and lover, heterosexual and homo-
sexual; because of the lack of such categories, eighteenth-century friend-
ships were erotic.
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While it might seem that this discussion is a primarily historical one,
about the nature of friendships in the eighteenth century, it is in fact more
important and relevant to literature than anything else. Much of the evi-
dence concerning friendships from this time period comes from such lit-
erary authors as Gleim, Schiller, and Jean Paul. The friendships themselves
flourished most extensively in epistolary form. Recipients shared letters
with like-minded associates; it was not surprising when they were pub-
lished. In his letters on friendship, the eighteenth-century poet Nikolaus
Dietrich Giseke mentions the devotion of the weekly journal Der Jüngling
(The Youth) from Leipzig as early as  to the theme of friendship, under-
scoring the importance of textual documents for the construction of friend-
ship within other textual documents.4 In Giseke’s letters the equation of
‘‘friend’’ and ‘‘poet’’ further connects the theme of friendship and literature;
he hopes that, if ‘‘a poet or friend’’ visits the area in which he is residing, he
will be able to detect some of the spirit that he has left behind.5 As poets,
these men construct their relationship verbally, primarily in letters.
An early example of this kind of epistolary friendship with a fine literary
legacy was the fervent correspondence between Pope, Arbuthnot, and Swift,
which appeared in . It became such a landmark of model friendship
that Jean Paul celebrated it in his novel Siebenkäs.6 As Jean Paul’s narrator
reflects on the intimacy between his two male protagonists, Siebenkäs and
Leibgeber, he compares their relationship with that of the English writers:
‘‘Why should I constantly repress the old feeling welling forth in me that
you have reawakened so powerfully and with which in my youthful years
the friendship between Swift, Arbuthnot, and Pope refreshed and pene-
trated me, so to speak furtively and yet so strongly?’’7 The narrator assumes
that a community will form around the appreciation of this male bonding:
‘‘And won’t many others, like me, have warmed themselves and taken cour-
age at the sight of the touchingly calm love of these manly hearts for each
other?’’ (). The verb translated as ‘‘to take courage’’ is ‘‘sich ermannen,’’
which, with its root ‘‘Mann,’’ suggests that this community will be an all-
male one. Thus male friendship, transfigured into literature by master letter
writers, inspires, within a novel written over sixty years later, further male
friendship. The imbrication of literature and friendship is complete.
Other writers concur with Jean Paul’s belief that textual descriptions of
friendship help engender friendship, and they therefore encourage a kind
of literary promiscuity. Friends spend a great deal of time describing their
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friends to each other. In his Vertrauliche Briefe (Confidential Letters), which
were not so confidential as to preclude publication, Giseke describes to his
old friends a new friend, who is so sensitive that he cries when he reads
Voltaire: this friend ‘‘hasn’t found a true friend, has no hope of finding
one either, and despairs for that reason.’’8 The connection to one friend
strengthens connections to other friends. Similarly, the Swiss historian Jo-
hannes vonMüller, a passionate devotee of the cause of friendship, not only
expresses his friendships in letters, he encourages others to join in the con-
struction of friendships with descriptions of friends. In a letter dated  Au-
gust , he wants to hear more about the friend of a friend: ‘‘I share with
you the delicate bond that you have with your friend, Mr. von Stansky. Tell
me more about him, describe him more exactly to me.’’9 Friendship not
only arises out of the textual relationship between two letter writers, it also
creates material about which to write, strengthening other textual bonds of
friendship.
Being primarily a literary phenomenon, eighteenth-century friendship
opened itself up to all the complexities of interpretation that literature
raises. The confusion caused by the cult of friendship is understandable. At
times, the declarations of love among men in eighteenth-century Germany
were so fervent as to indicate either an extraordinary acceptance of same-
sex eroticism or a use of language radically different from the current one.
The ‘‘marriages’’ between poets are a case in point. JohannWilhelm Ludwig
Gleim, the high priest of the German cult of friendship, whowas famous for
the ‘‘friendship temple’’ in his garden in Halberstadt,10 expressed the desire
to be in a relationship similar to marriage with Johann Georg Jacobi. Jacobi,
on the other hand, wrote to Jean Paul that he felt that friends should love
each other exactly as wives love their husbands. The dramatist of the Storm
and Stress, Jakob Michael Lenz, wrote an essay entitled Unsere Ehe (Our
Marriage), in which he compared his relationship with Goethe to that of a
marriage. In his fiery letter of  January , Heinrich von Kleist declares
his love for Ernst von Pfuel with the request that two authors live together,
as man and wife. What these men meant with these metaphors of marriage
is unclear from a late twentieth-century perspective. It might seem that the
only characteristic distinguishing the married couple from the unmarried
couple is the ability to have religiously sanctioned sex. On the other hand,
perhaps there were other features to married life that struck these poets as
desirable when they expressed their wish to marry each other.11
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Gleim’s outlook on eros and friendship suggests how closely associated
the two concepts were in the eighteenth century. When Christoph Martin
Wieland expressed in a letter concern regarding the novelist Heinse’s ‘‘pria-
pism,’’ Gleim responded that many claimed that ‘‘German youth first heard
of Greek love fromWieland himself and then began to keep Ganymedes,’’12
pointing to the importance of literature in constructing paradigms of sexu-
ality and friendship. His tone is lighthearted, and if any moralism is in-
volved, it is a censure of Wieland’s new prudishness. Gleim’s lack of de-
fensiveness with regard to same-sex desire is remarkable in a poet who
celebrates a love between members of the same sex. The most famous docu-
ment of this friendship was the correspondence between Gleim and Jacobi
in the years –. Gleim filled his letters with such eyebrow-raising,
gender-bending effusions as the following declaration of love to Jacobi:
I would like to be a girl:
He would marry me;
He wouldn’t lack for friends,
Nor for love, nor for wine:
I would like to be his girl!13
Admittedly, Gleim, who has devoted his life to the study of friendship, is
more cautious in his theoretical distinctions, differentiating between love
and friendship. He argues that the latter is superior, in that it fills the soul
entirely. Whereas one can be unfaithful in love, one can’t be unfaithful in
friendship. Reflecting on Jacobi’s numerous affairs with women, Gleim re-
verses his opinion on his own gender, announcing: ‘‘O how happy I am,
how fortunate, that I’m not a girl, for then it would be possible that my
Jacobi would be unfaithful to me.’’14 Given the context, this reversal of opin-
ion seems to be more a concession to Jacobi’s womanizing than an effort
to remove sensuality from same-sex friendship.
Indeed, the very lack of a difference between same-sex friendship and
love between men and women so enthused Jacobi that he could write to
Jean Paul that friends should love each other as wives love their husbands
(Dietrich); once again, textual documents connect Jean Paul, writing at the
end of the century, to the great friends of previous generations. Jacobi’s re-
mark to Jean Paul shows how desirous he is of uniting the phenomena of
love and friendship; he makes the claim just as strongly in his letter dated
 August  to Gleim: ‘‘Yes, my dearest friend, friendship is not far from
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love. At your departure, I felt everything that a lover can feel, not except-
ing even the small circumstances that are so interesting for him.’’15 Unless
Jacobi assumes that a lover does not have any sensual experiences in relation
to his beloved, he must be asserting a certain sensuality in the friendship
between men.
Significantly, the correspondence between Gleim and Jacobi was scan-
dalous in its day. Gleim’s friend, the poet Anne Luise Karsch, censored him
mildly with the reproach: ‘‘there are too many kisses for this love to be able
to escape libel, suspicion and mockery.’’16 Thus it is not modernity alone
that finds the expressions of love in the cult of friendship ambiguous. In-
stead, the eighteenth century was becoming deeply concerned with the dif-
fuse eroticism found in the writings of friendship.
One of the last to write unabashedly in the mode of friendship was the
Swiss historian Johannes von Müller. In a classic example of how one is
usually not supposed to read documents of the cult of friendship, The Gay
Book of Days gives an entry to Johannes von Müller, near such luminar-
ies as J. Edgar Hoover, Joe Orton, Sherlock Holmes, and Francis Poulenc.17
This publication, which bears the subtitle ‘‘An Evocatively IllustratedWho’s
Who of Who Is,Was, May Have Been, ProbablyWas, and Almost Certainly
Seems to Have Been Gay During the Past , Years’’ would seemmost un-
likely to have an interest in a Swiss historian of the late eighteenth century.
Its reason for including Müller is the beauty of his letters to Charles von
Bonstetten, ‘‘love letters, among the loveliest every penned’’ (). A closer
look at the Müller case justifies The Gay Book of Days by revealing that the
ambiguity that allows the book to include Müller was just as present by the
end of the eighteenth century as it is in the twentieth.
In the foreword to the Biographische Denkwürdigkeiten (Biographical
Memorabilia), the editor of Müller’s collected works, a relative named Jo-
hann Georg Müller, describes the meeting between the older Müller and
Bonstetten as follows: ‘‘At that moment the lightning struck that sparked
a quickly moving, all-encompassing fire, that friendship whose documents
Friederike Brun, the Danish muse, worthy of the same sentiments, brought
to the eyes of the public; a friendship of the strictest, purest virtue, in every
other way the same as those ancient Greek friendships that brought forth
the best and greatest things’’ (:viii–ix). Interestingly, Johann Georg Müller
has no interest in defending the Greek friendships with regard to their strict
and pure virtue: Johannes von Müller’s friendship is ‘‘in every other way’’
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similar to the Greek friendships. Johann Georg Müller does feel the need
to defend the purity of the letters that Brun published without the permis-
sion of Johannes von Müller. In fact, many at the time doubted the purity
of those letters, for which reason Müller had to defend himself, although
he insisted that he would never take back the sentiments expressed in the
letters. Reflecting on the scandal provoked by Bruns’s publication of the
letters, Müller writes to Gleim, whose own letters had scandalized the coun-
try, ‘‘What I said about my intimate love to you, what I said in general . . .
I am proud of, I won’t hide it’’ (:). The denial by both the Müllers of
an impure content in Johannes von Müller’s letters indicates precisely that
the sexuality of letters was a debatable point in the late eighteenth century.
Both Paul Derks and Simon Richter have written about the Batthyani
scandal, which damaged Müller’s reputation almost irreparably. One of
Müller’s students faked letters from a putative ‘‘Count Batthyani,’’ who, like
Müller, was unmarried, looking for a friend, loved antiquities, and other-
wise seemed to be Müller’s ‘‘type.’’ In the course of the correspondence,
Müller’s student slipped requests for money into the letters. By the time the
fraud was detected, Müller was ruined financially, mortified socially, and
had to leave Vienna. The social mortification came about because these let-
ters, filled as they were with the discourse of friendship, were as sexually
suspect at the end of the eighteenth century as they are at the end of the
twentieth.
Prior to the Batthyani affair, Müller had another encounter with a man
that also instructively underscores the eroticism of eighteenth-century
friendship. In , Müller met a Marquis and fell for him with a passion
that bears all the mark of falling in love. He writes about their meeting to
his brother:
It was the coming together of two people determined for each other by
eternity, and I cannot say which of the two felt it first and most warmly;
just as little could I say that I thought in this moment of his extraordi-
nary charm, which wins all hearts for him, or of the rich and fine culture
of his mind, his wide knowledge, his honest, sensitive, religious heart;
indeed I discovered these perfections for the most part later, but the har-
mony of the whole transported me, I felt that I would be his and he mine,
before I knew why. (:)
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Although these flowery passages seem like love at first sight, they could still
be interpreted as a kind of chaste friendship. The next letter that Müller
writes to his brother attempts to force just such a sexless interpretation:
I had previously poured out my heart to you regarding my friend, and
then it occurred to me to wonder whether you, accustomed to feeling
more quietly, might not find my youthful fire (for I feel I am not over
!) crazy, whether you might not discuss with a witty remark the ten-
der bloom that rejoices my heart, whether you would treat everything
in the friendly way that otherwise characterizes you; and this disturbed
me especially because I would be responsible for it: for Ch[ilesien], al-
though Italian, and although  years my junior, and although poet, and
although he loves me uncommonly, would however not have written the
way I did, and disapproved when I showed it to him. . . . (:).
In hastening to endorse an asexual interpretation of the friendship, Müller
is underlining the confusion that is possible between erotic relationships
and friendships. Both the Marquis and Müller’s brother would not have
used the same language in describing this friendship, presumably because
such language was already erotically suspect. Thus interpreting these pas-
sages is confusing not only for twentieth-century readers, but also for eigh-
teenth-century ones. Müller was willingly entering a linguistically suspect
arena when he indulged in his flowery declarations of love.
These issues of interpretation appear in the more traditional literary
genres, as well as in published letters. Many of Friedrich Schiller’s writ-
ings are infused with intense male bonding that has recurrently allowed for
queer interpretations. Hammer finds in Schiller’s writings ‘‘intermale rela-
tionships so passionate that they interrupt and violate the standard circuit
of male homosocial bonding.’’18 Schiller’s ode ‘‘Friendship’’ () demon-
strates his interest in the phenomenon of same-sex intimacies, as does the
play that Hammer deals with most intensely, Wallenstein (begun in 
and published in ), ‘‘the dramatic creation most overtly concerned with
manhood, homosocial bonds’’ (). Although (or perhaps because) the
play concentrates on the masculine arena, it displays friendships of the kind
that the poets wrote about in their letters to each other. Wallenstein admits
to taking on the feminine role in his care and love for Max:
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I myself was your female nurse, I was not ashamed
Of small services, I tended you
With a woman’s bustling care.19
He does this all because of his love for Max: ‘‘you I loved ’’ (l. ). Passages
like this have provoked a steady stream of queer appropriations of these
texts throughout the twentieth century. In Wallenstein, Schiller is content
to allow the sexual ambiguity to sit, unresolved.
A short story by Schiller, Spiel des Schicksals (Play of Fate) thematizes
the haziness of the boundaries between friendship and erotics. In this story,
a prince is quite taken with a young man named G*, ‘‘the very image of
blooming health and Herculean strength’’ (:). Explicitly, the prince is
not interested solely in G*’s mind, but also finds his body attractive: ‘‘If
the prince was entranced by the mind of his young companion, this se-
ductive exterior irresistibly transported his sensuality’’ (:). The rela-
tionship blurs the boundary between friendship and love: ‘‘Equality of age,
harmony of inclinations and character established quickly a relationship
between them that possessed all the strength of friendship and all the fire
and turbulence of passionate love’’ (:–). In the course of time, a count,
Josef Martinego, manages to insinuate himself into the good graces of the
prince. In order to have the prince all to himself, the count urges the prince
to indulge in unnamed ‘‘vices.’’ Knowing that ‘‘nothing is more entitled to
a bolder intimacy than the co-knowledge of secretly held weaknesses, the
Count awakens passions in the Prince that had until now still slumbered’’:
‘‘He carried him away to such excesses as permit the fewest witnesses and
accessories’’ (:). Derks argues convincingly that these unnamed, secret
vices are very probably sexual; the fact that the prince subsequently has a
string of other male ‘‘favorites’’ allows one to presume that the vices are
homosexual in nature. In this story, Schiller clearly meditates on the va-
garies of friendship and its proximity to vice.
LikeWallenstein, Schiller’s Don Carlos was picked up by early twentieth-
century writers as a text dealing with male-male desire—most famously
by Thomas Mann, whose Tonio Kröger uses the play as a way of getting
to know Hans Hansen. The play is a network of male-male desire. Tonio
Kröger concentrates on the king’s love for Posa, while other readers from
the beginning of the twentieth century concentrated on the love between
Posa and Don Carlos. Referring to the sacrifices that Don Carlos makes
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for Posa, one writer from the early homosexual rights movement laments
dramatically that ‘‘already now in our materialistic, egotistical time, boys
and youths who let themselves be beaten bloody for their beloved friend
as Schiller reports of Don Carlos, are becoming rare.’’20 However, not only
twentieth-century readers find such possibilities in the text. In  Schil-
ler himself had to answer the argument that the play presents ‘‘passionate
friendship’’ as a viable alternative to ‘‘passionate love’’: ‘‘You claimed re-
cently to have found evidence inDon Carlos that passionate friendship could
be just as moving a subject for tragedy as passionate love’’ (:). While
Schiller denies this argument, his discussion of the issue underscores the
many possible interpretations that the eighteenth century gave to accounts
of friendship in literature.
While Schiller denies the relevance of passionate friendship to Don Car-
los, he admits that he is interested in handling precisely this theme in an-
other work, Die Malteser (The Maltese). In Die Malteser it becomes clear
that the distinction between ‘‘passionate friendship’’ and ‘‘passionate love’’
is subtle indeed. The work, which is linked with Don Carlos in that it treats
the all-male knightly order to which Carlos’s friend Posa belongs, was to
feature two characters, Crequi and St. Priest, who were to be lover and be-
loved. Although in his notes Schiller dutifully assures the reader that this
love is ‘‘pure,’’ he also refuses to desensualize it: ‘‘Their love is of the purest
beauty, but it is nonetheless necessary not to take from it the sensual char-
acter which grounds it in nature. It may and must be felt that it is a transfer-
ence of sexual love, a surrogate of the same, and an effect of nature’’ (:).
This emphasis on the sexual in the relationship between the two men re-
curs repeatedly in his notes. Clarifying Crequi’s love for St. Priest, Schiller
writes, ‘‘His passion is true sexual love and makes itself known through a
concern for little things, through raging jealousy, through sensual adora-
tion of the figure, through other symptoms’’ (:). The actors are even
encouraged to show their love so far that the audience is suspicious: ‘‘The
lover may demonstrate his tenderness so blatantly, although it could appear
to be suspicious’’ (:–). Once again, it is not the case that only mod-
ern eyes find reason for suspicion in this text: Schiller fully expected his
contemporaries to confront issues of same-sex desire within the context of
friendship. And why should eighteenth-century readers have regarded pas-
sionate friendship as significantly different from passionate love if it was to
exhibit all the symptoms of that love? In all probability, the directness with
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which Schiller phrased this question made it impossible for him to finish
the drama.
Jean Paul is another author whose accounts of friendship have always
lent themselves to queer interpretation. His novel Siebenkäs, for instance, is
filled with male-male kisses and embraces. Even the narrator gets into the
action, occasionally interrupting his narrative in order to lament tearfully
the absence of friends of Jean Paul’s, such as for instance Gleim. There are
warrior scenes in which young male friends lie intertwined with each other:
‘‘they lay clinging to each other on the waves of life, like two ship-wrecked
brothers, who swim in the cold waves, embraced and embracing, and hold
nothing more than the heart of which they are dying’’ (). Elsewhere, a
similarly masochistically tinged, homoerotic fantasy appears: ‘‘Finally the
smoke rolled apart over the two bloody people, who lay in each other’s
wounded arms, it was two sublime friends, who had sacrificed everything
for each other, themselves first, but not their fatherland. ‘Lay your wounds
on mine, beloved!—Now we can be reconciled again; you have sacrificed
me to the fatherland and I you.—Give me your heart again, before it bleeds
to death.—Ah! We can die together!’ ’’ (). Jean Paul further draws on
anthropological reports of his time to invoke utopias where male partner-
ships are blessed, like Tahiti, where the men ‘‘exchange names as well as
hearts with their [male] beloveds’’ (), and the Balkans, where male-male
partnerships are blessed like marriages between men and women. In these
visions, Jean Paul erases the boundaries between same-sex friendship and
heterosexual love, and allows for ambiguous interpretations.
The ambiguity surrounding friendship in the eighteenth century made it
appropriate for literature, which by its nature encourages multiple interpre-
tations and always seeks to free itself from the tyranny of specific meanings.
Jean Paul’s ambiguity runs against the current of his time, however, which
was distinguishing increasingly strictly between sexual and nonsexual
friendship. Of course, none of thewritings from the earlier parts of the eigh-
teenth century actively promoted sexual friendship. Indeed, sexual friend-
ship was clearly tabu, as Giseke’s description of friendship as ‘‘couragous
in love and pure in intention’’ indicates.21 Giseke’s poem ‘‘Schreiben über
die Zärtlichkeit der Freundschaft’’ (‘‘Treatise on the Tenderness of Friend-
ship’’), which documents some of the rules for friendship in the earlier part
of the eighteenth century, is filled with embraces and declarations of love,
yet it does insist on the purity of friendship: ‘‘. . . Too proud for coarser
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drives / He devotes himself exclusively to friendly love.’’22 A major goal of
friendship is to keep the friend on the straight and narrow, pointing out
his failings to him and encouraging him to pursue the good. While such a
conceptualization of friendship might seem a bit dry and explain the rela-
tive obscurity of Giseke, the very presence of these admonishing remarks
indicates that even a very religious man like Giseke could envision a more
sexual kind of friendship. Similarly, Adelung’s dictionary defines friend-
ship both as occurring between members of the same sex and as explicitly
asexual: ‘‘reciprocal love of two people, without a difference of sex and with-
out any intention of satisfaction of sensual desires.’’23 In an era in which
homosexuality was still undefined, it is surprising that the lexicographer
found it necessary to confirm that a laudable relationship between mem-
bers of the same sex had no intention of satisfying sexual desires. Clearly,
it was possible in the eighteenth century to conduct a friendship in a way
that led some people to believe that the intentions of one or both sides were
less than honorable.
Much of the earliest discussion of same-sex relationships took place in
the context of the study of antiquity. Classicists were trying to come to
terms with descriptions of intense male-male friendships in the texts of
ancient Greece and gradually came to the conclusion that these relation-
ships had a certain level of eroticism. Johann Georg Hamann, for instance,
reached his conclusion on the sensuality of all friendship in his Sokratische
Denkwürdigkeiten (Socratic Memorabilia), published in : ‘‘One cannot
feel a lively friendship without sensuality.’’24 But while Hamann was open
to the possibility that modern friendships were like Greek friendships and
that both shared a common sensuality, the aesthetician Friedrich Wilhelm
Basileus Ramdohr is more typical of the end of the eighteenth century when
he tries in  to distinguish rigorously between Greek friendships and
Greek love. He concludes that the love documented in ancient Greek texts
was in fact not friendship: ‘‘It therefore cannot be maintained that the love
of youths, as it was approved by the morals of the time of the Socratic
School, was friendship. It was rather a tenderness based on sexual sympathy
and even on bodily drives.’’25 Ramdohr does attempt to preserve the dig-
nity and honor of some of the ancient Greeks by denying that this love was
entirely carnal: ‘‘On the other hand, it was also not—as others have main-
tained—the consequence of coarse physical desire. This only crept in and
occasionally took the upper hand’’ (:). His willingness to concede that
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coarse bodily love did intrude occasionally and sometimes take over makes
his defence a qualified one at best. In any case, he insists that ‘‘a confusion
between love and friendship is never found in Xenophon and Plato’’ (:).
Ramdohr feels that his own era has been much more lax about this distinc-
tion than the ancient world: ‘‘There hasn’t been an appropriate differentia-
tion between friendship and sexual tenderness, at least not until now. It has
been said: Friendship is a weaker degree of love! But what is love here? And
what constitutes its strength? Is there not the word of a friend who said to
the other: your love was more to me than the love of women!’’ (:). The
ancient tradition, which had been used by Hamann to plumb the depths of
sexuality within friendship, was now employed to disengage sexuality from
friendship.
In the course of distinguishing friendship from sexual relations between
members of the same sex, Ramdohr helps establish a new sexuality. In order
to distinguish true friendship from sexually tinged relationships between
members of the same sex, Ramdohr calls for a ‘‘semiotics, doctrine of signs
for differentiation of friendship from sexual tenderness’’ (:). The cir-
cumstance that both partners in a friendshipmight belong to the same sex is
only ‘‘an ambiguous sign for distinguishing friendship from sexual tender-
ness’’ (:) because members of the same sex could in fact have a sexual
relationship with each other: ‘‘On the other hand there are enough cases
in which so-called male friends and female friends felt true sexual tender-
ness for each other’’ (:). He has ‘‘countless’’ examples of this happening
(:). Ramdohr explains such relationships by asserting that bodily sex is
only loosely related to a person’s actual gender. A relationship could there-
fore consist of a masculine woman and a feminine man, as well as a num-
ber of other possible combinations: ‘‘men can live in domesticity happily
together with men, women with women, or finally men with women—in
every relationship of this sort, one is always in word and deed the leading,
ruling one, the other always the one who acquiesces but profits’’ (:).
With this alternative interpretation of the household, Ramdohr is on the
verge of identifying people by their sexual orientation. The consequence of
removing sexuality from friendship is the creation of the homosexual.
Ramdohr has not received the credit that he is due for conceptualizing a
category of people who love members of their own sex (or, as he would put
it, people who love people who have the same bodily sex as they do). He
believes that such people have an essential urge that comes from the ori-
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gins of their being: ‘‘Desires that are based on the original construction and
development of our being do not deserve reproach and their striving for
union cannot be attributed to the goal of satisfaction of an unnatural desire’’
(:). Since these desires are based on a natural urge, they should not
be criticized. For this reason he admonishes those who criticize Winckel-
mann or other art connoisseurs who are peculiarly susceptible to this kind
of desire: ‘‘Shame on him who suspects something shameful here. It hap-
pened unselfconsciously, it happened publicly, as evidence for the involun-
tary movement of sexual sympathy, which was probably unknown to the
enthusiast himself ’’ (:). Indeed, this desire should never be considered
a perversion or even an error: ‘‘In no people in the world can one consider
the desires for union of such bodies that according to external characteris-
tics belong to one sex, but in their organization actually stand in the har-
monious relationship of the more delicate organization to the stronger, for
a mere degeneration of sensuality or a confusion of nature’’ (:). Thus,
although Ramdohr does not have the vocabulary of ‘‘homosexual’’ to work
with, he is part of the project of establishing a category of person whose
essential being prepares him or her to love exclusively and sexually mem-
bers of his or her own sex. And while such a move is on one level liberating
and clearly antimoralistic, it also comes at a cost: the cost of desexualizing
friendship.
A generation later, Heinrich Hössli critiques, develops, and cements
Ramdohr’s observations. Horrified by an  murder in which the thirty-
two-year-old lawyer Dr. Franz Desgouttes had killed his beloved room-
mate, the twenty-two-year-old Daniel Hemmeler, Heinrich Hössli commis-
sioned a novelistic treatment of the subject from the Swiss writer Heinrich
Zschokke. Hössli, who wanted to delve sympathetically into the realm of
male-male love, was unsatisfied with Zschokke’s treatment, finding it too
moralistic. For this reason, he wrote his own account, a two-volume treatise
defending male-male love, published –. Long before Foucauldians
might expect it, Hössli is arguing for a type of man who is characterized
by a sexual orientation toward other men: ‘‘there is a certain man-loving,
purely humane type of male person.’’26 He concludes his book on a similar
note: ‘‘Masculine love . . . is its own special certain type, just a twig of the
general sexual life, which can just as little become a native love for the other
sex, as that kind of love could conversely ever intentionally restructure itself
as the other’’ (:).
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Hössli and his era are clearly moving toward seeing sexuality as more
than an act, but as a major determinant in identity. One of Hössli’s sources,
a certain J. H. Schmid, points out that the ‘‘concept of sexuality is no longer
determined exclusively by sexual organs, but rather by the entire organ-
ism’’ (:). Indeed, the entire personality is based on sexuality according
to Hössli
The roots of the love, however, with the research of whose nature we
are concerned here, was and is sexual love (we are not speaking here
merely of the sexual drive), because this sexual love involuntarily desires,
searches for, and needs a male being, precisely because of his sex, and
not a female being, again precisely because of her sex—for what alone
speaks to us, grabs us, excites us, carries us away, attracts us, takes us
in possession, completes us, perfects us, that says which love is in us.
(:)
This is an early document for the importance of sexuality as a fundamental
of the psychology of that new creature called ‘‘man’’ that Foucault asserts
is less than two centuries old.27
In this new creature, the sexual orientation of those who love their own
sex is natural and as unchangeable as that of those who love the other sex:
‘‘The large and general part that loves the other sex can never have the
nature of those who do not love the other sex, and those who love their
own sex cannot become lovers of the other sex’’ (:). Like Ramdohr, Hössli
is determined to distinguish ‘‘masculine love’’ from ‘‘the love of souls’’ or
friendship. Working with the Greeks, he points out that their male love
affairs always contained a lover and a beloved, whereas friendship was re-
ciprocal and not directional in its nature. Friendship seems to take a while
to develop, being intellectual and emotional, whereas ‘‘sexual love’’ had its
‘‘roots in the corporeal’’ (:). Like Ramdohr, Hössli depicts same-sex
love with a minimum of moralizing and helps establish a category that is
waiting for the identity-based terminology of the second half of the nine-
teenth century. At the same time, however, he helps close down the possi-
bility of a sexually diffuse friendship that thrived on a generalized eroticism.
With the arrival of an increasingly well-defined state of being that would
become known as ‘‘homosexuality,’’ it becomes impossible for men to make
the kind of declarations of love to each other that wasmore common among
the poets of the eighteenth century. Already Giseke was concerned that
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‘‘there are only a few left who can love nobly.’’28 Like many later think-
ers on the subject, Giseke is convinced that friendship is an old and dying
art. Müller also insisted that the ‘‘moderns’’ failed to understand his notion
of friendship. Writing to the fictional ‘‘Batthyani,’’ he underscores how few
people understand the thought of friendship: ‘‘Often the thought of friend-
ship, which so few today completely grasp, uplifts my heart.’’ The tone
is similar when he writes to Gleim defending his earlier declarations of
friendship. Müller anticipates the twentieth century in claiming that mod-
ern readers don’t understand the textual friendship of the eighteenth cen-
tury.While perhaps these ‘‘misunderstandings’’ are less serious than Giseke
and Müller claim, it is certainly true that by the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, characters in literature increasingly steer clear of effusive declarations
of love lest they be marked as a specific type of lover of men. The expul-
sion of sex from friendship begins to create modern heterosexuals, as well
as modern homosexuals.
Schiller provides an excellent example of this process. While his sexu-
ally ambiguous Don Carlos was written mainly in the s, he makes much
more clear the sexual boundaries of Wilhelm Tell, which appeared in 
and was the last work he completed. Although Schiller pays hommage in
Wilhelm Tell to ‘‘a reliable man / Johannes Müller . . . von Schaffhausen’’ (ll.
–), he avoids all the sexual complexities that were associated with
Müller. Like Schiller’s other works, Wilhelm Tell is still all about men and
patriarchy, but it clearly posits that patriarchy is heterosexual. Again and
again, the men bond over their control over women. In the opening scenes,
Baumgarten defends his actions againstWolfenschießen, ‘‘the violator of my
honor and my wife’’ (l. ). As Baumgarten tries to convince the ferryman
to take him across the river despite a dangerous storm, his supporters point
out that he is ‘‘a father of a family, with wife and children!’’ (l. ). The ferry-
man points out that he, too, has ‘‘wife and children at home’’ (l. ). Once
Tell agrees to take upon the heroic task of transporting Baumgarten across
the lake, he asks the shepherd to console his wife (ll. –). When the
patriots decide to stand up for their rights, these rights are clearly marked as
fatherly and husbandly: Stauffacher exclaims, ‘‘We stand for our land / We
stand for our wives, our children!’’ (ll. –). The latter part of the excla-
mation, about wives and children, becomes the refrain that the entire crowd
repeats (l. ), which suggests that the domestic relationship to wife and
children is even more important to these men than their patriotism. Thus
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the struggle for freedom is inextricably linked with patriarchal power in
Schiller’s representation. But while this power had seemed infused with the
possibility of male-male love in his earlier works, such ambiguities are com-
pletely ruled out in Wilhelm Tell, which makes clear the heterosexuality of
its characters.
While most of the descendents of the erotic participants of the eigh-
teenth-century friendship cult become clearly attached to wives and chil-
dren, others seem to be more explicitly lovers of men. Out of the ashes
of the cult of friendship comes the character constellation that will draw
upon itself the name ‘‘homosexual.’’ As the incendiary force of friendship
disappeared, sexual identity began to make its appearance. Initially these
characters are in fact specifically modeled on the cult of friendship. When
Johannes Friedel describes in his anonymously published Briefe über die
Galanterien von Berlin auf einer Reise gesammelt von einem österreichischen
Offizier (Letters on the Galantries of Berlin, Collected on a Trip by an Aus-
trian Officer []) a small circle of ‘‘the warm,’’ men who love men, he
admits that he at first had not recognized them as what they were because he
thought they were just close friends: ‘‘I assumed all these scenes took place
in the tone of friendship, true masculine sympathy of the soul’s mood. And
observing from the side, I admired the small group of cordial friends.’’29 It is
worth reemphasizing that as long as friendship was a potent force in society,
people found it hard to distinguish between legitimate and erotic friend-
ship. This possible confusion is an example of what Luhmann refers to in
a footnote as ‘‘the difficult question of homosexuality as a secret mortgage
on the concept of friendship.’’30 In part because of these anxieties, the pan-
eroticism of eighteenth-century friendship gave way to clearer definitions
of homosexuality and heterosexuality.
In this era, some of the first literary depictions of men who love men
show up. Ein Jahr in Arkadien: Kyllenion (A Year in Arcadia: Kyllenion),
published in  by August, Duke of Sachsen-Gotha and Altenburg, is per-
haps the earliest homoerotic novel in the German tradition. It depicts the
love between a nobleman and a shepherd: ‘‘Alexis the splendid and Julan-
thiskos, the no less dear.’’31 They see each other at a dance, appreciate each
other’s beauty, and even dance with each other. Julanthiskos is completely
smitten with the prince, but Alexis, in the whirl of his social life, only toys
with the shepherd boy’s affections. After other romances are brought to a
conclusion, Julanthiskos chances upon his beloved Alexis, lying wounded
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and covered with blood in the forest: ‘‘as they slept mouth on mouth on
the soft moss in a Kyllenian cave, the youths were finally found by Alexis’s
slaves’’ (). The rest is history: ‘‘Alexis the saved was no longer ungrate-
ful and Julanthisko the finder was no longer unhappy’’ (). The two go
on to live together, like all the other lovers in the story. In keeping with its
aristocratic pedigree, Kyllenion conservatively holds on to the traditions of
the erotic friendships, refusing to create a rigorous boundary between non-
erotic and erotic friendships. All of the pairs in the novella, regardless of
whether they consist exclusively of men or of men and women, are friends
intellectually, emotionally, and physically. One would not be able to dis-
tinguish between the friendship that obtains between the men and women
and the friendship between Julanthiskos and Alexis. The only aspect that
gives it a sharper, more modern edge is the openness with which it suggests
a permanent physical relationship between the two men.
August von Platen provides a compelling example of a poet using the ac-
coutrements of friendship to reach a notion of something like sexual iden-
tity. According to his autobiographical writings, Platen, who lived from
 to , dealt intensively with issues of love and friendship during the
years of his adolescence and his young adulthood, from approximately 
to . He indicates that he began with a desire for love, but was restricted
by his knowledge of friendship only: ‘‘I wanted love; but I had until then
only felt the desire for friendship . . . my first inclination was for a man. I
may not add that I didn’t have any conception of unplatonic love.’’32 The
complicated negation of the final sentence stutteringly admits his desires
for a carnal relationship with another man, although he later claims that he
‘‘had in those days no idea that a punishable relationship could exist be-
tween two men’’ (). Despite his claim that he ‘‘ignored the possibility that
sensual pleasure could play a role in this’’ (), Platen describes attempting
to use friendship in order to achieve the goals of marriage: ‘‘I became ac-
customed to wasting my hopes and dreams of love on people of my own sex
and sought to achieve in their friendship that goal that the lover seeks in
marriage’’ (). Arguably, ‘‘that goal,’’ the one goal that distinguishes mar-
riage from a friendship, is sexual satisfaction. Nonetheless, Platen strives to
bring ‘‘true friendship’’ and ‘‘pure love’’ together in order to satisfy his in-
clinations (). Friendship continues to interest him enough that he would
like to write ‘‘an academic treatment on friendship among men’’ (), but
he nonetheless seems to reach a point where friendship doesn’t bother him
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as much as it did: ‘‘The fight in my breast between love and friendship has
been calmed’’ ().While it might seem that Platen is able to rehabilitate the
eighteenth-century notion of an ambiguously erotic friendship, in fact the
reconciliation that he effects between friendship and love has a much more
strident and self-assured ring to it: ‘‘I don’t need to be ashamed of what my
own conscious considers good,’’ he asserts about the kinds of friendships
that he would like to have (). At times, he seems to broach the possibility
of a natural orientation toward members of his own sex: ‘‘But what should
make me tremble the most is that my inclinations are oriented far more
toward my own sex than they are toward the feminine sex. Can I change
what is not my doing?’’ (). Half a century prior to Foucault’s ‘‘birth of
the homosexual,’’ a certain type of natural sexual identity was being con-
structed out of the ruins of friendship.
The Swiss author Heinrich Zschokke’s novella Der Eros, from ,33 por-
trays even more clearly the emergence of someone whose identity is shaped
by his love of members of his own sex. Commissioned by Hössli, who then
rejected it, Zschokke’s work deserves attention as a document in the cre-
ation of modern sexual identities. In the novella, news of a terrible murder
similar to the Desgouttes case that so preoccupied Hössli sparks a discus-
sion concerning friendship and love. Referring to same-sex friendship, one
character opines that it is ‘‘the most unsuspicious love of souls’’ (). Re-
flecting on such friendships in ancient Greece, another character, Holmar,
argues that the male-male love that took place then could not be classified
as friendship or as love today: ‘‘I can give it neither the name of love, nor
that of friendship, because we associate completely different conceptions
with such names’’ (). He posits a time when there was a kind of middle
way between love and friendship, something like the erotic friendship with
which the poets of the eighteenth century had experimented. For Holmar,
timeless emotions like ‘‘love’’ and ‘‘friendship’’ turn out to have culturally
particular histories. Specifically, in his society—nineteenth-century cen-
tral Europe—notions of love and friendship have become polarized so that
there can be no overlap between them.
Arguing for a return to a less restrictive range of emotional possibili-
ties, Holmar believes that all early peoples had friendships of the kind that
existed in ancient Greece (). He concedes that sometimes ‘‘among dis-
solute souls the holy fire of Eros probably now and then inflamed the de-
praved desires of bestiality’’ (), admitting the nearness of this love to
      : 
erotic love.While he does in fact generally strive to preserve the ‘‘purity’’ of
this love, Zsochkke views it as ‘‘a natural drive, like the reciprocal inclination
for each other of the sexes, or like the instinct of the mother and the in-
fant’’ ().While all young, virile, natural societies exhibit such love (),
decadent, unnatural, more civilized ones penalize it, forcing the young man
who loves other men into a frightening and criminal subculture (). For
such a man ‘‘his existence was his crime,’’ according to Holmar, who con-
tinues: ‘‘he had to become a murderer because he had disintegrated into
the most irreconcilable conflict within himself and with the whole world,
he had to disintegrate, he who in more humane time periods would have
made himself and others happy’’ (). In depicting the crisis of friendship,
Zschokke also sets the stage for a personal identity, based in nature, cor-
rupted by society, that is characterized by the love of members of one’s own
sex.
As sexuality becomes more and more clearly excluded from notions of
friendship, friendship itself becomes increasingly less provocative, suggest-
ing that it was the potential for sex that had made friendship so enticing in
the eighteenth century. If there were men who clearly love men and men
who did not love men, the ambiguity and complexity of friendship in the
eighteenth century became much less troubling. One merely had to deter-
mine whether the friends were ‘‘just friends’’ or ‘‘more than friends.’’ For
this reason perhaps, Sigismund Wiese’s drama Die Freunde. Trauerspiel in 
Akten (The Friends. Tragedy in  Acts)34 did not cause the scandal that the
collections of letters written by Gleim and others half a century earlier had.
Although, as its title suggests, the play is as concerned with friendship, it
did not draw upon itself accusations of immorality. Like the earlier works
cited, it is filled with references to such famous pairs of friends as Jonathan
and David, Achilles and Patrocles, and Orestes and Pylades. As one char-
acter looks for his beloved friend in the captured enemy lines, his assistant
compares his desire to heterosexual love:
If ever a child of humanity
Searched with hotter ardor for his beloved woman
As you examine the rows of Frenchmen,
I’m no child of woman. Tell me
Are you in love, is she hiding in men’s clothes?
()
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When Philipp responds that he can’t find ‘‘him,’’ his assistant reacts with
horror to the pronoun: ‘‘Him? Not her? Dear Philipp, what’s that?’’ ().
There is a kind of emancipatory rhetoric in the play, but it never aroused
censure, because by this point ‘‘friendship’’ was no longer considered an
erotic category. One might think that a document endorsing passionate
male-male friendship would create a scandal in the nineteenth century
when the conventions of the cult of friendship were long gone. In fact, al-
though eighteenth-century texts endorsing passionate friendship were con-
troversial, despite the existence of a recognized discourse on friendship, the
nineteenth-century text drew no attention to itself—because friendship had
lost its erotic charge with the emergence of new sexual identities.
While the tradition of ambiguously erotic friendships was not gone for
good—Walt Whitman, with his paeons to the societally beneficial adhe-
siveness of male bonding, would revitalize it at the end of the nineteenth
century, both for the masculinists around the early homosexual rights pub-
lication Der Eigene (The Exceptional ) and for the newly liberal Thomas
Mann of the s35—it lost considerable currency at the beginning of the
nineteenth century. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, it was
simply not interesting to portray erotic friendships betweenmembers of the
same sex. Poets no longer offered to marry each other, and their characters
stopped kissing members of their own sex—unless those characters were
marked as having a specific identity surrounding that sexual urge.With the
rise of such clearly marked sexual deviations, friendship became asexual,
whereas it had been infused with a subtle eroticism. Sexuality became, in
Sedgwick’s terms, ‘‘minoritizing,’’ rather than ‘‘majoritizing.’’ Contrary to
the assumptions of many modern critics, then, who argue that modern
readers confuse friendship and love, thereby projecting too much eroti-
cism into eighteenth-century friendships, friendship in the eighteenth cen-
tury was far more erotic than modern friendship. Precisely because modern
readers have learned from late eighteenth-century writers to distinguish so
precisely between love and friendship, modern friendship lacks the erotics
of that earlier era.

. ‘‘Michel Foucault: An Interview,’’ Edinburgh Review (): –.
. The History of Sexuality. Volume : An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New
York: Random House, ), .
      : 
. The Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of California Press, ),
.
. Fritz Brüggemann and Helmut Pautian, eds., Der Aufbruch der Gefühlskultur
in den fünfziger Jahren, vol.  of Deutsche Literatur. Reihe Aufklärung (Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, ), .
. Brüggemann, Der Aufbruch, .
. Ibid., ; Giseke, incidentally, also cites Pope in his discussion of friendship.
. Jean Paul [ = Johann Paul Friedrich Richter], Jean Paul. Werke in drei Bänden,
vol.  (Munich: Hanser, ), .
. Brüggemann, Der Aufbruch, .
. Johannes von Müller, Sämtliche Werke, (Tübingen: Cotta, –), :.
. Paul Derks, ‘‘Die Schande der heiligen Päderastie’’: Homosexualität und Öffent-
lichkeit in der deutschen Literatur – (Berlin: Rosa Winkel, ), .
. Luhmann points out that marriagewas also undergoing a change in eighteenth-
century Germany, and public moralists were for the first time calling upon men to be
friends with their wives. At the same time that the poets are attempting to restructure
their friendships along the lines of marriage, others are attempting to recast marriage
along the lines of friendship. It becomes impossible to determine which institution is
copying which.
. Derks, ‘‘Die Schande,’’ .
. Hans Dietrich [ = Hans Dietrich Hellbach], Die Freundesliebe in der deutschen
Literatur.Nachdruck der Ausgabe Leipzig . Homosexualität und Literatur,  (Ber-
lin: Rosa Winkel, ), .
. Brüggemann, Der Aufbruch, .
. Ibid., .
. Simon Richter, ‘‘Winckelmann’s Progeny: Homosocial Networking in the
Eighteenth Century,’’ in Outing Goethe and His Age, ed. Alice Kuzniar (Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, ), .
. Martin Greif, The Gay Book of Days (Secaucus, N.J.: Mainstreet Press, ),
–.
. Stephanie Barbe Hammer, ‘‘Schiller, Time and Again,’’ German Quarterly .
(): .
. Friedrich Schiller, Sämtliche Werke,  vols, eds. Gerhard Fricke and Herbert G.
Göpfert (Munich: Hanser, ), ll.–.
. Harry Oosterhuis, ed.,Homosexuality and Male Bonding in Pre-Nazi Germany:
the Youth Movement, the Gay Movement, and Male Bonding Before Hitler’s Rise. Origi-
nal Transcript from ‘‘Der Eigene,’’ the First Gay Journal in the World, trans. Hubert
Kennedy (New York: Harrington Park, ), .
. Brüggemann, Der Aufbruch, .
. Ibid., .
. Johann Christoph Adelung, Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der Hoch-
deutschen Mundart (Vienna: Pichler, ), :.
. Sämtliche Werke, ed. Josef Nadler, vol.  (Vienna: Herder, ), .
 :  
. Venus Urania: Ueber die Natur der Liebe, über ihre Veredlung und Verschöner-
ung,  parts (Leipzig: Goschen, ), :.
. Eros. Die Männerliebe der Griechen,  vols. (Berlin: Rosa Winkel, ), :.
. The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Pan-
theon, ), xxiii.
. Brüggemann, Der Aufbruch, .
. Edited by Sonja Schnitzler (Berlin: Eulenspiegel, ), .
. Niklas Luhmann, Liebe als Passion: Zur Codierung von Intimität (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, ), .
. August Herzog von Sachsen-Gotha, Ein Jahr in Arkadien. Kyllenion. Nachdruck
der Ausgabe von , ed. Paul Derks (Berlin: Rosa Winkel, ), .
. August von Platen, Memorandum meines Lebens, ed. Gert Mattenklott and
Hansgeorg Schmidt-Bergmann (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, ), .
. Reprinted in Hössli, vol. . –.
. Drei Dramen, (Leipzig: Brockhaus, ).
. See Walter Grünzweig, Constructing the German Walt Whitman (Iowa City:
University of Iowa Press, ).
 Of National Poets and
Their Female Companions
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Das Denken ist fast wie ein Mitdichten.
—Martin Heidegger, ‘‘Hölderlins Hymne ‘Andenken’ ’’
Among the central issues in German idealism to which contemporary
German philosophers like Dieter Henrich and Manfred Frank have been
returning is the so-called original insight of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, which
concluded that the self cannot be understood apart from its being self-
posited or self-asserted. Fichte, of course, was well aware that the act of self-
assertion explicitly raised questions of self-presentation, self-construction,
self-reflexion, self-objectification, and self-transcendence, in other words,
a battery of problems that organize themselves under the general rubric
of ‘‘posure.’’ Fichte himself put the question of positing, or posure, in an
almost Heideggerian way when he wrote, ‘‘Thus the first question would
be: how does the self exist for itself ? The first postulate: Think of yourself,
frame the concept of yourself; and notice how you do it.’’ However, empha-
sis upon enframing was quickly subsumed by reflection theory. ‘‘Everyone
who does no more than this [pose the question of the self ] will find that in
the thinking of this concept [one’s] activity as an intelligence reverts into
itself and makes itself its own object.’’1
In Einführung in die frühromantische Ästhetik: Vorlesungen, Manfred
Frank provides some detailed historical accounts of how the German ideal-
ists developed the question of positing. He notices, for example, that Novalis
had already begun to question positing of the self in terms of the relation-
ship between being and reflection in the following citation. ‘‘DasWesen der
Identität läßt sich nur in einem Scheinsatz aufstellen.’’2 Yet, if the question
of identity and being is mediated by the posure of reflexive representations,
for Novalis there nevertheless was a transcendental and unifying notion of
Being that was not to be questioned in the same sense that, in reflection,
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a certain feeling unified and stabilized the subject’s ‘‘Vertrautheit mit dem
Selbst.’’ No doubt, Manfred Frank’s probing into the relationship between
ontology and reflection theory is a historical follow-up to Martin Heideg-
ger’s late essay, ‘‘Kants These über das Sein’’ (), which aggressively re-
conceptualizes self-positing by means of citing passages in Kant’s Critique
of Pure Reason that provide an opportunity to question the subject-object
relation that reflection theory presupposes.
Heidegger argues that already in Kant there may be an awareness that
the object cannot be divorced from the question of the difference between
Being and beings and that thinking is not, in fact, grounded in the ‘‘Ich-
Subjekt,’’ but is posited or posed in relation to how Being is positioned;
thinking is in no way to be considered entirely independent of Being, but
quite to the contrary, must be understood in terms of how Being is posited,
posed, or positioned with respect to how subjects apprehend objects.
Whereas the subject-object relation takes priority in much of reflection
theory, Heidegger argues that, in fact, this relation is only the consequence
of an ontological orientation or positioning that shows itself more or less
explicitly from time to time in Kant’s writings. Fundamental to Heidegger’s
analysis is the insight that Being may not be a fixed category that is identical
to itself, nor posited or positioned in a determinate manner with respect
to what Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, called ‘‘Sein und Denken.’’
Whereas reflection theory drove Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel toward
a dialectical mode of analysis, Heidegger’s ontological considerations offer
the possibility that the ‘‘Ich-Subjekt’’ can be thought of within a structure
that does not give priority to the dialectical circularity of the reflection
model developed in, say, Fichte’s ‘‘Deduction of Presentation,’’ which, as
Jean Hippolyte tells us, was fundamental to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.
Indeed it was Edmund Husserl who had already attacked the Kantian
comprehension of ‘‘Sein und Denken.’’ In Ideas , Husserl argued that the
positing of intentionality—an already existing attitude presupposing the
experience of something perceived as ‘‘there’’ or ‘‘on hand’’—can be ne-
gated or called into question. Methodologically one can simply ‘‘parenthe-
size it.’’ In so doing, Husserl suggested that one could interrogate the ques-
tion of being, which may well be foundational for an understanding of how
intentionality (but more generally, consciousness) is posited. Husserl spoke
of this parenthesis, or epochê, as a means to acquire ‘‘a new region of being
never before delimited in its own peculiarity.’’3 But Heidegger, who was
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quite aware of Husserl’s critique, thought that this ‘‘new region’’ should
not be thought of as proper to consciousness, intentionality, or of the ob-
ject, but as a place [Ort] cleared by Being. In the essay on Kant, Heidegger
calls this place an Ortsnetz, a network, or more colloquially, telephone ex-
change. Oddly, it is in terms of such a telecommunications system that ‘‘das
Sein als Position gehört.’’ In short, the Ortsnetz (as opposed to the Kantian
faculties) is the manifold of open relationships in the world, as such, within
which we have to rethink Kantian reflection, and particularly as it concerns
a subjectivity that in Heidegger has been exteriorized or drawn out of the
self.
It is in this sense that the following passage on reflection radicalizes
Kant. Indeed, Heidegger focuses on a reflective movement back to the ‘‘Ich-
Subjekt’’ that breaks with the circularity of Kantian reflection thanks to the
intercession of the Ortsnetz im Ort des Seins, which I translate as ‘‘tele-
communications network in the neighborhood of Being.’’ ‘‘Die Betrach-
tung geht nicht mehr geradezu auf das Objekt der Erfahrung, sie beugt sich
zurück auf das erfahrende Subjekt, ist Reflexion. Kant spricht von ‘Über-
legung.’ Achtet nun die Reflexion auf diejenigen Zustände und Verhältnisse
desVorstellens, dadurch überhaupt die Umgrenzung des Seins des Seienden
möglich wird, dann ist die Reflexion auf das Ortsnetz im Ort des Seins eine
transzendentale Reflexion. [Reflection is a way of thinking that is not di-
rected immediately on the object of experience, but arches back to the ex-
periencing subject. Kant speaks of ‘‘deliberation.’’ Provided that reflection
heeds the situations and conditions of presentation, through which above
all the delimitation of the Being of beings would be made possible, reflec-
tion would be transcendental in terms of a communications network in the
neighborhood of Being.]’’4
No doubt, one could read this back into Heidegger’s own writing on
poetry. For example, one could begin to explore how a term like Gespräch
is mediated by a conception closer to the Ortsnetz than, say, mere conver-
sation or dialogue. In fact, I imagine that this kind of radical interpreta-
tion of Gespräch is what the philosopher Véronique Fóti had in mind when
she translates the term into English as ‘‘destinal interlocution.’’ In Heideg-
ger and the Poets, Fóti purposely avoids the word ‘‘conversation’’ because
it does not reflect the openness or indetermination of Being that is funda-
mental to its Heideggerian call. In short, the term interlocution is used to
denote something other than dialogue, or to put it another way, specula-
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tive reflection. Thanks to an interlocution, as opposed to mere dialogue, the
poet achieves a subjectivity of the Ortsnetz, a tele-communication, which
suggests that there is always more than one subjectivity on the line. Hence
the interlocution with Being takes into account a subjectivity that is by no
means solitary, but, rather, is brought into relation with Being by means of
an other [Mitsein]. Indeed, Heidegger himself pointed to this potential in
poetry when he said of Hölderlin’s hymn ‘‘Andenken,’’ ‘‘das Denken ist fast
wie ein Mitdichten.’’
In terms of Dorothy Wordsworth and Suzette Gontard—the respective
female companions of WilliamWordsworth and Friedrich Hölderlin—this
remark broaches questions of how the poet’s self-positing may be internally
divided or shared with an other who is the poet’s friend or companion. In
particular, it raises the question of how a self-positing can be conceptualized
from the standpoint of a ‘‘destinal interlocution,’’ which I take to be a fateful
speaking given or destined alongside that of the poet in which is manifest a
positing, positioning, or posure that is not self-identical or present to itself
and, as such, cannot be constituted or objectified through self-reflection
per se. Such positing or posure would not be totalizable or unifiable, but
characterized by a rupture, which I would like to call a caesura of difference
that preserves an alterity even as it denies separability. It is this caesura that
we will see figured in the abysses of the poets and their companions.

InMay of , DorothyWordsworth began The Grasmere Journal, a text
influential for her brother’s most important lyrics. In her first entry, May
, DorothyWordsworth addresses the departure of her brother on a trip,
which will separate them for some days. ‘‘My heart was so full that I could
hardly speak to W. when I gave him a farewell kiss,’’ she wrote.
I sate a long time upon a stone at the margin of the lake, and after a
flood of tears my heart was easier. The lake looked to me I knew not
why dull and melancholy, the weltering on the shores seemed a heavy
sound. I walked as long as I could amongst the stones of the shore.
The wood rich in flowers. A beautiful yellow, palish yellow flower, that
looked thick round and double, and smelt very sweet—I supposed it was
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a ranunculus—Crowfoot, the grassy-leaved Rabbit-toothed white flower,
strawberries, Geranium—scentless violet, anemones two kinds, orchises,
primroses. The heckberry very beautiful as a low shrub. The crab coming
out. Met a blind man driving a very large beautiful Bull and a cow—he
walked with two sticks.
There are no gods in the passage, no longing for Ancient Greece, no com-
memorative greetings, no heroes, and moreover, no national poet. Instead
the sister, having bade the poet farewell, sits behind by the margin of the
lake where one day she will see a raft of daffodils flashing beneath the dark-
ness of thunder. And though her mood has clearly altered the aspect of
the landscape, it is clear that she is concentrating so strongly that she has
forgotten herself at that moment she encounters the melancholy and dull-
ness of the water. Yet given this withdrawal of nature into dullness, she does
not make depressive pronouncements such as the following, which can be
found in Hölderlin’s Hyperion: ‘‘es gibt ein Vergessen alles Dasein, ein Ver-
stummen unsers Wesens [there is a forgetting of all being, a mutilation of
our essence].’’ The extrapolation from particularized moments of experi-
ence to the destiny of historical epochs is simply not made. Instead we are
told the wood is rich in flowers and that the heckberry is very beautiful. In
place of a meeting with a demigod, Dorothy encounters a blind man driv-
ing a large bull and cow. The blind man is treated as if the most remarkable
thing about him were the two beautiful animals with which he seems so
out of place. If there is nothing mythic about this blind man, there isn’t
anything ordinary about him either. And Dorothy Wordsworth will come
back to such wanderers in a place called Rydale, because without explicitly
making the connection, she has unselfconsciously associated her brother’s
journey with the wanderings of destitute people.
‘‘At Rydale,’’ she writes,
a woman of the village, stout and well dressed, begged a halfpenny—
she had never she said done it before, but these hard times!—Arrived at
home with a bad head-ach, set some slips of privet. The evening cold,
had a fire—my face now flame-coloured. It is nine o’clock. I shall soon
got to bed. A young woman begged at the door—she had come from
Manchester on Sunday morn with two shillings and a slip of paper which
she supposed a Bank note—it was a cheat. She had buried her husband
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and three children within a year and a half—All in one grave—burying
very dear—paupers all put in one place— shillings paid for as much
ground as will bury a man—a stone to be put over it or the right will be
lost—/ each time the ground is opened. Oh! that I had a letter from
William!5
As far as history is concerned, the two beggar women exemplify a world
in decline. As such, they reflect a condition of being that is threatening to
DorothyWordsworth. The first woman is still well dressed and is at the be-
ginning of what will be her ruin; the second woman is beyond what one
would ordinarily consider ill fate. She had buried her husband and three
children in the same grave and may not be able to pay for the cost of a
stone with which to ensure the plot’s sanctity. Narratively positioned be-
tween these two female figures is Dorothy herself, who arrived at homewith
a bad headache and who, with steadfast heart, plants some slips of privet.
The evening is cold, and she builds a fire. And only then, for the slight-
est moment, does she come into appearance with the phrase, ‘‘my face now
flame-coloured.’’ That, of course, is the extent of her Cartesian awaken-
ing, her figuring the self as a being-in-the-world. ‘‘I burn, therefore I am.’’
One wonders: is it around nine o’clock that the second beggar woman has
come to the door? Or does the memory of the beggar woman and her dead
only occur to her just then? It’s as if the flames had consumed time, as if
in the moment of self-awareness time got slightly derailed. In that moment
where she has figured herself, one suspects that where there should have
been a moment, an abyss had opened in which the difference and identity
between Dorothy and the unfortunates on the road undergoes disequilib-
rium, a kind of vertigo, which is only arrested by recollecting the poet, her
brother. ‘‘Oh! that I had a letter from William!’’6
This line, of course, has the status of a lost object whose absence has only
been temporarily forgotten or displaced only to return without warning to
stabilize the abyss where thoughts are swirling, as well as to mark the pain-
ful break around which the entire day’s events have been circulating. In the
Grasmere Journals, such a lapse or failure to remember is not uncommon.
It is noticeable in terms of small temporal slippages, narrative inconsisten-
cies, sudden fade-outs, and the force of displaced recollections that mark
openings or abysses of disequilibrium in which the temporality of every-
day life is disturbed.We should not be surprised, therefore, that the sudden
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exclamation that Dorothy would like a letter from her brother is not only
expressed aprés coup, but is, at the same time, irrationally premature. After
all,William has just left some seven or eight hours earlier from the moment
at which the wish is narratively introduced. Arriving both too late and too
soon, the remark intensifies even as it stabilizes the very disequilibrium it
addresses. This is further troubled because the wish for a letter or word from
the poet immediately follows remarks about the reopening of mass graves
and the deaths of husbands and children, suggesting further that we’re still
in some kind of opening, caesura, or abyss.
Coincidentally, in the same year and month, May , a banker’s wife,
Susette Gontard, is writing the German poet, Friedrich Hölderlin in Hom-
berg. Hölderlin, who is no longer a tutor living in the Gontard household,
is still in love with this passionate young woman with the Athenian pro-
file. ‘‘Are you returning?’’ she writes to him in her last letter dated Thursday
morning, May .
The whole region is silent and deserted without you and I am in such
agony. How will I be able to keep to myself those strong feelings for you
if you don’t come back? And should you return, it will also be difficult
to maintain my balance and not experience even more violent feelings.
Promise me you will not come back and that you will leave peacefully;
deprived of this certitude, I will perpetually remain in a tense and dis-
turbed state at my window every morning. And in the end we will be
calm again, therefore pursue your way with confidence and let us be
happy even in the depths of our pain and hope that it will ever ever be so
for us since we want the affirmation of the perfect nobility of our feelings
. . . Adieu! Adieu! Blessings . . . be with you.7
Here again we notice a text by a woman whose love is illicit to the poet, and
a poet who is not just any poet, but a national poet, though, as in the case of
WilliamWordsworth, at a time before his significance as such has been de-
finitively established. Moreover, in both instances, we notice how the writ-
ing is meant to calm what is clearly a very emotional and agitated state of
mind, which follows upon the poet’s departure. Like DorothyWordsworth’s
journal entry, Gontard’s letter to Hölderlin correlates mood to place—the
silent and deserted country—and proceeds with a number of rather abrupt
shifts marked by contrary desires: the desire for him to be with her and the
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desire for him to go away. Deprived of the certitude of knowing he is gone
forever, she says she will always be anxious. Yet in the end they will both
find peace. In their despair they will find happiness. Nobility of feeling will
be achieved and, in the end, she even anticipates that calm nobility of mind
as she blesses the poet, even to the point of anointing him in an act so self-
less and giving, that the entire letter undergoes an enormous sea change
reminiscent of various moments in Hyperion, which, Gontard tells Hölder-
lin elsewhere, she admires, even though her nervous temperament isn’t well
suited to the reading of serious literature.What is quite noticeable as well is
that just as Dorothy Wordsworth’s journal approaches the kind of natural
and social observations associated with the poetry of her brother, Gontard’s
letters are reminiscent of the dialectics of the philosophical circles in which
Hölderlin moved. For example, the dialectics of nearness and distance sug-
gested in the letter ends in an elevated and noble resolution in which the
poet receives benediction or sanctification. Her letters also invoke philo-
sophical terminology as in the following example in which she argues that
her spirit and soul are mirrored in his. ‘‘Mein Geist, meine Seele spiegeln
sich in Dir, Du giebst was sich geben läßt, in so schöner Form, als ich es
nie könnte. [My spirit, my soul are mirrored in you; you give what can be
given in so beautiful a form as I never could.]’’ Nowhere in DorothyWords-
worth’s journals do we hear such relatively elevated language. Conversely,
nowhere in Gontard’s letters are we given any sense of the immediate ex-
periences through which the passions are at once dampened and intensified.
Indeed, Gontard herself points out that despite the fact that the passion of
Hölderlin’s letters have given her the idea to start a diary, she is so agi-
tated that she can never find the right words to express herself: ‘‘Ich bin
nur so wenig ungestöhrt, wenn ich es verstohlen tun muß, ist eine Art von
Angst in mir, die mich hindert die rechtenWorte zu finden, so oft werde ich
aus meinen Gedanken gerissen und werde dann leicht verdrüßlich, doch,
will ich es versuchen, und jede ruhige Minute nutzen, nur mußt Du auf
keinen Zusammenhang rechnen [I am but so agitated, and when writing
in secret I feel an anxiety which keeps me from finding the right words, so
often am I cut off from my thought and then easily irritated; however, I
will attempt it and use every quiet moment, but you must not count on any
coherence]’’ ( March ). If one thinks of Hölderlin’s later poetry, espe-
cially, these words strike an uncannily sympathetic accord between the poet
and his beloved, as if her attitude about writing had disclosed something
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essential about the destiny of his poems. To put this a bit more sharply, I
would like to say that this destinal anticipation is not just relayed by means
of Gontard’s empathic appropriation of certain German idealist manners
of philosophical expression, but is given or destined by means of what is
‘‘so wenig ungestöhrt,’’ that is to say, of a disequilibrium of mind that has
its abysses or rifts.
Gontard frequently broaches these abysses, for example, in a letter of
early fall  when she tells Hölderlin that her mind is always elsewhere
and that she cannot stabilize her thoughts. ‘‘When I want to dream,’’ she
says, ‘‘even my phantasy won’t serve me.’’ And ‘‘when I want to read, my
thoughts stay still.’’ She says she feels apathetic, beside herself, unable to
express the right words. Courage and activity fail her. All of these feelings
relate to a moment analogous to that in the Grasmere Journals, the depar-
ture of the poet. Gontard writes, ‘‘I have often regretted having advised you,
at the moment of our separation, to distance yourself in another place.’’ And
she tells the poet that she did not understand what feeling had compelled
her to do that. ‘‘I believe, though, that it was fear, of the whole sensation
of our love, which became too intense for me in this powerful break [Ich
glaube aber, es war die Furcht, vor der ganzen Empfindung unserer Liebe,
die zu laut in mir wurde bei diesem gewaltigen Riß].’’ This is the break, en-
couraged by Gontard, that, unpredictably, has opened as an abyss in her
being that cannot be stabilized, despite her meticulous instructions about
how Hölderlin is supposed to secretly make his way to her bedroom, as
if these elaborate rituals could somehow compensate for the Riß that has
opened. It is a Riß that Gontard tries to figure even as her text holds it back
in disequilibrium as part of an experience that is properly speaking hers
and which sets her apart from Hölderlin, the poet, who is so often being
pushed away by these abysses, these lapses, in which Gontard says she can-
not pose herself in relation to him. Yet, in the very holding back of these
abysses by not only Gontard, but by Dorothy Wordsworth, who so care-
fully hides them as so many secrets in the seams of her sentences, there is,
nevertheless, a destinal or fateful effect of these abysses that is perceptible
in the poetry of Gontard’s and Wordsworth’s companions.
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How, then, do these abysses in being figure in the poetry of poets who
only much later will be strongly identified within their respective cultures
as national poets? If we turn to Martin Heidegger’s examination of Hölder-
lin in the  seminar on Germanien, we will immediately notice that he
considers language. ‘‘Das Gedicht ist Sprache. Aber wer spricht nun eigent-
lich im Gedicht?’’8 Throughout Heidegger’s various seminars on Hölderlin
during the s and early s, the main strategy is to jettison authorial
and formalist readings while allowing the words to speak poetically in ways
that further philosophical thinking about man’s relation to the world and
to the divine.
Central to Heidegger’s thinking is a notion of openness, of which the
Abgrund or ‘‘abyss’’ is but one. If poetry is speech, who or what is speak-
ing? Not Hölderlin, simply, but according to Heidegger, language itself,
which keeps shifting levels and introducing new voices and tonalities whose
sources are concealed. In Germanien, for example, the stanzas are not all
spoken by the same subject, and the ‘‘I’’ who announces itself for the last
time in line twenty-nine cannot, according to Heidegger, be considered
the origin or source for the poem. For ‘‘dieses Sprachgefüge ist in sich ein
Wirbel, der uns irgendwohin reißt.’’9 That is, the speaking is constellated
such that it delimits a tourbillon or whirling movement that rips and pulls
us—sweeps us away—in some unspecified direction. InGermanien this dis-
equilibrium drags us to no one else than the virgin woman, the mother of
all things who is said to be the upholder of an abyss. This abyss is a particu-
larly odd one that I want to exploit in that if one looks at drafts A and B of
Germanien, one notices that the phrase ‘‘und den abgrund trägt’’ is missing
from the B manuscript. Heidegger himself makes quite a bit of this, and in
the Hamburger translation, one notices that in the German, the phrase is
left out, while in the translation it is supplied. Hamburger too sees that in
Hölderlin’s B manuscript the abyss has been evacuated or emptied in the
place of its having been posited in the A manuscript, which is to say, the
abyss has literally fallen into itself and disappeared. Hence it could be said
to be present in its very absence.
Die Mutter ist von allem, [und den abgrund trägt]
Die Verborgene sonst genannt von Menschen,
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So ist von Lieben und Leiden
Und voll von Ahnungen dir
Une voll von Frieden der Busen.10
The Mother of all things, [upholder of the abyss,]
Whom men at other times call the Concealed,
Now full of loves and sorrows
And full of presentiments
And full of peace is your bosom.11
In these lines, particularly, an allusion to Diotima—Hölderlin’s name for
Susette Gontard—is made with respect to the notion of concealment. In all
of the poems entitled ‘‘Diotima,’’ it is quite explicit that Diotima is in de-
cline and that she is becoming increasingly concealed in the earth. ‘‘Deine
Sonne, die schönere Zeit, ist untergegangen [Your sun, of a lovelier time,
has descended].’’ This is why she blooms ‘‘verschlossen,’’ concealed, in a
fallen world that cannot fully sustain her. In Germanien, the traces of this
Diotima survive in that other feminine presence, the upholder of the abyss.
Like that abyss, however, she is both appropriated and expropriated by the
poem, gathered and dissipated. Indeed such an appropriation and expro-
priation could be said to be the destiny of other texts that are always being
held in reserve, outside the poem, namely, the letters of Susette Gontard
with their numerous small breakdowns and intimate shocks. We could put
this another way by saying that thematically encrypted in her apotheosis
in Germanien, is an abyss into which she disappears, though it is an abyss
that is itself a sublation of those abysses of her prose that have been des-
tined to take on national significance with respect, in this case, to a poem
about the fatherland and its people. This codetermination of companion
texts, held in reserve outside the poem, that nevertheless achieve their des-
tiny within the poem bears on what Heidegger calls Gespräch, or ‘‘destinal
interlocution.’’ In the case of Hölderlin and Gontard, this interlocution is
precisely that of how the woman’s disequilibrium has been put at the dis-
posal of the poet even as it has been held back within her experience as a
woman (not to say, within her writings, which were prejudicially deemed,
at the time, to be of lesser significance because of her gender). Yet, it is in
the everydayness of her experiences that a certain comportment has been
disclosed that involves the construction of an Abgrund, a zone of disequi-
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librium where the figure of the poet is posed or posited as a figure that
cannot stabilize or hold together the Wirbel that is sweeping the text away
from its moorings or supports—the stable relationships of everyday life. At
the same time, these texts are engaged in a destinal interlocution where the
Abgrund of female experience will not only require itself to be divinized or
spiritualized by the poet, but much more radically, will also require that
such experience become a codetermining force of disruption or rupture
within a national poetry as yet to come, say, in the twentieth century. And
this poetry that will not only speak to the piety of the fatherland, but by
extension, to the calling into Being of that fatherland’s people as a distinc-
tively German people. It is here, of course, that turning from the private
relationship between poet and female companion—their destinal cohabita-
tion—to that of the public relationship between poet and a national people,
or Volk, occurs by means of a destinal interlocution, or Ortsnetz im Ort
des Seins, from which women’s writings are not to be so easily excluded (as
for example, by Heidegger himself who does not consider the possibility of
a fateful significance of Gontard’s writings for the destiny of the German
people).
For it is in the writing of Susette Gontard that something is concealed,
reserved, held back, or set aside, a disequilibrium in which the self has lost
itself in the transport of conflicting moods, motivations, desires, fantasies,
or somatic symptoms, which point to a hole, gap, or rupture that cannot
be repaired by any ecstasy whatsoever, least of all, Gontard’s brief ecstasies
with Hölderlin in her bedroom. It is in this woman’s letters, then, that we
see to what extent a destructive tear is guarded or vouchsafed for the sake of
a destinal interlocution through which she gives herself over to the destinal
arrival of a national poet, a giving or positing that holds something back
that cannot be posed. It is in that positing/nonpositing by the poet’s com-
panion that a destructive poetic rupturing becomes visible—the tornado or
Wirbel—through which the fatherland as homeland of Being is posed as the
proper place [Ort] for a national German identity, though, of course, this
place is precisely what the destinal interlocution has called into question as
something that is essentialistically posed or posited by the poet(s).
In the case of the Wordsworths, where we might think an English tem-
perament avoids the sort of nationalistic political horizon imaginable in the
case of Hölderlin, it has to be said that something not entirely dissimilar is at
work. If we look at the famous poem ‘‘Lines, Composed a Few Miles above
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Tintern Abbey on Visiting the Banks of the Wye During a Tour. July ,
,’’ we see that William has rendered his sister divine and that she has
been put in the role of a spiritual guide and, in anticipating the keen poetic
perceptions of theGrasmere Journals, of a muse. Yet, as in the journals, there
is temporal distortion as well, for William has fast forwarded their lives to
such an extent that he is recovering the present companionship with his sis-
ter from an undetermined future point, from whose perspective the walk
with Dorothy by the Wye River is itself but a stabilizing moment whose
purpose is to assuage the violence of an abyss—the approach of death that
will inevitably sunder one from the other. Hence the walk a few miles above
Tintern Abbey will be posed or set up byWilliam for Dorothy as a remem-
brance that pays homage to her from the perspective of the future anterior,
a temporal perspective, which, when compared to the present, delimits a
very curious caesura that in rendering the sister divine also points to the
evanescence or the forgetableness of the moment that is supposed to be sal-
vific, as if that moment were swallowed up into itself in the very same way
that the abyss in Hölderlin’s Germanien disappears into its own absence.
In fact, it is this disappearance, or fading of the scene within a temporality
of the future anterior, that makes the closing lines of ‘‘Tintern Abbey’’ ex-
tremely emotional and brings them quite close to the Diotima poems of
Hölderlin, where the very flowering of Diotima characterizes the decline of
her sun. Like Diotima, William’s sister is made sacred or recovered, even
as from the future anterior she is destroyed or lost in advance. And the
abyss, which delimits this recovery and loss, is that within which a figure
is constructed and dismantled, or in Heidegger’s terms, appropriated and
expropriated. But, of course, it is this division or difference between appro-
priation and expropriation that we see reflected in the everyday events of
the sister herself, events that are already recorded in the Alfoxden Journal of
the year , the very same year the poem ‘‘Tintern Abbey’’ was composed
in tranquility.
It is in this journal that Virginia Woolf was especially sensitive to Dor-
othy’s reticence or holding back. Commenting on the passage about having
received Mary Wollstonecraft’s biography, Woolf notices that there is no
comment about Wollstonecraft’s life as such, just a caesura. And yet a day
later, ‘‘an unconscious comment’’ is dropped. ‘‘Quaint waterfalls about,
about which Nature was very successfully striving to make beautiful what
art had deformed—ruins, hermitages, etc. etc. In spite of all these things,
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the dell romantic and beautiful, though everywhere planted with unnatural-
ized trees. Happily we cannot shape the huge hills, or carve out the valleys
according to our fancy.’’12 Whereas Wollstonecraft wanted to dramatically
revolutionize the world, Dorothy Wordsworth argues for a conservation or
abiding relation wherein the attention to the minute details of the landscape
discloses the Abgrund or abyss, and this is in fact revolutionary in a differ-
ent way fromMaryWollstonecraft’s fulgurations; for the abysses of Dorothy
Wordsworth are in fact the destabilizing codeterminants of a destiny that
will work itself through in the poetry of her brother, an Ortsnetz im Ort
des Seins that brings the countryside of England into the place of Being as
homeland, or perhaps even fatherland (the land of words-of-worth), to a
people who are called into assembly by an intimate company. In their place
she accepts the com-posure of brother and sister, a com-posure or con-
versation that for all its correspondences resists intersubjectivity. As such
they are not posited in terms of a Fichtean reflection theory wherein the
subject’s striving toward determination through the positing of the self in
relation to an object is to be occupied or taken over, merely, by an other.
Rather, Dorothy and William Wordsworth reflect what in the context of
‘‘Andenken’’ Heidegger calls ‘‘der Zurückbleibende,’’ the ones who in stay-
ing back have achieved a com-posure that enables them to encounter their
land as ‘‘fatherlandish’’—not subject to the feminist challenge of one like
Wollstonecraft—and to hear the call of its holiness as a call to ‘‘das Eigene.’’
Yet, as in the context of Heidegger, this ‘‘Eigene’’ is nothing but the staying
back of the poet and of the poetic word that keeps to itself as interlocution
rather than conversation: the silence in which the truth is concealed and
disclosed, a truth that is the truth in art.
Toward the end of The Prelude, William Wordsworth points us in the
right direction when he speaks of a humbler destiny in contrast to the reve-
lation of a divine spirit on the peak of Mount Snowdon. ‘‘A humbler destiny
have we retraced, / And told of lapse and hesitating choice, / And backward
wanderings along thorny ways.’’ It is in this humbler destiny with its lapses,
hesitating choices, and backward wanderings that the holding back of the
sister comes to appearance as the ‘‘trait’’ of the national poet, if not that
of the fatherland itself. In that sense, the sister is the trait without which
the fatherland could not disclose itself as Being, or what Heidegger in the
context of Hölderlin calls the holy. That this trait is destined in the inter-
locution between sister and brother speaks to the divisibility and noncoin-
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cidence that persists even in the disclosure of the natural world as ‘‘das
Eigene,’’ a natural world that will come to be identified more and more
strongly with nation. OnWednesday,  October , DorothyWordsworth
wrote in her journal: ‘‘A fine morning—a showery night. The lake still in
the morning—in the forenoon flashing light from the beams of the sun, as
it was ruffled by the wind. We corrected the last sheet.’’
Post-Script
In an essay entitled ‘‘Sauf le Nom,’’ Jacques Derrida cites the following
lines of Angelus Silesius’s CherubinicWanderer: ‘‘Friend, let this be enough;
if you wish to read beyond, / Go and become yourself the writ and yourself
the essence.’’ Commenting on these lines, Derrida writes, ‘‘The friend, who
is male rather than female, is asked, recommended, enjoined, prescribed to
render himself, by reading, beyond reading; beyond at least the legibility of
what is currently readable, beyond the final signature—and for that reason
to write.’’ Derrida’s point is that the friend is at once pre-scribed and ren-
dered by the poet’s reading and simultaneously situated ‘‘beyond the final
signature.’’ Both Susette Gontard and DorothyWordsworth, in my view, are
situated in precisely this way as friends whose own writings fall outside the
writing of national poets despite the fact that they are, as Silesius might put
it, ‘‘the writ’’ and ‘‘the essence.’’ Derrida summarizes this as follows:
Not to write this or that that falls outside his writing as a note, a nota
bene or a post-scriptum letting writing in its turn fall behind the written,
but for the friend himself to become the written or Writing, to become
the essence that writing will have created. (No) more place, starting from
there, beyond, but nothing more is told us beyond, for a post-scriptum.
The post-scriptumwill be the debt or the duty. It will have to, it should,
be reabsorbed into a writing that would be nothing other than the
essence that would be nothing other than the being-friend or the
becoming-friend of the other. The friend will only become what he is,
to wit, the friend, he will only have become the friend at the moment
when he will have read that, which is to say, when he will have read
beyond—to wit, when he will have gone, and one goes there, beyond,
to give oneself up, only by becoming writing through writing. The be-
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coming [Werden], the becoming-friend, the becoming-writing, and the
essence [Wesen] would be the same here.13
My account of the poets and their female companions adds a biographi-
cal dimension to Jacques Derrida’s claims about friendship, in which the
presence of the friend is always already prescribed as arche-trace or, more
precisely, arche-voice.14That the friend is writ is something I have attempted
to show in terms of how the female companions are themselves what one
might call the ‘‘post-scriptum’’ or PS of the text—what in earlier writings
Derrida was calling the supplement, in this case, a supplement that precedes
or comes in advance of a national poetry. That the relation between the poet
and the friend escapes a binding or tangible connection is, of course, why
one necessarily speaks of a caesura wherein there is both a turning toward
and turning away from an other. Indeed it is because of the undecidable
logic of this caesura that the post-scriptum calls to us from ‘‘beyond the
ear,’’ an unheard-of intimacy. Here, of course, one encounters the peculiar
possibility that a national poetry will come to pass, not because a poet was
necessarily attuned to a people or Volk, but because the poet participated
in what we could call an ‘‘unheard-of intimacy’’ with a woman that escapes
objectification as a concrete relation.What comes to pass in this unheard of
intimacy, however, is the destinality of an interlocution that expresses itself
over time (that is, historically) as the recognition of a national poet whose
work is ‘‘fatherlandish’’ to the extent that it grounds the destinal interlocu-
tion by means of asserting a male poetic voice that is heard by others as if
it were the voice of a people or nation.
Derrida has alerted us to the fact that in terms of a Heideggerian under-
standing ofMitsein, one is always going to encounter what Heidegger him-
self called Kampf. ‘‘Kampf belongs to the very structure of Dasein. It be-
longs to its historical structure and thus, this must also be explicitly stated,
to the subjectivity of the historical subject.’’15 In our context, this Kampf
obviously relates to the question of gender and the prioritization of a male
voice. No doubt, we can think of this as reflecting a subjectivity that is itself
the consequence of a national Kampf or interlocution that implicitly or un-
consciously organizes itself around an idea of there being a fatherland—a
national paysage grounded in terms of the priority of a man’s poetic voice,
that is to say, a voice that determines the writ of the female companion to be
post-scriptive, despite its essential significance as a voice that makes legible
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a determining caesura without which a certain poetry could not have come
to pass. In the case of the Wordsworths, this is evident in the relation be-
tween Dorothy’s Grasmere Journals and William’s The Prelude. In the case
of Hölderlin, the Kampf can be detected in the subsuming of Gontard’s tur-
bulence within the lyricism of works like Germania.
In Being and Time, Heidegger asks, ‘‘To what extent and on the basis of
what ontological conditions does historiality belong, as an essential con-
stitution, to the subjectivity of the ‘historial’ subject?’’16 If the priori-
tization of the fatherlandish voice of the national poet could be said to
fulfill those metaphysically oriented ontological conditions upon which his-
toriality depends, is it not, in fact, the case that this fatherlandish voice is
always already constituted by the caesura of an interlocution to which a
female voice is quite essential? After all, is it not to this post-scriptum that
the fatherlandish is largely indebted, insofar as the writ of the female com-
panions is an engendering of something other than themselves? In ‘‘Sauf le
Nom,’’ Derrida thinks of this sort of engendering in terms of a logical break-
down between the possible and the impossible, since a becoming-self en-
genders a becoming-other if not a becoming-nothing that is, strictly speak-
ing, impossible even if it is inevitable. This surplus ‘‘introduces an absolute
heterogeneity in the order and in the modality of the possible. The possi-
bility of the impossible, of the ‘more impossible’ that as such is also possible
(‘more impossible than the impossible’), marks an absolute interruption
in the regime of the possible that nonetheless remains, if this can be said,
in place’’ (). That the trace or trait of this possibility/impossibility may
exceed hearing or is, strictly speaking, beyond the ear points to the pecu-
liarity of a destinal interlocution that characterizes the fate of a poetry that
over considerable time will be recognized as having national significance.
That reflection theory will eventually install itself at the very point when the
two genders face off over the question of who speaks for a people is inevi-
table, something that feminists exemplify more often than not. Important
for us, however, has been the prehistory of this Kampf in terms of a caesura
andMitdichten that undermines conceptions of self-positing upon which a
nationalized battle of the sexes is necessarily founded.
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 Between Aufbruch and Secessio:
Images of Friendship among
Germans, Jews, and Gays
 
Der Mensch wird am Du zum Ich.
—Martin Buber, Ich und Du1

Writing these first words, I am distracted by music blasting from
the closing boat parade of the Amsterdam Gay Games, which displays the
motto: friendship.

I made my first public appearance as professor of comparative literature
in Amsterdam by opening a conference on literature and homoeroticism
entitled ‘‘Vriendjespolitiek,’’ a sarcastic reference to backroom politicking
(old boys’ network). I had no idea what to say. In the end I saved myself
with Thomas Mann’s  speech Von deutscher Republik, his coming out in
defense of the Weimar Republic and homosexuality. A few months later I
sat in a committee to judge a dissertation on the role of adolescent readings
in the formation of homosexuals. Page Grubb’s ‘‘You got it from all those
Books’’ includes a study of Mann’s Tod in Venedig, as well as an analysis
of questionnaires returned by members of Amsterdam’s gay community.2 I
appear in the old Lutheran church for the defense in (borrowed) cap and
gown; the audience consists mostly of friendly gay leather jackets.
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Were there ‘‘friendly gay leather jackets’’ in the academic audience when
Thomas Mann gave his lecture Von deutscher Republik in Berlin? The pub-
lished text reports only about ‘‘extended unrests’’ and about hostile scrap-
ing of feet on the ground. Anticipating this hostility, he tried to make his
ideas palatable to conservatives: he urged his audience to reclaim the Re-
public from aggressive Jew boys (‘‘scharfe Judenjungen’’);3 he extensively
quoted Novalis to reach the neo-Romantics; and he suggested connections
between male bonding in the youth movement, the state, and the war4 on
the one hand and Walt Whitman’s homoeroticism on the other.
Mann skillfully strengthened these tenuous connections by appealing to
popular publications by Hans Blüher that his young audience was likely to
know and respect. Blüher’s three-volume history of theWandervogel caused
a sensation in  by claiming that this first organization of the youth
movement was propelled by homoerotic bonding and that the later ejec-
tion of homosexuals from the movement was to be understood in terms of
Freud’s theory: the leaders who persecuted the homosexuals were ‘‘weak’’
inverts who projected their self-hatred upon others.5 Blüher’s second book,
Die Rolle der Erotik in der männlichen Gesellschaft, extended his theory of
male bonding to a great variety of other organizations, above all to the state,
which he proclaimed to be the homoerotic counterpart to the heterosexual
family.6
Mann referred to Blüher in his  lecture (without naming him) by
remarking: ‘‘eros as statesman, even as state creator, is an image familiar to
us from ancient days and intelligently advocated anew today’’ (:). But
whereas three years earlier he found Blüher’s lecture on Deutsches Reich,
Judentum, Sozialismus ‘‘excellent’’ and ‘‘almost word for word’’ spoken from
his soul,’’7 he now qualified the praise by adding that it made no sense to
ascribe libidinal energy only to monarchy and its restoration.8 The qualifi-
cation indicates that both Blüher and Mann changed their ideological posi-
tion between  and : in , Mann was still the Prussian-German
conservative of his Betrachtungen,9 while Blüher thought that temporarily
the best political system for Germans was a democratic republic and he
said soothing words about socialism.10 By  the tables had turned: Mann
came to defend the Republic, whereas Blüher published Secessio judaica,
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a highly disturbing book that needs reconsideration, however painful this
may be.11
Blüher predicted that the German Reich would rise from its ashes,
whereas the Jews would disappear from the country. Although he consid-
ered some Jews as noble and great, and although he sneered at Teutonic,
völkisch, and ‘‘vulgar’’ anti-Semitism, he regarded the impact of Jewish
thinking upon Germans as ‘‘corruptive.’’ Such were the theories of Ein-
stein12 or Freud (–), and above all, socialism and Marxism, which
promulgated internationalism and class struggle at the expense of class-
transcending nationalism. ‘‘Jewish socialism,’’ the product of a race with-
out nation, derived politics from economics and denied the primacy of
the nationhood (–): ‘‘One cannot follow the Jewish and the German
way simultaneously. All nations listening to the Jewish voice are lost’’ ().
Zionism was welcome because it revived Jewish nationalism and turned
against the ‘‘mimicry’’ of assimilation. Believing that Jewish mimicry was
most quickly disappearing in Germany, Blüher predicted that his country
will be spared of ‘‘the inevitable Weltpogrom’’: ‘‘Germany alone will flinch
from murder’’ ().
But Secessio went beyond Zionism, for Blüher’s argument constantly
slipped from diagnosis into prescription. He demanded that Jews be forbid-
den to serve as German officers or judges, and he opposed German-Jewish
marriages (). Secessio judaica meant dislodging the Jews from the host
nations onto which they had grafted themselves (). To recognize sine ira
et studio the historical necessity of the secession was theoretically founded
(and hence not ‘‘vulgar’’) anti-Semitism: ‘‘Whoever calls a Jew a Jew is an
anti-Semite’’ (). Jews had no right to say ‘‘we Germans’’ () even if they
had bravely fought for the fatherland, for as a group they represented defeat-
ism: ‘‘Prussians and heroism belong together; Jews and the spirit of defeat
belong together’’ (). TheWeimar Republic was for Blüher a senseless anti-
historical construct [geschichtswidriges Gebilde] because it originated from
a Jewish spirit: ‘‘Its ideal is the well-being of all [Allgemeinheit], and this
‘all’ is the Jewish substitute for the state. The German Republic is therefore
a typical Jew-product without historical honor’’ ().
It would be easy to dismiss Secessio judaica as proto-Nazi ‘‘hate litera-
ture,’’ but we should resist the temptation, for it is an uncanny amalgam
of blindness and insight. Kafka, for one, understood it this way when on
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 June  he started in his diary a reply he was unable to finish. The prob-
lem, he noted, was not only ‘‘Blüher’s philosophical and visionary power,’’
but that responses had to counter the suspicion ‘‘of wanting ironically to
dismiss the ideas of this book.’’ What Kafka could not dismiss ironically
was surely the inevitability of the Jewish secessio—an idea that, tragically,
so many assimilationist German Jews did indeed dismiss.
The problem with Blüher’s book is not that it stated the necessity of the
secessio, or even that it made a colossal blunder in predicting that no po-
grom would occur in Germany. Rather, it failed by mixing prescription into
the diagnosis and taking a duplicitous position with respect to the Jews: it
claimed to make dispassionate observations about historical inevitabilities,
but resorted time and again to venomous and ‘‘vulgar’’ anti-Semitic ideas.
Once more, Kafka brilliantly perceived the ethical conundrum: ‘‘He calls
himself an anti-Semite without hatred, sine ira et studio, and he really is
that; yet he easily awakens the suspicion, almost with every remark, that he
is an enemy of the Jews, whether out of happy hatred or unhappy love.’’13
Whether Blüher was an ‘‘enemy of the Jews,’’ and if so, whether he was
motivated by ‘‘happy hatred’’ or ‘‘unhappy love’’ are complicated psycho-
logical and personal questions that texts, which are linguistically and inher-
ently ambiguous, are unlikely to answer unequivocally. Nevertheless, what-
ever the vagaries of language, in real life we must answer such questions
if we are to distinguish between friends and foes, and if, as historians, we
wish to use in some sense the past in coping with the future. I shall then
attempt to sketch an answer to the questions that Kafka, with good reasons,
left open by filling the gaps and resolving the ambiguities of Secessio judaica
with biographical information. I shall try to understand his both philo-
and anti-Semitic stance by looking at his friendship with Jews. More con-
cretely, I suggest that he was motivated by an ‘‘unhappy love’’ and that the
mechanism behind his notion of secessio was a version of the construct that
he himself had set up to explain the ostracizing of the homosexuals in the
Wandervogel. Purging Germany of the Jews was modeled (unconsciously?)
after the purging of the Wandervogel of homosexuals: just as the leaders
of that youth organization ejected homosexuals to resolve their own inner
conflict, so too, Blüher developed his anti-Semitism to suppress his homo-
erotic attraction to certain Jewish men. Secessio judaica was a tragicomic
personal farewell to his ‘‘unhappily beloved ones.’’
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Blüher’s Munich lecture was in good measure philo-Semitic. Accord-
ing to the prefatory note to the published text, the lecture was occasioned
by an internal dispute of the Freideutsche Jugend in Berlin and designed
to prepare the ground for the upcoming national assembly. Attempting to
mediate between right-wing chauvinists and the heavily Jewish left wing,
Blüher called upon his audience in Berlin, Hamburg, Hannover, and Mu-
nich to remain loyal to the idea of the expired Reich, so that Germans,
‘‘now the pariah of the world,’’ would not have to disperse like the Jews in
diaspora and cease to exist as a nation. If the idea of the Reich matured
to become one of life’s ‘‘final matters,’’ it could become what Zion was for
the Jews. Jews and Germans had comparable fates.14 Although the disap-
pearance of the historic Jewish state had led to a fatal weakening of male
bonding so that the heterosexual family had to assure racial survival for a
long time, Zionism revived male friendship and opened new hopes for re-
establishing the state. And this, Blüher proposed, was a shining example
for his German audience, now also threatened with the loss of its national
identity.
But this admiration for the exemplary rise of national consciousness
among Jews was coupled to another, much more negative view of the Jews
in the lecture’s final harangue against the left: the socialist party was dis-
loyal to the Reich (), and socialism was basically a Jewish idea (): ‘‘The
spirit is always both conservative and revolutionary. The true creators and
pillars of culture have always been related to the idea of the priest or the
king. But priestly and royal human beings have no place on the left; they
are mere empty constructions there. Hence I say to you: freideutsche youth
beware of the left! Distrust the men of the Enlightenment, the freethinker;
beware the benefactors of humanity [Menschheitsbeglücker] who never as
yet succeeded in making anybody happy; distrust the Zivilisationsliterat,
the tribunes of the people, the busybodies, the men of progress and the
reformer who cannot reform even himself ’’ (–). In Blüher’s  auto-
biography, the ambiguities and contradictions of the  lecture are flat-
tened into an equally brilliant but pompous and one-dimensional attack
onWeimar, which would have shocked Mann had he come to read it—and
not only because it is unkind to him:
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Certain segments of the youth movement joined the communists, and
people repeatedly assumed that I did so too, for, according to a strange
conception, Geist was leftist. Others again had diametrically opposite
ideas about me. Parts of the refluent army had settled at the time in
Munich, either to study or to engage in literary and political nuisance.
In short, I was expected to take a definitive position, for I was not ex-
pected to take a wavering attitude, such as Thomas Mann took. He also
stayed in Munich, and wanting to avoid injustice he found everywhere
and in everything something good. I have therefore made my position
known in the lecture ‘‘Deutsches Reich, Judentum und Sozialismus,’’ and
I calmed hereby the mood and gave people direction. The lecture in
the Steinickesaal, which I had delivered already in Leipzig, Berlin and
Münster, was a great success and had to be repeated. I wasn’t quite so a-
political after all; but there is a difference between defending one’s father-
land and espousing vague ideas about reforming mankind. All the good-
looking youth—mostly in uniform, racially and individually superb in
appearance—gathered around me at the time, while all the long-haired,
ill-kempt rabble piled up on the other side: the literati with profound
humanity-gaze, freideutsche by-products of the type that was loafing
around then.15
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Blüher’s account of his  Munich lecture suggests a homoerotic at-
tachment to racially and physically ‘‘superior’’ men in uniform. Indeed, he
fought the infamous law against homosexuality earlier by arguing that a
certain type of homosexual, the Männerheld [male hero], was a physically
and mentally superior and healthy masculine specimen.16 Yet his case for
homosexuality was based on educational, artistic, and cultural values, and
his most vigorous public defenses of inversion date from the first war years
when he was most deeply attached to Jewish intellectuals: in Rolle der Ero-
tik, he claimed that the spiritual type closest to him was overwhelmingly
represented by Jews (:), and his autobiography recalls that he had been
in such an ‘‘intensely philo-Semitic disposition’’ and so strongly ‘‘attached
to Jewish people’’ that his father ‘‘started to frown.’’17
Blüher’s theoretical and personal problems with Jews can in good mea-
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sure be traced to his fascination with and attraction to the brilliant young
men around the short lived and now all but forgotten left-wing journal of
the Freie Studentenschaft called Der Aufbruch. The editorial staff included,
next to Blüher, a galaxy of future celebrities: the writers Kurt Hiller, Rudolf
Leonhard, and Alfred Wolfenstein, the future philosopher of science Hans
Reichenbach, as well as his brother Bernhard, and the anarchist writer and
political activist Gustav Landauer. Martin Buber was linked to the group
through his close friendship with Landauer. Editor in chief was a student
called Ernst Joël, president of the social committee in the Freie Studenten-
schaft,18 who was also the founder and moving spirit of a shelter [Siedlungs-
heim] that the Studentenschaft ran in Charlottenburg for workers and the
poor.
The central themes in Der Aufbruch were opposition to the comradery
of the beer halls and the war, and affirmation of a socially engaged homo-
erotic male friendship. They link Ernst Joël’s ‘‘Brief an einen Freund’’
(–), Landauer’s Whitman translations (–), Blüher’s ‘‘Was ist Anti-
feminismus?,’’19 and Joël’s ‘‘Von deutschen Hochschulen’’ (–). In Alfred
Wolfenstein’s programmatic poem ‘‘Kameraden!’’ (–), the ‘‘call for
Friendship [Ruf nach Freundschaft]’’ was to replace the blood relationship
to family and the heterosexual desire of the street.
The first issue of Der Aufbruch appeared at the end of July  and
came through unscathed; the following double issue (August/September
) brought disaster. Bernhard Reichenbach’s poem ‘‘Anti-Barbarus’’ (–
) was severely censored, and Joël’s satire on the torch parade of the Ber-
lin students for the Swedish queen led to his expulsion from the university
by the rector, Ulrich von Wilamowitz, who also accused him of tolerating
‘‘homosexual obscenities’’ in the publication. Blüher protested in an open
letter, comparingWilamowitz’s treatment of Joël with his famous attack on
Nietzsche’s Geburt der Tragödie and subsequently resigned from the univer-
sity.20 Landauer drafted a protest to the lower house of the Parliament, but
apparently did not send it off.21
While Joël’s expulsion temporarily cemented the friendship between the
editors, plans for a Free Academy eroded it. Buber (supported by Lan-
dauer), Joël, and Leonhard all had their plans.22 The participation of women
became amajor stumbling block when Blüher accused the feminists in ‘‘Was
ist Antifeminismus’’23 of attempting to infiltrate homosocial organizations
like the youth movement and the university, which, in his view, had tra-
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ditionally provided political and spiritual leadership. Antifeminism was a
‘‘will to the purity of male bonding.’’24 Joël agreed: in his eyes, a community
of higher learning could only consist of (male) teachers and young men.
Unlike Leonhard, he was unwilling to admit women, even if that meant that
the plan, so dear to his heart, would fail.25 But Landauer, who participated
in the editorial board in good measure because he found Blüher interest-
ing,26 was irritated by antifeminism. Unaware that Joël sided with Blüher, he
wrote to him on  December : ‘‘I remained a stranger to some of your
intimates and helpers; others, like Mr. Hiller and even Mr. Blüher I reject. I
say ‘even’ because I find him very attractive and I look at his work with
genuine participation. But we enter distinct paths. I want to wait patiently
his further developments and conquests, and I will contribute to this ac-
cording to my strength. I say therefore nothing final about our differences.
But the given must be my point of departure. Thus, for instance, I can only
say, as a symptom, that the article ‘Was ist Antifeminismus’ would never
have appeared in the Socialist [Landauer’s own journal] without unleashing
a polemic in which I myself would have participated.’’27 As Landauer ex-
plained in letters to Blüher ( February ) and Buber ( March ), he
unconditionally opposed the exclusion of women; he regarded their equal
rights and spiritual equality as self-evident. Blüher finally proposed in Der
bürgerliche und geistige Antifeminismus28 something like a compromise. He
envisioned a ‘‘gothic’’ and a ‘‘dionysian’’ wing for the Academy (). In
the gothic wing, women had no place (–); in the dionysian one, male
eros was to have a hegemonic position (), but (the cleverest and most
feminine) women would be granted a subordinate role—as long as they
accepted the supremacy of male bonding and rejected feminism (–).
Hardly a proposal to persuade Landauer!
The Free Academy never got off the ground, and the friends went their
own ways. Buber moved to the vicinity of Frankfurt in March ; Joël
matriculated at the University of Heidelberg; Hiller launched the pacifist-
revolutionary Aktivismus movement and the yearbook Das Ziel; and Blü-
her started to court conservative, reactionary, and nationalist circles, which
slowly but inexorably pushed him to abandon his former Jewish friends.
Let us follow then the strategies that Blüher followed in seceding from
Hiller, Joël, Landauer, and Buber. Hiller, who was Blüher’s closest ally in
fighting for gay emancipation, represents the most revealing and drastic
case. In his first public announcement about his break with Hiller, a con-
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cluding note in his collected essays (), Blüher declared that he was
greatly enriched through his association with Hiller, one of the most in-
telligent minds in Germany. He fondly recalled their visionary talks and
plans for a Bund der Geistigen, a union of intellectuals and artists.29 Indeed,
Blüher wrote several contributions for Hiller’s Das Ziel in  and ;
by  he claimed that the so-called Bund was held together only ‘‘by the
bookbinder’s work.’’30 The falling out had surely more than one reason.
When in early  Joël openly attacked Hiller and left, Blüher was torn
between two of his intimate friends and hesitated. The Blüher Archives in
the Staatsbibliothek of Berlin preserve a long letter from  April  to
Joël, which sings high praises of Hiller and most sharply condemns Joël
for his treachery. But next to Hiller’s grateful acknowledgment of the de-
fense ( June ), there is also an emotionally charged letter by him from
 December , which shows that Blüher later reversed himself and also
left the Bund.Hiller bewailed that the Judas in Blüher destroyed everything
that he considered in him beautiful, great, and even holy, yet he could not
refrain from wooing him: ‘‘Find your way back to me! I cannot come to
you; I am sure of my case and I consider my system good and clear . . .
How unfortunate this break! You have a mind that only a few have; our
movement loses something when it loses you.’’
Hiller’s pathos indicates the homoerotic attractions and jealousies in
matters of politics and philosophy. What interests me here is not so much
the precise psychological mechanism of the triangular (or polygonal) rela-
tion, but resultant arguments and ideologies. In the mentioned long letter
of  April , Blüher criticized Joël for calling Hiller a Literat, and he ac-
cused him of playing up to the bourgeois anti-Semites and right wingers:
‘‘you would undoubtedly turn anti-Semitic against Hiller if you were not
a Jew yourself.’’ Ironically, Blüher came to adopt precisely the attitude he
found so objectionable in Joël: from  onward, Hiller became for him—
together with Maximilian Harden, Siegfried Jacobsohn, Arnold Zweig, and
Kurt Tucholsky—the prototypical Jewish literator. Thewords of , which
keenly try to avoid the charge of anti-Semitism, ominously foreshadow his
later stance: ‘‘My friendship with some of the most important living Jews,
to which I attach the highest value, protects me from the possibility of fall-
ing prey to gross and cheap anti-Semitism. Yet the thinking of some Jew-
ish literati, which occasionally produces some quite useful results, is for
this very reason undeniably inadequate for seizing and animating the heart
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of the species that grew here between the North Sea and the Alps. Very
different spiritual forces are needed for this, which the Jewish literati can-
not muster, in spite of their intense endeavors.’’31 Indeed, the  lecture
on Deutsches Reich, Judentum und Sozialismus distinguished Buber and the
other admired Zionists from secular and assimilationist abstract thinkers
like Freud and Einstein on the one hand, and on the other hand, from
social activists, reformers, socialists, liberals, and progressivists who dedi-
cated themselves to the task of transforming humanity. The last group, to
which Hiller belonged, was to blame for the anti-Semitism and Germany’s
postwar ills. The Jews produced an excess of the Tschandala (a fashionable
term at the time, also used by Thomas Mann and others, for inferior human
beings). These Nietzschean slave mentalities produced a special philoso-
phy of ressentiment, which concealed itself behind the noble ideas of lib-
eralism, progressivism, Enlightenment, belief in science, and rationalism.32
Germans, Blüher warned, had better keep their distance from ideologies
that Jews of this type were trying to force upon them, and he specifically
cautioned against ‘‘the last flowering of the Jewish literati culture, the so
called Activism movement,’’ which carried on its banner these ‘‘insufferable
ideals for making mankind happy,’’ though it was basically only a ‘‘matter
of the ghetto.’’33 It must be added that Hiller never responded venomously
and continued to show warmth and admiration for Blüher even after the
war.
Blüher’s secessio from Landauer seems to have been less violent, although
this impression may simply be due to the absence of extant letters between
Blüher and Landauer from  onward. In their absence we have to rely
on Blüher’s autobiography, which actually devotes more space to Landauer
than to any other figure in Blüher’s adult life.34 Blüher unconditionally ad-
mired Landauer’s serenity, integrity, and spirituality; his Aufruf zum Sozia-
lismus was among the few pieces of socialist theorizing he found palatable.
Although he considered it utopian and politically ineffective—in Blüher’s
eyes anarchist Jews were bound to misunderstand the state35—he admired
its quasi-mysticism, its denial that economics had primacy, and its oppo-
sition to Marxism. Under Landauer’s spell, Blüher even abandoned for a
moment his Nietzschean elitism and turned against the hubris of the intel-
lectuals. In ‘‘Hybris bei den Geistigen,’’ published in the last issue of Der
Aufbruch, he advocated a descent of the spirit into the Volk, a ‘‘socialization
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of the spirit’’ [Sozialisierung des Geistes] by means of male bonding: ‘‘for
the male bond captures and domesticates the hubris of those that are su-
perior; it transmits the spirit downward and brings about an equalization
of castes.’’36 It was Landauer’s translation of Whitman that must have in-
spired this affirmation of aWhitmanian democratic homoeroticism, which
anticipates Thomas Mann’s Von Deutscher Republik.
Blüher’s autobiography shows several traces of Landauer’s homoerotic
spell over Blüher and of Blüher’s jealousy of both male and female rivals.
Thus he tells us that confronted with proponents of the ‘‘final solution’’ he
would point to Landauer’s photo and ask whether his guest would want to
subject this man to Hitler’s methods. Without fail, the handsome, spiritual
face would achieve what nothing else could: the visitor’s ‘‘Arian worldview’’
would begin to crumble.37 Blüher boasts that Landauer always addressed
him when important matters were discussed at Der Aufbruch,38 and he con-
tests that Landauer finally ‘‘rejected’’ him.39 As to Landauer’s wife, the poet-
ess Hedwig Lachmann: she disliked Blüher for his antifeminism and was
such a disturbing presence when the two men discussed matters of the state
that they had to move to Blüher’s place in order to continue in a ‘‘genu-
ine atmosphere of male bonding’’ (–). Landauer wrote to Hedwig, ac-
cording to Blüher, some of the most beautiful German love letters, but once
they were married, he opened an amorous correspondence with another
woman (ff.).
In the next years the relation cooled, in part because Landauer consis-
tently opposed the war, and Blüher came to believe that he wished for Ger-
many’s defeat.40 At their final meeting, in September , Blüher appar-
ently attempted to dissuade Landauer from going to Munich, where things
started to boil, but Landauer saw hope in chaos and left, together with
Buber (–). Their subsequent correspondence () is no longer extant.
Blüher recalls that during his lecture tour in January  he saw Lan-
dauer (with Buber) on the streets of Munich in a fur jacket and high fur
cap; ‘‘he looked like the incarnation of the old Kropotkin’’ whose history
of the French revolution Landauer had translated (). But Blüher now
avoided talking to Landauer. According to his autobiography, he was now
on the side of the racially well-bred officers, Landauer’s future murderers,
whereas Landauer associated with the long-haired and ill-kempt ‘‘riff-raff,’’
‘‘Tschandala-Jews’’ like Erich Mühsam, who was, Blüher adds with a tinge
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of jealousy, Landauer’s Thou-friend (). And yet in those very days, Blü-
her would still recommend Landauer’s Aufruf zum Sozialismus to Thomas
Mann, who duly read it on , , and  February .
Less than three months later, on  May , Landauer was brutally mur-
dered in his jail cell by right-wing officers. We do not know what Blüher’s
immediate reaction was, but the revision of a remark in Secessio judaica in-
dicates the trend of his later attitude. In the original edition of  he still
wrote: ‘‘The murder of Gustav Landauer weighs on Germany’s account of
liabilities. This deed will be a heavier burden to carry than the Versailles
peace treaty.’’41 It is a sad comment on Blüher’s civil courage that in the
third edition, which came out in , just after Hitler came to power, we
read: ‘‘The murder of Gustav Landauer burdens Germany only as much as
the death of Archimedes had burdened Rome.’’
Blüher’s autobiography says nothing about Joël’s expulsion from the
University of Berlin, about Blüher’s defense of him, and about the quarrels
between Blüher, Hiller, and Joël. Joël is mentioned only as one of Blüher’s
less famous Jewish acquaintances, who killed himself in  because he
did not want to endure ‘‘Germany’s disgrace [die Schmach Deutschlands].’’42
But what does ‘‘Germany’s disgrace’’ mean here? In Blüher’s autobiogra-
phy, within his later right-wing and Prussian ideology, ‘‘disgrace’’ consis-
tently refers to Germany’s defeat inWorldWar I, brought about by internal,
mostly Jewish opponents of the war who stabbed the military ‘‘in the back
[Dolchstoß].’’ As we have seen, Blüher had broached this topic already in his
 lecture. Joël’s protest suicidewould thus exonerate him from the charge
that Blüher (and others) leveled against the Jews, namely that they wanted
and furthered Germany’s war defeat: Joël became so to speak a victim of
the Dolchstoß.
But this cenotaph for a German-Jewish martyr is spurious, for he did
not commit suicide: in  he was a student of medicine in Rostock, in the
s a physician working with the children of the Berlin poor, in  he
contributed to the festschrift for Buber’s fiftieth birthday43 and participated
in Benjamin’s experiments with hashish.44 Only on  August  did the
shocked Buber report to Franz Rosenzweig that this ‘‘noblest face of the
German youth movement’’ had died a few days earlier.45
Could Blüher have been ignorant that his erstwhile friend lived another
ten years in the very city where Blüher lived? How did Joël’s suicide slip into
Blüher’s otherwise factually reliable autobiography? Joël’s letter to Buber
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from Rostock, dated  July , may provide a clue. Landauer’s death
deeply depressed him, and he reproached himself for having been disloyal
to the man who was apparently something like a spiritual leader for him. In
Rostock, he felt more isolated than ever; he was disgusted by the students,
who appeared to him ‘‘worse’’ and ‘‘more securely in the saddle’’ than ever.
He was so revolted by the mean and undignified behavior that the Ger-
mans showed in defeat that he seriously entertained the idea of eventually
emigrating.46
It is highly unlikely that Blüher came to know the content of this letter
(which was published only after his death), hence we cannot assume that
he adopted the meaning that Joël attached to ‘‘disgrace.’’ Joël found Lan-
dauer’s murder and the German responses to the defeat disgraceful, whereas
in Blüher’s autobiography, disgrace refers to the allegedly Jewish sabotage of
Germany’s war effort. In short, Blüher consciously or unconsciously ‘‘kills
off ’’ the Joël who persisted in the oppositional position he assumed during
the war, preserving only the transfigured image of a German patriot.
Ironically, Blüher treated the most outspoken hawk among his Jewish
friends, the one that Landauer called Kriegsbuber (something like ‘‘war boy
Buber’’), most ignobly. It seems that neither Buber’s move to southern Ger-
many in , nor the publication of Secessio judaica, nor even Blüher’s later
anti-Semitic publications brought to an end the relationship. Indeed, Buber
reports in a conversation with Werner Kraft on  May  that once in
the twenties he saved Blüher, upon the latter’s own request, from suicide.47
Did Blüher displace his own, never-mentioned suicide with Joël’s never-
occurred one? Be it as it may, Blüher’s heavily anti-Semitic Die Erhebung
Israels gegen die christlichen Güter (), ‘‘finished off ’’ Buber differently.
The crucial passage occurs in an appendix to a remark in the text that lib-
eral and enlightened Christians follow Buber and their ilk in criticizing the
Christian notion of grace. Buber is thus one of those who ‘‘corrupt’’ Chris-
tianity and Germany. The appendix purportedly intends to rectify Buber’s
image, for ‘‘it is actually inadmissible to attack such an important and thor-
oughly pure man as Martin Buber on the basis of a passage in a letter, and to
suppress the rest.’’48 Yet the introductory critique of Völkisch anti-Semitism
quickly switches to a defamatory attack on Buber: ‘‘It goes without saying
that Martin Buber, together with Gustav Landauer and other, less happy
manifestations of Jewdom, had supported those circles that later paralyzed
the resistance of our nation against the enemy and forced it to capitulate.
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What else could he have done as a Jew, especially once the Balfour Declara-
tion about Palestine existed?’’ (). The accusation that he (and the Jews
in general) was against Germany’s war efforts and among those that forced
it to capitulate deeply hurt Buber. On  February , just two weeks after
Hitler came to power, he reported to Ernst Simon that nothing happened to
him as yet, but in viewof what ‘‘nationalistic literati like Hans Blüher’’ wrote
about his alleged attitude during the war, he was prepared for the worst. He
added, with precise reference to the just quoted passage, ‘‘although it is un-
true, I did, of course, not dispute it.’’49 By an irony of fate, the Nazis found
Blüher’s disdain for Völkisch and ‘‘vulgar’’ anti-Semitism unpalatable. His
publications were taken out of circulation, and for the next twelve years he
worked on a philosophical treatise, Die Achse der Natur,50 that he consid-
ered his magnum opus. After the war he unsuccessfully solicited the help
of Thomas Mann and other luminaries to get it published and finally had
to be content with a minor publisher. Neither Die Achse der Natur nor the
Werke und Tage became the success he hoped for. Blüher became a relic of
the past.

Buber escaped to Israel in  and got a chance to demand a rectifi-
cation from Blüher after the war, when the tables had turned. He did not
respond to the complementary copy of Die Achse der Natur, but when Blü-
her congratulated him on his seventy-fifth birthday in ,51 he copied into
his response the twenty-year-old annotations from his copy ofDie Erhebung
Israels (preserved in the Buber Archives at the University of Jerusalem),
contesting Blüher’s allegations line by line (:–). Blüher was taken
aback, remained silent for a year, and then, in a long, undated letter, he
complained that Buber unjustly accused him of having been a Nazi and a
vulgar anti-Semite (:–).52 Buber wisely responded on  April :
‘‘No, Hans Blüher, I have never regarded you as a ‘vulgar’ anti-Semite. But,
since you apparently have not noticed it yourself, I thought I ought to make
you aware that what you have said publicly on the matter in highly criti-
cal times and in a highly erroneous manner has factually furthered the
case of the most vulgar form of anti-Semitism’’ (:). Blüher’s response,
dated  December , is a both moving and psychologically complex at-
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tempt to satisfy Blüher’s need to set things in order before Christmas and
his approaching death. The renewed relationship was to be based on an
intellectual-spiritual bonding on the margins of and in opposition to poli-
tics: upon hearing that Buber was under severe attacks in Israel because of
his dovish attitude with respect to the Arabs, Blüher declared that he trea-
sured the relationship (he did not dare calling it friendship) with Buber
infinitely more than those with Heuss (at that time the president of Ger-
many) or any other CDU (Christlich-Demokratische Union) leader [sic]:
‘‘my relation to you is important, those to others are not’’ (:). There is,
of course, a bit of the braggadocio in the belittling of the contacts with Ger-
man political celebrities, which was to show that Blüher still had important
connections (‘‘I have friends high up but I love you most’’), yet Blüher’s
final wooing was surely genuine, for it was coupled to the painful admission
that he used to believe ‘‘a bit’’ in race (:).
The author of Ich und Du responded on  January  with words di-
rected as much at us as at Blüher:
I cannot reject an initiative like yours, especially because I never felt ani-
mosity towards you; I welcome your proposal to reestablish our contacts.
. . . What ‘‘broader circles’’ most blame me for is: first that I have stood
since  for a cooperation with the Arabs (until  in the form of a
binational state and since Israel’s victory over the seven aggressor states
in the form of a mid-Eastern federation of people) and have been at the
spearhead of actions leading in this direction. Secondly (as you surely
know frommy frequently reprinted  speech in the Pauluskirche) that
I have been and will be hardly less emphatically against the confound-
ing of the German people with the murderous bands of the gas-chamber
organization. . . . Generalization seems to me the primary injustice . . .
not only with respect to the fictions of ‘‘race’’ but also against the realities
of people. (:–)
Epilogue
The wisdom of Buber’s last quoted letter may have reached Blüher too
late, for he died on  February . Its message to us is so obvious and
relevant that commentaries could only trivialize it. Indeed, I shall resist the
temptation of leading my story to a grand moral conclusion. The story,
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pieced together from personal and historical events, could, of course, be
concluded with yet other dates (?, ?, ?, ?), but as a token
of friendship I prefer keeping it open. Like friendships, which come about
serendipitously and remain fragile, my constructed story is tentative. I had
no clear strategy when I set out to trace history from the moment of writ-
ing to some turbulent years earlier this century. Looking back at my own
rather lengthy process of writing, I recognize in the unplanned process a
resistance to certainties and conclusions. Though I have entertained a few
hypotheses, I have no grand psychological or sociological thesis concerning
Blüher’s friendship with Jews. But my shuttling backward and forward in
time expresses, perhaps, an unpremeditated wish to understand what hap-
pened not as inevitable but contingent, not as fateful but unfortunate, and
above all, not as a matter of blood.
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 Women’s Comedy and Its
Intellectual Fathers: Marx as
the Answer to Freud
 
At a time when socialism has all but vanished from the global stage,
it remains instructive to study its representation on the dramatic stage,
since the practice of socialism and its ideological underpinnings in Marxist
theory have been enormously influential for the theater of the past century.
Perhaps foremost in this heritage is Bertolt Brecht, whose epic theater is
avowedly indebted to the dramatist’s training in Marxist theory and whose
own impact on twentieth-century drama has been profound.
Among some of the more interesting heirs of Brechtian theory and prac-
tice are contemporary women playwrights whose work integrates this in-
fluence with feminist and psychoanalytic thought that might at first glance
seem unsuited to such a linkage. Possibly even more surprising is the blend-
ing of these heterogeneous ideologies within the comic mode.
I would like to exemplify the effectiveness of such an innovative combi-
nation of intellectual and cultural influences through a comparison of the
comic dramas Cloud Nine (premiered ) by the British playwright Caryl
Churchill (b. ) andGeorge Sand (premiered ) by the German writer
Ginka Steinwachs (b. ). My analysis will illuminate the ways in which
the two writers employ antirealist techniques in order to call critical atten-
tion to the sexual, economic, and social practices that have been buttressed
by the aesthetics of realist theater in the West.
Although psychoanalytic theory is an important influence on both Chur-
chill and Steinwachs, these plays contain a strong indictment of Freud’s
views on female sexuality and femininity. To put it simply and to announce
my argument in advance, for both writers the answer to Freud is Marx: in
place of Freud’s thought, which rests on a hierarchy of gender as equated
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with sex, they advocate pluralism in terms of gender and sex, and egalitari-
anism in terms of class and race. Although Marx’s writings do not focus on
matters of sex, gender, and aesthetics, for Churchill and Steinwachs the eco-
nomic egalitarianism he advocates goes hand in hand with sexual and aes-
thetic pluralism. In other words, although the debt of the two playwrights
to their intellectual fathers is considerable, as I will show, the one father—
Freud—is largely rejected while the other—Marx—is embraced.
Like so much drama, Churchill’s Cloud Nine focuses on a family and on
the complexities of the relationships between its members. We watch as the
family father Clive carries on with a Mrs. Saunders behind the back of his
wife Betty, who, while on the surface is extremely conventional and sub-
servient to her husband, falls for his friend, the explorer Harry Bagley. The
young children of Clive and Betty, Victoria and Edward, are cared for by a
governess called Ellen.
But this is no typical British family, and no typical play. The first act is
set in a British colony in Africa during the Victorian era, the second act
in London in the present, although the characters have aged only twenty-
five years. Even more striking is Churchill’s use of cross-casting: in Act I,
Betty is played by a man and the family’s black servant Joshua by a white
man, in each case embodying the figures who shape their behavior and self-
image; the nine-year-old Edward is played by a woman (as Churchill writes,
‘‘within the English tradition of women playing boys,’’1 but he is also a bud-
ding homosexual); and the two-year-old Victoria is played by a dummy,
reflecting the way she, as a young girl, is being raised. In the second act, all
characters are played by actors of their own sex except Cathy, the daughter
of Victoria’s friend Lin, in a move that according to Churchill simply repre-
sents a reversal of Edward’s earlier casting, although further reason could
be found in her fondness for violence and weapons. Although considered
radical and daring at the time of its premiere in , Churchill’s Cloud Nine
has during the past twenty years become firmly situated in the canon of
twentieth-century theater, if not canonized; Susan Carlson calls it ‘‘one of
the most widely known comedies by a contemporary British woman.’’2
One character who is decidedly not cross-cast, but rather completely at
home in his natural identity, is Clive. As one whose job is to look after Her
Majesty’s domains, he functions as a virtual personification of the British
colonial presence in Africa. His representative function is made clear in his
exhortation to his son Edward: ‘‘Through our father we love our Queen and
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our God, Edward. Do you understand? It is something men understand’’
(CN, I:). At the outset of the play, with the Union Jack flying high, Clive
and his family sing a song of praise to QueenVictoria, the large empire over
which she rules, and the forces of war that keep it safe. For Clive, British
imperialism is a ‘‘high ideal’’ (CN, II:). Yet Clive is cruelly domineering
and patronizing to blacks and women alike.
Clive’s similar treatment of blacks and women intimates a parallel be-
tween colonialism and male-female relations in the Victorian era. This par-
allel becomes explicit when we compare remarks he makes to his mistress
Caroline Saunders and his wife Betty with statements made to his friend
Harry Bagley, the explorer. Clive tells Caroline Saunders, ‘‘You are dark like
this continent’’ (CN, I:), and exclaims to his wife Betty that ‘‘Women can
be treacherous and evil. They are darker and more dangerous than men’’
and that ‘‘We must resist this dark female lust, Betty, or it will swallow us
up’’ (CN, I:–); talking to Harry Bagley, he refers to the ‘‘natives,’’ whom
he also calls ‘‘savages’’ (CN, I:), as his enemy: ‘‘there is something danger-
ous. Implacable. This whole continent is my enemy. I am pitching my whole
mind and will and reason and spirit against it to tame it, and I sometimes
feel it will break over me and swallow me up’’ (CN, I:–).
There is no mistaking the comic effect that lines like these are intended
to produce in contemporary audiences. Yet the parallel Clive’s discourse
draws between the murky, untamed dangers of female sexuality and the
dark, primitive hostility of the colonized blacks in Africa, both threatening
to ‘‘swallow him up,’’ can scarcely help but evoke the infamous metaphor
conceived by an actual Victorian personage, Sigmund Freud: ‘‘the sexual
life of adult women is a ‘dark continent’ for psychology’’ (with the phrase
‘‘dark continent’’ left in English in the German original).3 Sander Gilman
describes this expression as a ‘‘phrase with which [Freud] tied female sexu-
ality to the image of contemporary colonialism and thus to the exoticism
and pathology of the Other.’’4
Because the allusion to Freudian thinking is so unmistakable, the sexual,
economic, and racial imperialism under attack in Cloud Nine can be illu-
minated by a capsule rehearsal of Freud’s views on femininity and female
sexuality. Prominent among the characteristics he associates with women
is dependence, in particular on their fathers: ‘‘the number of women who
remain till a late age tenderly dependent on a paternal object, or indeed
on their real father, is very great.’’5 (The analogy to the British colonizer,
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paternalistically assuming the white man’s burden vis-à-vis the childlike,
benighted natives, is not difficult to recognize.) Similarly, Freud dissoci-
ates women from the sphere of work and civilization, since he views them
as intellectually inferior due to ‘‘the inhibition of thought necessitated by
sexual suppression’’;6 rather, ‘‘Women represent the interests of the family
and of sexual life. The work of civilization has become increasingly the
business of men, it confronts them with ever more difficult tasks and com-
pels them to carry out instinctual sublimations of which women are little
capable.’’7
Also notable in Freud’s conception of femininity are women’s paltry
sense of justice and their secretiveness and insincerity.8 Interestingly, he
associates women with both narcissism and masochism; for him the narcis-
sistic woman is ‘‘the type of female most frequently met with, which is prob-
ably the purest and truest one’’—and yet: ‘‘The suppression of women’s ag-
gressiveness which is prescribed for them constitutionally and imposed on
them socially favours the development of powerful masochistic impulses,
which succeed, as we know, in binding erotically the destructive trends
which have been diverted inwards.’’9
Woman, according to Freud, is truly a multifaceted being. Little won-
der, then, that she is more prone to hysteria (psychosomatic illness), the
condition that plagued so many of Freud’s earliest Jewish female patients
in Vienna, whose maladies have been preserved in the Studies on Hyste-
ria written by himself and his colleague Josef Breuer (vol. II of SE). And
given the picture he paints of femininity, little wonder that he assumes that
women long to be men—the feeling that has famously come to be known
as ‘‘penis envy’’: ‘‘The wish to get the longed-for penis eventually in spite
of everything may contribute to the motives that drive a mature woman to
analysis, and what she may reasonably expect from analysis—a capacity, for
instance, to carry on an intellectual profession—may often be recognized
as a sublimated modification of this repressed wish.’’10
What all this comes down to is that Freud, as he repeats from his earliest
writings on the subject to his last—from his statement in Three Essays on
the Theory of Sexuality () that the erotic life of women is ‘‘still veiled in
an impenetrable obscurity’’ to his characterization of the nature of femi-
ninity as a ‘‘riddle’’ in ‘‘Femininity’’ ()11—is baffled by women. In the
latter essay, which is the written version of an undelivered lecture, he con-
tinues addressing his imagined audience as follows: ‘‘Nor will you have es-
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caped worrying over this problem—those of you who are men; to those of
you who are women this will not apply—you are yourselves the problem’’
(). One of Freud’s most frequently quoted statements is his description
to Marie Bonaparte of ‘‘the great question that has never been answered
and which I have not yet been able to answer, despite my thirty years of
research into the feminine soul’’: ‘‘What does a woman want? [Was will das
Weib?].’’12
In short, women are as darkly impenetrable to Freud as the native in-
habitants of Africa are to Churchill’s Clive. But what is clear about patri-
archy and imperialism is the bipolar nature of their ideology: they are both
based on clear-cut, hierarchical differences—between white and black, male
and female, normal and abnormal, powerful and weak, wealthy and im-
poverished. By contrast, what Churchill advocates instead is an egalitarian
pluralism, a multiplicity of views and ways of being in the world.
This position is perhaps most evident in the sphere of sexuality.Whereas
Clive’s attitude toward homosexuality is clear from his reaction to Harry’s
sexual overture to him—‘‘The most revolting perversion. Rome fell, Harry,
and this sin can destroy an empire’’ (CN, I:), other characters embrace a
homosexual or bisexual way of life. In the second act, Victoria’s friend Lin,
a divorced single mother, persuades Victoria, who is married with a young
son, to enter into a sexual relationship with her, and Edward has a boy-
friend called Gerry. When Victoria and Edward have difficulties with their
respective partners, they both move in with Lin. The play’s most graphic
expression of pluralistic sexuality is put into the mouth of Edward, who,
lamenting that he is sick of men, says, ‘‘I think I’m a lesbian’’ (CN, II:);13
he later reveals that he sleeps in the same bed as his sister and her lover Lin.
In Cloud Nine, no one form of sexuality—heterosexuality, homosexuality,
or bisexuality—is placed above the others as the norm; no one form has
hegemony; all can coexist. Indeed, pluralistic sexuality provides the key to
the meaning of the play’s title. The song ‘‘Cloud Nine,’’ sung in Act II dur-
ing a scene between Gerry and the Edward character from Act I, includes
the following stanzas:
Smoked some dope on the playground swings
Higher and higher on true love’s wings
He said Be mine and you’re on Cloud .
Twentyfive years on the same Cloud .
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Who did she meet on her first blind date?
The guys were no surprise but the lady was great
They were women in love, they were on Cloud .
(CN, II:–)
The title metaphor hence contains associations with transgression—such as
drugs and homosexuality—yet Churchill encourages us to look carefully at
the social code that regards these activities as transgressions.
The larger ramifications of the play’s statements about sexuality are
made explicit by Victoria, who tells Lin, ‘‘You can’t separate fucking and
economics’’ (CN, II:). The linkage between sexual and economic exploi-
tation reprises the theme of colonialism that dominates Act I, where the
institutions of imperialism and conventional familial and sexual constella-
tions are simultaneously undermined through their connection by Harry
Bagley, celebrating ‘‘the empire—the family—the married state to which
I have always aspired’’ (CN, I:), since by this point the audience knows
that he is a sexually voracious homosexual and pederast. The survival of
imperialism in the present and its often disastrous repercussions continue
to be critiqued in Act II, in the news that Lin’s brother has been killed in
the army in Belfast and the recurring nightmares she has as a result.
More broadly, Churchill’s attention to economic oppression reflects the
influence of Marxism on her intellectual formation. Her conception of an
ideal society—‘‘decentralized, nonauthoritarian, communist, nonsexist’’—
reflects the typical characterization of her as a ‘‘socialist-feminist intellec-
tual.’’14 The Joint Stock Theatre Group, the collective with which Churchill
worked between  and its closing in  and which produced Cloud
Nine, was socialist in orientation. Given its source, Clive’s lament at the end
of the play that Africa is presumably to be communist can be read as a
statement in support of that doctrine. Yet the ideology that the play ulti-
mately seems to advocate is less one of doctrinaire Marxism than of simple
egalitarianism, free from binary power relationships between oppressor and
oppressed, exploiter and exploited. The best exemplification of this ideol-
ogy is found in the domestic situation featured in Act II, in which Lin and
Victoria work and Edward stays home with their children, an arrangement
that breaks with conventional, hierarchical gender and sex roles and that
manages to provide for all of them.
So what do these ideological issues have to do with comedy? In fact,
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Cloud Nine abounds in comedy, both verbal humor and comic situations.
Much of the humor stems from the dramatic irony created by the gap be-
tween the actual status of the actors, visible to the audience, and the roles
they are assigned by other characters. For example, early in the play Clive
announces, ‘‘My son is young. I’m doing all I can / To teach him to grow
up to be a man,’’ to which Edward—who we recall is played by a woman—
responds, ‘‘What father wants I’d dearly like to be. / I find it rather hard as
you can see’’ (CN, I:); the humor is of course magnified by the incongruous
use of rhyming couplets in iambic pentameter. Somewhat in the same vein
of sex-gender slippage, when Clive, Harry, and Edward play catch, Edward
misses the ball, thus demonstrating the lack of athletic ability that he asso-
ciates with the female characters. When Clive and Betty talk to their young
daughter Victoria (played by a dummy) and she does not respond, Clive
observes, ‘‘Not very chatty tonight are we?’’ (CN, I:). Later Betty remarks
that ‘‘Victoria was a pretty child just like a little doll—’’ (CN, II:). Hu-
mor is also created by an incongruity between characters’ expectations of
other characters and the actual language or behavior of those characters,
as when the governess Ellen tells her employer Betty that she does not like
children (CN, I:). The exaggerated nature of the amorous language Ellen
uses in trying to seduce Betty is rendered all the more grotesque by Ellen’s
marriage to Harry Bagley.
This wedding between a male homosexual and a lesbian, the event with
which the first act closes, functions as an ironic inversion of one of the most
stalwart conventions of comic drama, an inversion magnified by the indica-
tion in the stage directions that Joshua raises his gun to shoot Clive while he
is making a toast to the happy couple. This thwarting of comic convention
links Churchill to other women writers of comedy, particularly in recent
decades. Work is increasingly being done on the ways in which women,
who for so long participated in comic drama mainly as the object of men’s
humor, adapt the comic mode to their purposes today.
To indicate just a few traits viewed as characteristic of women’s comedy,
process comes to take precedence over resolution so that the ‘‘happy end-
ing’’ is deemphasized (indeed, since the end of a comic drama in the male
tradition has so frequently been marriage, a resolution that often meant the
end of a woman’s autonomy, from the female perspective this ending was
not necessarily a happy one). The pluralism and multiplicity of vision that I
have been discussing in thematic terms with regard to Churchill are evident
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formally as well; comedy by women often eschews linearity and conven-
tional laws of time and space in favor of simultaneity and heterogeneity.15
Churchill’s break with these laws in Cloud Nine has been mentioned—the
fact that Act I is set in a British colony in Africa during Victorian times and
Act II in London in , while the characters have aged only twenty-five
years. Similarly, the play’s conclusion stands in clear contrast to the con-
ventional comic ending: in lieu of a wedding, the Betty character of Act I
embraces the Betty of Act II, symbolizing the fact that Betty, who has left
Clive, gotten a job, and found a place of her own, has finally come to accept
who she is.
To an even greater degree than Churchill’s Cloud Nine, Ginka Stein-
wachs’s play George Sand represents a pluralistic, twentieth-century re-
sponse to a hierarchical, nineteenth-century conception of gender, sexu-
ality, and the social structures that support them. In the play, a series of
scenes depict the adventures of the historical Sand—writer, feminist, revo-
lutionary, lover of many famousmen and women, and explorer who crossed
the Alps alone and on foot—from the early s until , paying special
attention to her husband, her lovers, her children, her divorce trial, her role
in the Revolution of , and her death. This summary, however, makes
the play sound like a nineteenth-century realist novel, and it is anything
but that. It could best be described as a happening or a comic extrava-
ganza, roaming freely through time and space, moving without clear tran-
sitions from nineteenth-century Paris to Majorca, Venice, and the banks of
the Nile; and interweaving dream, hallucination, and reality. Nevertheless
the objects of Steinwachs’s critique are recognizable, and even more vividly
than in Cloud Nine, Marxist inspiration colors comic vision.
In economic terms, the primary target of Steinwachs’s attack is not im-
perialism, as in Cloud Nine, but the commodification of art and the artist.
George, eavesdropping on the art scene in Paris, describes it as ‘‘the hubbub
of literature on the stock exchange of the art market . . . where value and
lack of value are represented as currency.’’16 Even this most down-to-earth
setting betrays Steinwachs’s fondness for surrealism (she wrote her disserta-
tion at the École Normale in Paris on André Breton): predatory crocodiles
infest the literary marketplace as the Seine becomes the Nile. The most per-
vasive symbol in the play for the relationship between art and commerce is
the Nineteenth-Century Opera Express of Art, a train engineered by Gus-
tave Flaubert and stoked by Honoré de Balzac; as Katrin Sieg points out,
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‘‘The image of the literary machine as a train is a visual pun on the word
Kohle as ‘coals’ and ‘money.’ ’’17 Stendhal and Victor Hugo are passengers
on the train, as is George Sand.
As a woman artist, Sand is doubly commodified. The status of women
as commodities is noted by Marx in Capital:
It is plain that commodities cannot go to market and make exchanges
of their own account. We must, therefore, have recourse to their guard-
ians, who are also their owners. Commodities are things, and therefore
without power of resistance against man. If they are wanting in docility
he can use force; in other words, he can take possession of them.
In the th century, so renowned for its piety, they included amongst
commodities some very delicate things. Thus a French poet of the period
enumerates amongst the goods to be found in the market of Landit,
not only clothing, shoes, leather, agricultural implements, &c., but also
‘‘femmes folles de leur corps’’ [wanton women].18
The introduction of Marxist thought is not inappropriate, since Steinwachs,
like Churchill, studied Marxism. As we will see, much in George Sand re-
flects this training.
The answer of Steinwachs’s Sand, as of the actual Sand, to her double
commodification—as both artist and woman—is to adopt male dress and
habits. Her notorious male attire and the cigars she smokes are not in-
tended merely to be provocative but to help her win some of the rights
and freedoms that men in her society enjoy. Sand’s trousers function as
a crucial symbol in Steinwachs’s play. When George rides her horse into
the men’s shop to request a pair of pants, the salesmen assume that they
are for her husband. When she clarifies her wish, the manager responds,
‘‘we don’t make trousers for women . . . we now live in a world which has
been perfectly tailored to the needs of men, whose privileges no one can
touch’’ (GS, II:). Sand’s response is to crack her riding crop and ex-
claim, ‘‘    , I require them immediately—’’ (GS, II:), a
quotation from Gotthold E. Lessing’s ‘‘Seventeenth Letter Concerning the
Newest Literature’’ of  February , his famous polemic against the early
eighteenth-century German theater critic Johann C. Gottsched for advo-
cating the wholesale and, in Lessing’s opinion, unimaginative imitation of
French dramatic models. Just as Lessing distinguishes himself from the criti-
cal consensus of his day by standing up to the authority of Gottsched, so
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does Sand’s challenge to male privilege set her apart from her peers. Given
its incongruity in this context, however, the quotation from Lessing seems
intended above all as an attack on rules and regulations in general, whether
aesthetic conventions or gender barriers.
Steinwachs ironically highlights George’s titanic status by evoking a par-
allel to the life of the greatest hero in German neoclassical drama: as she
gallops through Paris following the scene in the shop, she proclaims, ‘‘here
is where I want to live, become a human being’’ (GS, II:), echoing the
famous lines spoken by Goethe’s Faust as he walks among the townspeople
on Easter day after overcoming a period of suicidal depression, ‘‘I’m human
here, here I can be!’’19
George’s offer of ‘‘my horse for a pair of pants’’ (GS, II: and pas-
sim) makes explicit the relationship between gender and material worth to
which Steinwachs is calling attention; as George declares, ‘‘George Sand . . .
proudly presents the fashion of women’s trousers on economic grounds’’
(GS, II:). Her masculine attire symbolizes her ‘‘completely insidious
hope’’ to be able to live by means of her own writing (GS, II:) (as the
historical Sand largely succeeded in doing). As we later learn, her pose is
at least partially successful: she trades regularly at the men’s shop and is a
female member of the Jockey Club.
In the scene ‘‘G(e)orge of Fontainebleau,’’ George’s trousers become a
graphic symbol of her ability to negotiate between different worlds. As she
is poised spread-eagled over a gorge, the stage directions specify that her
right leg represents the institution of marriage, the church, the military, and
the fatherland, while her left leg represents free love, anarchy, debauchery,
and excess; her left leg is associated with her lover Jules Sandeau, a jour-
nalist who calls her a woman in motion, whereas her right leg is associated
with her husband the baron, who insists that she is a woman of standing.
In fact she is both these things, as the play’s subtitle indicates—‘‘A Woman
in Motion, the Woman of Standing’’—and in this scene George not only
alternates between balancing herself on one leg and then the other, but
decides that she will divide the year between time spent writing with San-
deau and time spent with her family. This quality of fluidity, of negotiation
across categories of gender, sexual mores, and professions, links the charac-
ter George Sand to her creator; as MonaWinter writes, ‘‘[Ginka Steinwachs]
explores her anatomy and invents limits that do not limit.’’20
George’s alternation between the two ‘‘legs’’ of liberal and conservative
’  : 
values, facilitated by the trousers she wears, or her adoption of a masculine
pose, can be read as emblematic of the dialectical vision that informs much
of the play. I have mentioned Steinwachs’s Marxist training, and her dia-
lectical vision in George Sand can be illuminated through reference to his
work.
Marx’s concept of the dialectic is indebted to the thought of Hegel.
Marx critiques much in Hegel’s philosophy, insofar as Hegel is an idealist
and views the family and civil society as products of the idea of the state,
whereas Marx, a materialist, sees these institutions as concrete realities and
as the initiators of the state.21 Similarly, in the afterword to the second Ger-
man edition of Capital, Marx writes of the need to ‘‘discover the rational
kernel within the the mystical shell’’ of Hegelian dialectic (vol.  of Col-
lected Works, ). Yet Marx recognizes that Hegel was the first to present the
‘‘general form of working [of the dialectic] in a comprehensive and con-
scious manner’’ (), andmuch inMarx’s conception of the dialectic reflects
Hegel’s influence.
With regard to Steinwachs’s play, the fact that George Sand does not
rest on either of her ‘‘legs’’ exclusively, but rather adapts facets of the ways
of life represented by both is analogous to the process of sublation [Auf-
hebung] in the Hegelian-Marxist dialectic; although dialectical categories
typically represent polar opposites, often reflecting laws of nature or of hu-
man beings, there exists a unity in the conflict between the two such that
negating the second term leads to a new, synthetic entity that contains fea-
tures of both opposites. For Marx, the notion of the dialectic is useful in
talking about the contradictions of capitalism, the oppositions and con-
flicting forces that make up capitalism and its modes of production. With
reference to the economically driven progress of history, in Marxist theory
the dialectical tensions within capitalism and between capitalism and so-
cialism would lead, in Marx’s expectation, to the eventual triumph of the
latter. Ira Gollobin offers a useful summary of the function of dialectical
categories for Marx:
In Capital, the dialectical categories are like guideposts, spokes that in a
variety of ways helped guide Marx from the periphery of reality toward
its hub, the innermost features: for example, in differentiating objective
reality from subjective fancy and basing himself on an objective approach;
in finding that commodities—seemingly simple and well-understood
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entities—had a hidden essence behind their appearance; in tracing the
forms of exchange from barter to the use of money as a universal equiva-
lent and the content of each form; in delineating the production of abso-
lute and of relative surplus-value; in ferreting out, in the welter of seem-
ingly purely fortuitous economic occurrences, those that are contingent
and those that are necessary; in determining the particular and the gen-
eral in various economic relations.22
Not only does George Sand embrace a dialectical vision, its rhetoric
points up the critique of the class system—a central element of Marxist
thought—that helped inspire the revolution of  in which the actual
Sand took part and of which the Sand of Steinwachs is characterized as
the ‘‘ ’’ (GS, XI:): ‘‘     
       
         
-  - . -
  .  .  
     . . .    -
    —     
 ’’ (GS, XI:).
Steinwachs’s portrayal of this revolution as propelled by ideas that were
increasingly coming to be associated with Marx is intensified by the fact
that the text describes the revolution of  as preparation for the Paris
Commune of – and the October Revolution in Russia. Likewise in the
political arena, the dialectical vision attributed to Sand is split between her
children: her daughter Solange, true heir to her father, speaks in favor of the
need for military might to protect the interests of the proprietors’ class and
refers to the people as ‘‘,’’ whereas George’s son Maurice supports
the proletariat and talks of a ‘‘     ’’
(GS, XI:).
As in Churchill’s Cloud Nine, the pluralistic nature of Steinwachs’s vision
is expressed on a sexual level as well. Neither heterosexuality nor homo-
sexuality nor bisexuality is advocated as the ‘‘proper’’ way to live; in the
play’s view each sexual orientation has a right to exist, and they coexist side
by side. This position is manifested most extensively in the title character,
who, like her historical model, counts not only Sandeau, Alfred de Musset,
Frederic Chopin, the sculptor Alexandre Manceau, and other men among
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her lovers, but also Marie Dorval, an actress at the Comédie Française. An
indirect, playful reference to Sand’s bisexuality can be read in the refer-
ence in the scene of the divorce trial to ‘‘ -- 
   [sic]  ’’ (GS, X:).23 As
in Cloud Nine, sexual transgressiveness is linked here with other illicit plea-
sures; in the erotic scene between George and Marie, the two smoke mari-
juana onstage, appropriately enough, at a table with a statue of Baudelaire
and the inscription ‘‘ ’’ (GS, IV:).
As the stage directions tell us, the women’s resulting state of intoxica-
tion ‘‘stimulates a production of the oral theater’’; Marie later refers to the
‘‘palatetheater of the mouth’’ (GS, IV:, ). These important concepts
in Steinwachs’s aesthetic are elucidated by her brief essay ‘‘The Theater as
Oral Institution’’ (), which includes the following passage:
The theater as oral institution is oral. Orality in the Freud-Lacanian
theory of the libidinal stages denotes a regression to the first and lowest
of three (among which there are two higher) stages. All progress is re-
gressive. . . . That indirectly attests progressivity to the theatoral theater.
An oasis in the desert, Id capital I italic d, liquifidates a l(M)anguage
as dessiccated [sic] as frozen assets. Articulatory relishing of words. In
every instance, wallowing precedes swallowing. Babblebanquets, speech-
feasts. (Translated and quoted by Sieg, )
Steinwachs’s oral theater exploits multiple possibilites of the mouth—as
the organ that transmits verbal language; as a polyfunctional sexual organ,
capable of experiencing erotic pleasure of numerous kinds with both sexes;
and as the agent of culinary and intoxicative pleasure.
Her aesthetic can be seen as an extension of Brecht’s notion of ‘‘culinary
theater,’’ a term that he used for the most part pejoratively: he endeavored
to create theater that would not simply be enjoyed and consumed by audi-
ences, but that would be received intellectually and provoke critical thought
that would ideally lead to social reform. Steinwachs has a similar intention,
but views oral pleasure—of multiple kinds—as a means of achieving it.
In the short production of the oral theater within Steinwachs’s play, the
realms of sexual and aesthetic pleasure merge in the dialogue of the drug-
intoxicated George and Marie, as the denotative meaning of language is
subordinated to the sensual sounds and suggestive power of words. The
overall effect, as with George’s negotiation between two genders and two
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sexual orientations, is one of fluidity and simultaneity in which contradic-
tions can coexist, one in which boundaries—whether established by social
convention or by rational, lucid thought—are erased.
Steinwachs’s concept of theater as an oral institution is clearly meant
as part of her critique of the aesthetic doctrines of German classical the-
ater, most overtly, of Schiller’s  essay ‘‘The Stage Considered as a Moral
Institution [Die Schaubühne als eine moralische Anstalt betrachtet].’’ For
Steinwachs, Schiller’s sense of the theater’s primary function as didactic
robs it of its potential to give pleasure. As the passage cited above indi-
cates, Steinwachs’s oral theater instead invokes another German-language
thinker, Freud, whose ‘‘Three Essays on theTheory of Sexuality’’ () pos-
tulate three phases of development in infantile sexuality, the oral, anal, and
phallic stages, each referring to the part of the body on which the infant’s
erotic interest is focused. Steinwachs’s indebtedness to the Freudian belief
that oral pleasure is primal is reflected also in her essay ‘‘The Palatetheater
of the Mouth’’ (), in which she writes, ‘‘In talking of body language . . .
it is sometimes forgotten that the language of the mouth or mouth language
is n o t m e r e l y a n o t h e r, but rather the first of all gestural lan-
guages, p r e c e d i n g t h o s e o f h a n d a n d f o o t, o f u p p e r
b o d y a n d l o w e r b o d y.’’24 The influence of Freud on Steinwachs
is evident as well in her published dissertation,Mythologie des Surrealismus
oder die Rückverwandlung von Kultur in Natur (), one chapter of which
uses Freud’s theories of dream interpretation to elucidate Breton’s concept
of automatic writing.
When it comes to adult female sexuality, however, Steinwachs, like Chur-
chill, distances herself from Freudian thought. The play’s pluralistic atti-
tude toward gender and sexual orientation, manifested above all in George’s
alternation between feminine andmasculine roles and between heterosexu-
alty and homosexuality, flies in the face of Freudian views on these matters.
As we have seen, Freud’s views are resolutely hierarchical, defining gen-
der according to biological sex (men are to behave in a ‘‘masculine’’ fash-
ion, women in a ‘‘feminine’’ fashion) and positing the male as the norm
and the female as the deviation from it. Further overt jabs at Freudian
conceptions of human sexuality include the stage directions to the first
scene, a dream scenario, ‘‘    
-  :     ’’ (GS,
I:)—in view of the play’s portrayal of lesbian sexuality, surely an ironic
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observation. In like manner, the language of an attorney at George’s di-
vorce trial can be read as a virtual parody of Freudian thinking on sexu-
ality and gender roles, which can be seen to represent the views of most
of his contemporaries in nineteenth-century Europe: ‘‘  
   ,     , are
and will always be an abomination to us, the   of the
 of    in the . long live the
. long live the . down with the mannish women. fear our
malice. genital supremacy’’ (GS,X:–). George’s response to this tirade
constitutes a further attack on Freudian views, ‘‘down with the  
 , with the male-dominated imagination of the cunt’’ (GS,
X:).
The aesthetic pluralism reflected in Steinwachs’s concept of theater as
oral institution is evident in virtually every facet of the style of George Sand.
Although Churchill breaks with laws of logical temporality in the transi-
tion from the first act of Cloud Nine to the second, in moving from Victo-
rian times to  while retaining the same characters, yet presenting them
as only twenty-five years older, she maintains temporal consistency within
each act. By contrast, much of George Sand jumps around freely between
time periods and levels of reality.While most of the play is set in nineteenth-
century France, references to contemporary European and American cul-
ture are interwoven into the text. Allusions to radical politics, such as the
activity of the Black Panthers, are found along with references to icons of
popular culture like MGM; both high literature—for example, the German
author Botho Strauss—and popular literature—Bonjour Tristesse—are in-
voked. The play even contains evidence of Steinwachs’s studies of literary
and cultural theory, including references to Walter Benjamin, to the ‘‘tran-
sition from the raw to the cooked’’ (GS, IV:), to Deleuze and Guattari,
and others. Not only do we encounter Balzac, characters from his novels
make an appearance as well.
One of the best illustrations of the heterogeneous, simultaneously satiric
and surreal quality of much of the play can be found in a passage from the
stage directions for the scene of George’s divorce trial:
The  of rhinos, with the support of four green-
monkeys as tambour-majorettes, conducted by a capuchin monkey, play
the march. one, two, three, four, turn left, the  turns from
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the courtroom of the  into the auditorium of the . the
three presiding asses from the gray fraternity occupy the court desk.
in front of it, the attorneys confront each other.   
 holds the lion of the salons,   , on
a leash;      holds  
the lioness on his leash. an anticipatory scratching spreads through the
audience of gapers and apes. (GS, X:)
Linguistically, as well (and of course orthographically), the play is
strikingly heterogeneous, punning freely and abundantly; inserting Latin
phrases from the Catholic mass into the initial dream scene set in the atelier
of the sculptor and lover of Sand, Alexandre Manceau; alternating between
various languages in a seemingly random fashion; and filled with neolo-
gisms. Most of these devices are humorous, yet as should be apparent by
now, the play does not move toward a conventional comic resolution. As
in the case of Betty in Cloud Nine, the title character of this play progresses
not toward marriage but away from it, becoming divorced in the course
of the action. Although the historical George Sand was the first woman in
European history to win back her premarital property in a divorce trial
(Sieg, ), the play does not end on a note of triumph. While the penulti-
mate scene presents what could become a happy ending in its depiction of a
class-free utopia where the needs of everyone are taken care of, Steinwachs
undercuts this vision by calling attention to the greed and avid consump-
tion that infects even the workers now that they have achieved the goal of
the revolution. Most strikingly, the figure called , portrayed as a
‘‘gracious virgin with flowing hair,’’ ‘‘takes one step forward and two steps
back’’ (GS, XI:). And the final scene of the play, in which Sand dies and
her lover Manceau shoots himself at her bedside, thwarts comic convention
even more emphatically.
Both Churchill and Steinwachs, like so many other contemporary
women writers of comic drama, resist or reject outright the conventions of a
mode in which resolution has typically depended on tying up loose ends by
tying down female characters, metaphorically speaking. Both Cloud Nine
and George Sand advocate political and economic egalitarianism as well as
an aesthetic and sexual pluralism that embraces contradiction and mul-
tiple possibilities, showing that similarities in their intellectual formation—
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above all the influence of their intellectual father Karl Marx—constitute a
more decisive factor for their work than do their differing nationalities.
In the end, the vision of the playful, whimsical Steinwachs appears darker
than that of Churchill, who concludes her play on a forward-looking note
as Betty achieves autonomy and self-awareness. Yet a haunting line repeated
several times in the course of George Sand suggests that Steinwachs is not
without hope for progress and reform: ‘‘   . we
must follow it’’ (GS,XI: and passim) (an allusion to ArianeMnouchkine’s
film about Molière). An interesting paradox emerges here. In her invoca-
tion of the theater’s function as a model, Steinwachs echoes precisely the
aesthetic against which her doctrine of the theater as oral institution re-
acted: Schiller’s notion of the stage as a moral, didactic institution. Perhaps
her thought is even more dialectical than she recognizes.
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 Friendship and Responsibility:
Arendt to Auden
 
Throughout her life, Hannah Arendt championed friendship and re-
sponsibility; and though she left no single work devoted entirely to the sub-
ject, her writings testify to her ongoing fascination with both. To sort out
their significance, the discussion that follows will take up the interrelated
themes of neighbor, brother, member, and comrade; friend versus enemy;
friendship and ethics; the concept of responsibility; the relation of guilt to
responsibility; and the ‘‘family man.’’ The discussion will close with a sec-
tion in praise of the guiding themes.
Fraternity and Friendship
Friendship must be distinguished from fraternity. To start with the obvi-
ous: in a slogan like ‘‘liberty, quality, and fraternity,’’ the concluding term
carries distinctly familial overtones; the problem is that the family is at best
a minor player in Arendt’s discursive arena. It is not that she discounts
the historical or biological significance of the family. Her key concept of
natality, the capacity for new beginnings that characterizes human being-
in-the-world, explicitly takes for granted the existence of parents. Such exis-
tence falls, however, within the condition of necessity: although the new-
born, at the moment of conception, had to have had a mother and a father,
what finally matters is that the new arrival enjoys a certain creative freedom
on entering the world. If Arendt rarely mentions family roles, it is because
she is concerned not with biological origination but with the consequences
for labor, work, and action that are constituted, in principle, by natality.
The family, for its part, remains within the purview of the household, from
which one infers that condition of fraternity, of being a brother, remains
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there, too. For being a brother implies existing in an essentially private way.
A friend, by contrast, knows no such condition, but chooses freely to bond
with another in the world even as that other so chooses.
Neighbor, Brother, Member, and Comrade
Love and Saint Augustine, the dissertation Arendt wrote for Karl Jaspers,
elucidates the intertwining of neighbor, brother, and member. Remember-
ing their sinful deeds as factors in an integral community history, human
beings, insofar as they are redeemed in Christ, venture new interpretation of
that past. Only in this way can they sustain the interdependence of past sin-
fulness and present existence; and here the role of neighbor enters: ‘‘Only in
this reinterpretation can the pre-existing past continue independently, be-
side the newly . . . experienced being. Thus, it is only from this pre-existence
that the neighbor derives his specific relevance. The neighbor is the constant
reminder of one’s own sin. . . .’’1
Put a little differently, love of neighbor expresses the mutuality of one
person to another in past sinfulness: ‘‘The reason one should love one’s
neighbor is that the neighbor is fundamentally one’s equal and both share
the same sinful past.’’2 Transcendence of such a state occurs when I recog-
nize in the other the same revealed grace that has been visited in equal mea-
sure upon me. Eventually, if such transcendence is to develop into a higher
state of being and blessing, human beings must undergo estrangement from
the world, must build up among themselves that state of institutionalized
solidarity we call the city of God. Heremutual love reigns as faith, dissolving
one’s obligations to the prior world and rendering one ontically ‘‘explicit’’:
‘‘When I attain the explicitness of my own being by faith, the other per-
son’s being becomes explicit as well, in equality. Only then will the other
become my brother (‘brother’ for neighbor and ‘brotherly love’ are terms
found throughout Augustine’s writings).’’3
At this point, the individual as neighbor and brother assumes, within the
context of a spiritual polity, the fuller identity of membership. ‘‘The com-
munity of Christ is understood as a body containing all individual members
within itself. . . . The individual has ceased to be anything but amember, and
his entire being lies in the connections of all members in Christ.’’4 Such a
collectivity, positive in itself, functions as a defense against menace brought
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on by the shared past of sin so that ‘‘the concrete impulse of neighborly
love arises from the thought of one’s own peril.’’5
Arendt’s portrayal of Christian membership helps us understand its cul-
minative nature, the complexities of Augustine’s reflections, and the way
in which, within his imagined community, individual freedom to decide is
decisively limited. ‘‘What was once necessary by generation has now be-
come a danger involving a decision, one way or the other, about him—the
individual.’’6 Now the individual may, in attempting to save one’s neighbor
and fellow member, imitate Christ, but in so doing the individual does not,
on Augustine’s account, choose freely. ‘‘Mutual love lacks the element of
choice; we cannot choose our ‘beloved.’ Since the neighbor is in our same
situation, he is already there before any choices can be made.’’7
Finally, the concept of friendship figures prominently in the Christian
trinity. Faced with the mystery of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Augus-
tine finds an explanatory analogue in the everyday world.
The paradigm for a mutually predicated relationship of independent
‘‘substances’’ is friendship: two men who are friends can be said to be
‘‘independent substances’’ insofar as they are related to themselves; they
are friends only relatively to each other. A pair of friends forms a unity,
a One, insofar and as long as they are friends; the moment the friendship
ceases they are again two ‘‘substances,’’ independent of each other. . . .
This is the way of the Holy Trinity: God remains One while related only
to Himself but He is three in the unity with Son and Holy Ghost.8
The paradigm of friendship has the virtue of circumventing familiar di-
chotomies and hierarchies, such as body and soul, or good and evil. As a
mode of mutuality, it has the further virtue of positing in friendship an
essential equality. Given that God has created human nature in his own
image, Augustine understandably looks into that nature for the relation-
ship of mutual predication, which is friendship. In Arendt’s words, ‘‘since
it is precisely man’s mind that distinguishes him from all other creatures,
the three-in-one is likely to be found in the structure of the mind,’’9 that is,
in being, knowing, and willing.
 :  
Friend and Enemy
By contrast, familiars of the secular world, especially in its modern phase,
set a high value on freedom as opportunity; this is nowhere more the case
than in political liberalism, with its commitment to the sovereignty of the
individual and ‘‘free’’ moral choice. It was partly to address the short-
comings of the latter that a ‘‘decisionist’’ debate arose in Germany follow-
ing the First World War, a debate in which Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of
the Political is one central text (and the focus of numerous revisionist read-
ings of Schmitt’s extensive corpus) andHeidegger’s Being and Time (though
a very different book in many ways) is another. In the latter, resoluteness
[Entschlossenheit] is prized as the fitting attitude of anyone desiring, or de-
ciding, to exist authentically. Not a few critics, including Leo Strauss,10 have
been troubled by the lack of concreteness in the concept, in particular, the
failure to establish norms for choosing this over that: for what, finally, is
one to be resolute? Is such freedom more than a blank check? Similar ob-
jections may be raised against Schmitt who, less ‘‘vague’’ than Heidegger, is
‘‘clear’’ in a more reductive way. Thus he states bluntly: ‘‘The specific po-
litical distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is
that between friend and enemy.’’11
The enemy is more ‘‘other’’ than most of the social actors described thus
far: he is not the civic brother, not the neighbor, not the friend. He is, how-
ever, or can be, the member or the comrade; it may be noted that Schmitt
joined the National Socialist Party in May , at the same time as Hei-
degger. Schmitt’s friend-enemy antinomy aims at a sort of universality of
camaraderie within the political. At the same time, the antinomy has about
it an immediacy and almost visceral heat.
The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of in-
tensity of a union or separation. It can exist theoretically and practically,
without having simultaneously to draw upon all those moral, aesthetic,
economic, or other distinctions. The political enemy need not appear
as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage
with him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the
stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specifically in-
tense way, existentially something different and alien. . . . 12
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Schmitt’s enemy clearly dominates the foreground of discussion. It is this
figure that incites the jurist’s imagination, while other roles hover, as it were,
in the background. Given this inequity, how is any organization or person
to decide precisely who the friend and the enemy actually are? The answer,
such as it is, is contextual and at the same time utterly indeterminate; only
the specifics of a situation, one must infer, can provide anything like reliable
guidelines.
Only the actual participants can correctly recognize, understand, and
judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict. Each
participant is in a position to judge whether the adversary intends to
negate his opponent’s way of life and therefore may be repulsed or fought
in order to preserve one’s own form of existence. Emotionally the enemy
is easily treated as being evil and ugly, because every distinction, most
of all the political, as the strongest and most intense of the distinctions
and categorizations, draws upon other distinctions for support.13
The only means by which to judge a given situation accurately is to be
a participant within it—a disarmingly abstract way of arriving at a con-
crete decision, it seems to me. Historically, moral and political philosophers
have looked for some Archimedean point of leverage for gaining a shar-
able perspective on a given social or ethical situation. Without some such
reference point, what is to prevent a disinterested ‘‘external’’ observer from
transferring the mean traits of the enemy, as here depicted, to the friend?
The answer is, apparently, nothing: ‘‘. . . the morally evil, aesthetically ugly
or economically damaging need not necessarily be the enemy; the morally
good, aesthetically beautiful, and economically profitable need not neces-
sarily become the friend in the specifically political sense of the word.’’ All
such distinctions, to Schmitt’s way of thinking, are entirely dependent on
circumstances and may be multiplied ad nauseam. What remains the same
and publicly manifest is the friend-dichotomy antinomy per se: ‘‘Thereby
the inherently objective nature and autonomy of the poetical becomes evi-
dent by virtue of its being able to treat, distinguish, and comprehend the
‘‘friend-enemy antithesis independently of other antitheses.’’14 Schmitt is as
prepossessed by the appeal of the enemy as Cicero is by the appeal of the
friend, but the latter has decided to defend friendship as the supreme hu-
man value; and even when a given friendship goes bad, he does not allow
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that either of the partners could ever become an enemy: ‘‘what has hap-
pened is just a termination of friendship and not a declaration of war. For
if a man has been your friend, it is the most discreditable thing in the world
to let him become your enemy.’’15
Friendship and Ethics
Arendt, for her part, does not follow this deviation from the broad Aris-
totelian view of friendship sketched out in the Ethics. In the latter, as in
Arendt’s essay on Lessing (to which I will turn below), the enemy is hardly
theorized at all. Arendt, like Aristotle, seeks out what is positive and con-
crete, not what is abstract and merely possible. Friendship, as it exists in
the world, is an observable social phenomenon helping to provide cohesion
among the constituents of any given people or polity. Now, with Schmitt,
we could abstract a group of enemies opposed to my group of friends. But
the former cannot be opposed to each other: they must in fact be friends to
one another, and enemies only to us. What is there in such an enemy but
the possibility of a friendship turned against another friendship? Could a
political theory formed on such principles be anything but occasionalist?
In the second book of the Ethics, friendship stands, positively, for com-
munity:
Brothers and comrades go shares in everything, other friends share this
or that part of their possessions and to a greater or less extent accord-
ing to the warmth of their friendship. . . . And with an intensification of
friendship there naturally goes an increase in the sense of obligation be-
tween the friends, because the same persons are involved and their obli-
gations of friendship are co-extensive with their obligations in justice.16
Finally, Aristotle anticipates Augustine in seeing all who are thus obliged
as what amounts to civic members: ‘‘But all associations may be regarded
as parts of the association we call the state. Thus when people associate in
their travels it is to secure some advantage. . . . Well, political societies too
are believed to have been originally formed, and to continue in being, for
the advantage of the citizens.’’17
In her essay ‘‘On Humanity in Dark Times,’’ Arendt takes a point of de-
parture for her discussion of friendship from the ancients, which for her
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means always the ancient Greeks, who ‘‘thought friends indispensable to
human life, indeed that a life without friends was not really worth living.’’18
Postponing specifically political perspectives, Arendt emphasizes the af-
fective, suggesting that a shared joy is the highest joy; she also notes the
modern emphasis on friendship as a function of intimacy. It is a function,
however, that raises more difficulties than it solves. For, with Rousseau, the
modern individual is so alienated from the greater world that
he can truly reveal himself only in privacy and in the intimacy of face-
to-face encounters. Thus it is hard for us to understand the political
relevance of friendship. When, for example, we read in Aristotle that
friendship among citizens is one of the fundamental requirements for the
well-being of the City, we tend to think that he was speaking of no more
than the absence of factions and civil war within it. But for the Greeks
the essence of friendship consisted in discourse.19
Such discourse is more than a medium for expressing special interests, say,
or for electioneering, or what have you. Discourse is to be taken in the
broadest sense as responsible commentary or critique of the world, such
that it comes fully to be only in being thus commented on or criticized:
‘‘For the world . . . does not become humane just because the human voice
sounds in it, but only when it has become the object of discourse.’’20
The process offers no guarantees. There is nothing, for example, to pre-
vent reductive, imbalanced, or otherwise irresponsible views of friendship.
As noted above, the discourse of intimacy, brought to a peak of personal ex-
pression by Rousseau, too warmly embraces the alienated condition of the
modern sensibility. Similarly, fraternity is redolent of the, as it were, pre-
political realm of domesticity and privacy. Not surprisingly, Arendt prefers
the ‘‘classical’’ worldliness of a Lessing, whose Nathan theWise, ‘‘modern as
it is, might with some justice be called the classical drama of friendship.’’21
What strikes us as so strange in the play is the ‘Wemust, must be friends,’
with which Nathan turns to the Templar, and in fact everyone he meets;
for this friendship is obviously so much more important to Lessing than
the passion of love; that he can brusquely cut the love story off short . . .
and transform it into a relationship in which friendship is required and
love ruled out. The dramatic tension of the play lies solely in the conflict
that arises between friendship and humanity with truth.22
 :  
To approach that conflict, Arendt poses a hypothetical situation involving
a ‘‘logical’’ argument for genocide. ‘‘Suppose that a race could indeed be
shown, by indubitable scientific evidence, to be inferior; would that fact
justify its extermination?’’23 Arendt answers, in part, that the divine com-
mandment against killing one’s fellowman provides too easy an answer, and
the same may be said of other cultural perspectives, be they legal, moral,
or religious. To face the question squarely, Arendt suggests, the question
would have to be phrased as follows: ‘‘Would any such doctrine, however
convincingly proved, be worth the sacrifice of so much as a single friendship
between two men? ’’24 Any response in the affirmative must suffer from, for
lack of a better phrase, an excess of generality, or rather of ‘‘objectivity.’’ The
question can be addressed adequately only from a perspective beyond the
familiar institutional prescriptions, whether in law, morality, or religion.
That beyond is, paradoxically, at hand in the lived world: it is the realm, not
of institutions, but of the human as such, the realm of the particular that
should never be reduced to the ‘‘subjective’’ any more than the positive as-
pects of culture should reduced to the ‘‘objective.’’ Again, the latter smacks
of the individualistic, face-to-face intimacy popularized by Rousseau; face
to face, individuals in the modern world are brought, or bring themselves,
too close to one another. ‘‘We have seen what a powerful need men have . . .
to move closer to one another, to seek in the warmth of intimacy the substi-
tute for that light and illumination which only the public realm can cast.’’25
In a state of intimacy, distinctions peculiar to any sovereign person slip into
‘‘the excessive closeness of brotherliness that obliterated all distinctions.’’26
In the process, human beings, losing the freedom of speech and movement
that are prerequisite to deciding and judging, find themselves deprived of
the elbowroom of public that is the fitting arena of public expression and
political activity. In such an arena, mere fraternity becomes the lesser prize,
friendship the greater. Thus ‘‘Lessing was never eager really to fall out with
someone with whom he had entered into a dispute; he was concerned solely
with humanizing the world by incessant and continual discourse about its
affairs and the things in it. He wanted to be the friend of many men, but
no man’s brother.’’27
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The Concept of Responsibility
A famous remark by E. M. Forster, in his essay ‘‘What I Believe,’’ invites
comparison with the present line of thinking, especially as it approaches
explicit problems of responsibility that will become increasingly promi-
nent in the pages that follow. At a crucial point in his credo, Forster ex-
amines hypothetically the significance of the difference between responsi-
bilities to friends and responsibilities to country. Before getting to these,
however, it should be said that Forster’s preferred term reliability amounts
to what Arendt and Jaspers call responsibility. Forster writes: ‘‘I hate the
idea of causes, and if I had to choose between betraying my country and
betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my coun-
try.’’28 In The Divine Comedy, Forster points out, betraying a friend becomes
a kind of capital offense: Dante ‘‘places Brutus and Cassius in the lowest
circle of Hell because they had chosen to betray their friend Julius Caesar
rather than their country Rome.’’29 It seems hard to imagine a testimonial
more congenial to Lessing’s concept of friendship. The same may be said of
Arendt’s and Forster’s views on discourse (the Englishman’s term is ‘‘talk-
ing’’): ‘‘Democracy has another merit. It allows criticism, and if there is no
public criticism there are bound to be hushed-up scandals. . . . Parliament
is often sneered at because it is a Talking Shop. I believe in it because it is
a talking shop . . . I value it because it criticizes and talks, and because its
chatter gets widely reported.’’30
On the other hand, when Arendt seeks a solution to the separation in
democracy between the role of the private person and the role of the citi-
zen, she requires the context of the state as Forster never would. Here she
is closer to Jefferson’s ‘‘Love your neighbour as yourself, and your country
more than yourself.’’31 The question becomes how to bring about a felt sense
of the latter’s presence comparable to the felt sense of the presence of one’s
neighbors? Such a sense could be obtained, Jefferson believes, by creating
numerous little republics, of the type that emerged in the revolutionary so-
cieties in late eighteenth-century France, in modern workers’ councils, in
the system of soviets set up in Russia, and in the political wards existing in,
but not always articulated with, the sovereign United States.32 In civil life,
private persons could be responsible citizens only if they could exert direct
political influence through civic discourse.
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Now the concept of responsibility is not without its difficulties. Entailing
as it does virtually the entire sphere of the ‘‘ought,’’ obligation, duty, and
trust, it is conspicuously overdetermined. To be responsible is, in Forster’s
terms, as we have seen, to be reliable; Bakhtin’s alternative is answerable;
and currently much public discourse in education and government has dis-
covered accountable to be a useful term. Responsibility, for Arendt, does
not inhere in any single unilateral act or attitude, which perhaps is why she
speaks in crucial passages of coresponsibility. That she does not do so consis-
tently may imply that she did not recognize how felicitous the term would
prove to be. Such a possibility is fitting insofar as she often brings to the
fore ideas and attitudes that other thinkers have employed with little or no
examination. In any case, her teacher Heidegger has provided in Being and
Time some early insights into responsibility; in ‘‘The Question Concern-
ing Technology,’’ he goes on to provide the most economical and eloquent
account I know of the general concept of coresponsibility.
In Being and Time responsibility is seen in relation to, but not limited
to, a set of terms concerned with indebtedness and guilt. Ultimately, he
seeks to delimit the concept of primordial human guilt; thus ‘‘indebtedness
becomes possible only ‘on the basis’ of a primordial Being-guilty.’’33 Dasein,
human being, is the kind of being that is thrown into the world; as thrown,
‘‘it projects itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown,’’ and it
is this basis on which human being must assume as its own. In so doing,
however, it finds that its projections have the capacity of outrunning it, as it
were. ‘‘In being a basis—that is, in existing as thrown—Dasein constantly
lags behind its possibilities,’’34 and this can be seen as in part what he is
‘‘guilty’’ of. To go further in this line of inquiry, helpful as that might be
for an understanding of Heidegger’s first major work, would lead us away
from the present discussion. Here our concern is with the way in which
‘‘The Question Concerning Technology,’’ drawing on concepts and terms
in the earlier text, moves toward a general paradigm of responsibility and
coresponsibility [Mitschuld].
Heidegger takes his point of departure from the traditional philosophi-
cal analysis of causality, consisting in the material, the formal, the final, and
the efficient. In the first-named concept we find the matter of stuff from
which something is made. Heidegger’s example is a silver chalice. The form
or shape of the entity being caused is then understood to fall within the
modality of the formal. The third or final cause is the purpose or end to
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be served by the thing created; and the fourth is the efficient cause, ‘‘which
brings about the effect that is the finished, actual chalice, in this instance,
the silversmith.’’35
The revision of all this that Heidegger offers his reader stems from the
differences that emerge when one compares the Aristotelian, Roman, and
Germanic approaches with those of Greek antiquity: ‘‘What we call the
cause [Ursache] and the Romans call [causa] is called aition by the Greeks,
that to which something else is indebted [das, was ein anderes verschuldet].
The four causes are the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being
responsible for something else.’’36 The translator of the essay helpfully notes
that ‘‘The verb verschulden actually has a wide range of meanings—to be in-
debted, to owe, to be guilty, to be responsible for or to, to cause. Heidegger
seems intent on awakening all these meanings and on having connotations
of mutual interdependence sound throughout this passage.’’37 He continues:
Silver is that out of which the silver chalice is made. As this matter (hyle)
it is co-responsible for the chalice. The chalice is indebted to, i.e., owes
thanks to, the silver for that out of which it consists. But the sacrificial
vessel is indebted not only to the silver. As a chalice, that which is in-
debted to the silver appears in the aspect of a chalice and not in that of a
brooch or a ring. Thus the sacrificial vessel is at the same time indebted
to the aspect (eidos) of chaliceness. Both the silver into which the aspect
is admitted as chalice and the aspect in which the silver appears are in
their respective ways co-responsible for the sacrificial vessel.38
Having touched upon the two modes of matter and aspect, Heidegger pre-
sents a third that he deems to be, if you will, more responsible. This is ‘‘that
which circumscribes the chalice as sacrificial vessel. Circumscribing gives
bounds to the things. . . . That which gives bounds, that which completes,
in this sense is called in Greek telos. . . . The telos is responsible for what as
matter and for what as aspect are together co-responsible for the sacrificial
vessel.’’39
There remains the fourth participant in the fourfold of coresponsibility,
and that is the silversmith, who is not, however, the efficient cause as that
has been received by the philosophical tradition. Gathering together matter,
aspect, and purpose (hyle, eidos, and telos), the ‘‘silversmith is co-respon-
sible as that from whence the sacrificial vessel’s bringing forth and resting-
in-itself take and retain their first departure.’’40
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In sum, ‘‘the four ways of being responsible . . . differ from one another
yet they belong together.’’41 Our understanding of their interrelationship
remains incomplete until we consider what in general terms it occasions,
or as Dewey would say, consummates. ‘‘The four ways of being responsible
bring something into appearance. They let it come forth into presencing
[An-wesen] . . . It is in the sense of such a starting something on its way
into arrival that being responsible is an occasioning or an inducing to go
forward [Ver-an-lassen].’’42 This could almost be an account of the back-
ground of Arendt’s concept of natality, the phenomenon of new beginnings.
For, in contemplating coresponsibility, we see that it does not cause but
rather provides the necessary condition of worldly doing and making. As
a cautionary note, it should be remembered that natality is a human event
in the human world, whereas Heidegger concentrates here on made things,
technological artifacts in the broadest sense, and on the differences that ob-
tain within the physis that is nature, which, in its highest form, emerges as
‘‘poiesis in the highest sense.’’43
Guilt and Responsibility
In her  essay ‘‘Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility,’’ Arendt
begins with the difficulty of distinguishing between Germans and Nazis.
As the war went on, political strategists among the latter had been doing
everything they could to create the impression of a seamless national fab-
ric, arguing that ‘‘there is no distinction as to responsibility, that German
anti-Fascists will suffer from defeat equally with German Fascists, and that
the Allies had made such distinctions at the beginning of war only for pro-
paganda purposes.’’44 At first the prerogative of the Gestapo and the SS, the
operation of concentration camps eventually provided an arena of activity
for ordinary members of theWehrmacht. Toweaken further any distinctions
between Germans and Nazis, the latter carried out a terror campaign aimed
at anti-Fascists, at the same time providing fellow Nazis with documenta-
tion to make it harder for the Allies or anyone else to tell the criminal from
the noncriminal. In the midst of this fraudulent reconstitution of identity,
orientation, and values, the interpersonal relations discussed above were
in large measure damaged if not erased. The other could be a brother or
friend only within definite boundaries (racial, political, biological) estab-
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lished by intranational enemies. The role of the member could at first glance
appear to remain intact, but the merging of ordinary soldiers into fascist
organizations had less to do with providing a satisfying sense of member-
ship than with eliminating any traditional sense of belonging or solidarity.
‘‘That everyone, whether or not he is directly active in a murder camp, is
forced to take part in one way or another in the workings of this machine
of mass murder—that is the horrible thing.’’45
How to determine identity, and hence responsibility, for the crimes in
question? In this situation we will not be aided either by a definition of
those responsible, or by the punishment of ‘‘war criminals.’’ Such defi-
nitions by their very nature can apply only to those who not only took
responsibility upon themselves, but also produced this whole inferno.
. . . The number of those who are responsible and guilty will be relatively
small. There are many who share responsibility without any visible proof
of guilt. There are many more who have become guilty without being in
the least responsible. Among the responsible in a broader sense must be
included all those who continued to be sympathetic to Hitler as long as
it was possible, who aided his rise to power, and who applauded him in
Germany and in other European countries.46
Those whowere responsible in these ways showed themselves to be guilty of
a signal incapacity similar to the thoughtlessness Arendt discerns in Adolf
Eichmann. In each and every case, the indispensable connection between
the ability to think and the inability to recognize moral distinctions, which
requires a capacity for, and an exercise of, judging (the theme of the third
and final volume of her study of The Life of the Mind), has been damaged
beyond repair. In ‘‘Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility,’’ Arendt
can nonetheless relieve the variously responsible ‘‘ladies and gentlemen of
high society’’ from being labeled war criminals because ‘‘unquestionably
they have proved their inability to judge modern political organizations,’’47
and judged on this ground they were not guilty as Hitler and his circle were
guilty. They were simply, again, responsible—or rather, coresponsible: ‘‘Yet
these people, whowere co-responsible for Hitler’s crimes in a broader sense,
did not incur any guilty in a stricter sense. They, who were the Nazis’ first
accomplices and their best aides, truly did not know what they were doing
nor with whom they were dealing.’’48 That formulation would seem to allow
a space in which Heidegger could appear, based on his early support for the
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Nazi regime—of which he was certainly an explicit accomplice for a time—
and his inability to realize, early on, the kind of operatives with whom he
was dealing. Only on the occasion of his eightieth birthday does Arendt
direct her full attention to this subject.49
Neither the Nazis themselves nor ‘‘those irresponsible co-responsibili-
ties’’ evoke the ultimate horror, Arendt suggests; it is rather the fact that
those key traditional roles that give a society cohesion, such as friends,
brothers, members, or comrades are here obliterated or replaced: ‘‘In that
organization which Himmler has prepared against the defeat, everyone is
either an executioner, a victim, or an automaton, marching onward over
the corpses of his comrades—chosen from any army unit or other mass
organization.’’50
The Family Man
The familiar figure of the benign paterfamilias provides another disturb-
ing instance of culpable role transformation. The groundwork for the trans-
formation is laid in part by the neglect and subsequent decay of civic virtue
and commitment to legitimate public activities and institutions. Add to this
the social chaos and economic disruptions of the early twentieth century,
especially in Germany after the First World War, and you have a formula
for the emergence of the paterfamilias in the role of ‘‘an involuntary adven-
turer, who for all his industry and care could never be certain what the next
day would bring. . . . It became clear that for the sake of his pension, his
life insurance, the security of his wife and children, such a man was ready
to sacrifice his beliefs, his honor, and his human dignity.’’51 To survive, the
man of the family, in becoming an unthinking functionary of the state and
the party, might reduce or eliminate his role as friend, brother, member,
and comrade. At the same time, he might take on any role that would help
him avoid the sacrifice of his family, which would be expected to survive
only as long as he survived. ‘‘The only condition he put was that he should
be fully exempted from responsibility for his acts.’’ At the same time he and
other heads of household recognized only ‘‘responsibility toward their own
families. The transformation of the family man from a responsible member
of society, interested in all public affairs, to a ‘bourgeois’ concerned only
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with his private existence and knowing no civic virtue, is an international
modern phenomenon.’’52
Jaspers, taking up the same or similar issues, draws distinctions among
moral, criminal, political, and metaphysical guilt. To the sphere of moral
guilt belongs responsibility for recognizing the purport and appropriate-
ness of human actions. Criminal guilt is a sphere governed by positive law
and the exercise of police power. ‘‘Political guilt involves at least (passive)
co-responsibility in the case of every citizen of a state. . . . Everybody is
co-responsible for theway in which he is governed.’’53 The same coresponsi-
bility obtains in the metaphysical sphere as that solidarity among human
beings by virtue of which everyone becomes at some level coresponsible for
any and every worldly deed. At the conclusion of ‘‘Organized Guilt andUni-
versal Responsibility,’’ Arendt states: ‘‘Perhaps those Jews, to whose fore-
fathers we owe the first conception of the idea of humanity, knew something
about that burden when each year they used to say ‘Our Father and King,
we have sinned before you,’ taking not only the sins of their own commu-
nity but all human offenses upon themselves.’’54 Community in this broad
sense holds out hope that the concept of the human can still embrace the
threatened but vital social roles, from friend to member.
Any acknowledgment of the significance of the latter should come with
the caveat that, as functionaries in violent times, members may experience
in comradeship and fraternity a state of being ‘‘beyond’’ what is typically
found in friendship. In times of collective violence, ‘‘We find a kind of group
coherence which is more intensely felt and proves to be a much stronger,
though less lasting, bond than all the varieties of friendship, civil or pri-
vate.’’55 Groups or masses caught up in such movements may experience,
Arendt points out, a sense that insofar as members are committed utterly
to coexistence with comrades, they may discover in their own deeds and
dedications an augury of what will eventually be their own, which is to say
their group’s, immortality. But brotherhood of this sort presents significant
dangers, for ‘‘it is true that the strong fraternal sentiments collective vio-
lence engenders have misled many good people into the hope that a new
community together with a ‘new man’ will arise out of it. The hope is an
illusion for the simple reason that no human relationship is more transitory
than this kind of brotherhood.’’56
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In Praise of Friendship and Responsibility
On the subject of friendship, we find in Cicero as well as in Arendt a be-
lief in a distinctive moral quality that illuminates a given person and moves
him or her toward a like illumination in another. ‘‘What unites friends in
the first place,’’ Laelius says to his friends Fannius and Scaevola,
is goodness of character. All harmony, and permanence, and fidelity,
come from that.When this moral quality appears, and reveals its brilliant
light, and perceives and recognizes the same illumination in another per-
son, it is impelled in his direction and receives his radiant beams. And
that is how love or friendship comes into existence. Both words, amor
and amicitia come from amare, to love. And love is precisely the nature
of the affection you feel for your friend.57
In the midst of the Enlightenment, the influential F. W. Klopstock ar-
gued for the identity of love and friendship, probably influencing Hein-
rich von Kleist’s views of both. As a participant in the eighteenth-century
cult of friendship, Kleist, in any case, would employ erotic language in his
intimate letters to a close male friend, though the element of idealization
seems as notable as the amatory. The legitimizing of such sentiment and
affect in the Storm and Stress movement may be seen as part of the same
pattern. ‘‘The new emphatic, emotional grounding of subjectivity finds in
the cult of friendship both an expression of itself and a budding need for
community—indeed, some scholars see in the emphatic friendship of the
eighteenth century a ‘utopia of bourgeois community.’ ’’58
Arendt, to be sure, would not subscribe to the view that love and friend-
ship are identical. For the author of TheHuman Condition, love is unworldly
and can prosper only in privacy. But precisely the opposite is the case with
friendship: ‘‘love, in distinction from friendship, is killed, or rather extin-
guished, the moment it is displayed in public. . . . Because of its inherent
worldlessness, love can only become false and perverted when it is used for
political purposes such as change or salvation of the world.’’59 On the other
hand, Arendt agrees with Cicero regarding the affinity that draws two per-
sons together in friendship, mutual responsibility, and affection, and the
obligation of each to pay as much honor to the other as is humanly possible.
In Cicero, this takes the form, for example, of Laelius’s extended panegyric
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on the virtues of his longtime friend, Scipio, now dwelling in death, and an-
ticipates Arendt’s panegyric ‘‘Karl Jaspers: A Laudatio,’’ in which she blends
the role of friend and the theme of responsibility, and points to the same
quality of illumination, which she calls ‘‘clarity,’’ that we found in Cicero.
For her old, loyal, and exemplary friend, Arendt explains,
responsibility is not a burden and it has nothing whatsoever to do with
moral imperatives. Rather, it flows naturally out of an innate pleasure in
making manifest, in clarifying the obscure, in illuminating the darkness.
His affirmation of the public realm is in the final analysis only the re-
sult of his loving light and clarity. . . . In the works of a great writer we
can almost always find a consistent metaphor peculiar to him alone in
which the whole work seems to come to a focus. One such metaphor in
Jaspers’s work is the word ‘‘clarity.’’60
Central to that work is Jaspers’s general sense of historical mission, and
the particular desire to achieve something of the cosmopolitan purposes
entertained in the political philosophy of Kant. In the wake of the Sec-
ond World War and the atom bomb, Jaspers is able to discern ‘‘the emer-
gence of mankind as a tangible political reality.’’61 Here, if anywhere, one
can feel the spirit of Lessing and his commitment to full achievement of
friendship in relationships of embodied responsibility. As she translates the
thinking behind Jaspers’s Psychology of World Views, her comments seem
to lose some of their idealistic luster while gaining in sensitivity to more
or less present realities. The following comments, for example, presciently
describe the postmodern condition as envisaged by Jean-François Lyotard
and Jürgen Habermas:
The shell of traditional authority is forced open, and the great contents
of the past are freely and ‘playfully’ placed in communication with each
other in the test of communicating with a present living philosophizing.
In this universal communication, held together by the existential experi-
ence of the present philosopher, all dogmatic metaphysical contents are
dissolved into processes, trains of thought, which, because of their rele-
vance to my present existing and philosophizing, leave their fixed his-
torical place in the chain of chronology and enter a realm of spirit where
all are contemporaries.62
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Arendt’s memorial essay on the passing of W. H. Auden is a passion-
ate testimonial to friendship and the burdens of responsibility. She met
the poet, she explains, ‘‘late in his life and mine—at an age when the easy,
knowledgeable intimacy of friendships formed in one’s youth can no longer
be attained, because not enough time is left, or expected to be left, to share
with another. Thus we were very good friends but not intimate friends.’’63
As a poet who is political and public in the best sense of both terms, Auden
portrays the threat and promise of the human creature in a homicidal age.
Faces along the bar
Cling to their average day:
The lights must never go out,
The music must always play,
All the conventions conspire
To makes this fort assume
The furniture of home;
Lest we should see where we are,
Lost in a haunted wood,
Children afraid of the night
Who have never been happy or good.64
To such as these the poet shows the failed promise of universal love. For
the children do not wish to love their friends, brothers, comrades, fellow
members—not to mention members of their own families; they wish love
only for themselves:
For the error bred in the bone
Of each woman and each man
Craves what it cannot have,
Not universal love
But to be loved alone.65
Then the famous closing line of the next-to-last stanza: ‘‘We must love one
another or die.’’ Here is no mere wish for something unattainable, but a
challenge to reach for something already in view. You find the same trying,
for example, in Auden’s efforts to make his friends happy: ‘‘When friends
asked him to produce a birthday poem for the next evening at six o’clock,’’
Arendt recalls, ‘‘they could be sure of getting it.’’66 You find trying as well
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in Hermann Broch’s powerful sense of responsibility for friends, especially
when they experienced dire need, a sense of responsibility that Arendt re-
wards with high praise: ‘‘it was Broch who took care of everything. . . .
It seemed to be assumed that all help would come from Broch, who had
neither money nor time. He was exempt from such responsibilities . . . only
when he himself landed in the hospital . . . and there obtained some repose,
which cannot very well be refused to a broken arm or leg.’’67
Arendt’s praise of others complements and compensates for the fear that
she did not always meet her responsibilities to those who were closest to
her. After the sudden death of her husband, she writes a tortured letter to
her close friend Mary McCarthy in which she declares: ‘‘Am not at all sure if
I should not be ashamed of myself. . . . Perhaps this is a process of petrifac-
tion, perhaps not. Don’t know.’’68 The reader may detect at least an element
of the ‘‘survivor complex’’ so familiar in this our age of mass destruction.
Fear of failing others can become a fear of pity, as in Arendt’s dilemma over
Auden:
Said he had come back to New York only because of me, that I was of
great importance for him, that he loved me very much, etc. I tried to
quiet him down and succeeded quite well. In my opinion: Oxford where
he hoped to go for good has turned him down (I suppose) and he is des-
perate to find some other bearable place. I see the necessity but I know
also that I can’t do it, in other words, I have to turn him down . . . I hate,
am afraid of pity, always have been, and I think I never knew anybody
who aroused my pity to this extent.69
Arendt might have consoled herself with a piece of Goethean wisdom that
she introduces into an essay on Bertolt Brecht: ‘‘The poet’s relation to reality
is indeed what Goethe said it was: They cannot bear the same burden of
responsibility as ordinary mortals; they need a measure of remoteness.’’70
Why should the same not apply to Arendt? Though not a poet, she is a
poetic thinker in the mold of Heidegger and Walter Benjamin, and poetic
texts play a significant role throughout her own writings. Certainly Arendt
could be remote in these writings, as she could be in person; and precisely
that fact may help to explain her sense of inadequacy, especially in the face
of Auden’s appeals for a help she is unable to provide.
In his poetry, at least, her friend could make a more disciplined, less
poignant, but finally more bearable kind of appeal:
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Follow, poet, follow right
To the bottom of the night,
With your unconstraining voice
Still persuade us to rejoice;
With the farming of a verse
Make a vineyard of the curse,
Sing of human unsuccess
In a rapture of distress;
In the deserts of the heart
Let the healing fountain start,
In the prison of his days
Teach the free man how to praise.
In a murderous age, the poet could offer something a little like consolation
and a little like compensation, but somehow more than either; the ‘‘more’’
is praise, or has praise in it, and if we are surprised at Arendt’s recognition
of this, it is at least in part because of a certain militancy in Auden’s, and
in her, conception of it. As she observes, ‘‘Praise is the key word of these
lines . . . praise that pitches itself against all that is most unsatisfactory in
man’s condition on this earth and sucks its own strength from thewound.’’71
Auden goes even further in the encomiastic, italicized moment that lifts the
following lines to a thrilling height:
I could (which you cannot)
Find reasons fast enough
To face the sky and roar
In anger and despair
At what is going on,
Demanding that it name
Whoever is to blame:
The sky would only wait
Till all my breath was gone
And then reiterate
As if I wasn’t there
That singular command
I do not understand,
Bless what there is for being,
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Which has to be obeyed, for
What else am I made for,
Agreeing or disagreeing?72
It is this singular command that is one of the great abiding gifts to those
who never met the poet as well as to those who were his friends.
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In the dark times, will there also be singing?
Yes, there will be singing. About the dark times.
—Bertolt Brecht
I. Critical Songs
Let us consider dark times first. Dark times, such as those of Europe’s
recent history, times that we have come to identify with the rise of fascism
and the onset of World War II, its battles, its cruelties. Were these the times
for philosophy? Or were these times that cast into doubt its task, its pur-
pose, its continuity?
What would the place of a critic be in such times? We may wonder. But
philosophy itself, Hannah Arendt seems to imply, experienced dark times
often, perhaps as a caesura, or as a lack of orientation, and even early in the
twentieth century. Indeed, this crisis of philosophy may have prepared the
ground for a totalitarian state devoid of critical reflection. Thus on the eve
of Martin Heidegger’s eightieth birthday, in October , Arendt writes
an account of the s when ‘‘the rumor of Heidegger’s teaching reached
those who knew more or less explicitly about the breakdown of tradition
and the ‘dark times’ (Brecht) which had set in, who therefore held eru-
dition in matters of philosophy to be idle play and who, therefore, were
prepared to comply with the academic discipline only because they were
concerned with the ‘matter of thought’ or, as Heidegger would say today,
‘thinking’s matter.’ ’’ Arendt compares Heidegger’s early and strange fame
to that of Franz Kafka, who, at about the same time (the s) was un-
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known to many but famous, and a ‘‘rumor,’’ to a few. In the case of Hei-
degger, students would follow him to Freiburg or Marburg because of such
a ‘‘rumor that there was someone who was actually attaining ‘the things’
[and not just theories or books] that Husserl had proclaimed, someone
who knew that these things were not academic matters but the concerns
of thinking men—concerns not just of yesterday and today, but from time
immemorial—and who, precisely because he knew that the thread of tradi-
tion was broken, was discovering the past anew.’’2 On a different occasion,
Arendt would cite these ‘‘dark times’’ again, this time not as a reference to
the matter of thought, but perhaps to the matter of biography, to a matter
of a specific life, that of Walter Benjamin, a man who died quite literally
in darkness, on a night in , after an ill-fated attempt to cross the bor-
der between France and Spain. Heidegger countered a broken tradition by
pursuing those philosophical questions that existed since ‘‘time immemo-
rial’’; he was trying to reconnect German philosophy to the Greeks, when
there was no other continuity at hand. Benjamin did not offer such a philo-
sophical undertaking to find a place within eternal philosophical concerns.
Heidegger’s contemporary arrived at the Spanish border a day too early per-
haps or a day too late; he became simply a victim of bad timing. But he was
also a man who had blundered into these dark times belatedly, as Hannah
Arendt eagerly points out. Benjamin was unacquainted with the fast pace
of the twentieth century; for Arendt, he remained, despite all odds and all
chronology, a nineteenth-century flaneur.
Arendt, who first wrote about Benjamin for the New Yorker in , re-
printed her article as a preface to the first English anthology of his essays,
Illuminations,3 and included it once more in a collection of her own work,
entitled Men in Dark Times, which was published in  as well. There,
she qualifies the notion of ‘‘dark times’’ that she had taken from Bertolt
Brecht’s poem ‘‘To Postery.’’ Brecht, she writes, ‘‘mentions the disorder and
the hunger, the massacres and the slaughterers, the outrage over injustice
and the despair ‘when there was only wrong and outrage,’ the legitimate
hatred that makes the voice grow hoarse’’ (viii). This may be ‘‘real’’ enough,
but Arendt is eager to look at the less visible aspects of dark times:
‘‘Dark times,’’ in the broader sense I propose here, are as such not identi-
cal with the monstrosities of this century which indeed are of a horrible
novelty. Dark times, in contrast, are not only not new, they are no rarity
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in history, although they were perhaps unknown in American history,
which otherwise has its fair share, past and present, of crime and disaster.
That even in the darkest of times we have the right to expect some illumi-
nation, and that such illumination may well come less from theories and
concepts than from the uncertain, flickering, and often weak light that
some men and women, in their lives and their works, will kindle under
almost all circumstances and shed over the time span that was given
them on earth—this conviction is the inarticulate background against
which these profiles were drawn.4
Dark times, used in the plural here, are not unique. Even if history may
never quite repeat itself, dark times can be found often distinguishing them-
selves paradoxically by unique shadows that are not cast by any light. But
darkness is not the only quality that is both singular and a multiple occur-
rence. Arendt’s emphasis shifts in this passage from darkness to a flicker-
ing—a hopeful glow, which carries a note of optimism. No specific histori-
cal situation is at stake here. The flickering candle, moreover, is neither one
of mourning nor of memory; it shines ahead. And indeed, history is trans-
formed by Arendt’s pen into a scene reminiscent of that of the origin of
painting, as described by Pliny in his Historia naturalis, or by Quintilian in
his De institutione oratoriae, in which a woman held up a light to trace the
shadow of her parting lover.5 Are the dark times needed for illuminations
to appear, do they themselves cast the portraits that she desires? In Arendt,
history focuses on individual lives and works that counteract events that
are both darker and more visible.
And in her collection of profiles, Benjamin is prominently featured while
Heidegger is excluded—at least explicitly so. Brecht joins Benjamin’s ranks,
as does Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Jaspers, and the author who shared Hei-
degger’s pattern of fame, Kafka. Perhaps it is not accidental that Arendt’s
collection would begin with that of an Enlightenment thinker, Gotthold
Ephraim Lessing, although it is not necessarily the light of reason that is
here at stake. For her, Lessing articulates a particularly important concept
of Humanität.6 And he, too, had a peculiar relationship to his own time
(and place): ‘‘For Lessing never felt at home in the world as it then existed
and probably never wanted to, and still after his own fashion he always re-
mained committed to it. Special and unique circumstances goverened this
relationship. The German public was not prepared for him and as far as I
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know never honored him in his lifetime. He himself lacked, according to
his own judgment, that happy, natural concord with the world, a combina-
tion of merit and good fortune, which both he and Goethe considered the
sign of genius.’’7 Whereas Heidegger could gather a crowd of students, Less-
ing was deprived of students as well as of public honors. Did he choose his
particular isolation at the Wolfenbüttel library voluntarily? Was he ahead
of his time, or like Benjamin, quite simply behind?
In her essay on Lessing, as well as elsewhere in her collection, Arendt
focuses on the notion of ‘‘illumination’’ that would, cast into the plural,
provide the title for her collection of Benjamin’s work. In regard to these
dark times, illuminations occupy a peculiar temporal space, as they seem
to waver between history and hope. Perhaps they are also able to provide
the shadow that makes it possible for her to trace her closest, and perhaps
already departed, friends.
History and hope do not always refer to general, common, ‘‘official’’
events. Thus illuminations, too, offer a trajectory to the private realm, or at
least one that has been excluded from a public sphere: hence, perhaps the
stress on Lessing’s isolation, or on Heidegger’s lonely voice. But it may be
another reason why Arendt’s men know of traditions yet live in dark times
that commence in the eighteenth century, when our modern notion of a
public sphere came into being.8 ‘‘If it is the function of the public realm
to throw light on the affairs of men by providing a space of appearances
in which they can show in deed and word, for better and worse, who they
are and what they can do,’’ Arendt writes, ‘‘then darkness has come when
this light is extinguished by ‘credibility gaps’ and ‘invisible government,’
by speech that does not disclose what is but sweeps it under the carpet,
by exhortations, moral and otherwise, that, under the pretext of uphold-
ing old truths, degrade all truth to meaningless triviality’’ (viii). There is
a public language of ‘‘mere talk,’’ and in citing ‘‘mere talk,’’ Arendt refers
here again to her former teacher Heidegger, who had described this ‘‘mere
talk’’ in Being and Time, a book that he completed in the twenties during
their years of close friendship.9 In Being and Time,Heidegger writes as well:
‘‘The light of the public obscures everything.’’10 Thus Heidegger provides
Arendt with an enlightening concept, much as another one of her teach-
ers, who had been Heidegger’s friend as well, Jaspers, had provided illu-
mination for her. InMen in Dark Times, Arendt included not one, but two
essays on Jaspers.11 ‘‘What do you think is the greatest influence that Pro-
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fessor Jaspers has had on you?’’ Günter Gaus had asked Arendt a few years
earlier in an interview. ‘‘Well, where Jaspers comes forward and speaks, all
becomes luminous [da wird es hell],’’12 Arendt responds, and her phrasing
echoes a Freudian case study. But in her collection of luminaries, it is not
Jaspers, but Benjamin who clearly stands out. He did not just offer illumi-
nations, he collected them, much as a diver would delve into deep waters
that house secret treasures.
II. Pearl Fishing
Arendt knew Benjamin personally, of course. Although they had met
in Berlin, they became good friends only in Paris. Arendt had fled Ber-
lin in  to join her husband Günter Stern, who arrived in Paris several
months before her.13 Benjamin was Stern’s cousin. But even after the separa-
tion of Stern and Arendt seemed inevitable and final, Arendt’s contact with
‘‘Benji,’’ as she used to call him,14 remained close. He befriended Arendt’s
lover and later husband, Heinrich Blücher, and when Arendt traveled to
Geneva on behalf of a zionist organization, Blücher and Benjamin con-
tinued to meet for conversation and chess.15 Both were sent in  to the
detention camp in Colombes.16 In his letters, Blücher reported Benjamin’s
words to Arendt proudly. A statement made in October , for example,
gave evidence of their common point of view: ‘‘Benji is here and behaves
in an extraordinarily rational manner. I have talked to him at length today.
He is very much interested in Jewish issues, thinks highly of our cause [that
is, Blücher’s contact with communist groups] and would like to participate
and really do things. Yesterday, he answered to a direct question in an al-
most moving way: I am learning Jew [ich lerne Jude], because I have finally
understood that I am one. I think this is clear enough and seems to be a
decent capitulation.’’17 What Blücher seems to describe here is Benjamin’s
own turn toward ‘‘things,’’ and his own ‘‘thinking matter.’’
In her letters to Blücher, to Kurt Blumenfeld (the former head of the
German Zionist Organization), and to others, Arendt communicated a real
sense of loss following Benjamin’s death; and although she had been un-
able to protect his life, she ventured to protect and publish Benjamin’s
works. After the war, Arendt sought out the publisher Salman Schocken for
this project and made use of her former connections, as she had worked
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as an editor for the Schocken publishing house in her early years in New
York.18 In pursuing her project, Arendt argued against her former husband
Günther Stern and against Theodor Adorno, who both seemed hesitant to
promote Benjamin’s writings.19 Adorno in particular seemed troubled by
Benjamin’s unorthodox reception of Marxism and his criticism of other
members of the so-called Frankfurt School. Arendt, in turn, seemed in-
trigued by what she considered to be Benjamin’s uniqueness: ‘‘Benjamin
probably was the most peculiar Marxist ever produced by this movement,
which God knows has had its full share of oddities,’’ she writes (). But
Benjamin also appeared to be a ‘‘type.’’ He was unique, because his work
was, and Arendt borrows Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s evaluation: ‘‘down-
right incomparable [schlechthin unvergleichlich]’’ ().20 He was typical,
because his lifestyle and old-fashioned demeanor represented the German-
Jewish bourgeois upper middle class.
In her essay, Arendt tells tales of Benjamin’s book collecting, which out-
paced his declining fortune and rendered him out of pocket more often
than not. These stories become anecdotes about an individual, but cast a
nostalgic glance at a bygone era, the nineteenth century, as well. Benjamin,
moving from Berlin to Moscow or to Paris, seemed quite simply always
out of place and out of time. When Benjamin replaced material goods with
words, his collections multiplied and adjusted to new modes of exchange.
Arendt is eager to point out the connection between the collector of books
and the flaneur of words, as she sketches a picture of Benjamin placed in a
Parisian coffee house, citing from a notebook filled with jotted-down quo-
tations. But unlike Benjamin’s gentlemanly book collecting, his planned
project to construct a text entirely out of quotations gave evidence for his
early interest in surrealism and contemporary aesthetics. Such a project
would not only break with tradition, but review history from the present,
and would construct an imagewhose historical significancewould lie within
the new. Arendt quotes Benjamin to illuminate this process: ‘‘The genuine
picture may be old, but the genuine thought is new. It is of the present.
This present may be meager, granted. But no matter what it is like, one
must firmly take it by the horns to be able to consult the past. It is the bull
whose blood must fill the pit if the shades of the departed are to appear at
its edge’’ (). This is the project that Arendt defines as unique. But in her
Paris years, Arendt herself was occupied with a similar undertaking. In ,
shortly after the completion of her dissertation on St. Augustine, Arendt
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had begun to work on a biography of Rahel Varnhagen that would be con-
structed from quotations of Rahel’s writings. Arendt had emigrated with
the manuscript from Berlin to Paris, where she discussed her project with
Benjamin. He encouraged her to add two final chapters and to complete
the book.21
Benjamin’s esteem for Arendt’s study is reflected in his correspondence
with Scholem. Already in early , Benjamin shows some familiarity with
Rahel’s letters,22 and in early , Benjamin sent Scholem a copy of Arendt’s
manuscript.23 ‘‘I would very much like to know what kind of impression
Rahel Varnhagenmade upon you,’’24 Benjamin urges his friend, who would
read the text ‘‘with a different emphasis,’’25 concentrating rather on the
‘‘fraud’’ on which the German-Jewish relationship was based. Scholem was
not interested in a ‘‘hidden’’ Jewish tradition here,26 but in the future. ‘‘[T]he
future of Judaism is totally cloaked in darkness,’’27 Scholem writes.
Much like Benjamin, Arendt rejected psychoanalysis, but her string of
quotations produced an interior monologue of sorts, a series of excerpts
from Rahel’s letters that would lose their original addressees but would in-
sist on the integrity of Rahel’s authorship. While Arendt may thus have felt
a personal affinity to Benjamin’s work, Benjamin had certainly no indi-
vidual biography in mind. He wanted to construct an image of a topo-
graphical and temporal space, to describe the world of objects and their
circulation. In his project on the Paris arcades of the nineteenth century,
the city did not emerge as a historical reconstruction, but as an image of
modernity. His sources were less contained and seemed to resist contain-
ment. Thus Arendt did not view him as a critic—a term that was, indeed,
critically reflected upon by Benjamin himself—but as a diver who would
rescue words the way that she would try to rescue biographical tales. In
citing the image of the pearl fisher, Arendt replaced the textual construc-
tion of Paris with an image of a natural realm that was hardly touched by
man: the sea. Despite his uniqueness, Benjamin could be compared to the
philosopher of dark times—although their similarities might be invisible to
most, not in the least to himself. Thus Arendt writes: ‘‘Without realizing it,
Benjamin actually had more in common with Heidegger’s remarkable sense
for living eyes and living bone that had sea-changed into pearls and coral,
and as such could be saved and lifted into the present only by doing vio-
lence to their context in interpreting them with ‘the deadly impact’ of new
thoughts, than he did with the dialectical subtleties of his Marxist friends’’
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(). Three years later, Arendt will write the following on behalf of Heideg-
ger: ‘‘The rumor about Heidegger put it quite simply: Thinking has come
to life again; the cultural treasures of the past, believed to be dead, are being
made to speak, in the course of which it turns out that they propose things
altogether different from the familiar, worn-out trivialities they had been
presumed to say.’’28 Benjamin’s collecting and Heidegger’s thinking share
the mode of reviving cultural treasures, of diving for words, of making dead
objects speak. For the political theorist Arendt, Heidegger’s and Benjamin’s
search for truth and their reliance on language and linguistic probings seem
to unite both beyond the question of ideology. And Arendt, recognizing
this bond, becomes more than just a person to summarize similarities of
thought; her own work searches for a place within this old and new world
of ‘‘things.’’
III. Hunchback
In Arendt’s essay, Benjamin enters the twentieth century as an endan-
gered species. Still of a time past and unable to adapt to the present in prac-
tical ways, he acquires the uniqueness of a living artifact as well as of an
original thinker. Both are in need of protection, and Arendt’s essay turns
into a curatorial space. She, too, becomes a pearl diver of sorts. It is Arendt
who carries Benjamin’s ‘‘Theses on the Philosophy of History,’’ written on
slim newspaper wrappers of the Cahiers du Sud and the Schweizer Zeitung
from Paris to NewYork, perhaps to show them to Adorno, but ultimately to
include them among her own papers, and they are now stored, together with
her notes and correspondence, in the archives of the Library of Congress.29
If she later described Rahel as ‘‘my closest friend, though she has been dead
for some hundred years,’’30 it was certainly Benjamin’s work during the late
years of the war that should provide her with further guidance. In Lisbon,
en route to the United States, Arendt and Heinrich Blücher read from Ben-
jamin’s ‘‘Theses’’ to each other as well as to other refugees, to discuss the
possible practical implications of his concept of ‘‘messianic hope.’’31 Her
attempts to place Benjamin’s writings posthumously follows those earlier
efforts by Adorno (from New York) or Gershom Scholem (from Jerusalem)
to keep Benjamin alive and working during the years of war. In her essay,
Arendt describes Benjamin’s resistence to Adorno’s or Scholem’s help as an
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awkward gesture of self-preservation, and as an insistence on some form of
independent life. No doubt, her description reflects much of her own tense
relationship with Adorno, as well as her troubled friendship with Scholem,
which came to an end after the publication of her Eichmann book in .32
For Arendt, Benjamin proves to be resisting help, as much as his texts
resist a simple reading, cast as they are in a seemingly straightforward,
simple language that would hide some of their complexities. In her essay,
Arendt moves outside his work to an account of his life and tries to make
sense of Benjamin’s essays by integrating them into a biographical tale. Life
stories are nothing new for Arendt. Following her book on Rahel Varn-
hagen, Arendt often employed different kinds of biographical narrative,
most strikingly perhaps in her Origins of Totalitarianism, the three-volume
study published in  that established her fame.33 There, Arendt tells the
life stories of Rahel Varnhagen again, of Benjamin Disraeli, as well as other
writers and politicians. While Benjamin’s life is perhaps able to elucidate
his work, life stories for Arendt should offer themselves as examples for
political theory and actions taken, even in dark times. In his essay ‘‘The
Storyteller [Der Erzähler],’’ Benjamin predicts the end of narrative due to
the absence of experience, and more specifically, the experience of death.34
In Arendt’s essay, Benjamin’s death not only takes a central position, but it
is integrated in a general narrative of lucky coincidences and mishappen-
ings. Benjamin’s life becomes a tale about the good and bad turns of fate.
Like the hero of a fairy tale, he can win with naïveté and remain blind to
difficulties. And it is perhaps this blindness with which he could confront
the dark times victoriously.
Indeed, to understand Benjamin’s life and the instigation for his work,
Arendt forms his life into a story with a simple plot line and chooses a chil-
dren’s tale as its leitmotif. This tale could have been culled from any of the
children’s books that Benjamin collected. It is the story of the little hunch-
back, published in Georg Scherer’sDeutschem Kinderbuch.35 ‘‘Wherever one
looks in Benjamin’s life, one will find the little hunchback,’’ Arendt writes
().
This story of the little hunchback appears in Benjamin’s work as well,
first in his own autobiographical text, Berlin Childhood Around . Ber-
lin Childhood consists of a sequence of brief vignettes that, brought into
constellation with each other, provide a theory and practice for the remem-
brance of things past. There, Benjamin reminiscences about his youth and
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his mother’s references to a ‘‘little hunchback’’ who would play tricks on
persons and objects in the house (–). Indeed, the memories of the tales
about the little hunchback conclude the memoirs of his youth. Arendt, who
describes Benjamin’s intense study of the Romantic period,36 does not place
the hunchback in a children’s book, but traces its presence to a poem and
folk song in Achim von Arnim’s and Clemens Brentano’s collection Des
Knaben Wunderhorn.37 ‘‘Mere children’s talk’’ is thus elevated to the realm
of German canonical literature. And, to stress the importance of this poem
as an emblem, or even an allegory of Benjamin’s life, Arendt quotes several
verses:
When I go down to the cellar
There to draw some wine
A little hunchback who’s in there
Grabs that jug of mine.
When I go into my kitchen
There my soup to make
A little hunchback who’s in there
My little pot did break.
. . . . . . . .
O dear child, I beg of you
Pray for the little hunchback too.
(–)
These are the verses that appear as citations in Benjamin’s autobiographical
text, but are gathered and united in Arendt’s biographical tale. Diving for
these words, Arendt reconstitutes a poem.
IV. Kafka
The little hunchback trips the child in the role of an adult, drawing wine
and making soup. His signature is one of mischief. He may cause damage
inadvertently and is a sorry figure—one that should be included in a prayer
for protection. If there is any political action inscribed in his deeds, it is
perhaps indeed that of resistance. But something else becomes obvious as
well. As in the tale of the race between the hare and the canny porcupine,
the little hunchback is always already there waiting.
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Arendt’s essay on Benjamin was first written in German and then trans-
lated into English by Harry Zohn, who was also responsible for the trans-
lation of Benjamin’s essays in Illuminations. Arendt was pleased with this
English version, for which she did some revisions,38 but naturally, the Ger-
man text came first. Mary McCarthy, to whom Arendt had sent the essay on
Benjamin and indeed all the pieces of Men in Dark Times, reflected on the
matter of translation, and finally evoked a third, secret language of power-
ful, hidden names that had preoccupied Benjamin himself within a theo-
logical framework. In McCarthy, however, it appeared as part of a fairy-
tale tradition and produced a German subtext of a different sort. ‘‘You turn
their lives into runic tales, with formulas like rhymes carpentering them
together: Rumpelstiltskin,’’ McCarthy wrote to Arendt, recognizing as well
her friend’s protective role: ‘‘[o]f course you are coaxing them to tell you
(and us) their secret name. This book is very maternal, Hannah, mütter-
lich, if that is a word. You’ve made me think a lot about the Germans and
how you/they are different from us. It’s the only work of yours I would call
‘German,’ and this may have something to do with the role friendship plays
in it, workmanly friendship, of apprentices starting out with their bundle
on a pole and doing a piece of the road together.’’39 Arendt agreed with
McCarthy about the fairy-tale-like properties of her essays but did not seem
to understand her remarks about their ‘‘German’’ nature40—and her ex-
change with McCarthy here is oddly resonant of the discussion on German
(and Jewish) essence that she conducted with Jaspers in earlier years.41 But
if a ‘‘gnomic quality’’ marks Arendt’s essay on Benjamin as one of appren-
ticeship and motherly protection, as McCarthy writes,42 that quality is not
one that appears here for the first time. The hunchback did not only haunt
Benjamin’s autobiographical sketch and Arendt’s account, but it also struc-
tures Benjamin’s own well-known essay on Franz Kafka.43 Here, he cites two
other verses that Arendt faithfully included with his essay in Illuminations:
When I come into my room,
My little bed to make,
A little hunchback is in there,
With laughter does he shake.
When I kneel upon my stool
And I want to pray,
A hunchbacked man is in the room
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And he starts to say:
My dear child, I beg of you,
Pray for the little hunchback too.
()
At the end of the third section of this essay, entitled ‘‘Das bucklicht Männ-
lein [The Hunchbacked Little Man],’’ Benjamin does not refer to Rumpel-
stiltskin, but to the prisoner of ‘‘The Penal Colony.’’ In Kafka’s tale, this
prisoner is submitted to a sentence without knowing the reason for his con-
viction. His back is ornamented with letters that spell the ‘‘name’’ of his
crime in a manner that was unreadable to him. Benjamin compares the
hunchback—here no longer a figure of a children’s poem, but of a folk
song—with the characters of Kafka’s imagination. The hunchback is con-
demned to lead a displaced and disfigured life [entstellte(s) Leben]44 and
would only be released by the arrival of the Messiah. In the verse that Ben-
jamin quotes, the hunchback does not break things, but interrupts another
person’s actions with laughter and conversation; thus, he questions daily
tasks and prevents proper prayer. With his reference to the messianic tradi-
tion, it is Benjamin, not Arendt, who responds to McCarthy’s claim. ‘‘In his
depth,’’ he writes, ‘‘Kafka touches the ground which is given to him neither
by ‘mythical speculation’ [mythischem Ahnungswissen] nor by existential
theology. It is the ground for the German folk tradition [Volkstum] as well
as the Jewish one.’’45
Arendt does not comment on the occurrence of the figure of the hunch-
back in Benjamin’s essay on Kafka, but it is precisely the figure of Kafka
that looms large in her essay on Benjamin. She herself had written repeat-
edly about the author. In her early piece, ‘‘The Jew as Pariah: The Hidden
Tradition’’ published in ,46 and later included in a German collection
called Die verborgene Tradition,47 ‘‘Kafka’’ itself becomes a secret name; and
its bearer is described as a writer who aggressively rethinks the problematic
of the pariah. Arendt refers to his novel The Castle whose hero, the land
surveyor K., fails to measure and establish borders but is intrigued by the
mysterious castle and the villagers’ peculiarities. For Arendt, K. becomes a
Jew who lacks the pariah’s innocence and awkwardness. In a second essay,
entitled ‘‘Franz Kafka,’’ Arendt discusses a second novel, The Trial, but re-
turns to The Castle as well.48 She praises the author’s simple language, which
gains perfection by the lack of adornment. It is a language in search of truth
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that establishes the author both as modern and as a stranger among his
peers ().
In her essay on Benjamin, however, Arendt stresses Kafka’s importance
even more emphatically. Kafka, too, was ‘‘unique.’’ ‘‘Innumerable attempts
to write à la Kafka, all of them dismal failures, have only served to em-
phasize Kafka’s uniqueness,’’ Arendt writes, ‘‘that absolute originality which
can be traced to no predecessor and suffers no followers’’ (). Benjamin
shares this originality, and the ‘‘downright incomparable’’ Berlin critic is
constantly being compared to the slightly older writer from Prague. Both
are unique, both offer a touch of the Romantic hero—if not genius—as they
reflect on the modern world. One has to study Benjamin’s ‘‘Theses on His-
tory’’ to understand Kafka’s sense of progress and a fiction that predicts
reality in a most gruesome way.49
Benjamin’s reputation may have been greater during his lifetime, Kafka’s
greater after his death, but these differences seem slight. If Kafka wrote
his fiction in the purest German, Benjamin’s achievement as a critic was
to think poetically, to focus on an allegorical mode. Indeed, Arendt feels
unable to describe Benjamin without constant references to that other Jew-
ish writer. It is perhaps not surprising that her file on Benjamin combines
his manuscripts and notes on his work with her own research on Kafka.
In a single folder, now part of the Arendt Papers, Benjamin and Kafka are
inseparably bound together by Arendt’s guiding hand and pen.50
Arendt’s own sketch of Benjamin’s life and work in turn does consider-
ably more than rely upon quotations from Benjamin’s essay or cite its figure
of the hunchback. Like Benjamin, Arendt divides her work in sections that
bear different headings, moving that of ‘‘The Hunchback’’ in first place. A
Chassidic tale or the description of a photograph gain importance in Ben-
jamin’s piece; here, they are replaced by anecdotes from Benjamin’s life.
Arendt seems to slip into Benjamin’s skin, rewriting his essay by restoring
his life’s story, producing a palimpsest of obvious names and secret ones
that are inscribed beneath the essay’s title and the author’s signature.
Thus Arendt did not only write an essay on Benjamin. As an author of
‘‘dark times,’’ Heidegger becomes his companion and his shadow. And as
a ‘‘unique’’ author of German prose, he becomes Kafka’s double. In turn,
Arendt, who could not rescue Benjamin in life, becomes the writer of his
fate. She publishes the story of his life together with a selection of his essays
and enters thus herself into this intriguing constellation of the philosopher,
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collector, and writer. This may be Arendt’s own way of thinking poetically,
perhaps, that she had praised so much in Walter Benjamin. Perhaps this
may be another way of writing history from the present, of approaching it
allegorically. Thus Arendt does not only refer to Benjamin’s illuminations.
In her description of his life and work in those dark times, she tries to enact
their lessons as well.
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On Daniel Ganzfried’s The Sender
and BinjaminWilkomirski’s Fragments
    
MaryWollstonecraft Shelley remade the traditional trope of the ‘‘book
as offspring’’ by dubbing her Frankenstein ‘‘my hideous progeny,’’ thus ren-
dering uncanny andmonstrous what had been an innocuous metaphor, and
positing the literary birth as unnatural and deformed precisely by virtue of
its incongruously natural progenitor.1 In what follows, we consider two texts
that implicitly reverse this formulation: by shaping their very different nar-
ratives around or against the Holocaust, they implicitly acknowledge that
extraliterary event as a hideous progenitor and as the monstrous sponsor of
human histories (those of the survivors) that demand to be retold. Further-
more, the Holocaust has become productive of histories of another sort:
those of the postwar, ‘‘second’’ generation, which through the operation of
what Marianne Hirsch has called ‘‘postmemory’’ uses the experiences of the
survivor generation as a means of fashioning a coherent identity in a global-
izing world of weakened national, confessional, and humanist codes.2 In a
grotesque sense, the ethical self-fashioning made available by a relationship
to narratives and memories of the Holocaust might be said to represent the
literary construction of a progenitor. The Holocaust seems, in other words,
to be the cause for the affects and symptoms felt in the post-Holocaust self
that is in the process of coming into being through this very operation.
This metaphorical moment of autocreation has been given a literal turn
with the discovery of fraud in the work of Binjamin Wilkomirski, who was
found in his Fragments to have literally fabricated for himself a past as
a child survivor of the camps.* The person responsible for the discovery,
*As this essay went to press, it was conclusively proved that Fragments was a hoax.
The remarks in the second half of the essay should be read in the context of the debate
over the book’s authenticity still ongoing in .
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Daniel Ganzfried, is himself the author of a book, The Sender, a fiction-
alized second-generation memoir in which these very temptations of self-
fashioning, of self-authorization through the Holocaust, are thematized and
worked through with subtlety and rigor. In the essay below, we take up first
Ganzfried’s novel, with its resistance to the lure of the Holocaust as liter-
ary progenitor and its construction of an alternative memory, the subject
of which will remain somewhere on the border between father and son, self
and other, history and fiction. The second half treatsWilkomirski’s text and
the ramifications of its full-frontal and yet entirely fraudulent eyewitness re-
counting of the events of the Holocaust for a late-postwar generation accus-
tomed to blurring phenomenological boundaries in its aesthetic life-world.
And yet it is precisely this generation, which will outlive the eyewitnesses
and the survivors, that is in need of accuracy and truth for its appraisal of
the disastrous past out of which it has arisen. As members of such a co-
hort, and having been vexed for some time now with this same problem,
we count ourselves fortunate to have had our own engagements formed by
Stanley Corngold: to whom in grateful tribute this work.
At a crucial point in the climactic reunion scene with his father in Homer’s
Odyssey, Telemachus, the son of Odysseus, manifests doubt about the iden-
tity of the man who has just revealed himself as the long-awaited hero, re-
turned from his ten years of wandering following the end of the TrojanWar.
‘‘Well,’’ replies this man, effectively, ‘‘I am the only Odysseus you’re going
to get.’’3 At this, Telemachus is reconciled to the man who is in fact present
before him and who had until that moment consisted for him of little more
than a collection of stories. The son has been tested by his own wanderings
through the farther reaches of his homeland, as well as by an impromptu
apprenticeship with his father’s comrades Nestor and Menelaus. He is now
prepared to lend his efforts to the task of reestablishing this Odysseus as
king of Ithaca, husband to his mother Penelope, and rightful administrator
of the patrimony Telemachus himself had earlier been called upon, in view
of his father’s long absence and presumed death, to bestow anew.
And yet Telemachus would not, in theory, have to make do with only
this bald declaration as proof of his putative father’s identity. Once Odys-
seus, disguised as a wandering mendicant, has been smuggled into the be-
sieged palace, his true identity is ‘‘read’’ and recognized conclusively by a
faithful retainer. The servant, Euryclea, who has been called upon to give
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the stranger a footbath, notices a scar on Odysseus’s leg and, since she had
been that man’s nurse when he was young, is able to recall the origins of
the wound in an episode from her charge’s gallant youth. The final seal is
set to the process of recognition when Penelope herself, the faithful wife,
tests and then formally recognizes Odysseus as her husband on the basis of
his possession of a piece of information (the nature of their marriage bed)
to which only the two of them had been privy.
These three stages of recognition—let us call them testimony, physical
proof, and cross-examination—are also the subject of Daniel Ganzfried’s
novel of second-generation Holocaust memory, The Sender, in which a son
confronts a long-lost father who happens to be a survivor of the Nazi work
and death camps.4 But the uses of these stages of recognition are signifi-
cantly different in the epic poem and the contemporary novel, as much as
the latter recalls the former thematically. Telemachus in the Odyssey moves
through his putative father’s testimony to an encounter with physical proof
(the scar) and cross-examination (the shibboleth of the bed), respectively
notarized and carried out by others more qualified than he, all of which
will establish Odysseus as the counterpart to the corpus of stories Telema-
chus has heretofore had as the sole and undisputed legacy of his father. The
hero of Ganzfried’s novel, meanwhile, follows a path that is the reverse of
this one. Faced with the solid and uncontroversial presence of a man he has
no reason to doubt is his father, Ganzfried’s Georg must himself carry out
the cross-examination of this man, as well as the inspection of the physical
proof of his identity, that will cause the store of anonymous tales to which
Georg has gained access to fit this particular, undisputed father.Where Tele-
machus gives primacy to the man, in other words, Georg gives primacy to
the story. Telemachus does not believe that the man he sees before him can
be the actual hero of the stories he has heard, and he must be led to a belief
in the authenticity of this all-important figure through the series of proofs
evinced above: he must make the man fit the stories. Georg, meanwhile,
cannot believe that the stories he has been listening to in his capacity as
transcriber of taped accounts of concentration camp survivors can possibly
refer to this figure, whom he knows beyond any doubt to be his father. He
must struggle with versions of the same sort of proofs as confront Telema-
chus in his attempt to make the stories fit the man.
But Georg’s stories have primacy not only because of the relatively un-
controversial identity of the man in question. The particular stories Georg
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has been hearing belong to the foundational history of his time, to the cor-
pus of eyewitness accounts of the Holocaust, of its precursors, its effects,
and its survivors, to what might be termed the Iliad of the modern era.
Now, Telemachus’s stories, the accounts of his father’s exploits both on
and off the battlefield, comprise in fact the original, veritable Iliad, as well
as that saga’s continuation in the equally celebrated but no longer extant
cycle of Nostoi, or tales of return from the Trojan War. And yet even that
seminal store of Hellenic myths pales in comparison with the flesh-and-
blood hero of the Odyssey himself, with that Odysseus who continues to
be the central and irreplaceable motive force in his own very much on-
going narrative. Faced by such a presence, Telemachus moves seamlessly
from being a consumer of those stories (to whose accumulation he has de-
voted much of the earlier part of the poem) to becoming an actor in their
sequel, in the poem’s present time, with all of that frame narrative’s notori-
ously Iliad-recapitulating intrigue and violence as Odysseus and his allies
slay Penelope’s suitors and take back the hereditary hall. For much of The
Sender, by contrast, Ganzfried’s Georg clings tenaciously to the accounts of
the Holocaust, to its causes and its aftermath as evoked in the account he
has been hearing, even in the face of his flesh-and-blood father. He does
this in part because this particular man happens to be leading a life of no
special distinction or urgency in the novel’s present time, and in part, in a
related sense that is famously true of survivors’ accounts of the Holocaust in
general, because the Holocaust did not—indeed does not—allow distinc-
tive characters to emerge out of it (as do the Iliad, the Odyssey, and the lost
Nostoi), and thus to take on heroic characteristics that might enable them
to transcend their story’s narrative world.
Georg’s recognition of the sameness of the accounts of concentration
camp survival comes early on in the novel, as he is about to happen upon
the tape cassette containing what sounds like his father’s voice but which
bears, intriguingly, no return address. In a striking image, Georg is lulled
by the series of identical testimonies he must hear and transcribe:
The more cassettes Georg had listened to since starting the job, the more
often he had heard repeated years, places, countries, and the names of
the concentration camps entered on the forms; for some time, in fact,
he had had the impression, nearly dozing between the headphones, that
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he was listening over and over again to one and the same story of sur-
vival of one and the same camp.When details did nevertheless stand out,
which was seldom the case, they would stir about on the stew of voices
like leaves torn from a tree that float downstream while one watches for
a while, until the next branch comes and they are forgotten. The fifteen-
minute breaks he took between sessions at his listening post had recently
been getting more frequent, without his noticing it, in proportion to the
extra effort it took him to get the headphones on again in his windowless,
soundproof studio.5
This is indeed the tape cassette that will provide the motive for the quest
that comprises the rest of the novel. And here, in what might indeed be
called a Homeric simile (relying as it does on a pastoral miniature to con-
vey something workaday or unbeautiful), is evidence of what Dan Diner
has called the ‘‘statistics, but not the narrative’’ of the Holocaust. For ‘‘the
million-fold molding of life histories into one single fatal destiny, which was
carried out in a factory-like way, deprives the event in the consciousness of
posterity of any story-telling structure.’’6 What the Holocaust was meant
famously to achieve, after all, was the elimination not only of the Jews but
also of their retailable, inheritable memory; and insofar as memory is one
of the phenomena most closely associated with the Jewish tradition, it has
even been suggested that memory itself formed a substantive target for the
architects of the ‘‘Final Solution.’’7
This nonnarrativity of the Holocaust is more pointedly foregrounded in
The Sender when Georg considers one of those people who lived through
the camps, a wealthy New York real estate developer who is now contrib-
uting money and prestige to the burgeoning museum project:
He was one of the ‘‘Survivors,’’ as those who had lived through the con-
centration camps were familiarly known here. They made up their own
species, one referred to themwith pride and gave them special privileges.
This was especially crucial in NewYork, where all the other communities,
after all, could only by stressing their alleged uniqueness avoid dissolv-
ing unnoticed into their surroundings. Some of them shrilly, others with
an elegant aloofness, each according to the share of authenticity reserved
to that uniqueness. On the other hand, no one was exactly sure what was
to be done with these ‘‘Survivors;’’ their own silence about their history
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set them too distinctly apart from the rest of the family, which was con-
cerned with nothing so zealously as the attempt to bear witness to the
rest of the world. ()
What Georg is confronted with, then, is the singularly vexing problem of
a history so ethically privileged that it submerges its very actors within its
need to tell itself—to tell itself, in fact, through others who are less ethically
entailed in their own narrative than the sufferers of the events they relate.
And the Holocaust’s ethically privileged history is of course so aesthetically
impoverished that it would in any case hardly afford thematerial for any one
of its actors to emerge from its grinding sameness as a distinct character.
Between the Holocaust’s narrative unsuitability and its perverse compul-
sion to be narrated, then, there remains very little ground for meaningful
speech.
Ganzfried’s solution to this conundrum, in the face of the survivor father
who stands before him upon the observation deck of the Empire State
Building throughout the novel’s entire framing narrative, will be in fact to
free his protagonist gradually from the grip of the Holocaust testimony to
which he has been attending, and to construct for him instead a lovingly
detailed and perhaps entirely fictional account of his father’s life before and
after the period of his internment in various of the Nazis’ concentration
camps. For the reader will in fact never be allowed even to ‘‘hear’’ the voice
on the cassette recordings, but will only hear about it at the double remove
of Ganzfried’s third-person account of Georg’s listening. At most, the elu-
sive phonic messenger or ‘‘sender’’ is sensually described: he is a ‘‘hoarse
tenor’’ with an ‘‘eastern accent,’’ and is ‘‘probably a smoker’’ (). The voice’s
effect on Georg is evident on every page of his strand of this polyphonous
novel, but the first-person narrative that takes over from Georg’s third-
person sections during roughly half of the book’s considerable length, and
which even the careful reader may be forgiven for believing is equivalent
to the taped testimony, spends very little of its time recounting life in the
camps.8 Much more of Ganzfried’s care and attention is lavished on evok-
ing, through that anonymous narrator’s voice, the quality of the small-town
Eastern Jewish experience before and during the Nazi occupation of Hun-
gary in , on recounting without pathos the trials of rehabilitation in
a British army field-hospital established on the site of Bergen-Belsen fol-
lowing the Nazi defeat, and on detailing the poverty and continuing injus-
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tices to be encountered in Palestine and Israel from the immediate postwar
period and on into the s.
This other narrative strand of the book will eventually dovetail, if only
ambiguously, with the novel’s present, set in  at the height of the Gulf
War and the imminent return of soldiers from a distant campaign. The mar-
tial background serves further to underline the Telemachean echoes of the
novel’s third strand. In the weeks leading up to the Allied attack on the
Iraqi forces in Kuwait, during which period Georg searches for evidence to
link the anonymous tape-recorded concentration camp testimony with his
father, he consults veterans of the Hungarian-Jewish world, just as Telema-
chus visits his father’s aging comrade Nestor to learn of his whereabouts;
and he has recourse to the amazing if limited technological advances in
memory storage, as at the Mormon Family History Center, with its gene-
alogical data banks (), in a wry inversion of Telemachus’s experience
of memory-altering magic at the home of Menelaus and Helen. But in the
course of his research, Georg, like Telemachus once again, will be frustrated,
for final confirmation of his father’s identity will lie always just beyond his
grasp, as indeed all guarantees of the ultimate return of the hero Odysseus
will elude his son until that man stands before him and reveals himself. And
as he tries once more to reconstruct the period following  March , the
date of the Nazi take over in Hungary, the beginning of the transports of
Hungarian Jews to the death camps, and the occasion for the taped reminis-
cences, and thus to reserve for his father some connection with the master
nonnarrative epic of their time, Georg grows to suspect that his own task
may be doomed, and that his father may have to remain ‘‘without history,
merely a left-behind’’ (). As he attempts to recall his own early memories
of his father, a vision of his restless eyes, he begins accordingly to doubt the
possibility of retrieving what that man had witnessed, and indeed, of shap-
ing from any such retrieved testimony an adequate or true narrative: for
‘‘no reality would arise from facts alone, since his sender was now threat-
ening, if the facts did not add up, to disintegrate into an insubstantial trick
of the mind’’ ().
It is against such a threat of his father’s evanescence, of his deterioration
into a mere ahistorical chimera, that Georg—or rather, Ganzfried’s novel,
for the ultimate responsibility for the first-person portion of the story is
never made clear—will construct the elaborate and yet unpathetically nar-
rated history of a life, from its origins in prewar provincial Hungary through
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a most delicate and elliptical treatment of its concentration camp experi-
ences, and thence to its Diaspora settlement in postwar Switzerland (al-
though that destination is never explicitly named, but only cryptically sug-
gested). In a parallel movement, however, Georg will for the entire duration
of the novel’s present–time frame narrative attempt to read upon his father’s
forearm the ultimate and most tangible proof of that man’s identity with
the privileged anonymous speaker of the Holocaust testimony: the tattoo
Georg knows from childhood experience to be there. But the son is forced
into a game of oblique scrutiny of his father’s person since he cannot him-
self recall the number from past viewings, his father’s physical presence in
his life having been too brief and too early. It would be a simple enough
matter to check his father’s tattoo against the number recited clearly in the
tape recording: only his father does not oblige, oblivious as he is to Georg’s
design.
This ongoing furtive struggle to glimpse the tattooed number signals
Georg’s unwillingness to relinquish the hope that some redemptive reality,
some palpable history, may indeed arise from ‘‘the facts,’’ from a discov-
ered correspondence between the material testimony of the tape cassette
and the material object of the writing on his father’s body. This hope per-
sists despite the novel’s empirically attested option for another sort of truth,
for a (re)constructed history that will in fact elide the privileged moment
of the camps only to seek its wisdom in the quotidian of pre- and post-
Holocaust experience. Indeed, Georg’s attempts to glimpse his father’s tat-
too recall in one notable juxtaposition the pre-Holocaust marking of Jewish
bodies in fascist Hungary by means of yellow armbands, only thereby to
render suspect and illegitimate this even more indelible means of determin-
ing identity.9
And the novel will indeed ultimately equivocate upon the issue of this
factual identity. For there will come no Euryclean moment for Georg, no
recognition by means of the tokens and shibboleths of which Homer’s epic
makes use. The revelation of his father’s tattoo will not have a chance to
bring forth out of itself in vivid plastic detail the original scene of its in-
scription. In any case, the first-person account of the camp survivor and
putative bearer of that tattoo notably leaves out much of its subject’s camp
experiences and avoids touching down in Auschwitz altogether.10 For, as
Erich Auerbach notes in ‘‘Odysseus’ Scar,’’ his foundational reading of the
representation of reality in Greek epic and the Old Testament, treating the
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famous Euryclea scene in the Odyssey, the full-blown realism of the retell-
ing of Odysseus’s wounding by the wild boar in his youth, the cause of the
scar that at a critical moment in his adventures threatens to reveal him, has
the power to hold up Homer’s frame narrative and suspend the impetus of
his story’s suspense.11 In a related yet opposed fashion, Ganzfried’s novel
avoids such a realistic retelling of Auschwitz and a confrontation with the
origins of the wound on the body of its survivor precisely because it knows
that such a retelling, such a confrontation, would threaten to suspend the
frame narrative that is underway.
Here then Ganzfried’s novel reverses Georg’s initial priorities, his privi-
leging of the story—the Auschwitz testimony—over the man; or at least it
substitutes now a new story for the one that had first caught the protago-
nist’s attention by means of its generally acknowledged powers of ethical
compulsion. For in place of the inevitably foregrounded and overshadow-
ing style of the narration of Auschwitz, of the branding of his father’s body,
and of that brandmark’s discovery within the present time of the frame nar-
rative—the style of those numbing tape recordings Georg has been listening
to, what in the context of Homer’s epic technique Auerbach refers to as the
sort of style that ‘‘causes what is momentarily being narrated to give the im-
pression that it is the only present, pure and without perspective’’12—Ganz-
fried’s novel substitutes a lower-profile, less insistent, substantively subtler
narrative. The Sender is in fact a special hybrid of past and present, vivid
and less vivid, a veritable pastiche or cinematic montage of at least two dif-
ferent voices or perspectives in whose mingling revelation occurs, if at all,
only at the margins of the story, without significant or leading recognition
by any of its characters: for the connection between the two or three differ-
ent story-strands is never made explicit, nor, if it is implied (in for instance
the appearance of similar minor characters in the first- and third-person
sections), is its significance emphasized.13
The novel effects thus a very artful blending of styles. It may indeed re-
linquish its right to revelation and the absolute vividness of identification
through explicit shibboleths and the recognition of a wound. It does not,
however, in those sections of the book in which the anonymous Hungarian
Jew speaks in the first person about his life, wholly abandon elements of
the vivid, plastic style that renders Homer so pleasurable to read, even as
it supplements those sections with the flatter, more monochromatic scenes
set in present-day New York.14 Thus Ganzfried’s novel is able to skirt the
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overwhelming narrative abyss of Auschwitz, yet must surrender neither its
project of a vindicating recreation of the father’s world disrupted by the
Holocaust (and now likely to be overshadowed by the contemporary in-
sistence upon narrating precisely and uniquely that event) nor its ethical
commitment to a meaningful confrontation with the recognized survivor
of the Holocaust (in contradistinction to the cynical professionalism with
which his colleagues treat such witnesses15).
But the scenes in which father and son do in fact draw closer to one an-
other, the stage for the fulfillment of this stern ethical imperative, are not,
for all that, entirely devoid of literary antecedent or allusion. Indeed, they
draw their power from a celebrated episode of another venerable tradition,
an episode equally concerned with the estrangement and reunion of father
and son, and it is in the admixture of this alternative style that The Sender
will in the end find its oblique reconciliation with the difficult claims of
Holocaust testimony. For in reading the sections of The Sender in which
Georg researches his father’s past, and especially those sections in which
father and son spend an afternoon and evening atop the Empire State Build-
ing, one recalls Auerbach’s parallel description, in that same essay in which
he discusses the Odyssey, of ‘‘an equally ancient and equally epic style from
a different world of forms,’’ that of the Elohist author of Genesis as he relates
Abraham’s attempted sacrifice of Isaac.16 There Auerbach speaks of a barren
verbal landscape, one unadorned with epithets and externalized descrip-
tion, yet with an implied profundity of psychology and an unrelieved sus-
pense in inverse proportion to such narrative austerity: all of this serving to
provide the most extreme possible contrast with the genial foregrounded-
ness of Homer’s epic technique.17 And indeed, the scenes atop the Empire
State Building are remarkable for their dryness, their inarticulateness at the
level of dialogue, their mystery regarding motivations and history, without
thereby surrendering anything in the way of hinted psychological depth or
narrative tension.
But the biblical episode, of course, is not evoked here in the context of
the New York passages only as a marker of stylistic contrast with Ganz-
fried’s Homeric world of the anonymous Hungarian Jew. What Georg and
his father enact on the Empire State Building resembles the events of Gene-
sis  thematically as well as stylistically. In both stories, a journey has
been undertaken following a mysterious command (God addresses Abra-
ham abruptly and without apparent location18; Georg receives an anony-
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mous tape recording, and his father is perplexed and startled when he is
unexpectedly given his son’s number to call []); the journey takes the
characters to a high place (God commands Abraham to take Isaac to one
of the mountains in the land of Moriah, which Abraham will then call
Jehovah-jireh, or ‘‘In the mount of the Lord it shall be seen,’’ Genesis .,
while Georg and his father ascend to the observation deck of the equally
portentously-named Empire State Building19); in both stories, a father and
son are united by the necessity of a difficult and painful task (the imposed
sacrifice, featuring the use of a knife and fire; the need for certainty regard-
ing a wound inflicted by means of heated steel); and in both stories, the
original goal is foiled or supplanted (the sacrifice is in the end not required,
Abraham’s faith having been proven without it; the tattoo is not inspected
and the camp is not discussed, Georg having decided to accept his father as
unknowably connected with the experience of the camps, and nevertheless
unique for having lived a certain life before and after).
In place of the original goal of the biblical episode, of course, which is the
immediate physicality of access to blessedness in the present through hu-
man sacrifice, there will be born a new conception of religious (and indeed
cultural) identity through God’s promise to Abraham of future blessed-
ness,20 while in place of the original goal of the novel, a reckoning with the
indelible truth of the tattoo and Auschwitz, there is born a new kind of
truth, a recognition that wisdom arises not from the facts, but from intro-
spection, from an imaginative and perhaps fictionalizing encounter with
memory, from a literary construction of one’s own origins, and indeed of
one’s own father.
In both narratives, in Genesis  and in The Sender, there is thus a
strongly redemptive strain. The Genesis episode will reprivilege, and thus
redeem, Abraham’s relation to his son, for Abraham’s holiness had led him
to a willingness to negate that relationship in favor of fealty to a spiritual
father or Lord of his own, while at the episode’s conclusion he is rewarded
by that same Lord with a vision of limitless, felicitous, unscathed progeny
(‘‘I will multiply thy seed as the stars of the heaven’’). Ganzfried’s Georg,
meanwhile, sees his father redeemed as a significant and valuable store of
idiosyncratic memories quite apart from his involvement in the heretofore
overprivileged world of the Holocaust, a world of monolithic narrative that
had threatened to subsume his father in the all-important project of its own
telling. What is ultimately redeemed in Ganzfried’s The Sender—without
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however undoing or banishing either the specter of Jehovah’s initial grim
demand for human sacrifice, which informs the novel structurally, or that
sacrifice’s modern avatar, the Holocaust, which drives it at the level of its
plot—what is ultimately redeemed is a fantasy of reunion with the world of
the father, one that in turn privileges over his physical presence an imagi-
native and literary encounter with his memory.21
When Binjamin Wilkomirski’s memoir Fragments first appeared in the
summer of , only a few months before Daniel Ganzfried’s The Sender,
it was widely received as one of the most important new works of Holo-
caust testimony, comparable in some estimations to the writings of Primo
Levi and Paul Celan. Published by the Jewish Press of Suhrkamp Verlag in
Frankfurt, it has since been translated into thirteen languages, made into
two films and one theatre piece, and has received among others the Na-
tional Jewish Book Award, the Jewish Quarterly Literary Prize, and the
Prix de la Mémoire de la Shoah. Wilkomirski himself has toured countless
schools and universities in Switzerland as well as other parts of Europe, the
United States, and Israel to speak of his experiences in the camps and in
postwar Switzerland as a child survivor of the Holocaust. Fragments is by
all accounts the best-known book to have come out of Switzerland in the
s, and Wilkomirski himself had become the most visible Jew living in
Switzerland.
The slim volume22 is a record of the visions and affects of a Polish-
Jewish child from Riga who survives Majdanek and a further unidentified
camp (assumed by most critics to be Auschwitz) and is subsequently sent to
Switzerland where he is given the brand-new identity of a Swiss citizen and
is adopted by a well-to-do couple in Zurich. His early childhood experi-
ences, writes Wilkomirski in the opening pages of Fragments, ‘‘are based
in the first instance on the exact images of my photographic memory and
the images that have been stored up along with them—bodily ones, too.
Then comes auditory memory and the memory of what has been heard,
also of what has been thought and at the very end the memory of what
I have myself said. . . . If I want to write about it, I must renounce the
organizing logic, the perspective of the adult’’ (). Like partly recovered
reels of old documentary film, these memories are marshaled into loosely
ordered tableaux that resist the adult’s will to an ordered chronology: Wil-
komirski’s father’s skull crushed against a wall by the Latvian militia; his
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own body hurled into concrete by a camp guard; two dead children, their
frozen fingers gnawed to the bone. This suggests a memory wholly un-
edited by the ordering principles of the adult self and untouched by the
enormity of Holocaust knowledge crowding the imagination of the mil-
lennial mind. It is a form of memory, then, that for all of its fragmented-
ness is unadulterated and pure, a memory for which fragmentedness is, the
book implies, the very symptom of purity and, by extension, the proof of
authenticity.
As if to underscore further the authenticity of the book, Wilkomirski
differentiates between the activity of a poet or an author and his own work
in the opening pages of his Fragments: ‘‘I am not a poet, not a writer. I can
only try to set down in words experience and event as exactly as possible—
as precisely, indeed, as my childhood memory has stored it up: without any
knowledge yet of perspective and vanishing point’’ (). More than anything
else this seemingly modest disclaimer for the literary quality of his auto-
biography is a further claim for its value as truth, a status that is of course
elemental to the act of witnessing the Holocaust. The reader is led to be-
lieve that it is not Wilkomirski himself who is responsible for the particu-
lar structure and the particular memories of the book, but rather that the
memories manifest themselves through the author, who is then left to trace
their contours as a child would trace those of a picture under glass.
Given this relinquishing of authorial responsibility, the artful, indeed lit-
erary, structuring of the book comes as something of a surprise: interwoven
with Wilkomirski’s earliest childhood memories in Riga and in Majdanek
are those of his arrival and painful integration first in the Swiss town of
Adelboden, and then in Zurich. What makes this structure most remark-
able is that each strand of the narrative underscores the varying shades of
memory the protagonist’s former selves were capable of having. In the first
distinct strand, the earliest flashes of horror glint against the faded and con-
fused background of time and place: a boy bids his dying mother farewell
in a desolate camp barrack; he gasps for air under crushed bodies in a train
with an unknown destination; he finds himself yanked along by disembod-
ied hands on endless marches to nowhere. In the second strand, that boy’s
impressions in Switzerland during the first few years are related by Wilko-
mirski as a sort of double memory—that is, the adult remembers the older
child’s memory for whom the noncamp environment could only be inter-
preted according to the remembered ‘‘normalcy’’ of the camps. In this view
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the adoptive parents’ gas furnace appears to be just the right size for cre-
mating a child; the Wilhelm Tell myth, as studied in school, is rejected as
implausible because ammunition, after all, even for the crossbow, is much
too precious to be wasted on children; and a ski lift on a school outing be-
comes a conveyor belt feeding children into the crematorium at the top of
the slope.
The readers, in the meantime, are taken in completely by both strands
of the memoir. While they busy themselves in the first half with supplying
the missing contexts and details of the camps that the child Binjamin can-
not understand or articulate, the second half of the book compels them to
translate the most mundane events of everyday life into the stuff of night-
mares. That is, the book’s readers are called upon to ‘‘remember’’ and to
apply their own Holocaust ‘‘experiences’’ in order to understand the book:
to be, in Susan Suleiman’s terms, both a referential reader, who asks what
camp, what train, what city, and a universalizing reader, who interprets
common objects and activities as icons for universalized suffering.23 Frag-
ments can only be read the way it is because of writers like Primo Levi, or
Jean Améry, or Paul Celan, all survivors who report with mature and astute
intelligence what occurred around them. And not only because of these last,
of course, but more recently because of the numerous research centers, nar-
ratives, films, documentaries, and extravagantly outfitted Holocaust muse-
ums that have turned the Holocaust into a cultural reference point, a store
of shared knowledge that unites a broad readership. It is this inundation
that accounts for our growing competence in the Holocaust and that makes
us greet eagerly any new perspective on the stories we’ve heard so many
times before. Fragments itself is, in other words, at once a product and con-
firmation of our collective imagination. No wonder it has found such an
echo around the world.
No wonder, too, that the suggestion that this book might be written by
an imposter who took advantage of our eagerness has come as a shock. In
the fall of , three years after Fragmentswas first published, Daniel Ganz-
fried’s research, published in a series of articles in the Swiss weeklyDieWelt-
woche, suggested that Binjamin Wilkomirski was really Bruno Doessekker,
a Swiss musician with a penchant for the history of the Holocaust who had
made up his ‘‘memoir’’ from whole cloth.24 Ganzfried had not set out to
prove this on his own initiative. Having been asked by the Swiss cultural
foundation Pro Helvetia to write an article on Binjamin Wilkomirski and
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the phenomenon of children without identities for their house organ, Ganz-
fried stumbled across biographical inconsistencies that were hard to recon-
cile with the story told in Fragments. Bruno Doessekker, who only assumed
the name Binjamin Wilkomirski when he began to write, had, according
to the official registry of the city of Biel, been born there in  as Bruno
Grosjean, the illegitimate offspring of one Yvonne Berthe Grosjean. Rather
than spending time in an orphanage in Cracow after the war, as Fragments’
protagonist is supposed to have done, Bruno was given up for adoption by
his birth mother and assigned to an orphanage in Adelboden, whence he
was placed in  with the Doessekkers of Zurich, who would became his
foster parents. His still living biological uncle, by this account, the brother
of Berthe Grosjean, confirms this information. In  Bruno Doessekker,
previously known as Grosjean, entered the public school system at the age
of six bearing the name of his foster parents. Bruno’s biological father con-
tinued to support his son until the Doessekkers officially adopted him in
.When his birth mother Yvonne Grosjean died in , he accepted her
modest inheritance.
Wilkomirski’s first, and to date only, public response to Ganzfried’s reve-
lations came in the form of an interview in the Zurich daily Der Tagesan-
zeiger.25 In this interview he points out that the seamless identity Ganzfried
has unearthed is nothing new, but rather the driving force for writing the
memoir in the first place. His biography, he maintains, is marked precisely
by this tension between officially constructed identity and memories that
could not be made to conform to the official story, a tension he had already
thematized in the postscript to his book. There, in Fragments, he wrote: ‘‘I
too received a new identity while I was still a child, another name, another
birthdate, another birthplace. . . . But this date corresponds neither with my
life history nor withmymemory . . . The legally notarized truth is one thing,
that of a life is another’’ (). This tidy explanation, however, still leaves
room for skepticism: if Wilkomirski was born in , as is claimed in Frag-
ments, instead of in , as his birth certificate claims, then why was the
age difference of two years neither noted upon school entry nor at any later
date? If Berthe Grosjean is not his mother, then why did Bruno Doessekker
accept an inheritance from her estate in ? And perhaps most curious
of all: why had not Wilkomirski himself investigated the cirumstances of
his allegedly fabricated official dossier? Why had he not insisted upon re-
vealing the fact that the Swiss officials had switched his identity, and with
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it his entire background by falsifying documents after the war in an effort
to integrate Jewish children who had survived the camps?
One of the unique aspects of Fragments, after all, is the attention it trains
on the fates of children who survived the war either in camps or in hiding,
and who were then alledgedly given false histories and identities by a num-
ber of European governments in the largely well-meant effort to prepare for
them a life in societies in which anti-Semitism was still rampant. For the
various organizations that attempt to help people recover their true identi-
ties—Amcha, the Children without Identity section at Yad le Yeled in Israel,
the Children of Holocaust Society, the Contact Center for Children of Sur-
vivors of Nazi Persecution in Switzerland—the authenticity of Fragments,
along with its legitimizing effect, had been as important as its potential ficti-
tiousness is now shattering. Not surprisingly, it has been these organizations
that have been most adamant in defendingWilkomirski.26 His is indeed one
of the few works that has thematized the problems that children without
identities must confront: their often scanty memory; the absence in most
cases of documents pertaining to their real pasts, even their names; and the
psychological problems and insecurities arising from traumatic memories
incommensurate with their assumed identity. Naturally a life history whose
essential characteristic is that it consists of memories that are often impos-
sible to trace would offer equally compelling material for someone whose
intent it was to forge a Holocaust memoir, and for someone whose aim it
was simply to excavate his past.
The verdict on whether the memoir is fictitious or not is still out, and it
is not clear when or indeed if we will ever learn the whole truth in this mat-
ter.27 While Ganzfried has suggested thatWilkomirski alias Doessekker take
a DNA test to establish, or rule out, kinship with his only supposed living
relative, the brother of Berthe Grosjean, Wilkomirski himself has appealed
unsuccessfully to the Bergier Commission, the federal body investigating
Swiss involvement in the Holocaust, to investigate his dossier. Since neither
of these suggestions has to date been taken up, we are left with four basic
scenarios: Wilkomirski is an imposter who has consciously constructed a
survivor’s memoir; Wilkomirski is an imposter but genuinely believes that
he survived the camps; Wilkomirski survived the camps and his memories
are inauthentic (that is, he was too young to have direct memories of his
experiences, and his memories have therefore been constructed); orWilko-
mirski survived the camps and his memories are authentic (that is, he has,
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as he claims in the book, direct memories of the camps). While many of
the participants in the lively discussions sparked by the Wilkomirski affair
have subscribed to and defended one or the other of these possible versions,
we would like to focus on two generalizable questions, which, while em-
phasized by the current scandal, do not depend on its definitive resolution.
First, what precisely changes in the function of the text within the larger
sphere of cultural memory if it is revealed to be fictitious? Second, what
sort of investment in a text’s authenticity warrants the kind of outrage the
revelations have generally elicited in readers?28
If Fragments is in fact invented, if Wilkomirski is, as Ganzfried believes, a
born Swiss who saw the camps only as a tourist, the book, as well asWilko-
mirski’s oral testimony, now stored at the oral history archives at Yale and in
the Spielberg archives, lose their testimonial value. This sudden change in
testimonial status can also be seen to threaten other testimonies: Holocaust
deniers have already begun to use the apparent effectiveness with which the
story of the Holocaust was made up by Wilkomirski as evidence that the
camps, and other survivor narratives, have been similarly invented. Even
if Wilkomirski is indeed a child survivor from Riga, but the memory frag-
ments he claims to have recovered from the time he was two to three years
of age were constructed to such a degree as to render indistinguishable
the line between authentic and inauthentic memory, his testimony would
still prove of little help. The author’s own description, in Fragments, of
how he managed to recover the past is instructive in this respect: ‘‘Years
of research work, many trips back to the presumed sites of the events, and
countless conversations with specialists and historians helped me to inter-
pret many inexplicable shreds of memory, to identify and rediscover places
and people, and to produce a possible historical context as well as a pos-
sible, halfway logical chronology’’ ().29 Memories reconstructed under
such circumstances, and with the retroactive input from so many sources
(including a highly controversial psychoanalytic technique often used with
adult victims of early childhood abuse to recover ‘‘deep’’ memory), are a
testimony not so much to the Holocaust itself as to its proliferation as a
cultural icon and system of reference in the late twentieth century.
While there is no doubt that the book’s status as Holocaust testimony
would change if it turned out to be fictitious, one might argue—and many
have—that the book’s literary and didactic merit remain the same whatever
the outcome of the accusations. It would still be a vivid and moving story
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of the Holocaust, one that grippingly renders the horrors of the camps.
Indeed, as Jurek Becker’s novel Jacob the Liar amply demonstrates, books
needn’t be historically true in order to render an essential truth about the
Holocaust.30 Had Fragments been introduced as a novel from the begin-
ning, it could have been received as a valuable contribution to Holocaust
literature, a thematization of the fate of child survivors. The uproar about
the text’s authenticity has however shifted attention away from the subject
of child survivors and onto other contemporary issues, thereby changing
the text’s cultural function and deflecting from its original context. Why,
for instance, was the fraud made public when it was? In what way does the
author’s pychopathology, if he turns out to believe he is a survivor when
he is not, block out the psychopathology of the two societies that have al-
legedly persecuted the novel’s protagonist? And why, finally, did its read-
ership make the ‘‘mistake’’ of receiving it with so much admiration and
praise?
The book’s initial reception and the dismay at the recent revelations
bear some investigation, with particular reference to readers’ investments
in Holocaust accounts and the seeming double standard by which such ac-
counts are judged. In the case of narratives that claim to tell the truth, there
comes into being a tacit pact between author and reader. For Wilkomirski,
who wrote to reclaim an identity, to reconstruct a memory, and to hold up
a mirror to a cruel and insensitive society, it is essential that someone con-
firm, legitimize, and record this real identity and the memory that proves it.
This is a role thousands of people have willingly played, reading the book,
awarding it prizes, recording it as testimony, listening and watching raptly
as Wilkomirski has told his story in auditoria, on television, and on radio.
The payback for readers in the meantime consists in the opportunity to
line up on the right side of the many ideological divides engendered by the
Holocaust. For the way one positions oneself with regard to the Holocaust,
that is, whether one believes it to have been unique, or that it should be
historicized within the broader sweep of history, whether it has been re-
membered enough, as MartinWalser would have it, or whether its memory
should be eternal, is a powerful determinant, at least in German-speaking
countries, of one’s political and ideological positioning within the general
culture. This tacit pact, then, for the reader as well as for the author, in the
case of a narrative that purports to tell the truth about the Holocaust, is
crucial for the fashioning of a particular kind of identity.
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The pact, of course, can only work as long as both sides hold to their
respective obligations: if Wilkomirski is writing in an attempt to reclaim
his lost identity, there must be a historical identity to reclaim; if he wants
to reconstruct a life from the shards of memory, those shards had better
be real. The uniqueness of the novel, namely that it is the account of one
of the rare child survivors, rests with the authenticity of its author’s claim.
The reader’s obligation, in the meantime, consists in believing and follow-
ing the basic premisses the author sets up. Contained in the sentence ‘‘I am
not a poet, not a writer’’ is a disclaimer with regard to the literariness of
the book, one which disallows criticisms on that score. In his postscript,
Wilkomirski makes clear his expectations to the reader. He writes, ‘‘I grew
up in a time and within a society that wouldn’t or couldn’t listen. . . . It was
only seldom that I tried with timidity to share even a fraction of my mem-
ory with anyone, but such attempts constantly went awry. A finger tapped
on the forehead or aggressive questions proffered in return would make me
shut up in a hurry, and take back again what I had revealed. I wanted my
security back, and I didn’t want to be silent any longer. That’s how I began
to write’’ (). To question the author’s memories is to be aligned squarely
with the boy’s monstrous teacher and his ignorant adoptive parents, who
stand for an entire society that wanted to hear nothing of the Holocaust or
of a small child who had been in its camps. It would also mean denying
him a security that can supposedly only come from the readers’ acceptance
and belief. But Wilkomirski ignores this pact in his single public response
to Ganzfried’s accusation when he says: ‘‘The reader was entirely at liberty
to take my book as literature or as personal document. . . . Nobody must
grant me belief.’’31 Of course, once the claim of authenticity has been made,
once readers have committed themselves to reading and participating in a
true story of the Holocaust, there can be no backing out on the part of the
author without breaching a trust, without breaking that pact.
If Fragments were conclusively revealed to be fictitious, however, all of
Wilkomirski’s faithful followers, themany schoolchildren who listened with
awe, the many critics who wrote with enthusiasm, and the many readers
who were haunted by the gnawed-off fingers, would be unmasked as dupes.
If the horrific images were invented, then the emotions they elicited from
their readers would take on the awful aspect of prurience, even porno-
graphic pleasure, and turn commendable sympathy into disgraceful lechery.
When Daniel Ganzfried decided to make public the results of his re-
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search in August of , he did so for numerous reasons, the three most
important having to do with reader reception, with preserving the capacity
for judgment even in the face of the Holocaust, and with the constitution
of the memory we hand over as a legacy to the next generation. It is not
surprising that Ganzfried, who in his novel The Sender resisted the impulse
to dwell on the Holocaust proper in an effort to privilege Georg’s father’s
postwar history, would insist in this nonfictional case that the person who
embodies the position his fictional—and factual—father does in history
be held to the stringent standards of testimony. The second-generation
memory Ganzfried employs through his protagonist Georg is beholden to
various postmodern phenomenological positions with special bearing on
narrative: the blurring of the boundaries between truth and fiction, the ac-
knowledgment of the constructedness of memory and the corollary con-
structedness of identity, and the contingent nature of the subject. In the
case of Ganzfried’s handling of Fragments, however, in the clearly marked
nonfictional space of Wilkomirski’s memoirs, the testing of the body of the
witness that is so delicately avoided in the clearly marked fictional space
of The Sender can and must be carried out. For in the case of Fragments,
what has been posited is not only the trope or figure of the Holocaust as
the hideous progenitor of scarred biographies, a rhetorical gesture to which
all members of the postwar generation might lay equal claim, what Wilko-
mirski did with his memoir, if Ganzfried is right, was actually to elect the
Holocaust as the archetype for his own undistinguished suffering. By the
terms of the inverted Odyssean process adhered to and then abandoned by
Ganzfried’s protagonist Georg, Wilkomirski must have expected to have to
undergo the scrutiny he has endured, having proposed the adequation of
his particular self to that centrally privileged and grotesquely paternal body
of history.

. ‘‘My hideous progeny’’ derives from the author’s preface to the  revised edi-
tion of her novel. See for an excellent variorum collationMaryWollstonecraft Shelley,
Frankenstein, or The Modern Prometheus, the  text edited with an introduction
and notes by Marilyn Butler (London: W. Pickering, ).
. On ‘‘postmemory’’ see Marianne Hirsch, ‘‘Past Lives: Postmemories in Exile,’’
Poetics Today, : (Winter ): –.
. See the Odyssey XVI –: ‘‘Telemachus, it doesn’t befit you to be too amazed
nor to wonder overly much at your dear father being present: for no other Odysseus
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will be coming hither, but here I am, just as you see me, I’ve suffered evils, quite a
few in fact, and I’ve come after twenty years to my fatherland’’ (our translation).
. Daniel Ganzfried, Der Absender (Zurich: Rotpunktverlag, ), hereafter re-
ferred to as The Sender.
. Ganzfried, The Sender, . All subsequent references to the novel will be pro-
vided parenthetically in the text. All passages cited in English are from Rafaël New-
man’s unpublished translation, excerpts of which are forthcoming in his edited vol-
ume, Jewish Writing in the Contemporary World: Switzerland (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press).
. Dan Diner, Kreisläufe: Nationalsozialismus und Gedächtnis (Berlin: Berlin Ver-
lag, ),  and  respectively; our translation.
. See Gunnar Heinsohn,Warum Auschwitz?: Hitlers Plan und die Ratlosigkeit der
Nachwelt (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, ). In his short essay ‘‘Gedächtnis und
Institutionen,’’ in Kreisläufe, –, an implicit dialogue with Ernest Renan, Diner
effectively lays the groundwork for such an idea in his identification of Germany’s
nineteenth-century anti-Napoleonic patriotism as that nation-to-be’s opting for an
ethnic collective memory over the political collective memory represented by the
French Revolution: that is, for a national identity founded upon a rejection of the his-
tory of universal values and institutions, the very history that would in a later period
come to be associated with ‘‘the Jews.’’
. The notion of strands of narrative, with its attractively Penelopean connotation
of a woven text, is owed to an essay treating Ganzfried among other young German-
language Jewish writers in Sander L. Gilman, Love + Marriage = Death? (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, ), pp. –; there, however, the suggestion seems in
fact to be that Ganzfried’s first-person account is tantamount to the taped testimony,
an imputation that clearly obscures the epistemological import of the novel. Other
readers who havemade this erroneous connection include some of Ganzfried’s earliest
Swiss reviewers: see Sandra Leis, ‘‘Ueberlebensmaske des Schweigens,’’ DieWeltwoche
( October ); Konrad Tobler, ‘‘Das Erinnern als Wissen um die Leerstellen,’’ Ber-
ner Zeitung ( November ); and Beda Hanimann, ‘‘Kindheit und Vergangenheit,’’
Der Kleine Bund ( December ).
. At The Sender , during a discussion of military drill in s Hungary, the
first-person narrator describes his teacher’s instructions always to wear the yellow
armband on the left arm and to keep it at all times visible: ‘‘He showed us the place
on the left upper arm—‘Never on the right!’—and explained that it had to be visible
at all times.’’ On page , despite his father’s having rolled up his sleeves, Georg is
foiled in his attempt to see the tattoo on his left forearm: ‘‘Now he would have been
near enough to him to be able to see more, but he found himself on the wrong side.’’
. Ganzfried has in fact remarked that he ‘‘closed the doors of the cattlecar in
Hungary and opened them again in Bergen-Belsen,’’ the site of the last of his subject’s
three internments, soon to become a British army field hospital (personal interview).
Auschwitz is of course remarkable in The Sender for its absence. At least one reviewer
with a clear taste for exactly the sort of pathetic witness-bearing the novel decries has
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gone so far as to lament the absence of echoes of Auschwitz, while forgiving the omis-
sion of the camp itself: ‘‘The story drifts more and more into banality; one simply
cannot accept the thoughtless lust for life of a young man who has survived Ausch-
witz. Mustn’t he have nightmares?’’ Lilian Leuenberger, ‘‘Beklemmende Suche nach
der Geschichte eines Vaters,’’ Zürcher Unterländer ( February ); our translation.
. See ‘‘Odysseus’ Scar’’ in Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in
Western Literature, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
, fourth edition), pp. –.
. Auerbach, Mimesis, .
. Note that Auerbach () speaks of the lack of ‘‘perspectivistic connection’’ be-
tween scenes of past and present in Homer’s Odyssey, as well, in which all is famously
said to be foreground with no possibility of characters’ remaining in the narrative’s
consciousness when not actually present. The difference of this disconnection from
that of The Sender is that, in Homer, there is no question that the scenes so juxtaposed
in fact do indisputably feature the same characters, while the point of Ganzfried’s text
is to cast doubt on precisely this sameness.
. Ganzfried has in fact spoken of his will to disrupt the reader’s pleasure, or con-
sumption of the ‘‘ice cream’’ of the Hungarian Jew’s detailed quotidian memoirs, by
intercutting them with the more challenging passages set in New York (personal con-
versation). Compare Auerbach’s account of scenes of description in Homer, in which
‘‘we may see the heroes in their ordinary life, and seeing them so, may take pleasure
in their manner of enjoying their savory present, a present which sends strong roots
down into social usages, landscape, and daily life. And thus they bewitch us and in-
gratiate themselves to us until we live with them in the reality of their lives; so long
as we are reading or hearing the poems, it does not matter whether we know that all
this is only legend, ‘make-believe’ ’’ (). Ganzfried’s novel will not determine which
of its strands is make-believe and which is truth, but neither will it allow us to be
lulled into the security of a pleasurable indifference to this question.
. See the scene (–) in which Georg’s superior, Ben, conducts a disingenuous,
fawning telephone conversation with an elderly lady whose estate he hopes to ac-
quire for the museum, and then announces to his colleagues in mock encouragement:
‘‘ ‘Have fun! And think about this: he who survives the Survivors has also survived
the Holocaust!’ ’’
. Auerbach, Mimesis, .
. Auerbach, Mimesis, –.
. ‘‘. . . God, in order to speak to Abraham, must come from somewhere, must
enter the earthly realm from some unknown heights or depths.Whence does he come,
whence does he call to Abraham? We are not told.’’ Auerbach, Mimesis, .
. Ganzfried has said that he chose to set his novel on the top of the Empire State
Building, rather than anywhere in the land to which his family had emigrated from
Israel, because ‘‘there is no place high enough in Switzerland from which to look
down on the Holocaust with the right distance’’ (personal conversation). The key to
interpreting this remarkable claim about a country within whose borders rise some
’  : 
of the world’s tallest peaks is perhaps then to be sought in precisely this biblical para-
text, which demands an artificial, urban counterpart to its natural setting so as to
underscore the novel’s parallel but different implications.
. ‘‘By myself have I sworn, saith the Lord, for because thou hast done this thing,
and hast not withheld thy son, thy only son: That in blessing I will bless thee, and in
multiplying I will multiply thy seed as the stars of the heaven, and as the sand which
is upon the sea shore; and thy seed shall possess the gate of his enemies; And in thy
seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed; because thou hast obeyed my voice.’’
Genesis :–.
. Lest this conclusion seem to ascribe to Ganzfried a Gnostic disdain for the
physical, like that suggested by Stanley Corngold of Kafka in ‘‘Nietzsche, Kafka and
Literary Paternity,’’ in Jacob Golomb, ed., Nietzsche and Jewish Culture (Routledge:
London, ), –, observe that The Sender ends in fact on a decidedly physical
(and surprisingly tender) note, as Georg and his father step into the elevator that will
take them back down to the less than sublime streets of New York. The father unwit-
tingly preempts his son’s ultimate attempt to examine his tattoo by begging Georg
‘‘for my sake,’’ or, more literally, ‘‘out of love for me,’’ to close his jacket and protect
himself against the cold: which service the son wordlessly performs, in the novel’s
final line (), and with a gesture of implicit respect for the loving imperative of the
man whose past Georg may or may not have called back into literary life.
. Bruchstücke: Aus einer Kindheit – (Frankfurt: SuhrkampVerlag, ).
(Published in English as Fragments: Memories of a Wartime Childhood, trans. Carol
Brown Janeway (New York: Schocken Books, []) All references subsequently
marked in the text; Wilkomirski’s book will hereafter be referred to as Fragments.We
have chosen to produce our own English versions of the passages here cited rather
than to follow Janeway, as her translation has become controversial: see Philip Goure-
vitch, ‘‘The Memory Thief,’’ The New Yorker ( June ): –.
. Susan Rubin Suleiman, ‘‘Monuments in a Foreign Tongue: On Reading Holo-
caust Memoirs by Emigrants,’’ Poetics Today, : (Winter ) –. Suleiman is
in turn influenced by Barbie Zelizer.
. See the series of articles by Ganzfried, ‘‘Die geliehene Holocaust-Biographie,’’
Die Weltwoche ( August ), ‘‘Fakten gegen Erinnerung,’’ Die Weltwoche ( Sep-
tember ), and ‘‘Bruchstücke und Scherbenhaufen,’’ Die Weltwoche ( Septem-
ber ), forthcoming in English translation in Newman (ed.), Jewish Writing in the
Contemporary World: Switzerland.
. Wilkomirski, ‘‘Niemandmussmir Glauben schenken,’’ interview by Peer Teuw-
sen, Der Tagesanzeiger ( August ).
. Siegfried Unseld, who heads the Jüdischer Verlag at Suhrkamp, had received
hints even before the book went to press that it might be fictitious. He accordingly sent
the manuscript to Lea Balint, who heads the Children without Identity section at the
Ghetto Fighters’ House of Yad le Yeled in Jerusalem, for examination and approval.
. See, however, the report aired on  February  on CBS’s ‘‘ Minutes,’’ with
its presentation of evidence showing that Doessekker was in Zurich in  in contra-
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diction of his claim that he was at that time in a Cracow orphanage following his
liberation from the concentration camp, as well as the testimony of Raul Hilberg,
who maintains that it would have been virtually impossible for a small child alone
to survive the camps. See also the long essays by Gourevitch, ‘‘The Memory Thief,’’
and Elena Lappin, ‘‘The Man with Two Heads,’’ Granta Nr.  (Summer ): –,
for sustained (if not uncontroversial) reflections on Wilkomirski’s history and mo-
tives. Lappin in particular, although ultimately skeptical of Wilkomirski, still cannot
entirely suppress her former friendship with him, which perhaps leads her to one-
sidedness in her assessment of actors such as Ganzfried.
. In this context we have benefitted from Birgit S. Erdle’s presentation as part of
the round-table discussion at the Theater Neumarkt in Zurich on  December .
. While he doesn’t here specify the nature of the specialists, we know that he
underwent psychoanalytic treatment using a controversial technique developed in the
early s to help adult victims of child abuse recover repressed memories. Elaine
Showalter has collected and analyzed some of these ‘‘recovered memory’’ phenomena
in her Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Culture (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, ).
. Jurek Becker, Jacob the Liar, trans. LeilaVennewitz (NewYork: Schocken, ),
orig. Jakob der Lügner (Berlin & Weimar: Aufbau-Verlag, ).
. Wilkomirski, ‘‘Niemand muss mir Glauben schenken’’; our translation.
 Of Friends and Mentors
 
No matter how well-matched the participants, in friendship there is
always some disparity that must be overridden by affection. In situations
where one of the two friends enjoys a more favored position than the other,
is more exalted in rank, prestige, wealth, or knowledge, the relationship
might more properly be considered as one of mentor to protégé. Such situa-
tions allow us to see the value of friendship as a bridge across the gap that
separates unequals; the friendly hand extended from a superior or elder can
in many ways do much more for one’s self-esteem, professional standing,
creative imagination, than all the more casual time spent in the company of
contemporaries. The mentor’s friendship can shape a character in ways that
might otherwise have been left unexplored, unknown. In his famous epistle
to Can Grande, Dante articulates a strong version of ‘‘the sacred bond’’ of
friendship between unequals.1 In offering to dedicate the Paradiso to his
friend, Dante casts himself as an inferior and yet is able to assert the value
of friendship between princes and ‘‘men obscure in fortune’’:
Nor do I fear to incur the charge of presumption, as some may object,
in assuming the name of friend, since no less than peers are those un-
equal in rank united by the sacred bond of friendship. For if one looks at
pleasant and profitable friendships very often upon observation he will
see that eminent persons have been linked with their inferiors. And if
he turn his gaze to true friendship, that is, friendship for itself, will he
not observe that men obscure in fortune but great in virtue have been
the friends of many illustrious and eminent princes? And why not, since
even the friendship of God and man is not hindered by their inequality.
If what is asserted may seem unworthy to anyone, let him listen to the
assertion of the Holy Ghost, that certain men have participated in his
friendship. For one reads of Wisdom in the Book of Wisdom, ‘‘For she
is a treasure unto men that never faileth, in which they that use are made
 :  
partakers of the friendship of God.’’ But the ignorance of the masses
forms judgments without discretion: just as it thinks the sun to be a foot
wide, so in one thing and another it is deceived by its credulity. But it
is not fitting that we, to whom it is given to know the best that is in
us, should follow in the footsteps of the herd, rather we are bound to
oppose their errors. For those who are vigorous in intellect and reason
and endowed with a certain divine freedom are constrained by no cus-
tom. Nor is this surprising, since they are not directed by laws, but the
laws by them. It is clear, therefore, as I said above, that it is not at all
presumptious to call myself your most devoted servant and friend.2
We can gloss Dante’s thought about friendship as the assertion that any
disparity between friends is dissipated by the very fact of friendship. Friend-
ship equalizes the friends to the extent that each necessarily takes part in
sustaining the valued relation. Dante’s example of the ‘‘friendship of God’’
is in a sense incredible, but it is offered authoritatively to silence those who
would find friendship between unequals incredible. If the Bible says there
is at least some metaphorical way in which we can claim God as a ‘‘friend,’’
then it justifies the possibility of friendship between princes and paupers,
between the powerful and the lowly, between those who know and those
who don’t. Pursuing imaginatively the Book of Wisdom’s quote about God,
we might wonder what kind of friendship we might enjoy with one who is
omnipresent and who would thus know all about us before we had a chance
to introduce ourselves. More philosophically, we might consider such a
highly hypothetical relationship in light of Maurice Blanchot’s description
of friendship as including a ‘‘common strangeness that does not allow us to
speak of our friends but only to speak to them, not to make of them a topic
of conversations (or essays), but the movement of understanding in which,
speaking to us, they reserve, even on the most familiar terms, an infinite
distance, the fundamental separation on the basis of which what separates
becomes relation.’’3
I want to hold on to that final phrase: ‘‘an infinite distance, the funda-
mental separation on the basis of which what separates becomes relation,’’
for it not only describes the distance that lies between one friend and an-
other (particularly where disparities of class intrude), it also underlines the
sense in which Dante’s claim to the princely Can Grande’s friendship occurs
within a deliberate separation: that of Dante and Can Grande, as friends,
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in distinction from the ‘‘herd,’’ the common run of person who might not
perceive the basis of the friendship. Dante claims that we two above the herd
determine what is best for us because the two friends enjoy a ‘‘divine free-
dom’’ that expresses itself in their willingness to recognize each other as
friends, no matter that social convention might make such a bond seem
unlikely. In other words, wisdom, which might here be glossed as the will-
fulness that permits one to exert divine freedom, makes one not only God’s
friend but a godlike friend, a friend who, we might say, is ‘‘beyond good
and evil’’ in the sense that the values of common humanity, which would
condemn the relation, are no longer taken into account: the friends ‘‘are
not directed by the laws, but the laws by them.’’
The assertion of the possibility of such friendship seems to me congruent
with Blanchot’s understanding of how ‘‘what separates becomes relation.’’
The friends exist in a realm apart, a realm called ‘‘friendship’’ that is not
liable to the laws of the state or to the rules of convention but only to the
dictates of wisdom, that is, what best serves the friendship. Blanchot says
that in such friendship we do not speak of our friends but only to them; in
other words, we do not hold the terms of the friendship up to a third per-
son for inspection; we do not invite the witness of an interlocutor who may
find cause to judge the worth of the friendship. In this again there is room
for comparison with the divine friendship imagined by Dante, for whatever
one may say about God, surely it is the case that, for the devout, what one
says to God is much more important and constitutes one’s true relation to
a divine being. Indeed, Dante’s comments about divine friendship are not
said of Can Grande but rather to him, but we needn’t interpret Blanchot’s
idea quite so literally. We may consider that, when speaking of friendship,
one does not tell the world of a particular friend, but rather speaks only to
friends. In so doing, one attempts to define (for the sake of one’s friends)
the relation formed by the separation of oneself and one’s friends from the
rest of humanity.
My use of the phrase ‘‘beyond good and evil’’ a moment ago was in-
tended to create a certain context of hyperbole with which to characterize
the bond between persons who are utterly committed to one another—‘‘for
better, for worse’’ as the marriage vow has it. But the phrase should bring to
mind aphorism  in Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil: ‘‘Whatever is done
from love always occurs beyond good and evil.’’4 That statement may be
read in conjunction with Nietzsche’s characterization of friendship in I.
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of The Gay Science as ‘‘a kind of continuation of love’’ in which the ‘‘pos-
sessive craving of two people for each other gives way to a new desire and
lust for possession’’ so that friendship becomes ‘‘a shared higher thirst for
an ideal above’’ the friends.5 Friendship such as that characterized by Dante
and by Blanchot, also occurs, like love, ‘‘beyond good and evil,’’ because
friendship contains a ‘‘shared higher thirst’’ that aspires beyond the dictates
of convention. In other words, the separation that becomes a relation is just
this desire to, as Dante says, ‘‘know the best that is in us.’’ The qualities in
ourselves that we would most like to emphasize are those that the friend as
mentor brings out in us, to the extent that we use the relation wisely.
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is the literary figure who may best be described
as existing beyond good and evil, and his fourteenth discourse, in Book
One of Also Sprach Zarathustra, is entitled ‘‘Of the Friend.’’ There we find
that the interlocutor or ‘‘third person’’ is the friend: ‘‘I and Me are always
too earnestly in conversation with one another’’ for the situation to be en-
durable without a friend. The friend, then, is ‘‘the cork that prevents the
conversation of the other two from sinking to the depths.’’6 We can say that
the friend is the witness to the hermit’s argument with himself, the mid-
wife to the birth of the philosopher’s thought, the occasion for outwardly
directed discourse.7 But this is not a purely beneficial relation; Zarathusta
suggests that friendship, by its addition of a perspective extraneous to one’s
own, may also be the means to one’s downfall. Rather than leading us to
find a mentor, ‘‘[o]ur longing for a friend is our betrayer’’ ().
Dwight David Allman highlights the ‘‘contentious basis’’ for friendship
in Zarathustra’s discourse, pointing out the heavy emphasis on enemies and
upon the enemy in the friend.8 But the sense of enmity that Zarathustra
evokes does not derive solely from the ‘‘agonistic conception of friendship’’
that Allman and others attribute to Nietzsche’s attempt to revive a pre-
Socratic ideal of friendship ().9 As Allman points out, Zarathustra’s dis-
course on friendship is not simply Nietzsche’s attempt to revive an ancient
ideal (), but is also ‘‘a testament to the fact that noble friendship is not
yet possible’’ (). This is indeed true and has its basis in Nietzsche’s own
experience: Zarathustra’s sense of the friend as betrayer, particularly where
women are concerned, and of woman’s ‘‘injustice and blindness towards all
that she does not love’’ (), derives in part from the fact that Book One of
Zarathustra was written early in  while Nietzsche was still nursing his
personal wounds, having been ‘‘ditched’’ by his friends Paul Rée and Louise
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Andréas-Salomé after hopeful plans for a free-thinkingménage-à-troiswent
awry.10 The experience clearly left Nietzsche bitter about the possibility of
mutually sustaining a beneficial friendship. In his subsequent book, Be-
yond Good and Evil,Nietzsche treats friendship even more negatively, often
placing the term ‘‘friends’’ in quotation marks to indicate either his irony
toward the concept or to highlight the lack of sincerity in such relation-
ships, or both. My point is that Zarathustra’s views on friendship are some-
what paradoxical: on the one hand, there is a positive value to be gained
(self-overcoming); on the other hand, there is a palpable danger in the pos-
sibility of betrayal, misunderstanding, and the malicious undermining of
one’s best efforts.
Zarathustra has been called ‘‘the loneliest man in literature,’’ and much
of that perception is due to the way in which he trumpets his isolation and
his lack of friends and followers, a tendency that becomes more marked in
Nietzsche’s own situation from the mid-s until his collapse. But, even
so, Zarathustra’s dictum that ‘‘You should honour even the enemy in your
friend’’ () and his insistence that slaves and tyrants cannot be friends
both point to an understanding of the give-and-take of friendship as a posi-
tive value: friendship is not simply mutual admiration or a complacent ‘‘us
against them’’ relation to the world, nor is it a relation of master/slave or
primarily an agon between equals trying to outdo one another. Friendship,
for Zarathustra, is a difficult test, something to be aspired toward, a task, a
goal: ‘‘O my friend, man is something that must be overcome’’ (). As All-
man points out, Book One of Zarathustra conceives friendship ‘‘strictly in
terms of its utility to the telos represented by the Übermensch’’ (). The
insistence is upon friendship as yet another relation that will fail; in that
failure one must find the germ for something better, more fully achieved,
more consistently itself. Zarathustra refers to his listeners as friends, but if
they are so it is only because they accept him as their mentor and define
themselves as the few who understand his teaching and are ready to sacri-
fice weak versions of happiness, reason, virtue, justice, and pity to become
‘‘hard,’’ which is to say demanding of their friends and of themselves.11
Indeed, Zarathustra deliberately revises the Christian doctrine of ‘‘love
of one’s neighbour,’’ for he finds in such ‘‘selflessness’’ a fear of the self and
of the solitude of the strong: ‘‘Do I exhort you to love of your neighbour?
I exhort you rather to flight from your neighbour and to love of the most
distant!’’ ().12 The ‘‘most distant’’ then becomes synonymous with a cer-
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tain kind of friend: ‘‘the creative friend, who always has a complete world
to bestow’’ (). It seems clear that this friend is Zarathustra himself who
hopes to inspire in his listeners the love for the impossibly distant and a
readiness for the doctrine of self-overcoming. But with regard to friendship
as an ideal, it is equally clear that Nietzsche intends friendship to be a pro-
cess in which one learns from one’s betters, subjecting oneself to an ongoing
inquiry into the values held in common—not least of which is each friend’s
evaluation of the other. As in Dante’s friendship with Can Grande, there is
a ‘‘divine freedom’’ in this creative friendship, a freedom that includes each
friend’s freedom to deny the other and even friendship itself should that
become necessary.13
Dante, for all his creative genius, had need of friends, particularly as
patrons and political allies; Nietzsche, for all his love of solitude, found
cause to proclaim the creative friend as that individual who becomes an
example for us, an incentive toward a higher relation. But there is a counter-
argument to these views of friendship’s salutary inspiring power, particu-
larly with regard to the creative individual, that has been stated quite force-
fully by the narrator of Marcel Proust’s A la recherche du temps perdu.14 Late
in A l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleur, the narrator attempts to justify the fact
that he snubbed his devoted friend Robert de Saint-Loup in favor of hours
of self-indulgent pleasure in the company of a troop of young girls; one of
whom, Albertine, eventually becomes a major obsession in his life. The nar-
rator, whom we will call Marcel for the sake of convenience, is often quite
adept at justifying his indulgences by stressing the importance they will
eventually assume once he arrives at a properly retrospective perspective on
his past. But rather than excuse his indifference to his friend by referring to
the romantic importance that Albertine will one day assume, Marcel instead
pauses to offer his reasons for not valuing Saint-Loup’s friendship:15 ‘‘friend-
ship is a dispensation from [the] duty [to live for oneself ], an abdication of
self.’’16 Friendship is not only ‘‘devoid of virtue’’ but ‘‘fatal’’ because it de-
prives us of our own company, that solitude in which the ‘‘work of artistic
creation proceeds in depth’’ (I.). With friends, we remain on the sur-
face of our thought, altering our most personal perceptions and individual
ideas, so as to appear in accord with a friend who cannot add anything
substantive to our search for truth.
Later, in Chapter Two of Le côté de Guermantes, Marcel even expresses
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his amazement that ‘‘men with some claim to genius—Nietzsche, for in-
stance—can have been so ingenuous as to ascribe to [friendship] a certain
intellectual merit’’ (II.). Friendship makes us ‘‘sacrifice the only part of
ourselves that is real and incommunicable . . . to a superficial self ’’ (II.–
). Once again the occasion for Marcel’s disparagement of the ‘‘pleasure’’
of friendship, ‘‘half-way between physical exhaustion andmental boredom’’
(II.), is the prospect of Saint-Loup’s company. We might say that much
of the tedium that Marcel finds in friendship can be attributed to his rela-
tions with Saint-Loup and that the latter’s professed affection and obvious
devotion act as the incentive to a perverse repulsion. Late in Le Temps re-
trouvé, Marcel learns of Saint-Loup’s death and remains for several days
shut up in his room, thinking of his deceased friend. Once again he recalls
‘‘the very special being’’ for whose friendship he ‘‘had so greatly wished,’’ a
friendship Marcel attained to an extent beyond which he could have hoped
but which failed to give him ‘‘more than a very slight pleasure’’ (III.–).
Saint-Loup’s meaning in the novel is very much predicated upon his
natural superiority to most of his ‘‘race’’ (the term by which the narrator
refers to the aristocracy in general and to the Guermantes family in par-
ticular). So, though we might take Saint-Loup to be the epitome of the
serviceable and self-effacing friend, it is as a ‘‘personality more generalised
than his own, that of the ‘nobleman’ ’’ (I.) that Saint-Loup remains fixed
for the narrator as a ‘‘type,’’ a figure to be circumscribed in its particu-
larity—a particularity that retains a ‘‘relation of distance,’’ as with Dante
and Can Grande. Saint-Loup’s superiority to Marcel is a matter of birth and
of personal merit; it is based upon his status as an exemplar of the Guer-
mantes family to which Marcel remains for many years utterly enthralled.
The Guermantes, as aristocrats with prestige and influence, have the poten-
tial to perform for Marcel the act of patronage that one of their number,
the infamous Baron de Charlus, performs for the violinist Morel. However,
it is not as patrons but as idiosyncratic objects of the novelist’s art that we
find so much attention given to the Guermantes. With regard to relations
within the hierarchy of the Faubourg St. Germain, we can find an irony in
the fact that Marcel’s social climb becomes the occasion for an increased
sense of alienation, not because our hero climbs above his class and out of
his element, but due to the inanity and superficiality he observes in the once
grand figures with whom he becomes friendly. The very relation of distance
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that lifts friends above ‘‘the common herd’’ places Marcel into a relation
with his chosen circle of snobs that reveals to him his own isolation while
in their midst—not because they don’t accept him but because they do.
The irony of finding what one wants superficial once one has attained
it is complemented by a further irony: the fact that the figure responsible
for the most important act of mentoring in the novel should emerge as the
one character, outside of Marcel’s immediate family, who has been known
to him longest: Charles Swann. As a Jew, Swann is always something of an
outsider despite his membership in the Jockey Club, and the rancorous divi-
sion of society that takes place during the Dreyfus affair serves to make his
isolation more obvious. Similarly, Swann’s choice of a former courtesan for
his wife also works against his status in the Faubourg, for he is never able
to introduce his wife to his glittering acquaintances. But Swann is never en-
tirely dropped socially, and his persistence in the novel indicates the extent
to which his vision of the world remains in play throughout. Swann is a
souvenir of Marcel’s childhood visits with his own family to his aunt’s home
in Combray where Swann was a neighbor, a friend of Marcel’s grandfather.
Swann occupies a middle ground between the eldest and the most youthful
generations in Marcel’s family and is in his prime during the period that the
narrator recalls with such immediacy after his episodewith themadeleine. It
is during the period of Marcel’s boyhood that, besides disrupting the young
Marcel’s ritualistic bedtime kiss from his mother, Swann provides Marcel
with a great lesson by presenting him with some reproductions of Giotto’s
depiction of the Vices and Virtues in the Arena Chapel at Padua.17
Habitual association of people with works of art causes Swann to iden-
tify the kitchen maid of Marcel’s aunt with the figure representing Charity
in Giotto’s allegorical frescoes. Reading one’s personal perceptions in terms
of art—as with the kitchen maid or his wife Odette—and reading art in
terms of one’s personal emotions—as in the ‘‘national anthem’’ of Swann’s
love for Odette found in ‘‘le petit phrase’’ of Vinteuil’s sonata—are char-
acteristic tendencies of Swann’s passed on in part to Marcel, while Swann’s
providing Marcel with reproductions of Giotto’s frescoes is tantamount to
a lesson in representation. Swann points out the resemblance between the
‘‘ample smock’’ of the pregnant kitchen maid and the ‘‘cloaks in which
Giotto shrouds some of his allegorical figures’’ (I.), but makes no further
comparison to indicate a moral or symbolic meaning. It is up to Marcel to
find a significance in Swann’s somewhat whimsical identification: the power
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of the frescoes is found in their symbolism and in the fact that the intended
virtue ‘‘was represented not as a symbol (for the thought symbolised was
nowhere expressed) but as a reality, actually felt or materially handled’’
(I.). The real meaning of the lesson is that abstract truths are best repre-
sented by mundane details and realistic figures—a lesson in the method of
allegory that has significance for the narrative we are reading. The method
is set forth outright, in the manner of Ruskin’s moralizing readings of the
carvings on medieval churches, when the narrator draws a comparison be-
tween the weight of the kitchen maid’s belly and the ‘‘crushing burden’’ of
death, not as an ‘‘abstract idea’’ but as something ‘‘painful, obscure, vis-
ceral’’ (I.). The pregnant kitchen maid becomes then an allegorical figure
for the confluence of birth and death as ‘‘burdens’’ that reveal the ‘‘ ‘seamy
side’ ’’ of life. The ‘‘burden’’ is the pathos of real life, present as the under-
lying ground of allegorical abstraction.
Late in the novel, after the serial episodes of ‘‘mémoire involuntaire’’ en
route to a reception at the home of the Prince de Guermantes, Marcel re-
flects upon the course of his life and, projecting the literary work he has
been waiting his entire life to write, hits upon an idea that had not formerly
occurred to him: ‘‘the raw material of my experience, which would also be
the raw material of my book, came to me from Swann’’ (III.). In the
many thousands of pages of the Recherche, it may be possible for us to miss
this necessary connection to the old friend of Marcel’s grandfather, so the
narrator spells it out for us: it was thanks to Swann that he became inter-
ested in Balbec and went there; there he met Albertine and also the Guer-
mantes, Saint-Loup and M. de Charlus; he ‘‘thus got to know the Duchesse
de Guermantes and through her [the Prince]’’ so that he owes to Swann
‘‘even my presence at this very moment in the house of the Prince de Guer-
mantes, where out of the blue the idea for my work had just come to me
(and this meant that I owed to Swann not only the material but also the
decision)’’ to compose a grand narrative (III.). The narrator remarks,
‘‘whoever it is who has thus determined the course of our life has, in so
doing, excluded all the lives which we might have led instead of our actual
life’’ (III.). This may seem a fatalistic message to derive from Swann’s
friendly advice, but that is the point: people’s comments can have repercus-
sions quite beyond what was intended. The narrator himself remarks that
this is a ‘‘rather slender stalk’’ (III.) to support the causality of his life’s
devotions, but unless we see that this thread exists (at least within the retro-
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spective realm in which the narrator exists), we miss what is inevitable in
the seemingly fortuitous.
Returning to the question of friendship, then, we can see that it is the
friendship of Swann, rather than that of Saint-Loup or any other Guer-
mantes, such as the bizarre and overbearing Baron de Charlus, that means
the most in the long run, not through what Hamlet, speaking to Horatio,
calls ‘‘the consonancy of youth,’’ but rather because of the elder man’s grasp
of what might interest a youth such as Marcel. Swann stands in the role of
the friend as mentor, one with ‘‘a world to bestow,’’ in Nietzsche’s phrase.
The irony (and there is always irony in Proust) is that Swann, who bestows
upon his friend the incentive to pursue those chimerical and evasive dreams
that will become the material for his book, is not able to turn his knowl-
edge and taste to his own advantage. Like Moses, he may lead others to the
promised land but not enter it himself.
Reflecting on the relation of Swann and Marcel as one of mentor to pro-
tégé in the light of Dante’s and Nietzsche’s ideals of friendship, we come
upon what could be called the allegorical nature of friendship. In other
words, we find that friendship always refers to an ideal that neither friend
alone could possibly see, much less reach.We can call this relation allegori-
cal because each friend must be read or perceived in relation not only to
his other—his friend—but also in relation to the other that the friendship
makes of him. Both members of the friendship are translated into more
significant versions of themselves. This, of course, is the very method that
Proust’s Marcel seemingly spends his life trying to learn: how to translate
his banal and ordinary existence into a work of literary art. He eventually
realizes that the most important lesson in that peculiar Bildung came to him
through the first adult, outside his family, to take any particular interest
in him. Even if the narrator is willing to play imaginatively with the other
possibilities that have been ousted, that might have been—were it not for
Swann’s intervention—his life’s passion, we (his readers) know that there is
no such alternative life. Marcel must become the narrator of the Recherche
or there is no Marcel at all. Thus the entirety of Proust’s great novel be-
comes something of an allegory of transformation, or rather an allegory by
which, to use a profoundly significant phrase of Nietzsche, ‘‘one becomes
what one is.’’18
The implications of the phrase are complex because of Nietzsche’s view
that no self or subject exists apart from acting, doing, becoming. And yet
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the phrase does seem to offer some version of a circumscribable and know-
able self coming into being through activity. Proust’s narrator is a fitting
illustration of such a process because, in fiction, a narrator is no more than
the sum of his effects; there never simply is a narrator, or rather, no char-
acter or person emerges as a single, stable subject within the narrative’s
long trajectory from the opening passages about trying to fall asleep to the
closing passages about wanting to write a novel. The analogy between sleep,
or dream, and literature holds because one cannot speak of sleep while one
is asleep; one cannot ‘‘be’’ a narrator but only an agent of narrative.Without
wishing to complicate the relation unduly, I want to make explicit that, in
Proust’s novel, transforming or becoming is always imagined as a process
much like writing, much like friendship, and that both ‘‘activities’’ are alle-
gories in that both stand for the process of becoming. Friendship may find
its be-all and end-all in nothing more, ultimately, than an occasion or in-
centive for transformation, for becoming what one is: the person whom the
creative friend bestows upon one. Encounters with mentors (even if, as with
Marcel, not recognized at the time) are charged with possibility, with fleet-
ing vision and vague apotheosis, for a self may emerge from such a process
like a photograph from its pool of solution: each print, each self, different—
but all bearing a relation to an image created through the friend’s influence.
In a section of The Gay Science entitled One thing is needful, Nietzsche
writes: ‘‘To ‘give style’ to one’s character—a great and rare art!’’ () and
insists that such art requires that a ‘‘single taste’’ have governed the devel-
opment of the style. In the moment when Marcel accepts the opinion of
Swann, he inaugurates a search for style that takes place within the bounds
of a taste that his mentor bestows upon him. In the course of the long nar-
rative, Marcel will learn much from his observations of others and of his
recollection of their opinions, but his reflection that so much hangs upon
the slender stalk of Swann’s advice contains a recognition of how much his
‘‘great and rare art’’ owes to a single taste—a taste for Balbec, for seagirt
Gothic churces, for frivolous women, for the pathos of living that lies be-
neath the formal beauty of the allegorical image—and this taste comes to
him through a man whose friendship toward himself was disinterested,
casual, provisional.
The friendship of the creative friend is by its nature provisional because
it awaits the sequel to the seed or hint dropped at a propitious moment.
Zarathustra cautions us to beware the betrayer or enemy in the friend, and
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the first place we may look for such betrayal is in ourselves when we fail to
see the significance of what the friend bestows. We wrap ourselves up and
guard our hearts in service to a ‘‘single taste’’: our taste for our own view,
our own company, our own heaven and hell above all. We are wary of what
the friend offers, for it may not be ‘‘the thing’’ sought for, the one thing
needful of which Nietzsche speaks. And yet, to the extent that we find in
friendship an opening for transformation, a Zarathustrian call to a higher
self, a self embarked on becoming a work of art by giving style to char-
acter, we find in friendship the Dantean ‘‘divine freedom’’ that makes laws
for itself rather than yield to those predetermined by lesser relations. Our
friend then becomes an allegory through which we read another version
of ourselves, as ‘‘through a glass darkly’’—to use Paul’s well-known phrase.
If the friend is, as Zarathustra says, the cork that keeps the conversation
between ‘‘I’’ and ‘‘Me’’ from sinking to the depths, the friend may also be
the glass through which ‘‘I’’ see ‘‘Me’’ transformed into something other, a
character, a style, a fatality ‘‘I’’ may still become.
In Ecce Homo,Nietzsche describes ‘‘what poets of strong ages have called
inspiration’’ as the creative experience that allowed him to produce his Zara-
thustra: ‘‘one accepts, one does not ask who gives. . . . Everything happens
involuntarily in the highest degree but as in a gale of a feeling of freedom, of
absoluteness, of power, of divinity.’’19 Nietzsche’s evocation of the freedom
and divinity of inspiration—which he considers an ancient ideal that one
must ‘‘go back thousands of years’’ to find expressed elsewhere—reminds us
of the ‘‘divine freedom’’ that Dante asserts in claiming, above and beyond
the logic of the herd, the right to call his social superior his friend. The cre-
ative mind, whether Nietzsche’s, Proust’s, or Dante’s, clearly seems to take
upon itself the recognition of what matters, of what will give style to char-
acter. More to the point, each may claim an experience in which, as Nietz-
sche says, it appears ‘‘as if the things themselves approached and offered
themselves as metaphors’’ (), for such is the allegorical perspective par
excellence: a sense of the things and persons of one’s life and experience as
mere signifiers in a text that one’s own imagination must find the authority
to write. The key to such authority, as Proust’s narrator shows us, may be
given to us offhand by a friend, a mentor who provides an added color or
angle or contrast to our habitual mode of perception. Dante himself is such
a friend when we consider that his letter to Can Grande is not famous simply
because of its eloquent assertion of friendship between unequals, it is also
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known for the lengthy disquisition on the allegorical method of the Com-
media by which Dante enlightens his friend as to the nature of the gift (that
is, Paradiso) he would bestow. Dante implies that in bestowing his poem on
his friend, he offers a vision that is significant for his friend’s spiritual good.
All three writers offer their readers a world of inspiration, of allegory, of
the subtle transformation of experience into enduring form.
Of course friendship is not a work of art. The world that friendship be-
stows is not a static world in which each thing is identified and understood
once and for all; neither is it the yawning abyss of boredom and social
niceties that Proust’s narrator describes upon occasion. Friendship, like the
self one is always in process of becoming, is intermittent, as is all feeling,
desire, and knowledge in Proust; but for friendship to exist at all one must
be willing to assert the divine freedom of those who choose to make some-
thing out of nothing, shedding skins—shedding friends if necessary, like
the lonely Zarathustra—in order to go further into ‘‘the infinite distance’’
that, in turn, creates a relation between the selves we once were and the
‘‘most distant’’ selves we may yet become, a relation that allows us to par-
ticipate—even at a distance—in the growth of our friends as in the growth
of ourselves.
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to Rée and others in late ; the first part of Zarathustra was published in .
. Zarathustra’s ‘‘transvaluation of all values’’ begins in the prologue where he
proclaims that the ‘‘greatest thing you can experience’’ is the ‘‘hour of the great con-
tempt’’ (), where, in typically hyperbolic fashion, we find that happiness ‘‘should
justify existence itself ’’; that reason should ‘‘long for knowledge as the lion for its
food’’; that virtue should drive one mad; that justice should make one a man of ‘‘fire
and hot coals’’; that pity is ‘‘the cross upon which he who loves man is nailed’’; great
contempt is directed at those who profess moderation in these things ().
. Hollingdale’s translation alerts us of a play on words in Nietzsche’s original
German text: ‘‘Nächsten = neighbour and nearest, and throughout this chapter Fern-
sten (= the most distant), the opposite of nearest, is also made to mean the opposite of
neighbour, i.e., the people of the most distant future. Hence the continual antithesis
between ‘neighbour’ and ‘most distant’ ’’ (–, n ).
. In section  of The Gay Science, ‘‘Star friendship,’’ Nietzsche writes, ‘‘We were
friends and have become estranged. But this was right, and we do not want to conceal
and obscure it from ourselves as if we had reason to feel ashamed’’; ‘‘That we have
to become estranged is the law above us.’’ Nietzsche goes on to express the poetic
idea that this law above us ‘‘is probably a tremendous but invisible stellar orbit in
which our very different ways and goals may be included,’’ and exhorts us to ‘‘believe
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in our star friendship even if we should be compelled to be earth enemies.’’ In other
words, Nietzsche suggests that estrangement does not necessitate the renouncing of
the friendship; it becomes more ‘‘venerable’’ as a moment along a path one should
not be ashamed of having walked.
. I do not mean to consider Proust’s own personal view of friendship; he cer-
tainly had a wide circle of friends and acquaintances with whom he was on affection-
ate and at times intimate terms. In his letters, Proust sometimesmakes statements that
undermine the value of friendship, but this usually occurs as part of a protestation
concerning his inability to engage in some social event; like Nietzsche, Proust was af-
flicted with ill health throughout his entire adult life and, in such circumstances, one
is sometimes forced to depend on the forbearance of friends to an excessive extent—
a fact that, on other occasions, can make one quite irritable about such dependence.
Certainly the writer’s need for solitude is so conventional as to be a cliché; what is
more interesting is the question of how such solitude is possible in the midst of friends
and family—a problem each writer must solve for him- or herself.
. The repudiation of Saint-Loup’s friendship, which is generally described in
terms of complete devotion, is a recurring theme in the novel. Marcel’s reticence fig-
ures, in part, as an important element in the narrator’s refusal of homosexuality:
eventually it is revealed that Saint-Loup has male as well as female lovers; the narra-
tor is appalled and claims that he had always kept a certain distance in his relations
with Saint-Loup. The eventual revelation, which comes as something of a surprise for
the reader as well, could be said to be the reason behind the narrator’s insistence on
the pernicious effects of friendship. For a somewhat overstated but still interesting
reading of Saint-Loup as the primary romantic interest in the Recherche and of the
narrator’s attempts to camouflage that fact, see Mark D. Guenette, ‘‘Le Loup et le nar-
rateur: The Masking and Unmasking of Homosexuality in Proust’s A la recherche du
temps perdu,’’ Romanic Review, vol. LXXX, No.  (March ): –.
. Marcel Proust, Remembrances of Things Past,  vols., trans. C. K. Scott Mon-
crieff and Terence Kilmartin (New York: Vintage Books, ), . All further refer-
ences are to this edition and contain the volume number as well as the page number.
. The original publication ofDu Côté de chez Swann included the announcement
that the Recherche would consist of three volumes. The announcement indicated the
section titles of each volume and included ‘‘The ‘Vices and Virtues’ of Padua and
Combray’’ as a section of the final volume, Le Temps retrouvé, projected for . For
a discussion of the importance of the configuration of vice and virtue in the Recher-
che, the analogies between Combray, Venice, and Padua, and speculation on why the
restatement of the theme was removed from the Venice sojourn, see Beryl Schloss-
man, The Orient of Style: Modernist Allegories of Conversion, (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, ), –.
. ‘‘Wie man wird was man ist’’: the phrase is the subtitle to Nietzsche’s Ecce
Homo, an attempt to explain himself as a writer and thinker. The phrase is discussed at
length in chapter six of Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, ). I am indebted to Nehamas’s comparison of
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Nietzsche’s idea of becoming with the position of Proust’s narrator: what Proust’s
narrator calls ‘‘the discovery of our true life’’ can, in Nehamas’s words, ‘‘be made only
in the very process of creating the work of art which describes and constitutes it. And
the ambiguous relation between discovery and creation, which matches exactly Nietz-
sche’s own view, also captures perfectly the tension in the very idea of being able to
become who one actually is’’ ().
. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann and
R. J. Hollingdale, and Ecce Homo, trans.Walter Kaufmann (NewYork: Vintage Books,
), –.
 Shprintze, or Metathesis: On the
Rhetoric of the Fathers in Sholem
Aleichem’s Tevye the Dairyman 1
 
It would be hard to think of a novel more intensely concerned with the
joys and sorrows of fatherhood than Sholem Aleichem’s Tevye the Dairy-
man. In four of the novel’s five central chapters, Tevye loses a daughter
in marriage—whether hopefully, resignedly, reluctantly, or kicking and
screaming—and in the fifth he loses a daughter to suicide when the engage-
ment is broken. Needless to say, pathos abounds—more than enough for
a relatively short novel; indeed, more than enough for a novel, stage play,
musical, and movie. But the father-daughter relation is of tropological as
well as thematic interest. Sholem Aleichem assigns to each daughter (more
precisely: to each daughter’s ambit) a characteristic figure of thought that
derives from the limited repertory of Tevye’s paternal discourse and that
turns out to control, with astonishing rigor, the political and social the-
matics of that daughter’s chapter. Thus Tevye the Dairyman combines fea-
tures of the tearjerker and the handbook of rhetoric; it organizes a welter of
highly chargedmaterial according to a grid of systematic tropes. To describe
the novel in this way is to suggest affinities with other classics of the early
twentieth century: Joyce’s Ulysses, for example, or Berg’sWozzeck.One goal
of the present paper is to confirm Benjamin Harshav’s thesis that the vir-
tuoso display of premodern modes of discourse in Sholem Aleichem para-
doxically establishes a unique Yiddish variant of European modernism.2
It will have to suffice here to demonstrate the tropological system at its
most explicit moment, the chapter ‘‘Shprintze [Hope],’’ and then to adum-
brate connections with the rest of the novel.We begin with a rather puzzling
conversation between Tevye and the happy-go-lucky Ahronchik, who has
quietly been courting the eldest available daughter, Shprintze:
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‘‘A good evening!’’ I said to him.
‘‘And to you, too,’’ he replied. He stood there a little awkwardly with
a blade of grass in his mouth, stroking his horse’s mane; then he said,
‘‘Reb Tevye, I have an offer to make you. Let’s you and I swap horses.’’
‘‘Don’t you have anyone better to make fun of ?’’ I asked him.
‘‘But I mean it,’’ he says.
‘‘Do you now?’’ I say. ‘‘Do you have any idea what this horse of yours
is worth?’’
‘‘What would you price him at?’’ he asks.
‘‘He’s worth three hundred rubles if a cent,’’ I say, ‘‘and maybe even
a little bit more.’’
Well, Ahronchik laughed, told me his horse had cost over three times
that amount, and said, ‘‘How about it, then? Is it a deal?’’
I tell you, I didn’t like it one bit: what kind of business was it to trade
such a horse for my gluepot? And so I told him to keep his offer for an-
other day and joked that I hoped he hadn’t come just for that, since I
hated to see him waste his time. . . .
‘‘As a matter of fact,’’ he says to me, as serious as can be, ‘‘I came to
see you about something else. If it’s not too much to ask of you, perhaps
the two of us could take a little walk.’’3
What is the rationale of this proposed exchange, which is never mentioned
again? One could certainly answer that there needn’t be any rationale, since
Ahronchik has already been richly characterized as the initiator of many
acts of capricious or whimsical generosity—bestowing a fistful of money
upon a beggar, taking a brand-new jacket off his back to thrust it upon a
perfect stranger, and so on. Still the horse trade seems to be featured as
especially pointless, and it leads directly (the ‘‘little walk’’) to Ahronchik’s
asking for the hand of Shprintze in marriage. The key to this scene is not
Ahronchik’s casual generosity—the disproportion of what he bestows on
others—but the very principle of exchange: I take what you have and you
take what I have. Only in a world governed by the principle of exchange can
social relations be understood as reversible enough to permit the marriage
of a millionaire’s son and a milkman’s daughter. As Tevye himself puts it,
Ahronchik’s mother would have no ‘‘reason to be ashamed of me . . . be-
cause if I wasn’t a millionaire myself, I would at least have an in-law who
was, while the only in-law she’d have would be a poor beggar of a dairy-
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man; I ask you, then, whose connections [yikhes] would be better, mine
or hers?’’ (). Such a reading of the horse trade may seem extravagant at
first, but it is supported by the text on every level from the narrative down
to the phonological. It will be remembered that ‘‘Shprintze’’ begins with a
discussion of Russia’s liberal constitution of , which triggered a series
of pogroms and persecutions in the Pale of Settlement. The rich Jews of
Yehupetz (Kiev) have abandoned their dachas in Boiberik and fled to other
parts; Tevye’s dairy business, however, has continued to blossom because
rich Jews from other parts have been flocking to Boiberik: ‘‘But why, you
ask, are they all running here? For the same reason, I tell you, that we’re all
running there! It’s an old Jewish custom to pick up and go elsewhere at the
first mention of a pogrom. How does the Bible put it? Vayisu vayakhanu,
vayakhanu vayisu—or in plain language, if you come hide in my house, I’d
better go hide in yours’’ (). The Hebrew words quoted here (‘‘and they
journeyed and they camped, and they camped and they journeyed’’) are
not to be found in the Bible in this configuration; the chiasmus that ex-
presses reversibility here is directly attributable to the liberal constitution,
which Tevye cannot pronounce and persists in fracturing as kosnitutsye—
that is to say, chiasmus as a figure of words derives from metathesis as a
figure of sound (ns/sn). The tragedy of ‘‘Shprintze’’ can thus be summa-
rized as follows: a brief hope-dream of social mobility inspired rhetorically
by a metathetic liberal constitution reveals itself as deceptive, and the world
returns to its customary state of irreversible relations—which state is then
explored in the following chapter, ‘‘Tevye Leaves for the Land of Israel.’’4
Since Tevye seems unable to discuss any issue for more than two sen-
tences without quoting Biblical, rabbinic, or liturgical support—vayisu va-
yakhanu being only a slender pseudoquotation—it seems reasonable to ex-
pect the rhetorical system uncovered here to be anchored in some genuine
holy-tongue material; and so it is. Late one evening Tevye is summoned to
the dacha of Ahronchik’s mother in Boiberik, and he speculates on the rea-
son: ‘‘What can be so urgent, I wondered as I drove there. If they want to
shake hands on it and have a proper betrothal, it’s they who should come
to me, because I’m the bride’s father . . . only that was such a preposterous
thought that it made me laugh out loud: who ever heard of a rich man going
to a poor one for a betrothal? Did I think that the world had already come
to an end . . . and that the tycoon and the beggar were now equals, sheli
shelkho and shelkho sheli—you take what’s mine, I take what’s yours, and
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the Devil take the hindmost?’’ (–). The Hebrew here is taken from the
(for our purposes marvelously titled) Mishnaic tract Pirkey Avot (‘‘Ethics,
or better: Sayings of the Fathers’’). Chapter V, verse  reads as follows:
‘‘There are four qualities in a human being: he who says, what’s mine is
mine and what’s yours is yours, that is the intermediate quality. And some
say, that is the quality of Sodom. What’s mine is yours and what’s yours is
mine—an ignoramus. What’s mine is yours and what’s yours is yours—a
righteous man. What’s yours is mine and what’s mine is mine—a wicked
man.’’ How appropriate that Tevye associates Ahronchik, subconsciously
perhaps, with the quality of an ignoramus! But the important reason for
quoting this compass-rose of the Mishnaic fathers in its entirety is that each
of the four quadrants plays a role in the novel: each designates in traditional
Jewish terms the governing trope of a daughter (again, more precisely, of a
daughter’s ambit). There are four quadrants and five daughters because the
youngest daughter, Beilke, repeats the story of the eldest, Tsaytl, with an
alternative (tragic) outcome. It remains now to sketch these connections.
In the case of Hodl, who marries a communist and follows him into
Siberian exile, ‘‘what’s mine is yours and what’s yours is yours’’—the com-
munist Peppercorn (Yiddish: Feferl) is memorably figured as a righteous
man. Hodl maintains of him and his revolutionary comrades that ‘‘they
were the best, the finest, the most honorable young people in the world,
and that they lived their whole lives for others, never giving a fig for their
own skins’’ (). ‘‘Her husband, she swore, was as clean as the driven snow.
‘Why,’ she said, ‘he’s a person who never thinks of his own self ! His whole
life is for others, for the good of the world’ ’’ (). (The key phrases in Yid-
dish here are nor fun yenems vegn and yenems toyve.) Many years later, in
telling the story of Beilke (‘‘Tevye Leaves for the Land of Israel’’), Tevye
actually brings himself to concur in this assessment: ‘‘At least that Pepper-
corn of hers is a human being—in fact, too much of one, because he never
thinks of himself, only of others’’ (). (Er aleyn iz bay zikh hefker, un der
gantser iker iz di velt.) It must be admitted that the crucial formulation of
righteousness from Pirkey Avot is not explicitly present in ‘‘Hodl’’—whether
because Sholem Aleichem preferred to submerge the tropological scheme
in a wealth of figurative variations, or possibly because the explicit rabbinic
theme of those variations did not occur to him until a later stage in the serial
publication of the novel—but the structure is evident, given the explicit
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citation in ‘‘Shprintze’’ and the constant informing presence of ‘‘Sayings of
the Fathers’’ throughout the novel.
To confirm our reading of ‘‘Shprintze’’ and ‘‘Hodl,’’ we turn to Beilke’s
chapter, which invokes both of them, thematically as well as rhetorically.
Beilke, the youngest daughter, has sacrificed her own happiness by marry-
ing a very rich middle-aged vulgarian in order to make life easier for her
father (this is the sacrifice that Tsaytl, the eldest daughter, was ultimately
saved from making in ‘‘Today’s Children’’; hence the tropological congru-
ence of these two chapters). Tevye attempts to forestall the sacrifice by
pointing out that ‘‘ ‘money is a lot of hooey, anyway, just like the Bible says.
Why, look at your sister Hodl! She hasn’t a penny to her name, she lives
in a hole in the wall at the far end of nowhere—and yet she keeps writ-
ing us how happy she is with her schlimazel of a Peppercorn.’ Shall I give
you three guesses what my Beilke answered me? ‘Don’t go comparing me
to Hodl,’ she says. ‘In Hodl’s day the world was on the brink. There was
going to be a revolution and everyone cared about everyone. Now theworld
is its own self again, and it’s everyone for his own self again, too.’ That’s
what she said, my Beilke—just go figure out what she meant’’ (). The
Yiddish here is more accurate in describing the condition of the world in
Hodl’s day: hot men zikh gezorgt far der velt, un zikh hot men fargesn—not
‘‘everyone cared for everyone’’ (reciprocity or reversibility = ignorance),
but ‘‘one cared about the world and forgot oneself ’’ (righteousness). Beilke
often speaks as though her world were the exact opposite of Hodl’s, and
this move is understandable since Hodl was her father’s choice of counter-
example. Actually, though, Beilke’s insistence on self-identity and social
rigidity proves that ‘‘what’s mine is mine and what’s yours is yours’’—her
world is the exact opposite of Shprintze’s (which of course had no stability).5
It must be admitted that this moment in the text achieves a maximum of
tropological density and even ambiguity—partly because the story of Beilke
not only revises the story of Tsaytl and rejects the story of Hodl, but also
serves as a bravura recapitulation of all the previous episodes.6 Nevertheless,
we can adduce another powerful piece of evidence for the deep analysis ac-
cording to four quadrants. Podhotzur, the rich vulgarian, who is naturally
impervious to Tevye’s theory of in-law reversibility (or yikhes relativity) as
developed in ‘‘Shprintze,’’ demands that his father-in-law either give up the
dairy business or, better still, remove himself to either America or Pales-
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tine. Since Tevye has always wanted to see the Holy Land anyway (more
precisely, to inhabit the five books of Moses), Palestine is decided upon.
Later, mortified by her complicity in this attempted erasure of the father,
Beilke bursts into tears and Tevye begins to comfort her: ‘‘ ‘Have you for-
gotten that God is still in His heaven and your father is still a young man?
Why, it’s child’s play for me to travel to Palestine and back again, just like
it says in the Bible: vayisu vayakhanu—and the Children of Israel knew not
if they were coming or going. . . .’ Yet the words were no sooner out of my
mouth than I thought, Tevye, that’s a big fat lie! You’re off to the Land of
Israel for good—it’s bye-bye Tevye forever’’ (). Here the spatial and so-
cial reversibility of ‘‘Shprintze’’ is reinterpreted temporally, and the point
is: it’s no longer available (if it ever was). At the end of a series of tropo-
logical inventions on the theme of confusing mine and thine, everything is
what it is. Such was already the condition of the world in Tsaytl’s day; but
at least it followed then as a consequence that people could be who they
were: Tsaytl did not have to sacrifice herself by marrying the rich middle-
aged vulgarian (the butcher Layzer Wolf ), but could start a life of penu-
rious felicity with her dreamboat of a tailor boy, Motl Komzoyl. Beilke is
not so lucky: Podhotzur ‘‘has businesses everywhere. He spends more on
telegrams in a single day than it would cost us to live on for a year. But
what good does all that do me if I can’t be myself ?’’ (). Now another say-
ing from ‘‘Sayings of the Fathers’’ returns to govern the world as a spectral
double of ‘‘what’s mine is mine and what’s yours is yours,’’ namely, Hillel’s
famous ‘‘im eyn ani li mi li?’’ ()—‘‘If I am not for myself, who will be?’’
It remains only to discuss the case of ‘‘what’s mine is mine and what’s
yours is mine—a wicked man.’’ The daughter in question here is obviously
Chava, who marries the Christian scribe of the village, Chvedka Galagan,
and is disowned by her father. It must be admitted that the evidence here
is at its least explicit; what we find is a series of encroachments, subsump-
tions, misappropriations. Thus, for example, the village priest turns out to
have knowledge of Hebrew—insisting, to Tevye’s amusement and horror,
that ‘‘he knew our Scriptures better than I did and even reciting a few lines
of them in a Hebrew that sounded like a Frenchman talking Greek’’ ().
The Christian subsumes the Jew—both his religion and his authority. The
priest claims to ‘‘think a great deal of you Jews. It just pains me to see
how stubbornly you refuse to realize that we Christians have your good
in mind’’ (). Chava is in his ‘‘charge,’’ his ‘‘custody’’ (rshus, hazhgokhe).
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Naturally, Tevye is outraged: ‘‘I demanded to know . . . what he thought of
a man who barged uninvited into another man’s house and turned it up-
side down—the benches, the tables, the beds, everything’’ (). As in the
diametrically opposite case of Hodl, there is no distinction between mine
and thine—Chava denies that ‘‘human beings have to be divided into Jews
and Christians, masters and slaves, beggars and millionaires’’ (). Tevye
can only respond that such distinctions will not disappear until the Mes-
siah comes; ‘‘but he already has come,’’ says the priest (). Everything is
already ‘‘theirs.’’
This completes our sketch of the tropological system. It would be illu-
minating now to delve more deeply into the texture of the Yiddish. Our
remarks onmetathesis in ‘‘Shprintze’’ (kosnitutsye for ‘‘constitution’’) would
have to be supplemented by aphaeresis in ‘‘Today’s Children’’ (stikratn for
‘‘aristocrats’’), prosthesis in ‘‘Tevye Leaves for the Land of Israel’’ (natalye
for ‘‘Italy’’), syncope in ‘‘Hodl’’ (khlire for ‘‘cholera’’), and various types of
ellipsis in ‘‘Chava.’’ But space prohibits. A detailed rhetorical analysis of
Tevye the Dairyman in Yiddish will be presented to Stanley Corngold—
most generous of readers and writers!—on the occasion of his th birth-
day (biz hundertuntsvantsik! ); or perhaps before.

. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Anita Gallers and Susanne
Fusso in developing the ideas and working out the details of the present paper. He
thanks David Katz for allowing him to discuss a version of the material with his
eager and perceptive students at Yale University. Quotations from Sholem Aleichem
refer to Tevye the Dairyman and the Railroad Stories, trans. Hillel Halkin (New York:
Schocken, ).
. Benjamin Harshav, The Meaning of Yiddish (Berkeley: University of California
Press, ) –.
. Tevye, –. Subsequent references in parentheses.
. Halkin’s ‘‘Constantution’’ misses the point. In general, his translation is funny,
ingenious, idiomatic, and a pleasure to read—highly recommendable. Nevertheless,
it introduces a number of small errors that tend to obscure the tropological structure
of the novel. For example, Halkin dubiously adds the name of Peppercorn to the pas-
sage about vayse khevrenikes (). On the other hand, his hilarious metatheses on the
name of Podhotzur (Hodputzer, Hodderputz), while not in the Yiddish, are attractive
additions to ‘‘Tevye Leaves for the Land of Israel’’ and can be motivated by Tevye’s
nostalgic preference for the metathetic days of Shprintze.
. In ‘‘Today’s Children’’ the operative rabbinic expression is ‘‘Odom koroyv le’ats-
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moy—charity begins at home’’ ()—literally: ‘‘A man is closest to his own self.’’
Money, of course, is normally understood as a medium of exchange; but not exchange
in the sense of ‘‘Shprintze.’’ According to the tropology of Tevye the Dairyman, the
world of commerce is governed not by easy exchange but by obstinate hoarding.
. Two examples of recapitulation: Efrayim the Matchmaker returns from ‘‘Hodl’’
(but recalls Motl Komzoyl—‘‘the matchmaker, the father-in-law, and the groom all
rolled into one’’ () from ‘‘Today’s Children’’); and the misunderstanding with Efra-




Here, too, I believe, is one focus of de Man’s appeal to students: he was
inviting into existence, among souls chained to the workbench of paper-
writing, matter-of-fact rhetorical moods of violence, superiority, and
dismissiveness.
—Stanley Corngold, ‘‘On Paul de Man’s Collaborationist Writings.’’1
Because it ‘‘is generally considered to be the paradigmatic poem of
modern consciousness,’’ Paul de Man2 argued in , you would think con-
temporary criticism should have arrived at a consensus on Goethe’s Faust
by now and then. While it remains unclear from which general view de
Man took down this tall order, at the end of his list of varying and contra-
dictory receptions of the work, just for openers, he singles out the lack of
determination of ‘‘the relative value of the two principal works based on
the theme of Faust, namely, Marlowe’s and Goethe’s’’ () as strong indi-
cators ‘‘that the critical placement of Goethe’s Faust in world literature is
not established once and for all’’ (). It doesn’t sound like Goethe’s Faust
was one of de Man’s faves. But the thematic studies of Faust under review,
on account of their nonsuperimposable variations or equivocations, are in-
structive for the inside view they afford of their own ‘‘different methodolo-
gies, and therefore permit, with Faust as touchstone, the bringing to light of
their own respective virtues and insufficiencies’’ (). De Man thus situates
Goethe’s Faust within or as the three-way intersection of thematic criticism
linking and separating the outright historical, the intellectual-historical,
and the mythological approaches to the ‘‘Faust theme.’’ As text, Goethe’s
Faust is a transparent placeholder or ‘‘touchstone’’ for the limited reception
of the Faust theme coextensive with it. Or it serves as transferential prop
in session with de Man’s resistance: ‘‘Faust’’ represents for de Man some
‘‘general’’ norm of ‘‘modern consciousness,’’ a modern complex associated
with Goethe’s authority. De Man goes on to demean this complex as open-
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headed invitational to a host of ‘‘alien elements,’’ ‘‘humanism, rationalism,
literary nationalism, tradition, and so on.’’ ‘‘Faust’’ thus doubles for de Man
as the alienating middlebrowbeat where the complexity of these elements
or ideologemes is not accorded ‘‘attentive study’’ ().
Speaking for himself, de Man addresses the beginning of Goethe’s Faust
as an ‘‘end of the line’’ in its evocation of ‘‘an irrational, essentially dispersed
character, whom only a chaotic will prevents from sinking into nonbeing,’’
a finish line that is, however, ‘‘only a point of departure for Goethe, who
situates his drama entirely on the opposite slope of this problematic.’’
The depth and the novelty of Faust are not in the initial anguish of its
central character but in the way he conquers that anguish, namely, in
the recognition of the necessary copresence of Mephistopheles, in the
conviction that Being is accessible only in the repeated negation of that
through which Being reveals itself to him.When, through the experience
of love, Faust finds that he has yielded to Being, he knows also that this
path will be littered with parts of himself that his development has had
to abandon along the way, will be marked by a series of cruel, degrading
sacrifices that Mephistopheles will always be delighted to carry out on
his account. ()
This ‘‘dialectic’’ or couples theory does not impose ‘‘the separation from the
real and the transcendent’’ as impediment to ‘‘formation of a path toward
Being,’’ and it is this ‘‘uniform direction’’ that harmonizes Faust’s otherwise
‘‘diverse,’’ even ‘‘catastrophic,’’ ‘‘experiences.’’ Goethe’s Faust I and Hegel’s
The Phenomenology of Mind, which are ‘‘exactly contemporaneous,’’ would
appear to be parallel universals in the mainstream of received ideas. ‘‘In the
development of the consciousness of self, as in the example of Faust’s life,
the passage from one stage to the next constitutes the central moment. Be-
yond their considerable differences, Hegel and Goethe do have this idea in
common’’ ().We either come full circle in booking this ‘‘passage,’’ ending
up with the splitting off of the middlebrow double, or we once again run up
against the ‘‘trans-,’’ the ‘‘across’’ we all must bear. When transference bears
down on de Man’s resistance as he’s passing his review of Faust studies, he
just splits. Because this is what we are left with: either all these journalistic
points of review are Goethe’s Faust or else they R us.
But first get to know the middlebrowbeat, get to know all about you.
The ‘‘excessive continuity’’ of the thematic approach of one of the critics
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under review is exemplified by his characterization of ‘‘romanticism as an
unconscious precursor of Nazism’’ (). In the mythological third of the
reception that is Goethe’s Faust, the ultimate claim is staked, ‘‘the totalitar-
ian position of absolute authority’’ (). In both touchdowns we are within
positions of resistance to psychoanalysis, which at the same time overlap
with psychoanalysis. How can there be ‘‘an unconscious precursor’’ with-
out Freud’s science? And yet this psychohistorical connection, which at the
same time elides the mediation of Romantic notions of the unconscious by
psychoanalysis (and by resistance to or inversion of psychoanalysis), be-
longs to the supernatural realm of the unread. The myth criticism under
review, which circumvents the mediation of repression that the intellectual-
historical brand of thematic criticism invoked and then performed, comes
to us via Jung’s notion of archetypes, and thus from a whole history of nega-
tive transference onto Freud.
De Man reads these thematic positionings not for their resistance. He
chooses instead to undermine the ‘‘totalitarian position’’ of the Jungian
brand of thematic criticism, for example, by pointing out that poetic lan-
guage, its origins notwithstanding, remains ‘‘mediate and temporal’’: ‘‘Art
is not an imitation (or a repetition) but an endless longing for imitation,
which by virtue of imitating itself, hopes finally to find a model. In other
words, poetic language is not an originary language, but is derived from
an originary language it does not know’’ (). This ‘‘over-correction’’ of the
mythic take on Faust serves to give it the dialectical benefit of releasing,
now in its undermined form, the ultimate reading after all, that of critique
of the mythic. The closing sentence of de Man’s review article: ‘‘This cri-
tique of the mythic constitutes the first step in a true thematic criticism,
which, contrary to what one generally assumes, should pass from myth to
idea, and from idea to formal theme, before being able to become history’’
(–).
All this passing just passes by the task of translation (and of transference)
that sets the stage of Goethe’s Faust. Because imitation, however problema-
tized, does not translate translation. Faust takes it from the top and opens
his translation scene with retranslations of ‘‘word.’’ It is through translation
that Faust would seek ‘‘compensation’’ for having failed to meet match and
maker in the earth spirit. It was in their botched exchange that first men-
tion of the Übermensch was dropped in German letters, right before Faust
passed on to the scene of Übersetzen.
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Walter Benjamin’s evocation of originary language as ‘‘pure language’’ in
‘‘TheTask of theTranslator’’ can’t get around the Berlin street wisdom about
‘‘pure’’ or rein, which debunks it to mean ‘‘mere.’’ Reine Sprache could also
mean ‘‘just language.’’ De Man can’t get around getting around to transla-
tion. What goes beyond poetic language is translation: we have de Man’s
words for Benjamin’s words for it on the taped record of his final  Mes-
senger Lecture, ‘‘Walter Benjamin’s ‘The Task of the Translator.’ ’’ ‘‘That is
the naiveté of the poet, that he has to say something, that he has to convey
a meaning which does not necessarily relate to language. The relationship
of the translator to the original is the relationship between language and
language, wherein the problem of meaning or the desire to say something,
the need to make a statement, is entirely absent.’’3 You can have your trans-
lation, but you can’t translate it, too. Only the original can be translated:
‘‘The translation canonizes, freezes, an original and shows in the original a
mobility, an instability, which at first one did not notice’’ (). According to
the media-technical analogies Freud uses in his earliest essays on transfer-
ence, a transference is a reprintable cliché that it makes out of the original
relationship it also freeze-frames and condemns as unstable.
One man’s translation is another man’s negative transference. Because
even though de Man seems to be talking metaphor, he’s suddenly in a spot
of resistance in theory. Benjamin, de Man notes, says translation is not the
metaphor of the original: ‘‘nevertheless, the German word for translation,
Übersetzen, means metaphor . . . Übersetzen, I should say, translates meta-
phor—which, asserts Benjamin, is not at all the same. They are not meta-
phors, yet the word means metaphor. The metaphor is not a metaphor,
Benjamin is saying. No wonder that translators have difficulty’’ (). No
wonder: it’s some kind of wound or re-wounding (as the tape rewinds) that
sends de Man to the corner of the class. The German and English words for
‘‘translation’’ also translate ‘‘tradition’’ and ‘‘transference.’’
Along the ‘‘intralinguistic’’ axis of Benjamin’s understanding of transla-
tion—versus the extralinguistic coordinates of paraphrase and imitation—
de Man lets go a striking reformulation of the ‘‘amazing’’ paradox that he
is suddenly willing to accept, namely that a metaphor is not a metaphor:
translations ‘‘kill the original, by discovering that the original was already
dead’’ (). But then he pulls himself together again and returns to Benja-
min, and returns translation to the afterlife of the original.
The afterimage of translation shares in the techno logic Benjamin de-
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velops in ‘‘SomeMotifs in Baudelaire.’’ The gadget connection with technol-
ogy, the flick of the switch, the push of a button, administers posthumous
shocks, which, as shots of inoculation, safeguard systems of circulation and
substitution against the massive psychotic breakdown and shutdown that
would otherwise follow from direct contact with the pressures of our on-
going technologization and massification. As long as we keep it on a short
control release, technologization ultimately provides a technology-free view
of reality. Pure or mere language gives to translation what’s due to the origi-
nal. Aura is thus neither created nor incorporated; it is destroyed and then,
by no default of its own, restored. In other words, let the taped record show:
de Man’s back, and his transference slips are showing. Either de Man split
aura/or he’s on both sides now.
In real time, de Man never takes the trans- to make the techno connec-
tions inside that hub of Benjamin’s thought, which is wide open to Freud’s
influence. He underscores instead a posthumous sense of the pangs Ben-
jamin’s translators have unambiguously associated with birth and thus re-
birth: ‘‘So if you translateWehen by ‘birth pangs,’ you would have to trans-
late it by ‘death pangs’ as much as by ‘birth pangs,’ and the stress is perhaps
more on death than on life’’ ().Wehe is an outcry of woe, of sorrow, also
of warning that the outcome of your actions will come to grief. The pangs
of one’s own word in translation and the afterlife or fermenting decay of the
original to which the translation also points find two examples in de Man’s
lecture, one intended, the other unattended. The intralinguistic Wehen are
plunged into an abyss, for which deMan finds the Frenchmise en abyme the
best translation, because it is a structure and has a ‘‘non-pathetic technical
sense’’: ‘‘The text about translation is itself a translation, and the untrans-
latability which it mentions about itself inhabits its own texture and will
inhabit anybody who in his turn will try to translate it, as I am now trying,
and failing, to do’’ (). That is the open-and-shut example of where the
woe goes. But when it comes to the French translation of Brot und Wein,
de Man is disturbed by connotations of bastardization and cheap restau-
rants: ‘‘It is all right in English because ‘bread’ is close enough to Brot. . . .
But the stability of my quotidian, of my daily bread, the reassuring quo-
tidian aspects of the word ‘bread,’ daily bread, is upset by the French word
pain.What I mean is upset by the way in which I mean—the way in which
it is pain, the phoneme, the term pain, which has its set of connotations
which take you in a completely different direction’’ (). The woe comes
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back all right in English as the pain that de Man cannot accept in trans-
lation for his daily bread. And why not pick on ‘‘wine’’ for Wein? In the
German there’s no ‘‘whining,’’ just the direct hit of weinen, of ‘‘weeping.’’
Too close. In the taped question-and-answer period, Neil Hertz wonders
how to account for the transition ‘‘from what’s really a contingent impossi-
bility—to reconstruct the connotations of Brot—to a major term, like the
‘Inhuman’ ’’ (). Let the recording show that de Man backs down: it was
just an anecdote, and Benjamin gave the example—and ‘‘whenever you give
an example you, as you know, lose what you want to say’’—and what he
gave, though it ‘‘comes from him,’’ from Benjamin, he, de Man, gave ‘‘for
the sake of a cheap laugh’’ (). DeMan has slipped, and covers what is now
the butt of his joke, with a defense so brittle it keeps turning on the speaker.
In other words, the anecdotal discussion of how Brot or interchangeably, de
Man offers, brood, Flemish for bread (), gets lost in the translation into
pain ‘‘is still very human’’ (). Stowaway in Brot is a certain melancholy
brooding that can never cross over into the external or ‘‘human’’ expression
of pain.
If we take Hertz, and take him at his word, then our question to de
Man remains, Why not ‘‘transhuman’’ rather than ‘‘dehumanized’’ or ‘‘in-
human’’? De Man: ‘‘If one speaks of the inhuman, the fundamental non-
human character of language, one also speaks of the fundamental non-
definition of the human as such’’ (). This all-or-nothing inhumanism
informs de Man’s reading of the end of Goethe’s Faust in his  review
article. He takes issue with the born-again view of the crying-out warning
shout of pain to come. The Jungian myth program sees poetry as ‘‘the lan-
guage in which the divine is preserved and to which, therefore, one never
returns to die; one returns to language to be reborn’’ (). DeMan issues the
corrective: ‘‘The end of Faust is not a return to the divine (which, moreover,
for Goethe, has never been absent), but is rather the evocation of the abso-
lute interiorization that is death’’ (–). While it is true enough that the
eternal is the internal (and likewise I’m sure), it is hard to imagine an abso-
lute interiorization, perhaps as hard or impossible as imagining one’s own
death. Because the other always goes first, there can never be the closure of
absolute interiorization. We are stuck between a loss—of the other—and
the hard-to-imagine place of our own death. Or in a more political or gene-
alogical setting: not even suicide realizes a self-relation but, in theory, takes
along countless undisclosed others on the way out. The totalitarian attempt
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to project self-difference onto the despised other runs out of victims and
up against the other within that must be offed—runs up against the suicide
that was all along the starting point.
Goethe’s Faust is doubled over by the suicidal ideation he extracts as in-
heritance down the corridors of the university from his father (the full-on
transferential setting). The impulse is halted by a blast from the past, back
to a future that uncontrollably comes toward us. Songs from childhood re-
store him to the doubly missing maternal connection. But the impulse isn’t
overcome; it is deferred (and prolonged) by the pact with the devil. Between
the songs that flash Faust back to his childhood and the signing of the con-
tract or wager, there remains the all-important transition of the translation
scene. Faust’s ultimate translation of Logos as performative deed prompts
Mephistopheles to come out of his poodle disguise; he takes this to be the
right time to make his proposition. Mephistopheles has a devil of a time
serving as bureaucrat to Faust the thinker, genius, professor, and journal-
ist. The devil or double translates into deeds by taking at their word cer-
tain thoughts that cross Faust’s mind. Faust can thus not see that the deeds
carried out by his double are in any way associated with him. In Benjamin’s
The Origin of the GermanMourning Pageant, you can find, in vestigial form,
an allegorical reading of Goethe’s Faust that resonates with the endopsy-
chic reading of Faust that Freud folds into his Schreber case study. In all
three texts, a highest court of mourning or haunting places us before the
law of our fathers—back in the transferential setting—and passes judgment
on the striving bent on the splitting of the translation of words into deeds.
In the Messenger Lecture on ‘‘The Task of the Translator,’’ de Man gives
the floor to his student, Carol Jacobs, whose recently published article ‘‘The
Monstrosity of Translation’’ is ‘‘precise and correct’’ on what thus, for de
Man, can go largely without saying. Let her prove that they are both aware
of the cabalistic meanings of Benjamin’s texts. But then he can step in and
take over once she arrives, back in Benjamin’s ‘‘The Task of the Translator,’’
at an error in translation, one that would make whole what remains, in the
original, a broken part (). She gets a break. We can recognize the trans-
ference gift—the famous teacher recommends his student by including her
in his corpus—, but in the afterlife, translation, transmission of de Man’s
collected work, we are also reminded of another Gift, a ‘‘poison’’ indistin-
guishable from the medicine that Faust’s doctor father hands down to him.
We don’t have to make the jump cut to a past we were left to not see. In
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 de Man gave an introduction to Jacobs’s Dissimulating Harmony,4 a
task or contract of translation that was one of the professor’s more devil-
ish performances. First he makes it all paraphrase, himself included, while
managing, for want of burden of proof or understanding, to count him-
self and everyone else out, too: ‘‘Paraphrase is the best way to distract the
mind from genuine obstacles and to gain approval, replacing the burden
of understanding with the mimicry of its performance’’ (). But then he
has the last word of a survival that is not Benjaminian or Nietzschean, but
in the terms of the transference, annihilating: ‘‘But whereas the apparent
fluidity of Nietzsche’s text turns out to be a stammer, the high quality of
Carol Jacobs’s readings threaten her with a worse danger. She cannot pre-
vent her stammering text from being impeccably fluid. Parable turns into
paraphrase after all, even and especially when one is as fully aware as she is
of this inconsistency. The result is no longer the birth of something purely
tragic, though it is certainly not benign. It may well be the birth of criticism
as truly critical reading, a birth that is forever aborted and forever repeated
but that, in the meantime, makes for indispensable reading’’ (). With an
endorsement like that, who needs newspaper reviews?
De Man’s horror of the middlebrow, which in  rushes him into con-
flation of Goethe with the appropriation of Goethe by Germanistik or by
Thomas Mann, is what he was all along pushing away, projecting outward,
and thus performing, too. We have only begun to read Goethe. The hands-
off thematic criticism that the Goethe corpus has generated as the outer
limit of defense dates way back, in fact to Friedrich Schlegel’s essay onWil-
helm Meisters Lehrjahre in which art appreciation takes over where ambiva-
lence had to be let off. That was Schlegel’s devil deal with the journalistic,
thematic, or middlebrow double. With the exception of the sketched read-
ing stretched between Freud and Benjamin, by and large Faust has been
given the appreciation treatment, which, just like idealization, conceals re-
sentment, until that is what it turns around to become exclusively and up
front. Friedrich Nietzsche teaches that Goethe’s Faust gets it all wrong. But
without Goethe’s closing lines dedicated to the eternal feminine and to
the Gleichnis, the mutable as ‘‘figure’’ of eternity, Nietzsche could not have
pulled up the difference that the internal feminine can make, a mourning
that must mourn even over themerely integrative and substitutivemoments
of successful mourning, a difference that goes with the flow of eternity as
figure [Gleichnis] of transience into the formulation ofDie ewigeWiederkehr
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des Gleichen. Karl Kraus dismissed Faust as an assembly of lines designed
for decontextualized citing and recycling or paraphrase. But then Kraus’s
position as antijournalist was profoundly untenable, and when he took on
Faust he was only going through another one of his phrases.
Developmentally speaking, journalism is adolescent, and often doubles
as acting out. Journalism begins, over and again, with the journal entries
jotted down by the teenager trying to contain the new-found interiority and
energy of insight. Adolescence can be defined as the crisis brought on by
insights and opinions, which are premature with regard to the teen’s ability
to give them a body and thus absorb and metabolize their shock value. Not
to graduate from the mirror stage of journal writing commits you to the
suicide drive. Every journal entry is here to serve you as the final line and
dating of suicidal ideation. De Man lost his teenage brother and then his
mother when he was a teen.We can’t be sure about the brother, but let’s as-
sume both committed suicide. DeMan’s horror of adolescent journal-ism—
the Teen Age—would give the momentum to his own splitting and acting
out. It is tempting to consider the inevitable return of his bad press as the
return also of the suicide pact. But the transference of the other stuck to de
Man’s corpus, taping it together, restoring it, and restoring it, for the first
time, to a legibility we have learned to associate with what Benjamin called
translation and what Freud identified as the transference. The resistance in
theory was all along to the transferential setting, and thus to all the articu-
lations of the trans-, to all the prefix launches that set us on our way, off
into the externalizations of our pain, which attention to the transference,
however, can, given time, translate and contain.
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 The Democratic Father
(Credit and Crime in Metaphor)
.  
The moment in which the world grows increasingly literal is threatening
and needs to be explained. Cervantes’ Don Quixote, Flaubert’s Sentimental
Education, and Kafka’s ‘‘The Judgment’’ describe different characters’
responses to consternation. Don Quixote saves himself by enlarging his
credulity, blaming magic, and summoning up religious patience: God will
help His faithful knight. In Sentimental Education, Frédéric Moreau saves
himself by constructing erogenous rhetorical fictions of selfhood; mastery of
the Oedipus complex will save the consternated lover. In ‘‘The Judgment,’’
Georg Bendemann consents to his own literalization and death; his hope lies
in immersion in a sort of Dionysian capitalist flux, an urban rage of sex and
commerce. In each case the anthropological moment shatters the reading
relation: interpersonal distress in fiction is amplified into a reading trauma.
Thereafter it is every hermeneut for her- or himself. Literature rewrites
anthropology by suggesting that interpersonality is founded on the violent
suppression of a more native unintelligibility. Interpersonality is the reward
for the lost knowledge of the universal failure of reading.
—Stanley Corngold in Franz Kafka: The Necessity of Form, –.
The Father
In all three cases, the early modern (Cervantes), the modernist (Flau-
bert), and the always already postmodernist (Kafka), at stake is the ‘‘Oedi-
pus complex,’’ which is to say, at stake is the Paternal Law—whether the
father is Don Quixote’s God, Frédéric’s inaccessible, idealized woman, or
Georg’s capitalist and sexualized father. Specifically, Stanley Corngold raises
here the question how this Law relates to the literal and the figurative or
metaphorical. This question surprisingly involves the tension between what
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Corngold calls the ‘‘anthropological moment’’ and the ‘‘reading relation.’’
The one’s death seems to be the other’s life. A ‘‘failure of reading,’’ a ‘‘vio-
lent suppression of a more native unintelligibility,’’ a ‘‘reading trauma’’ is
required for ‘‘interpersonality’’ to be attained. To focus on Kafka, who is
one of the literary fathers of this piece as well as of postmodernity, the
negotiation of this tension takes place ‘‘in a sort of Dionysian capitalist
flux, an urban rage of sex and commerce’’—in short, in what we know as
Western, modern, capitalist democracies, up to and including our contem-
porary, transnational global capitalism, which, the totalitarian associations
oozing in its global character notwithstanding, the Western liberalist dis-
course continues to equate with democracy. Concluding and paraphrasing,
we may thus arrive at our introductory statement: At stake is the function
of the father in the linguistic and discursive (and hence, ideological) dis-
ciplining of the subject as the subject of democratic (that is, noncoercively
coercive or hegemonic) Law.
Corngold’s linkage of the Oedipus complex to the literal and the meta-
phorical in language is analogous to Freud’s bringing together, in Totem
and Taboo (), of the murder of the primal father by the horde of his
sons and the Oedipal incestuous desire for the mother—namely, ‘‘democ-
racy.’’ Mapping the modern male (Western) subject onto the historical birth
of (French) modern democracy on the ground of the murder of the king,
Freud generates both the son and the father as an Oedipus and a Laios
without whom the mother would have remained irrevocably the exclusive
privilege of the king. The moment that the king establishes the prohibi-
tion of the literal incestuous act with the mother coincides with the public
recognition of the universal right, assumed to be shared by all sons, to the
metaphorical incest with the mother—a mother disembodied as the body
politic of democracy.
But at the roots of democracy lies not only Oedipus. There have always
been two names—both of Methuselahian mythological force—that since
antiquity haunt the Western discourse on Paternal Law and democracy:
Oedipus and Antigone. If Oedipus epitomizes the ultimate subjection of
the subject to the Paternal Law—a subjection necessary to save him from
his eponymous complex—Antigone, her disobedience to the Law notwith-
standing, remains paradoxically the woman of the prototypical democracy
that has ever since haunted the imagination of any subsequent Western
democracy. Sophocles’ Antigone is traditionally read as the tragedy meant
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to justify democracy as the adequate social organization over against mon-
archy. Or, almost in Sophocles’ words—in their translation—as the tragedy
meant to use Creon’s ‘‘misery’’ as a ‘‘witness to mankind what worst of woe /
The lack of counsel brings a man to know!’’1 What ‘‘reading trauma’’ and
what slippages between the literal and the metaphoric are required for an
ideal democracy, programmed to serve as the eidos or idea (father) for any
historically actual, future, Western democracy? What ‘‘anthropological re-
lations’’ and ‘‘native unintelligibility’’ must Oedipus and Antigone, the son
and the daughter, sacrifice in order for ‘‘interpersonality [to be] founded’’
for all democratic subjects?
Comparing the two seminal Sophoclean tragedies, one diegetic differ-
ence strikes us immediately: the occurrence of an actual crime (Oedipus’s
patricide), and its absence (Antigone’s general innocence, including regard-
ing the death of her brother). But Antigone, daughter and sister of Oedipus,
differs from the latter in several other ways, one of which is the impossibility
for Antigone to commit factually the incestuous act either with her father-
brother, Oedipus, or with her other brother, Polynices, since both are dead.
There is an additional brother, Eteocles, but he is not only dead, but dead
and buried, and hence no goodmaterial for creating a narrative around: no-
body cares, least of all Antigone. Furthermore, there is Ismene, a sister, who
also remains fairly invisible, protected by her antiheroic, quasi-bourgeois
readiness for noninvolvement. In any case, unlike her father Oedipus who
did not know, Antigone knows that the father, as well as the brother, is dead.
Finally, since their deaths lie beyond Antigone’s responsibility, she, unlike
Oedipus, should have no reason to feel guilt.
Antigone’s part in the tragedy consists in the attempt to get Polynices’
corpse buried, to render invisible this corpse (this embodiment of, among
other things, the impossibility of incest), to force the king, Creon, to hide
corpse and death, bury them, and thereby immortalize them. The king,
Sophocles argues in his literary way, must come up to the times—the times
of the Athenian democratic polis-state—by learning that corpses must be
honored by burial ceremonies, that is, rendered at once invisible and im-
mortal. In Corngold’s terms, he must learn to transform literal death (the
corpse) into metaphorical death (rituals, narratives, etc.). Rather than sheer
panem, both Sophocles and Corngold argue, the democratic subjects need
panem et circenses.
But Creon, who is an old-fashioned king, an authoritarian and decision-
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istic monarch, not yet adapted to the ideals of the Athenian democracy,
does not know how to protect his authority, refuses to render this piece of
flesh invisible, and is determined to derive all possible enjoyment from this
literal death and its massacred body. He refuses, in other words, to learn
that in democracy the laws of theater apply to reality, too, and that con-
sequently, the prohibition to represent death literally on the stage means
also the prohibition to represent death literally in reality. As if this were not
enough, by prohibiting the burial, Creon transforms the literally impos-
sible incest (between sister and brother) into a prohibition—something that
paradoxically presupposes that the incest in question has somehow become
possible, even if only metaphorically. In an interesting, democratic twist,
the king’s power to impose laws and effectively prohibit acts entails the sub-
ject’s (Antigone’s) power to commit other, impossible acts (for example,
incest)—not, of course, factually (literally), since the concerned males are
dead, but within the realm of imagination (metaphorically). Conversely,
Antigone’s imaginary power presupposes as its precondition Creon’s factual
authority and power.
This distinction between factual and legal authority and power on the
one hand and imaginary power on the other is something that, however,
was not systematically articulated by the fathers of ancient Greek democ-
racy. Its theoretical representation originates, and not bymere fortuity, with
Spinoza, one of the fathers (albeit one considered to be heretic and hence
capable of only abortive, monstrous offspring rather than properly demo-
cratic kids) of an epigenetic democracy, that is, the modern, secular, West-
ern democracy and its attempts to (re)establish itself out of the absolutist
state, which had already struck root in sixteenth-century Europe. In lieu of
any other kind of burial ceremony or funeral oration, Spinoza’s literal death
in  is immediately followed by the posthumous publication of his Ethics,
in which the distinction between these two forms of power was to outlive
him. Even though, metaphysically and ontologically speaking, imaginary
power (potestas; French pouvoir; German Macht) does not exist, Spinoza
had argued, in historical, empirical reality, this nonexistent power has cata-
lytically determinant effects on the real, existing power of authority (poten-
tia; French puissance; German Vermögen).2 Albeit not theoretically system-
atized, this distinction is already evident in Sophocles’ Antigone, in which
the eponymous heroine derives the force of her resistance precisely from her
conviction, against all empirical evidence, that she indeed has power and
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can affect her historical reality. But imaginary power is not only the source
of resistance, but simultaneously also the very ground of the authority that
it presumes to resist. The fulfillment of Antigone’s oppositional will would
be tantamount to a breach of Creon’s law and a subsequent infliction of his
authority, but inversely, this authority and law derive their effective power
and meaning in the first place only insofar as the possibility of their inflic-
tion and breach has already been opened up—something that presupposes
that in spite of the unchallengeable empirical fact that Creon is the locus of
historical authority, his subjects must be also loci of power. The establish-
ment of his prohibition is what transforms this (literal) impossibility into a
(metaphorical) possibility—just as it transforms the impossible incest into
a possibility.
But the force of Creon’s prohibition is not exhausted in this self-reflective
power to ground thus tautologically and arbitrarily itself by means of sup-
plementing its own law with the subject’s power to break this law, whatever
the latter may be. Creon’s prohibition is also the cause and motor that in the
first place set in motion the narration of Antigone’s story, the action and
plot of her tragedy, as well as all subsequent readings, rereadings, renarra-
tions, and interpretations, including its translations and debates—not to
mention the entailed production of material goods: books, articles, perfor-
mances, pictures, films, and so on. In other words, a prohibition, set in the
center of an impossibility, enables nothing less than exchange (discursive
and economic) to proliferate and sustain the chain of circulation of both
signification and commerce, thereby producing products and immortality,
surplus value, andmoral values alike. In this, the Sophoclean Antigone does
not differ, as we know at least since Lévi-Strauss’s analysis of myths, from,
say, Goethe’s Helen in Faust.3 Both function not so much as real women
but as signifiers that have the license to circulate freely across centuries and
genres, fiction and theory, culture and economy.4 But, whether in Sopho-
cles, Cervantes, Flaubert, or Kafka, this ‘‘Dionysian capitalist flux’’ requires
one more thing: corpses (literal, as are the knight’s victims or Georg him-
self, or metaphorical, such as Frédéric’s unattainable, spiritualized, immor-
tal, ideal, and hence always already dead woman). To remain with the origi-
nal father of democracy, however, the capitalist semantic and economic flux
requires two dead bodies: first, the body that this prohibition presupposes
as dead (Polynices), and second, the body that this prohibition eventually
kills (Antigone). Only by rendering invisible these bodies can the events
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of their literal deaths be transformed into an unobstructed, infinite chain
of free circulation of capital and signs. By contrast, to persist in focusing
on theses corpses would prevent the development and production of the
narrative—just as the obstinate focus on the commodity in exchange inter-
rupts (brings death to) the ostensibly free circulation of capital. Briefly put,
the democratic father must know well not only his Spinoza, but also his
Marx.
The Daughter
Beyond the tension between corpse and narrative,Antigone points to an-
other major, and currently perhaps more popular, tension, namely that be-
tween maleness and femaleness. If it can be said, as it often is, that Antigone
is the drama about the abyssal gap or radical incommunicability between
the two sexes, about the (Freudian) fact that males see females as blind to
ethical and legal prohibition [potentia], while females see males as blind
to impossibility—and hence to metaphorical possibility [potestas]—then it
can also be said that Antigone is the drama about the gap between (Creo-
nian) sadism, which kills, prohibits, and kills again, and (Antigonean) mas-
ochism, which disavows factual impossibility by means of imaginary pos-
sibility.5 Seen in this context, the denouement of the tragedy states that the
sadistic subject, Creon, with his prohibition, is the one who factually and
literally destroys the masochistic subject, Antigone. For his part, Creon is
destroyed only metaphorically, or by proxy, if you wish, since it is not he
who kills himself, but his wife and son who kill themselves. And even in his
metaphorical destruction, Creon is not only the master of Antigone, but as
Luce Irigaray has pointed out, the ‘‘master of that destiny’’6—his own and
his family’s, not to mention the destiny of democracy. In modern terms,
invoking yet another unwanted and disavowed father of the generation of
democracy out of the absolutist state, the Sophoclean king is a Machiavel-
lian prince avant la lettre,who regards ‘‘that it is better to be rash than timid,
for Fortune [destiny] is a woman, and the man who wants to hold her down
must beat and bully her.’’7
Now Irigaray’s comment is engendered as a reaction to Lacan’s reading
of Antigone, which itself is begotten by Heidegger’s reading of Antigone,
the procreator of which is Hegel’s original and seminal reading of Antigone.
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Allowing the mother (Irigaray) to function tacitly (as proper mothers are
supposed to do) in the further development of this argument, and passing
directly to the most recent father of this genealogical chain, Lacan turned
in his seventh seminar, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (–), to the im-
mortalized, ‘‘beautiful,’’ and dead Antigone, in order to elevate her heroism
to the status of the ethical par excellence. Insofar as it involves a Creonian
site of authority, an ethics of a state, such as the Athenian democratic state,
Lacan argued, indeed demands a beautiful, heroic, and dead Antigone.8
Lacan’s argument is structured around one basic thesis as the presuppo-
sition of any ethics pertinent to a post–World War II Europe, namely, that
one should not separate the being from the signifier.9 Antigone’s persistence
on burying Polynices’ corpse testifies to her determination not to let this
dead being be separated from the signifier, the rituals and narratives with
which the state accompanies its subjects to death. By contrast, Creon’s pro-
hibition of this burial presupposes this separation, which allows the state
to ‘‘finish off someone who is a man as if he were a dog,’’10 to treat being
as if it were not attached to any signifier, as if it did not bear any name,
and as if it were an animal, the cadaver of which can ‘‘legitimately’’ be
eaten by dogs and birds. Yet again, antiquity, modernism, and postmod-
ernism overlap insofar as the state, whether embodied in the king or in the
vast bureaucratic, legislative mechanism, can arbitrarily let its subjects die
‘‘Like a dog!’’11 But, whereas Kafka’s intention is to foreground that in this
brutal, inhuman death of the subject, ‘‘the shame of it must outlive him’’
(), Creon’s intention in treating Polynices’ corpse ‘‘like a dog’’ is that
what outlives him is not the ‘‘shame’’ of Creon’s own act but the ‘‘shame’’ of
Polynices’ historical past as a ‘‘traitor’’ of his country and as a ‘‘fratricide.’’12
In other words, the difference between Creon and Antigone does not lie in
their severing or not severing the being from the signifier, for Creon treats
Polynices ‘‘as if he were a dog’’ not because the signifier has abandoned him,
but, by contrast, because the signifier, manifest as historical and ethnic nar-
rative (in which Polynices has become a figure of treason and fratricide),
has stained him irrevocably. Creon’s prohibition of the burial is not moti-
vated by the assumption that the corpse in question does not bear a name,
but by the historical fact that it bears this name as opposed to another, less
infamous name.13
This forces Lacan to establish a further distinction, one which now per-
tains to the signifier itself. The signifier may be the one that circulates freely,
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transcending any historical determination, law, and authority, just as it can
be the very designation of history, its laws, and its factual power dynam-
ics. By analogy to the semantic ambiguity of ‘‘representation’’ (both rep-
resentation in language as well as political and legal representation), the
signifier is both: the ahistorical sign of imaginary power [potestas] and
the historical sign of effective political power and authority. Creon severs
Polynices’ body from the signifier taken in its first aspect, which through-
out history demands that human bodies be treated as bearers of names
and as singular objects to which are assigned singular deaths and tombs.
By contrast, Antigone, in her persistence to bury Polynices even if he had
undoubtedly been a traitor and a fratricide, severs being from the signi-
fier in its second aspect, which demands that death and posthumous treat-
ment be determined by the specific historical past of each subject. Lacan’s
ethical imperative, by valorizing Antigone and discrediting Creon, in effect
valorizes that specific function of the signifier, which affects that ‘‘purity,
that separation of being from the characteristics of the historical drama
he [who has lived] has lived through.’’14 Returning to Corngold’s terms,
the metaphorical, imaginary, as opposed to the literal signifier, succeeds
in suppressing not only ‘‘anthropology,’’ but also history, while democratic
‘‘[i]nterpersonality is the reward for the suppression’’ of ‘‘a more native un-
intelligibility’’ or ‘‘of the universal failure of reading’’ of specifically the his-
torical past and its actual power dynamics.
Thus, just as Cervantes, Flaubert, and Kafka allow redemption to emerge
out of the separation of the metaphorical from the literal, Lacan allows out
of the same separation, ethical purity to emerge and thus to ground onto-
logical purity. After this separation and the redemptive purity that, in prop-
erly Hegelian fashion, emerges in all of these cases, Don Quixote, Frédéric,
and Georg are like Antigone, who, yet again in Lacan’s words ‘‘appears as
autonomos, as a pure and simple relationship of the human being to that of
which he miraculously happens to be the bearer, namely, the signifying cut
that confers on him the indomitable power of being what he is in the face
of everything that may oppose him.’’15 Having thus attained the level of the
pure, redemptive, metaphorical, and imaginary signifier and power, Don
Quixote, Frédéric, Georg, and Antigone, unlike their enemies who always
serve and please a certain historical authority, can serve and please ahis-
torical, divine authority, whether this is understood as the pagan Gods, the
Christian God, or the secular ‘‘hermeneut.’’
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But as we saw in our analysis of the relation between Antigone’s (im)pos-
sibility and Creon’s prohibition, while metaphorically pleasing ahistorical
being, our characters and their imaginary signifier and power [potestas]
also please, feed, support, and ground historically factual power and its laws
[potentia], and this is why one can object that neither divinity nor the her-
meneutic act can be seen as ahistorical functions. Similarly, this is also why,
as we shall presently see, Lacan’s ‘‘ethical imperative’’ can be taken as such
only insofar as it is assumed to address not only Creon but both Creon and
Antigone—even if each of them from a different direction.
For Antigone, too, in her attempt not to let the ‘‘being,’’ Polynices’ body,
be severed from the signifier, the burial honors that a culture ascribes to
human dignity, ultimately separated being from signifier by turning both
Polynices’ and her own body into pure, ahistorical signifiers, that is, signi-
fiers that signify nothing else except signification itself. Antigone invokes
Polynices’ name as the simple marker of bearing a name, as opposed to
not bearing one, to not being inscribed in signification. By contrast, Creon
invokes Polynices’ name in its differentiation from all other names within
universal signification. Thus Antigone is reduced to a ‘‘good,’’ absolute mas-
ochist, whose life or death is tantamount to pure signification (the highest
signifier thereby being heroism). By contrast, Creon is reduced to a ‘‘bad,’’
absolute monarch, for whom life or death is tantamount to pure history and
effective relations of political power, within an always politically laden, and
hence highly fragile, interpersonality.
All this means that in order for the normative statement, do not detach
the being from the signifier, to function as an ethical imperative, it must
be heard differently by Creon and Antigone, because it structurally has two
meanings, contingent upon the ambiguity of the meaning of the terms ‘‘sig-
nifier’’ and ‘‘representation.’’ The one mode of hearing this imperative de-
rives from the signifier in its absoluteness, the signifier as opposed to the
nonsignifier. The other mode derives from the signifier in its differentiality
and specificity (the signifier as opposed and in relation) to all other signi-
fiers. Just as being [être] evokes both purity and separation [inter-esse], the
imperative [divide et impera] itself bears both meanings, the historical and
that which disavows history.
Consequently, ethics depends upon Creon’s ability to hear the impera-
tive as voiced from the imaginary disavowal of history and Antigone’s abil-
ity to hear it as voiced from within history. History, then, becomes tragedy
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(both literally and metaphorically) precisely insofar as neither man nor
woman succeeds in doing what they should do. In other words, the pre-
condition for the Lacanian normative statement to constitute an ethical im-
perative applicable to both genders—a universal ethical imperative—lies in
our not mistaking Antigone for the realized embodiment of the ethical at-
titude par excellence. Her power as a corollary of Creonian power, far from
signifying the advent of ethics in history, is limited to pointing to a possi-
bility of ethics—a possibility to which neither she nor he alone can point.
Antigone may arguably be heroic, but not yet ethical. Yet, she lies in the
foundational tomb of the democratic (paternal) Law.
The Forefather
In the chain ofAntigone’s readings, thematernal reading (Irigaray), more
or less tacitly, points to the fact that Antigone’s insistence to bury Polynices
is a metaphorical version of not only a sororal incestuous (and necrophiliac)
desire but also of the paternal incest—and hence directly analogous to Oed-
ipus’s desire for maternal incest. This reading presupposes two levels of
metaphorical displacement and distance from the literal. The first level is
introduced by the mere fact that the reproach of incestuous desire can in
the first place apply to Antigone only metaphorically—unlike Oedipus who
actually commits incest with his mother. By writing two separate trage-
dies, Oedipus Rex and Antigone, Sophocles distinguishes between literal
and metaphorical incest and thus makes us notice that the latter requires
our ability to metaphorize. Without this ability, Antigone’s desire to bury
Polynices is—just as a cigar may sometimes be simply a cigar—nothing
more than what it says: the desire to bury Polynices. On the second level,
Polynices can acquire the paternal position in relation to Antigone—so that
Antigone’s, already metaphorical, desire for incest is the desire of paternal
incest—again only metaphorically. Polynices, who is, like Antigone, child
of Oedipus and Jocasta, becomes metaphorically Antigone’s father only via
her other brother, Oedipus, who is also her father.
The crucial byproduct of this metaphorical sliding is a remarkable dis-
placement of the bearer of incestuous desire, which has now shifted from
Antigone to Creon. It is now he who desires, causes, and finally orders this
double burial, in which finally both Polynices and Antigone, the literal sib-
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lings, literally lie in the tomb, thus metaphorically committing the incestu-
ous act. This metaphorical incestuous act, finally, is not a substitute for any
desire on the part of either Antigone or Polynices, but rather the metaphori-
cal substitute for Creon’s own desire to commit incest with his literal sister,
Jocasta. What renders invisible both the literally tyrannical character and
the metaphorically incestuous desire, which underlie Creon’s prohibition
and acts, is the attribution of a purportedly incestuous desire for Polynices
to Antigone. By attributing this incestuous desire to her, by making his
desire hers, Creon acquires (to invoke yet another great father of modern,
specifically enlightened democracy) Antigone’s ‘‘tacit consent’’ to her own
burial.16 Thus the attribution of the incestuous desire to Antigone at one
stroke provides her with her potestas, and Creon not, of course, with his
potentia (which from the outset is his and needs no provider) but with her
‘‘tacit consent’’ to his potentia. In short, the passage from Oedipus Rex to
Antigone is the passage from coercive paternal authority and power to non-
coercively coercive, hegemonic, paternal authority and power.
To pursue this metaphorical sliding to the end, by means of the meta-
phorical fulfillment of his incestuous desire at the exodus, the tragic denoue-
ment in which both Polynices and Antigone are buried, Creon fulfills by
proxy not only his sororal incestuous desire—what he would get by actu-
ally committing the incestuous act with his sister, Jocasta—but also, finally,
his parental incestuous desire, insofar as Antigone and Polynices are not
only siblings but, metaphorically, also daughter and father. All of this boils
down to the fact that, through this long series of incestuous metaphors, up
to and including Antigone’s ‘‘tacit consent,’’ Creon’s tyrannical act is trans-
formed into an act of incestuous love. Consequently, tyrannical laws can
henceforth be breached or canceled only metaphorically—something that
reinforces their invisibility and literal force, protected safely behind the veil
of metaphorical incestuous love.
A crucial detail must not be overlooked here. The node that both sus-
tains the chain of metaphorical substitutions that move away from literal
incestuous possibilities (incest between Oedipus and Jocasta, Antigone and
Polynices, and Creon and Jocasta) and allows Creon to enter this chain
of metaphorical substitutions is neither Oedipus nor Antigone (who are
only nephew and niece, respectively, to Creon). Rather, it is Jocasta, who
has first-degree (literal) relationships with all. Surprisingly, the forefather,
whose voice Antigone is supposed to obey, in Lacan’s reading, is after all the
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primordial mother, as both Lacan and Irigaray conclude. Crucially, how-
ever, it is not Antigone but Creon who follows her voice.
But if the forefather, the authentic father and king (Laios, king of Thebes
and natural father of Oedipus, followed in the throne by his son, Oedipus,
and then his brother, Creon) is already the foremother (Jocasta), can we
really speak of a difference between the pre-Oedipal law of coercive tyranny
and the incestuous, seductive, noncoercively coerced law of democracy, be-
tween Oedipus Rex and Antigone, and, finally, between the literal and meta-
phor? We can, of course, object that Laios’s Law turns out to be Jocasta’s
Law only after Antigone and its metaphorical fulfillment of the incestuous
desire of the already Oedipalized king, Creon. But in Oedipus Rex itself,
Laios’s Law, far from being determined exclusively by the effective relations
of power [potentia], is already imbued by imaginary power and signifier.
There, the cause and motor of the action is indeed Laios’s inexorable order
to kill his son, Oedipus, but—beyond the fact that from the outset this in-
exorable Law reveals itself as impotent, since the last slave can break it with
impunity—this order is already programmed by a preceding order. This is
the divine order, expressed in the Pythian infallible oracle, which prophe-
cies that some day the son will kill the father and take his place, both the
political and the conjugal. Thus Laios turns out to be an always already
Oedipalized father who punishes his son as if he had already committed the
incest and the murder for which he is supposed to be punished. But, as such,
he proves to be also always already, like his successor Creon, a Machiavel-
lian prince, who knows that crimes and evil deeds can be effectively recti-
fied and prevented from threatening one’s power only prior to their actual
manifestation and exposure to the empirical, historical eye. In Machiavelli’s
own words: ‘‘That is how it goes in affairs of the state: when you recognize
evils in advance, as they take shape (which requires some prudence to do),
you can quickly cure them; but when you have not seen them, and so let
them grow till anyone can recognize them, there is no longer a remedy.’’17
As the specific early modern meaning of ‘‘prudence’’ indicates, and as any
reader familiar with Machiavellian theory of state, overt or concealed, or
with the linguistic concept of the performative function of language can
discern, the crucial point Machiavelli makes here is not so much that the
ideal prince is he who has Pythian prophetic abilities, but rather he who
can use the latter as justification for attributing arbitrarily the intention of
crimes to any subject, and to do so as effectively as if the subject had indeed
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already committed the crime.18 This is Laios’s feat and is what makes his
attempt to kill his son appear as an entirely justifiable act. For, after all, it
is clear that if Laios had not ordered his son’s death, and if, consequently,
the slave who had been ordered to execute the crime had not recoiled at
the cruelty of this order and let Oedipus survive and be raised without ever
having seen his father, then Oedipus could not ever run into his father and
not recognize him, let alone kill him.
Concluding and bringing together Oedipus Rex and Antigone, we can
infer that the overall, ‘‘cathartic’’ message is that metaphorical crimes
(whether they are tyrannical orders that dissolve behind incestuous desires,
or uncommitted crimes that function as if they had been committed) are
the ground of democratic and tyrannical paternal authority alike, both of
which are equally arbitrary. The ground of arbitrary authority, then, pre-
supposes the desire for metaphorization. This guarantees not only the trans-
formation of law into desire and the production of metaphorical crimes,
but also the desire to fulfill desires (incestuous or otherwise) only meta-
phorically—that is, only insofar as they are not actually fulfilled, and this
conversely means that the desire for metaphorization safeguards the lit-
eral unfulfillability of desire, that is, the obedience to and fulfillment of its
(Creonian) prohibition. The prohibition of literal fulfillment of desire is
sustained by the proliferation of its metaphorical fulfillments. The question
then becomes: Are the father and his Law always alive and omnipotent be-
hind the daughter’s metaphorical and democratic fulfillment of desire and
infringement of the Law?
The Gender of Democratic Epigones
‘‘The contrast between the power, based on the personal relations of do-
minion and servitude, that is conferred by landed property, and the im-
personal power that is given by money, is well expressed by the two French
proverbs, ‘Nulle terre sans seigneur [no land without a lord],’ and ‘L’argent
n’a pas de maître [money does not have master].’ ’’19 Insofar as authority
is arbitrary, paternal prohibition, set in the center of an impossibility, as
we saw, enables nothing less than exchange (discursive and economic). In
short, paternal prohibition is also the father of metaphor. To bury Polynices
is to commit a metaphorical incestuous act, that is, to break metaphorically
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the prohibitive law—thereby sustaining and guaranteeing its literal prohi-
bition. Furthermore, this metaphorical breach of the incestuous prohibition
affects also the sexualization of the law and its inscription into the register
of desire and potestas, rather than that of political power and legislation,
potentia, in which it originates. This is no more and no less than a conclu-
sion that could follow directly from Foucault’s contribution in understand-
ing psychoanalysis and, not least in it, Oedipalization. Psychoanalysis, as
Foucault has argued, is part and parcel of the discursive and hegemonic,
disciplining mechanism, by means of which coercive prohibitions and laws
are internalized as one’s own desire.20 This process of disavowal of literal
incest for the sake and by means of metaphorical incest merits closer atten-
tion. For what is ultimately disavowed here is less innocuous than sexual
incest.
Even though there is arguably no essential difference between Laios and
Creon, there seems to be one between Laios and Oedipus. This difference
seems to lie between the actual attempt of the father Laios to kill the son
Oedipus on the one hand, and on the other hand, the curse bestowed once
and for all on any generation of the Labdakides family. In the face of this
curse, the father Oedipus feels impotent and capable of only saying, as
he is about to abandon forever his family, home, and city at the end of
the tragedy: ‘‘Let our own fate wag onward as it may.’’21 This impotence
forces him to ask Creon for mercy, but, knowing that his position does not
allow him to ask for anything and that anything he touches, by hand or
tongue, is contaminated by him, he invokes gender difference and his so-
cially determined physical distance from his daughters to justify his partial
request:
And for my sons, Creon, take thou no care
Upon thee; they are men, so that they never
Can lack the means to live, where’er they be;
But my two girls, wretched and pitiable,
For whose repast was never board of mine
Ordered apart, without me, but in all
That I partook they always shared with me,
Take care of them; and let me, above all else,
Touch them with hand, and weep away my troubles!
Pardon, my lord; pardon, illustrious sir.22
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The difference between Laios and Oedipus converges with the difference
between the constative and the performative power of language. Laios gives
his son Oedipus to the servant to kill him, thus becoming an agent of the
future (and letting the statement ‘‘the father has attempted his son’s mur-
der’’ become constative), whereas Oedipus, himself being subjugated to a
curse greater than he, can only reduce himself to the passive role of a virus,
through which his children are also contaminated. His only hope (but also
fear) is that his daughters be at least partly (or not at all) immune to this
virus, for, as he continues to say, even if the gods meant that ‘‘Such as must
be the bane, both of my sons,’’ nothing prevents the people from wondering
whether it includes his daughters:
And you as well? For what reproach is lacking?
Your father slew his father, and became
Father of you—by her who bare him. So
Will they reproach you? who will wed you then?
No one, my children; but needs must wither,
Barren—unwed.23
Even though their gender may protect the two daughters against such a
violent and humiliating end as was his, it cannot protect them against its
female equivalent, an ‘‘unwed’’ and childless death—particularly when this
is also part of the father’s bequeathed prophecy-curse. Indeed, in her tomb
Antigone does not lament anything else but having to die ‘‘Friendless, un-
wept, unwed,’’ led ‘‘not as wives or brides are led, / Unblest with any mar-
riage, any care / Of children;’’ in ‘‘Thou Grave, my bridal chamber!’’24 Inter-
estingly, however, the lacking husband and children, potent as they would
be to mitigate the tragedy of her death, would never have had the power to
lead her to the same sacrifice:
For never had I, even had I been
Mother of children, or if spouse of mine
Lay dead and mouldering, in the state’s despite
Taken this task upon me. Do you ask
What argument I follow here of law?
One husband dead, another might be mine;
Sons by another, did I lose the first;
But, sire and mother buried in the grave,
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A brother is a branch that grows no more.
Yet I, preferring by this argument
To honour thee to the end, in Creon’s sight.25
It is as if the antediluvian curse legated by Oedipus to his children affords
no metaphorical substitutes or transitions within the range of its efficacy:
no replaceable party, husband or child, can in any way be implicated in the
law that concerns only his direct line of descent, on whom the curse befell.
By suffering her unwed and rebellious death, Antigone remains up to the
end faithful to both of her father’s prophecies/curses.
This means that Oedipus has committed against his daughter only a ver-
bal crime, as it were. Having never harmed her in any other way, he has only
allowed the performative and suggestive function of his words to lead her
to the fulfillment of their content. The difference between the two modes
in which paternal authority transmits its Law is evident in the difference
between the degrees of fatality and inevitability with which the tragic ends
approach in each of the two Sophoclean tragedies. It is here that Ismene’s
invisibility proves operative in the dramaturgic economy of the play, by
pointing to the fact that one can after all, like she did, evade the interpella-
tion exercised by the performative power of the curse and its transmission
by the father—unlike Oedipus who, haunted by factual crimes, cannot es-
cape his fate.
But this ostensibly clear-cut difference is yet again undermined by the
fact that the blurring of the two functions of language, the constative and
the performative, already marks the initial moment of Laios’s direct and
factual attempt to kill Oedipus. For Laios, as mentioned above, wants to
kill Oedipus only because he has been seduced by the performative power
of the Delphic omen. Thus the primal, pre-Oedipal father Laios, he who
should embody the literal, pre-Oedipal Law [potentia], has revealed himself
to be a puppet of the metaphorical laws of the imaginary and performative
power of language [potestas].
A puppet, but also an author. For what Oedipus says at his tragic end
about himself (‘‘O children, to have been / Author of you—unseeing—un-
knowing’’) applies doubly to Laios, since he nevertheless saw and knew.
Oedipus’s authorial father gives birth to his son by sending him to death as
a criminal, penalized for a crime that he has not committed at the time of
the punishment. This is literally a crime on credit that metaphorically func-
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tions as Oedipus’s ‘‘tacit consent’’ to his being punished by the father.When
a child is punished, the child is a woman, Rousseau would add. When the
paternal punishment predates the crime, the son (who is always a daugh-
ter) owes a crime to the judge-father, I would add. The son owes revenge
for the revenge taken on him. And this is exactly what Oedipus fatally does.
Yet if the son is always a daughter, Antigone then is a daughter of a dif-
ferent type. Unlike Oedipus who redeems his criminal debt to his father,
Antigone owes nothing and will never avenge anything, for the father ‘‘pun-
ishes’’ her only verbally and performatively. No crime has factually been
attempted against her; her credit relies only on words. But, and this was
the point of speech-act theory, words are also acts. Yet, just as Antigone is
a daughter of a different type than Oedipus, words are also acts of a dif-
ferent type than acts themselves are. To return to the terms of our local
father, Corngold, they are metaphorical acts. For, unlike Laios’s actual at-
tempt of infanticide, the paternal attempt against her can be disavowed,
incorporated, turned into all her own desire, but it cannot not be avenged,
because there is no crime against her, unless she herself commits it, unless
she herself decides not to make her own family and to remain faithful to
her original, cursed family, as she does with absolute determination up to
the end.
This then is the noninnocuously disavowed difference between the two
fathers, Laios and Oedipus—a disavowal that converges with the currently
popular disavowal of the difference between metaphor and the literal.26 The
former produces subjects who have at least the potential to redeem the
crime, the credit of which has justified their arbitrary punishment, for it is
a crime that has taken place literally. The latter, by contrast, by commit-
ting only metaphorical (verbal) crimes, does not fix the price required for
the redemption of the credit. Oedipus’s is an infinite credit, a credit about
which the last judgment and the final price are indefinitely and infinitely de-
ferred—so that Ismene, for instance, has eventually to pay nothing, whereas
Antigone pays all. Oedipus’s daughters encounter a crime that, like Marx’s
capital, is always suspended in eternal credit.
In other words, the daughter-daughter is subject to a metaphorical (and
capitalist) law, whereas the son-daughter is subject to a literal (and feu-
dal) law. As a result, whereas the son is committed to avenging the crime
committed against him, the daughter is committed to incorporating the
paternal law as her own (suicidal) desire, literal or metaphorical.
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Which of the two is the properly democratic paternal law at the root of
Western democracy?
Father and Crime on Credit
Shifting authorial register slightly, we may note that with Sophocles’
Antigone we are conceptually already within the Athenian democracy of
Socrates—and, performatively, within its legacy.We are, that is, in the state
that requires for its self-sustenance an act of redoubled scapegoating. First,
it requires scapegoating as an act of exchange, in which the citizens pay back
Polynices, Antigone, Socrates, and the others to come, for ‘‘their’’ crimi-
nal debt. But given that ‘‘their’’ debt is precisely only a debt on credit—
in fact, on an infinite and undefined credit, the price of which can be mo-
mentarily defined only retroactively, by the redemptive prices offered each
time, to be reopened anew for the next subject in the metaphorical series
of inheritance—scapegoating must also involve, secondly, the passive in-
corporation and active introjection of the guilt for ‘‘their’’ criminal debt
in the first place. It involves the act of initial crediting, by means of which
the father and the state ensure that the legacy continues to be transmitted,
that the next generation be credited for their noncommitted crime. This
becomes particularly evident in the case of Socrates because his crime and
legacy are cast more explicitly as a future utopia (the Platonic polis-state)
than are Polynices’ and Antigone’s.
This double scapegoating belongs to the everyday agenda of this state
and its philosophy, as Derrida reminds us in the part of his Dissemina-
tion devoted to ‘‘Plato’s Pharmacy.’’ Of the ‘‘pharmakon,’’ both poison and
remedy, and the ‘‘pharmakos,’’ the scapegoat, Derrida notes: ‘‘These exclu-
sions took place at critical moments. . . . Decision was then repeated. . . .
This ritual practice . . . was reproduced every year in Athens. . . . The date
of the ceremony is noteworthy: the sixth day of the Thargelia. That was the
day of the birth of him whose death—and not only because a pharmakon
was its direct cause—resembles that of a pharmakos from the inside: Soc-
rates.’’27 The phrase ‘‘not only because a pharmakon was its direct cause’’
points to the inscription of the Socratic death in the frame of its notorious
Hegelian reading. This, retroactively and from the inside of Socrates’ death,
bestows on it its own significance with paternal force the meaning of the
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death of Socrates—a man and a death who may or may not have existed,
may be literal or metaphorical. In Hegel’s words: ‘‘The sentence bears on the
one hand the aspect of unimpeachable rectitude—inasmuch as the Athe-
nian people condemns its deadliest foe—but on the other hand, that of a
deeply tragic character, inasmuch as the Athenians had to make the dis-
covery, that what they reprobated in Socrates had already struck firm root
among themselves . . . and that they must be pronounced guilty or inno-
cent with him.’’28 Pointing to the double operation taking place in demo-
cratic scapegoating, Hegel tells us that the ‘‘legal’’ cause of Socrates’ death
is ‘‘rectitude,’’ the Athenian people’s revenge against its ‘‘deadliest foe,’’ but
its ‘‘psychoanalytic’’ reason, Hegel—an analyst avant la lettre—adds, lies in
Athenians’ own guilt. Thus is guilt introjected and incorporated. After that,
the Athenians can arbitrarily make out of themselves ‘‘deadliest foes,’’ upon
whom they can confer ‘‘unimpeachable rectitude.’’
Passing now fromHegel to a later father in this legacy, we learn that what
has thus ‘‘struck firm root among’’ the Athenian people, namely, their guilt,
is also that which ‘‘is embodied or incorporated . . . [and] that which makes
the body—the bodying—strong, sure and erect, and is simultaneously that
by means of which we have become complete and that which conditions us
in the future, the juice from which we draw our strengths.’’29 This thinker
is not Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove, but Martin Heidegger in his 
seminar on the importance of the Nietzschean notion of the ‘‘Eternal Re-
currence of the Same’’ in Western thought. Hegel’s ‘‘guilt’’ coincides with
Nietzsche’s ‘‘eternal recurrence of the same,’’ and both are for Heidegger
that which is ‘‘embodied or incorporated’’ as the curse, the real Law, the dis-
avowed, but literal, eternal guilt for a metaphorical, noncommitted crime—
which nonetheless being precisely metaphorical will always already have
been committed. Eternal credit is the father of the eternal recurrence of the
same.
Passing now to the father due to whom this discourse on paternity is in
the first place possible, in Freud, too, trauma (the ‘‘crime’’ as the cause of
an unspeakable guilt) transcends factuality and literality. The only psycho-
analytic ‘‘fact’’ is ‘‘phantasies,’’ and it is precisely their imaginary ontologi-
cal status that bestows on them their paternal force—just as Polynices’ and
Antigone’s phantasmic crimes do. In Freud’s own words: ‘‘It remains a fact
that the patient has created these phantasies for himself, and this fact is
of scarcely less importance for his neurosis than if he had really experi-
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enced what the phantasies contain. The phantasies possess psychical as con-
trasted with material reality, and we gradually learn to understand that in
the world of the neuroses it is psychical reality which is the decisive kind.’’30
Freud’s statement reveals its rich significance particularly if we recall that,
according to him, our ‘‘normal,’’ modern and capitalist society is ‘‘the world
of the neuroses.’’ Now, the fate of ‘‘trauma’’ in psychoanalysis was to have
always already been its ‘‘origin.’’ In Lacan’s words: ‘‘Is it not remarkable
that, at the origin of the analytic experience, the real should have presented
itself in the form of that which is unassimilable in it—in the form of the
trauma, determining all that follows, and imposing on it an apparently
accidental origin?’’31 Yet Lacan argues there is a radical difference between
Nietzschean eternal recurrence of the same and psychoanalytic trauma, as
well as the compulsion to repeat it—a difference that yet again converges
with the difference between constative and performative, and above all,
the latter’s deceitful capacity to pass for constative. Nietzschean eternal re-
currence of the same (paternal law) is predicated, for Lacan, on Hegelian
teleology. Freud opposes the Hegelian legacy at the moment when he ‘‘re-
opens the junction [joint] between truth and knowledge to the mobility
out of which revolutions come.’’32 For ‘‘revolutions’’ against any paternal
authority, Lacan argues, are impossible as long as Hegel’s ‘‘cunning of rea-
son’’ presupposes epistemologically ‘‘that, from beginning to end, the sub-
ject knows what he wants’’ ()—regardless of whether the subject is also
assumed to know what the spirit of history (the Paternal Law) wants, as
Polynices and Antigone are, or not to know, as the enlightened subject is.
Freud’s insistence on the ignorance of one’s true desire ‘‘reopens’’ the ‘‘junc-
tion between truth and knowledge,’’ thus also opening up the possibility
that, against all accepted ‘‘knowledge’’ offered discursively to the subject,
the subject always transcends the ‘‘truth’’ this knowledge entails performa-
tively and presents to the subject as constative, as a fait accompli. Thus, re-
currence proves to be not necessarily the father of his own eternal return,
but also the possibility of his nonreturn.
To show the difference, Lacan turns to a Hegelian example, one that fore-
grounds guilt as the effect of specifically literary paternity. Prior to the dis-
junction between truth and knowledge, the statement ‘‘to be a philosopher
means being interested in what everyone is interested in without knowing
it’’33 appears to be an eternal truth, an unchallengeable constative state-
ment. The reason for this, Lacan continues, is that this statement ‘‘has the
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interesting peculiarity that its pertinence [to philosophy] does not imply
that it can be verified.’’34 Into this gap of unverifiability Freud thrusts his
sensitivity toward the performative function of language, thereby showing
that it is a systematically concealed gap that, since the emergence of Logos,
has always been open between knowledge and truth: so open that if one
does not ‘‘reopen’’ it, it can be closed in such arbitrary ways that if, for in-
stance, its ‘‘philosophical closure’’ happened to coincide with the end of the
spirit of history, it could as well turn the entire world into philosophers (just
as can the other notorious arbitrary closure, in which everyone, whether she
knows it or not, is obsessed with the will to power). In fact, if the paternal
law happened to be better sustained by the truth ‘‘that two and two make
five,’’ this is how the father would have closed the gap, and this is what he
would have said, ‘‘since whatever he might have meant, would always be the
truth.’’35 For ‘‘eternal recurrence of the same’’ (Logos) guarantees nothing
less than that the only absolute Law is Tauto-Logy—the father who arbi-
trarily performs reality, including all historical fathers. For the hypothe-
sis that the philosopher does what everyone does without knowing it ‘‘can
be put to the test only by everyone becoming a philosopher.’’36 And this
is to say, unverifiability and ignorance, far from being lack of knowledge,
are effectively guaranteed truth. And, what is more, (performative) truth
(unlike constative truth, which, according to our modern epistemology, is
always doomed to miss reality in itself ) is reality. For no sooner have we
accepted the truth of the hypothesis than we ourselves have become phi-
losophers. Just as no sooner have we accepted the truth of Hegel’s other
hypothesis, that ‘‘what [we] reprobated in Socrates had already struck firm
root among [our]selves,’’ than we ourselves have become Socrates.
In other words, as another father (who, like all fathers, is also a son) has
put it, ‘‘Eternal Recurrence of the Same is not . . . some religious revela-
tion or existential experience outside [the] semiotic’’ but ‘‘only a sign’’37—as
ambiguous as any other sign, as Ismene, Antigone, and Freud have shown
us. The pertinent question becomes, then, Geoff Waite continues, what this
sign ‘‘is a sign for in addition to being imbricated in this formal semiotic
structure, what it is as signifying practice’’ (). Moreover, we may add,
what is the purpose, the thing that the sign produces performatively, by
the ‘‘signifying practice’’ that cherishes eternal recurrence of the same as a
constative truth, and what is the other thing produced by the ‘‘signifying
practice’’ that foregrounds its arbitrarily performative, paternal power. For
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how else are we to have a minimally, however elusive, active function in
adopting fathers unless we know the answer to these questions?
Or should we rather abandon the question of paternity altogether? The
mere act of asking about literal, natural fathers suffices to perpetuate the
authority of biological bonds and the entailed dichotomies between natu-
ral and adopted children, and so on. Is this the case also with metaphorical,
literary fathers? Does it suffice to stop asking for the father to disappear?
This is indeed a rhetorical question, not because it has and must have no
answer, but because the answer is known: no—because when fathers are
metaphorical, it is particularly the absent father who is omnipotent. Our
silence about the father, far from ‘‘castrating’’ him, reinforces his potency.
I will conclude with a (post)modernist voice, this time not Kafka, but
Lou Andreas-Salomé, who attempted to address the issue of the ‘‘absent’’
father. In Biddy Martin’s succinct paraphrase, Andreas-Salomé ‘‘often used
the differences between sons and daughters to show what had been sub-
tracted from the conceptual world. For her, it was not only woman as ma-
teriality, phenomenality, or impossibility, but also as a figure of attachment
and love. Whereas the son is forced to repress his love for the father in
order to take his place, the daughter sublimates while remaining in love
with an absent parent, which then allows for an ethics without murder.’’38
Martin points out here that Andreas-Salomé’s distinction ‘‘between sons
and daughters’’ relies on the answer to the question whether or not the
father indeed tried to kill the daughter or the son. Given that in our patri-
archal society the answer is invariably ‘‘yes’’ for the son and ‘‘no’’ for the
daughter, Andreas-Salomé infers that the daughter is therefore in a privi-
leged position, and this allows her to remain ‘‘in love with an absent parent,
which then allows for an ethics without murder.’’
Alas, as I have tried to show, unlike literal fathers, it is precisely the ab-
sence of the metaphorical father and his factual ‘‘murder’’ that opens up
the infinite credit, which, as such, knows no limits in justifying any future
murder as its own redemption.
Thus regarding the difference ‘‘between sons and daughters,’’ we can
proceed only nominatively and say that ‘‘daughter’’ is that subject who
phantasmically constructs the trauma of the paternal murder as eternally
credited, whereas ‘‘son’’ is that subject who constructs it as always already
paid. The question after Antigone, however, is, as we saw, whether demo-
cratic subjects are always ‘‘daughters.’’ Assuming that this is indeed the case,
 : .  
then woman’s emancipation, whatever else it may involve, will not entail
the omen’s demand to the father to kill the daughter, too. For the point is
that the democratic omen demands no child’s murder. If in nothing else, it
is in this that democracy keeps its promise for equality.
Therefore both ‘‘sons’’ and ‘‘daughters’’ are left with an ‘‘absent parent.’’
What this effectively means is that nothing can be said about the father;
nobody has thus far seen him. He eternally returns where he was from the
beginning—his invisibility. Laios makes no appearance in either tragedy.
He is metaphorical Law: pure and elusive.

. Sophocles , .
. Note that the English language, unlike Latin and other European languages,
does not distinguish between these two forms of power. The Spinozian distinction
between potestas and potentia is central in the work of major contemporary theoreti-
cians of power and ideology, such as Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari,
and Antonio Negri. For a philological approach to this distinction, see Giancotti E.
Boscherini, Lexicon Spinozanum (The Hague, ) :–. For an ideological anal-
ysis of the relation between potestas and potentia, see Michael Hardt, ‘‘Translator’s
Foreword: The Anatomy of power’’ in Negri , xi–xxiii. Moreover, note that this
distinction corresponds to Lacan’s distinction between the symbolic (potentia) and
the imaginary (potestas) registers of the constitution of subjectivity—a correspon-
dence that is not accidental since Spinoza was one of the major paternal figures for
Lacan and his psychoanalytic theory. For more on the relation between Spinoza’s
distinction potestas-potentian on the one hand, and, on the other, Lacanian psycho-
analysis, the philosophy of German idealism, and linguistic theory, as well as for a
general reexamination of several of the Freudian concepts used in the present analysis,
against the above theoretical background, see Kordela .
. See Lévi-Strauss , particularly the chapter ‘‘The Structural Study of Myth,’’
first published in the Journal of American Folklore : (October–December ):
–). There Lévi-Strauss reduces the other Sophoclean tragedy relevant to our
issue of paternity,Oedipus, to the mythic negotiation of the irresolvable problem pro-
duced by the conflict between the tradition about the autochthonous origin of man
(the conviction that we come from one) and the empirical evidence of sexual repro-
duction (according to which we come from two). By analogy to this mythic version
of the logical incompatibility between one and two as origin, we can say that, on the
level of political power, this incompatibility manifests itself as the conflict between
one center of power (potentia) and two hegemonically conflicting and supplementary
poles (potentia and potestas).
. For more or less explicit accounts of the free circulation of meaning and truths
(semantic value) between signification and economical exchange, as an inherent qual-
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ity of the discourse of secular and capitalist modernity, see in addition to Lévi-Strauss,
Lacan ; Foucault ; and Barthes .
. This also means, as Deleuze has argued, that the counterpart of masochistic
disavowal (the fetishistic act of believing in the existence or possibility of what one
nonetheless knows to be nonexistent or impossible) is sadistic negation: the act of
destroying (killing) and eliminating from reality that part of reality that does not fit
in one’s scheme of reality. For the linkage of sadism and masochism to negation and
disavowal, respectively, see Deleuze .
. , .
. Machiavelli , .
. See Lacan , particularly the chapter ‘‘The Essence of Tragedy: A Commen-
tary on Sophocles’ Antigone,’’ –. For the French original, see Lacan , –
. Crucial in Lacan’s argument is the analogy between Creon and Antigone, seen
as functions within a democracy. This analogy emerges out of the fact that both the
Creonian locus of legislative authority and the ‘Antigonean’ sites of resistance against
this authority constitute exceptions to the democratic universality, according towhich
all subjects are subjected to the same laws and have equal rights. The inherently not-
all structure of democracy is known as a logical problem in set theory, which exhibits
the paradoxical undecidability about whether or not the set of all sets (for example,
the state as representative of all subjects) includes itself as part of itself. Moreover,
note that this paradox, as Zizek has shown, is expressed also in the Hegelian genus-
species logic (in which one species appropriates the position of the whole genus) as
well as in the logic of Freudian fetishism. The latter foregrounds that not only any
positive set, but also nothing (the void set or zero) can appropriate the function of the
whole—an insight that has been rearticulated in different ways by Lévi-Strauss and
Roland Barthes. For a concise and conceptually precise presentation of the trajectory
of the not-all logic from set theory (George Cantor, Bertrand Russel, Kurt Gödel) to
the theory of signifiers and structural anthropology, as well as the relation between
not-all logic and capitalism, see Karatani , particularly the chapters ‘‘Structure
and Zero,’’ ‘‘Natural Numbers,’’ ‘‘Natural Language,’’ and ‘‘Money,’’ –. For a po-
litical and ideological function of the not-all logic in terms of Hegel’s species-genus
logic and Freud’s fetishism, see Zizek .
The issue of the exclusion as the ground of the universal, or the ‘‘not-all’’ struc-
ture of the ‘‘all,’’ has been of central significance for some time now for certain trends
within social theory. On the paradoxical, ‘‘not-all,’’ structure of democracy as the so-
cietal organization of ‘‘citizens’’ with ‘‘equal rights,’’ see Lefort , particularly the
chapter ‘‘The Question of Democracy,’’ –. On the same issue, with special empha-
sis on the paradoxical relation between the universal and the particular, see Laclau
. Again on the same issue, with emphasis on the semantically inherent paradox
of ‘‘subjects’’ as ‘‘free and equal citizens,’’ see Balibar . Finally, on the function
of the ‘‘not-all’’ structure in both social formations and sexual difference, see Zizek
, the chapter, ‘‘Otto Weininger, or, ‘Woman doesn’t exist,’’ –.
. See Lacan , particularly –; , –. This presupposition even-
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tually leads Lacan to his famous ethical, ‘‘categorical imperative,’’ not to cede one’s
desire, which follows from the fact that, ‘‘From an analytic point of view, the only
thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one’s desire’’
(, ). The most central role in the general and institutionalized legitimation
and encouragement of this compromise of one’s desire (and hence of the induction
of guilt) has been played historically by Christianity (see Lacan , ). Thus, if a
kind ‘‘of ethical judgment is possible,’’ this can be expressed by means of the question:
‘‘Have you acted in conformity with the desire that is in you?’’ ().
. Lacan , /, .
. Kafka , .
. Recall that Polynices has also been the cause of the death of his buried brother,
Eteocles.
. All cited phrases and words in this paragraph are repeated in Lacan , –
.
. Lacan , ; , .
. Lacan , ; , .
. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Lettre à Mr D’Alembert sur les spectacles (Ed. M. Fuchs,
Geneva and Lille, ), , n. ; cited in Fried , . Rousseau uses this phrase
referring to the woman as the willful victim of successful male erotic seduction.
. , .
. ‘‘Prudence,’’ being etymologically a contracted form of ‘‘providence,’’ is used in
early modern and Baroque literature, just as it is today, to indicate the king’s ‘‘ability
to govern and discipline oneself by the use of reason;’’ to exhibit ‘‘sagacity or shrewd-
ness in the management of affairs,’’ as well as ‘‘skill and good judgment in the use of
recourses’’ and ‘‘caution or circumspection as to danger or risk’’ (Webster’s)—all of
which, however, were assumed, more explicitly than today, to derive from the king’s
primary ability to judge what is to be foreseen [pro-videre] and what not, depending
on political expediency.
Regarding the performative function of language, it is specifically speech-act
theory (as defined by J. L. Austin in theWilliam James Lectures at Harvard University
in ; see J. L. Austin , first published in ) that established within linguistics
the distinction between this and the constative functions of language. Briefly put, the
constative function of language refers to its passive function to describe or constate
reality—a reality that is assumed to be already given. If the future were pregiven, a
prophecy or oracle would be a constative statement. By contrast, the performative
function of language, deriving ‘‘from ‘perform,’ the usual verbwith the noun ‘action,’ ’’
indicates, Austin continues, ‘‘that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an
action’’ (, ). This is, for instance, the case in the statement ‘‘ ‘I give and bequeath
my watch to my brother’—as occurring in a will’’ (). This distinction is crucial to
psychoanalysis, insofar as the Freudian unconscious can be described as the discrep-
ancy between the constative and the actual effects of the performative function of a
statement. This discrepancy is possible precisely because the distinction between the
performative and the constative functions of language is heuristic rather than empiri-
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cally verifiable. With few exceptions, empirically it is in fact antinomically undecid-
able whether a statement fulfills only a performative or a constative function or both.
As Austin remarks, when I say ‘‘ ‘I apologize’ . . . it is the happiness of the perfor-
mative ‘I apologize’ which makes it the fact [constative] that I am apologizing: and
my success in apologizing depends on the happiness of the performative utterance ‘I
apologize’ ’’ ().
. Marx , :.
. See, for example, Foucault’sMadness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in
the Age of Reason, or The History of Sexuality. The same has been argued, albeit from
a different perspective and with different consequences, by Deleuze and Guattari (see,
for example, Capitalism and Schizophrenia, volume : Anti-Oedipus and volume : A
Thousand Plateaus).
. Sophocles , .
. Sophocles , .
. Sophocles , .
. Sophocles , –.
. Sophocles , .
. Note that crucial in the establishment of this disavowal as an epistemologically
legitimate, intellectual practice has been Paul de Man’s systematic attempt to oblit-
erate the difference between metaphor and metonymy, the literal and the figurative,
the grammatical and the rhetorical (such as the distinction between a question meant
literally to ask what it asks and one meant as a rhetorical question, the point of which
is precisely to preclude an answer). Thus, de Man has argued—against the logic of his
own argument, which points to the simple fact, deriving from the inherent ambiguity
of language, that always both sides of the above oppositions are operative—that the
question what is the difference between the literal and metaphor must be taken as
only a rhetorical question. For, by concluding that whenever we try to discern a dif-
ference ‘‘[w]e end up . . . in the same state of ignorance,’’ with ‘‘[t]he resulting pathos
[of] an anxiety . . . of ignorance’’ (, ), appearances to the contrary, in effect de
Man opts for only one of the two sides, the rhetorical, which indeed guarantees the
ignorance of differences. Having acknowledged that language produces always both
functions, it is one thing to attempt to identify on what level, in what aspect, and to
what end each is operative (as Corngold’s above cited passage does), and another to
ask conclusively (as well as ex- and pre-clusively) that therefore: ‘‘what is the use of
asking, I ask, when we cannot even authoritatively decide whether a question asks
or doesn’t ask?’’ (de Man , ). Yet again, in terms of paternity, the difference
converges with that between Laios and Oedipus as fathers.
. Derrida , .
. Hegel , –.
. Heidegger, , /: –; as translated in Waite , , without the em-
phasis. Brackets are mine.
. Freud –; , : .
. Lacan, , .
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. Freud , .
. Lacan , .
. Lacan , .
. Lacan , .
. Lacan , .
. Waite , .
. Salomé , . Implied here is mainly Lou Andreas-Salomé’s ‘‘Was daraus
folgt, dass es nicht die Frau gewesen ist, die den Vater totgeschlagen hat,’’ Almanach
für das Jahr  (Vienna: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, ), .
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 The Shadow of the Modern:




One of the legacies of the Enlightenment in nineteenth- and twen-
tieth-century European literature was the belief in the knowability of the
human world and the related view that this knowledge could be codified in
and through writing. The novels of Jane Austen, Honoré de Balzac, Charles
Dickens, and Theodor Fontane, for all their obvious differences, share the
fundamental assumption that human reason can decipher the initially con-
fusing and perplexing world of personality, emotions, and social class. Lit-
erature is a form of knowledge, with both author and reader exercising
their common faculties of observation and reason. Social class, geography,
gender and sexuality, historical generation, even the time of day: the en-
tire world is presented as a closed system of forces that author and reader
can understand and control. This last condition is crucial to the success of
the realist enterprise, and for complex reasons often all too easily satisfied.
For one of the tricks that reason plays on us is that knowledge, insofar as
it orients us in the world and gives us a sense of mastery, is also a form of
pleasure, not just cognition, and that, therefore, epistemological categories
are not free from emotional, affective investments.
At the same time, the Enlightenment exploited another form of plea-
sure in literature: that of not knowing something, of losing one’s sense of
orientation and mastery, of letting oneself fall prey to the emotions of fear
and horror. Although Shakespeare and the Elizabethan dramatists had de-
veloped this technique two centuries earlier, it was only in the eighteenth
century that an aesthetics of obscurity, horror, and the sublime was explic-
itly elaborated.1 Edmund Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry of  is based on
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the premise that clarity is less suited to the excitement of strong aesthetic
response (‘‘emotion’’ or ‘‘affect’’) than is obscurity, or the ‘‘imperfect idea
of objects’’; lack of knowledge was for him a defining condition of the sub-
lime.2 Other contemporary philosophers investigated the ‘‘Pleasure derived
from Objects of Terror’’ and ‘‘those kinds of Distress which excite agreeable
sensations.’’3 Starting inmid-century, an apparently anti-Enlightenment lit-
erature of darkness, ignorance, and terror flourished, elaborated first in the
English Gothic novels of Horace Walpole, ‘‘Monk’’ Lewis, William Beck-
ford, and Ann Radcliffe, as well as in the novels of the Marquis de Sade
and all sorts of monster and ghost narratives (Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein,
Polidori’s Dracula, the uncanny tales of E. T. A. Hoffmann and Edgar Allen
Poe) that issued from this enormously popular genre a generation or two
later. The pleasure here was not that of vision, mastery, and control, but
of blindness, victimhood, and loss of self: the pleasure of being led into
the dark, subterranean chambers of a medieval castle, of experiencing the
torments of a helpless protagonist (especially the child-woman), of con-
fronting an unknowable and all-powerful force of evil against which human
reason, knowledge, and science are powerless.
Two modes of conceiving the world, two modes of exciting different
forms of pleasure in the reader or spectator: this ‘‘sadomasochistic’’ model
of aesthetic pleasure is one of the more paradoxical, and enduring, paterni-
ties of the Enlightenment. For long after the novels of Walpole and Radcliffe
had become the objects of parody, the Gothic has constantly been updated
and revised for new forms of modern experience, expanding its domain in
the Victorian psychological and social novels, in detective and horror fic-
tions of the fin de siècle, in German expressionist cinema of the s, in the
RKO horror movies of the s, and in countless novels, films, television
series, video games, and Internet Web sites in contemporary global culture.
Indeed, recent commentators have even affirmed that American popular
culture, from daytime talk shows and the eleven o’clock ‘‘slasher’’ news-
casts, is peculiarly marked by its obsession with Gothic themes, vampires,
and sadomasochistic narratives of victimhood and predator. The more vir-
tual and high-tech we get, apparently, the morewe retreat to the premodern
fantasies of the Gothic.4
What is it about this genre, this set of stock settings and characters, this
very mechanical means of exciting fear and terror that has made it such a
dominant, even obsessive, force? Is there any logic to this uncanny paternity
 :  . 
of the Gothic? In the following remarks I will focus on two turn-of-the-
century narratives that make palpable this dual legacy of an Enlightenment-
inspired modernity: Bram Stoker’s Dracula () and Franz Kafka’s Amer-
ika (Der Verschollene, ).5 The first is no stranger to commentaries of
the Gothic, for the text takes us from modern ‘‘rational’’ England—‘‘up-
to-date nineteenth century with a vengeance’’—to a manifestly premod-
ern and Gothic setting in Transylvania complete with haunted castle and
vampire-ghosts. By contrast, Amerika, and indeed Kafka’s work generally,
has not been read in terms of the Gothic. Technology, bureaucracy, totali-
tarianism, decay of religion—these aspects rather have defined the ways in
which Kafka has been read, interpreted, and handed down. What I will
argue is that both Stoker and Kafka are Gothic writers precisely because
technology and superstition, knowing and not knowing, mastery and vic-
timhood, are presented not as mutually exclusive categories, but as parts of
the same entity. The uncanny paternity of the Gothic lies in this recogni-
tion of a divided, self-warring inheritance, at work even when we may not
initially recognize it: the Gothic as shadow of the modern.

Among its formal accomplishments, the eighteenth-century English
Gothic novel famously reversed traditional narrative perspective, and with
it concomitant gender and power relations. Rather than a questing male
hero, the subject of Gothic narration and perspective is the pursued, vul-
nerable, fearful heroine. It is not simply the supernatural setting of feudal
castle and midnight ghosts that makes a narrative Gothic, but this ‘‘female,’’
victimized prism through which the dark, labyrinthine space of the Gothic
site is perceived: a perspective that presupposes a link between external
space and interior state of emotions, underground vault and the deep psy-
chic levels of terror, architecture and memory. ‘‘Yet where conceal herself !’’
the heroine of the first Gothic novel asks when she finds herself the un-
wanted object of sexual aggression on the part of her fiancé’s father. ‘‘How
avoid the pursuit he would infallibly make throughout the castle! As these
thoughts passed rapidly through her mind, she recollected a subterraneous pas-
sagewhich led from the vaults of the castle of the church of Saint Nicholas.’’6
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With her flight into the depths of this suddenly remembered ‘‘secret pas-
sage,’’ the first Gothic heroine initiates a kind of narrative exploration into
the psyche as haunted castle (or haunted castle as psyche) that has become
the staple of all Gothic fictions since: ‘‘The lower part of the castle was hol-
lowed into several intricate cloisters; and it was not easy for one under so
much anxiety to find the door that opened into the cavern. An awful silence
reigned . . . through that long labyrinth of darkness. Every murmur struck
her with new terror;—yet more she dreaded to hear the wrathful voice of
Manfred urging his domestics to pursue her. She trod as softly as impa-
tience would give her leave,—yet frequently stopped and listened to hear if
she was followed.’’7 Not the male, questing hero then, with his sight firmly
fixed on the goal before him, but the anxious female heroine propelled for-
ward by fear. Unlike the hero of epic, whose ego is predefined by his lineage
and destiny, the child heroine of the Gothic romance is split between for-
ward motion and anxious listening, between future and past. The bound-
aries between subject and world become fluid. Like the swooning subject
of Füssli’s celebrated Gothic painting ‘‘Nightmare,’’ the Gothic heroine is
literally haunted by apparitions, doubles, nightmares, and obsessive memo-
ries that take on a corporeality, a physicality of their own. The women (or
the feminized Gothic men) are petrified by fear, they faint, fall into deep
melancholy reveries and spells, become like wooden automata, speechless,
insentient. At the same time, and in a parallel movement, inanimate build-
ings come to life, speak, and act with a will of their own: winds whistle
through the corridors, rusty hinges squeak, even silence ‘‘reigns.’’
This blurring of self and world is particularly evident in the momen-
tous passage from what is perhaps the most often imitated text of English
Gothic, Ann Radcliffe’s Mysteries of Udolpho (), in which the heroine,
Emily St. Aubert, gets her first glimpse of her captor’s property and her
soon-to-be prison:
Emily gazed with melancholy awe upon the castle, which she understood
to be Montoni’s; for, though it was now lighted up by the setting sun,
the gothic greatness of its features, and its mouldering walls of dark grey
stone, rendered it a gloomy and sublime object. As she gazed, the light
died away on its walls, leaving a melancholy purple tint, which spread
deeper and deeper, as the thin vapour crept up the mountain, while the
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battlements above were still tipped with splendour. From those too, the
rays soon faded, and the whole edifice was invested with the solemn
duskiness of evening. Silent, lonely and sublime, it seemed to stand the
sovereign of the scene, and to frown defiance on all who dared to invade
its solitary reign. As the twilight deepened, its features became more aw-
ful in obscurity, and Emily continued to gaze, till its clustering towers
were alone seen, rising over the tops of the woods, beneath whose thick
shade the carriages soon after began to ascend.8
This description, which bears comparison with the celebrated opening to
Kafka’s Castle,9 depends not only on a Burkeian evocation of a sublime
Gothic edifice caught at that liminal moment of twilight, but on the subtle
suggestion that the castle is a human, living presence, itself a phantom or
specter on the margin of death and life. As the light ‘‘dies’’ away on its walls
and the edifice is ‘‘invested’’ with darkness, it strangely comes to life, ‘‘stand-
ing’’ as a sovereign over the scene, its ‘‘features’’ ‘‘frowning’’ on potential
invaders. Equally powerful is the uncertainty whether this animation of the
castle is reflective of the actual sovereign Montoni, or, and perhaps at the
same time, of the heroine’s ownmelancholy consciousness. Time seems sus-
pended as she gazes and gazes, as if paralyzed, at an increasingly ‘‘obscure’’
and ‘‘awful’’ image, her subjective consciousness merging with the ‘‘exter-
nal’’ objects of her fears and obscure desires.10
This ‘‘supernaturalization of everyday life,’’ and not the medieval clap-
trap of ghosts and goblins, is the true supernatural of Gothic fiction. As
Terry Castle has remarked with regard to Radcliffe’s novel: ‘‘Old-fashioned
ghosts, it is true, have disappeared from the fictional world, but a new kind
of apparition takes their place. To be a Radcliffean hero or heroine in one
sense means just this: to be ‘haunted,’ to find oneself obsessed by spectral
images of those one loves.’’ Linking this narrative shift to a fundamental
change in the Western attitude toward death (Castle speaks no less than of
a ‘‘new phenomenology of self and other’’), she notes that the ‘‘corporeality
of the other—his or her actual life in the world—became strangely insub-
stantial and indistinct: what mattered was the mental picture, the ghost, the
haunting image.’’11 For the century that would take Freud’s understanding
of the human psyche to heart, the same century that would have to invent
notions like the ‘‘simulacrum’’ and ‘‘virtual reality’’ to account for the in-
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creasingly abstract, insubstantial nature of human relations, this aspect of
the Gothic novel perhaps best explains its longevity as the shadow of the
modern: a Gothic paternity (or should we call it maternity?) whose end is
nowhere in sight.

Historically, this regendering and spectralization of the Gothic narra-
tive has been linked to the emergence of women writers, to an increas-
ingly important audience of female readers, and to a progressive blurring
of fixed gender identities. In this context, it is interesting to note that both
Stoker and Kafka had strong homosexual leanings and that both were writ-
ing from a minority position vis-à-vis the dominant culture (Stoker was
Irish, Kafka a Czech Jew). Is this one of the reasons why they both gravi-
tated toward ‘‘victim’’ narratives, toward texts written from what Deleuze
and Guattari have termed a ‘‘de-territorializing’’ and ‘‘masochistic’’ per-
spective: marginal, exposed, subaltern, toward the perspectives of the child,
the outlaw, the foreigner, the animal?12 Kafka’s letters and fictions abound
in such reversals of the questing Western conqueror into passive schlemiel,
castrated son, or ritual sacrificial animal. Perhaps not surprisingly, desire
is often figured in his writing as the vampiric, parisitic gesture of a simul-
taneous aggression and devotion. The enormous cockroach Gregor Samsa
(an animal that, as Kafka noted to his father, not only stings its prey but
sucks out its blood) lusts after the exposed neck of his sister Grete. The
humiliated and violated Josef K. in turn attacks Fräulein Bürstner like a
‘‘thirsty animal,’’ lapping at her face with his tongue before placing a long
kiss ‘‘on the neck, right at her throat, and left his lips there for a long time.’’13
Stoker’s Dracula for his part shows a mesmerizing capacity for metamor-
phosis, a ghostly fluidity of being that can manifest itself as a dog, a bat, a
wolf, and, in the first spectacular manifestation of his supernatural quali-
ties, as a giant lizard that climbs down the castle wall ‘‘face-down,’’ Samsa-
like. His actual acts of aggression take place in England where he is a for-
eigner, an outsider-outlaw who will be hunted down by a veritable posse
of Western scientists, technology experts, and symbolic representatives of
the majority culture. Finally, the danger he presents to this culture involves
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the reversal of gender roles: chaste Victorian women become wildly erotic
femmes fatales, while the male paragons of reason and authority become
feminized, castrated acolytes of the master.
The opening chapters of Dracula, in which the young solicitor Jonathan
Harker travels out to Transylvania in the classic ‘‘questing,’’ exploratory
manner of theWestern hero, quickly reverses this identity and establishes a
feminized position of vulnerability, dependance, and erotically charged ter-
ror. Depicted as a light-headed ingénue interested more in cooking recipes
and sightseeing than the danger surrounding him, Harker quickly becomes
a prisoner of the older, courtly, and virile Count Dracula in a castle marked
by all the standard trappings of the Gothic: an impregnable, isolated posi-
tion in a wild landscape; vast size and complex interior architecture; and
spectral ‘‘hauntings.’’ In chapters fraught with a sexual ambiguity not unlike
the dynamics of captivity in Proust’s Albertine disparue (Dracula cooks for
Harker, makes his bed, and even wears his clothes), the novel describes an
explicit gender reversal in the young Englishman.While wandering through
the living quarters of a bygone age, Harker seats himself at an oak writ-
ing table ‘‘where in old times possibly some fair lady sat to pen, with much
thought and many blushes, her ill-spelt love letter.’’14 Reveling in the plea-
sure of disobeying the count, Harker decides to sleep where ‘‘ladies had sat
and sung and lived sweet lives,’’ giving in to a Gothic reverie of lascivious
female vampires: ‘‘In the moonlight opposite me were three young women,
ladies by their dress and manner. . . . All three had brilliant white teeth,
that shone like pearls against the ruby of their voluptuous lips. . . . I felt
in my heart a wicked, burning desire that they would kiss me with those
red lips. . . . There was a deliberate voluptuousness which was both thrilling
and repulsive, and as she arched her neck she actually licked her lips like
an animal. . . . I closed my eyes in a languorous ecstasy and waited—waited
with beating heart’’ (–). This scene, which concludes with the violent
entry of the count declaring that Harker is ‘‘his’’ property, sets the Gothic
terms of the narrative’s subsequent exposition in England. For after this vir-
tual gang rape of the central male protagonist by the three female vampires,
Dracula shifts its setting back to England where there is not one but four
main male protagonists (Seward, Arthur, Morris, and van Helsing) and two
female protagonists (Lucy and Mina), all of whom are put into the same
passive, subjected position of vulnerability that Harker occupies here and
that the Gothic heroine generally occupies in the novels of Lewis and Rad-
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cliffe. Indeed, the terror represented by Dracula is that of an invasion of En-
gland, and especially London with its ‘‘teemingmillions,’’ by an alien enemy
who is invisible and ubiquitous. In other words, after Harker’s dream rape
and possession by Dracula, the unified, single narrative perspective of his
intimate voice (represented in diary entries and letters to his fiancée) gives
way to a proliferation of disparate narrative voices, a veritable collage of
letters, diaries, newspaper articles, and scientific reports written by many
characters. This ‘‘castration’’ of the unified questing hero by the punishing
father-imago and homosexual lover Dracula15 results in a proliferation of
feminized heroes and heroines whose competing narrative perspectives are
partial, fragmented, and therefore impotent in the face of the ubiquitous,
totalizingmonster Dracula. Only when these various perspectives have been
reunited by Mina into a single narrative collective (she collates their vari-
ous diaries and letters into a single ‘‘master narrative’’) can they begin the
chase that eventually drives Dracula from England back to his native soil.
On a narrative level, then, Dracula would seem to effect a self-transfor-
mation from Gothic novel to detective story, from a feminized ‘‘victim’’
perspective to that of the hyperlogical, punishing, ‘‘sadistic’’ pursuer à la
Sherlock Holmes. The story seems to turn on a clear-cut opposition be-
tween the feudal, Gothic monster-devils from the East and, on the other
hand, theWestern doctors, lawyers, secretaries, and scientists familiar with
the most up-to-date technological inventions. But this is not really how the
novel is structured. Its ability to frighten the reader depends on a peculiarly
Gothic complicity between predator and victim, a Gothic blurring of the
boundaries of self and other. Dracula’s castle is an enjoyable place to be:
the food is good, the Count is interesting and courtly, the nighttime visions
far more exciting than anything Harker has experienced (or will experi-
ence) in England. Just asWalpole’s heroine inCastle of Otranto can ‘‘advance
eagerly’’ into the underground labyrinth () and the classic Gothic heroine
will inevitably ‘‘stray’’ into the hands of her aggressor, Harker wants to be in
Dracula’s old-world domain, wants to be cared for like a child, dominated,
even terrorized. He (and the vicariously masochistic reader) seeks out that
condition described by eighteenth-century aesthetics as a ‘‘distress which
excite[s] agreeable sensations.’’ Victimhood is a condition for extreme sen-
sation: for a heightened, exalted sense of ‘‘reality.’’
Dracula, for his part, has no identity other than that conferred by the
lifeblood of his victims; he is by definition a parasite, a ghost whose desire
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or will has no independent status but is a reflection of his victim’s fears. A
being without his own reflection, he not only sucks blood but appropriates
Harker’s voice and pronunciation, his knowledge of England, his rational
functions. His goal (and England’s fear) is to leave feudal Transylvania and
to become indistinguishable from the average nineteenth-century, mod-
ern Englishman. Nor are the Western protagonists unambiguously on the
side of modern technology and rationality. Seward is the head of a lunatic
asylum, his rational faculties and technology dedicated to deciphering the
signs of madness. The German-exclaimingVan Helsing, Seward’s mentor in
science, is also a kind of Faust figure versed in philosophy and black magic;
it is his familiarity with vampire lore that is crucial in defeating the monster.
Mina, after her near transformation into a vampire, enters into a telepathic
‘‘channeling’’ with the monster as he flees England that allows the men to
track and destroy him. And, of course, Dracula is ultimately defeated not
byWestern technology but by the traditional symbols of superstition: garlic
wreaths and crucifixes and stakes through the heart. Filled with references
to telegraphs, phonographs, Kodak cameras, and telephones, this novel of
modernity is haunted by nostalgia for Christian, premodern tradition.
To sum up: the force of Stoker’s Dracula story lies in the prototypically
Gothic reversability of self and other, of the continuity between feudal and
modern conditions, ‘‘Gothic’’ site and modern, nervous, ‘‘female’’ interi-
ority. In this regard Dracula’s homoerotic relations with Harker, as well as
the explicit identity reversals and exchanges that take place between them,
establish a parallel for the relations between superstition and technology,
‘‘primitive’’ East and ‘‘progressive,’’ scientificWest—relations that the novel
depicts as a kind of sadomasochistic relation between a passive, feminized
subject and a punishing, repressed other. Like the Gothic novels of Mary
Shelley and E. T. A Hoffmann, and even Goethe’s Faust, Dracula portrays
science itself as the origin of the ghostly and uncanny, the creator of the
monstrous doubles that haunt our rational consciousness. The clicking of
telegraph wires; the disembodied voices of the phonograph and telephone;
the spectral reality of photographic and cinematic images; indeed, the in-
creasingly ‘‘virtual,’’ abstract quality of modern exchange so well described
by Georg Simmel in his essays on modern urban life: these are the vampire-
like ‘‘ghosts’’ or ‘‘hauntings’’ that make us fear for our own visceral, bodily
reality and crave such an ‘‘agreeable source of distress.’’
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
One of my working assumptions in the following remarks is that much
of Kafka’s prose also offers a radicalized version of classic Gothic fictions.
His use of a ‘‘feminine’’ or ‘‘victim’’ subjectivity as his primary narrative
perspective; of labyrinthine architectural structures and a ‘‘poetics of dark-
ness’’ to foster the sense of claustrophobia, disorientation, and terror; of a
‘‘spectralization’’ of everyday life that makes his fictional worlds simulta-
neously real and unreal: all of these features are consistent with the para-
digms of Gothic fiction first developed in the eighteenth century. To be sure,
his writing exhibits peculiarities that cannot be reduced to or explained by
this Gothic model, peculiarities that often have much to do with his analy-
sis of modern bureaucratic and totalitarian power relations. But I think the
special force of his writing stems from the deployment of these modern
analyses into traditionally Gothic narrative conventions, resulting in what I
would call the ‘‘bureaucratic Gothic’’—a form of writing most easily recog-
nized in The Trial and The Castle, but first developed in nucleo in Amerika.
Kafka was undoubtedly drawn to the American setting because of what
he termed ‘‘das allermodernste’’ spectacle of modern technology and ‘‘traf-
fic.’’16 But after two chapters detailing this hypermodern world, the novel
switches to the description of ‘‘A Country House near NewYork’’ that recalls
the castles, haunted manors, and churches of the Gothic tradition. ‘‘Larger
and taller than a country house designed for only one family has any need
to be,’’17 the house is initially perceived by Karl at night in a state of con-
fusion, so that he lacks any overview of its actual dimensions and shape.
Once he actually enters the darker regions of the house, the Long Island set-
ting (!) gives way to an explicitly premodern, Gothic interior: ‘‘[Karl] could
scarcely credit his eyes at first, when at every twenty paces he saw a servant
in rich livery holding a huge candelabrum with a shaft so thick that both
the man’s hands were required to grasp it’’ (). Later in the chapter Karl
must contend with a ‘‘long labyrinth of darkness’’ straight out of Walpole’s
Castle of Otranto: ‘‘[the corridor] seemed to have no end—no window ap-
peared through which he could see where he was, nothing stirred either
above him or below him.’’ He passes ‘‘great stretches of blank wall com-
pletely devoid of doors; one could not imagine what lay behind them,’’ and
then comes to ‘‘one door after another,’’ all of them locked, but the rooms
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behind them ‘‘obviously unoccupied’’ (–). Enveloped by a tomb-like
silence, Karl suddenly comes up against an ‘‘ice-cold, marble balustrade’’
revealing a ‘‘great, deep chamber. One stood here as if in the gallery of a
church’’ (). In fact, the ‘‘country house’’ turns out to harbor a marble
chapel with vaulted ceiling.
Other staples of the Gothic also mark this chapter: a letter from Karl’s
uncle has to be delivered ‘‘at the stroke of midnight’’ and is read by candle-
light; an ancient servant with a long white beard arrives bearing a lantern;
moonlight provides the only natural illumination; and an entire battery
of menacing sounds and vaguely perceived shapes create an atmosphere
of undefined terror. Perhaps most striking is the Gothic spectralization of
figures, the effacement of their distinct contours, visible reality and ‘‘know-
ability’’ into subjective perceptions and anxious intuitions. Karl’s first im-
pression of Klara is of a disembodied voice, a kind of ghost: ‘‘In the dark-
ness of the chestnut avenue he heard a girl’s voice saying beside him: ‘So
this is Mr. Jacob at last’ ’’ (). Her misidentification of Karl Rossmann as
‘‘Mr. Jacob’’ underscores a misrecognition and fluidity of identity that con-
tinues throughout the novel; a bit later Karl will note to himself ‘‘what red
lips’’ Klara has, thinking of her father’s lips and of ‘‘how beautifully they
had beenmetamorphosed in his daughter’’ (). And of course Klara’s name
is a slight orthographic variation of Karl’s own—a semiotic version of their
sadomasochistic, ‘‘jiu-jitsu’’ struggle that takes place on a narrative level.
The Gothic world is one of false appearances, mistaken identities, dou-
bled selves. Karl initially thinks he must protect Klara from the unwanted
sexual attentions of the sinister Mr. Green, attentions that her father crav-
enly seems to allow (). He imagines himself to be the questing hero of
Western narrative, a knight who will break through the evil spell of this
Gothic castle and rescue the virgin victim. Instead, Klara turns out to be a
‘‘wild cat’’ who uses jiu-jitsu to slam Karl onto the couch, a sadist who gets
aroused while pummeling him and almost throws him out the window, and
finally a sexually experienced woman who already belongs to Karl’s (sup-
posed) friend Mack, the shadowy figure who inexplicably seems to control
everything in the Pollunder household from behind the scenes. Throughout
the novel this reversal of gender identity and passivity will be replayed: Karl
wants to initiate the typical American success story of the penniless young
immigrant whomakes good as a result of purposeful hard work, but instead
is ambushed and ultimately dragged down by a complexly malevolent envi-
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ronment. The questing male hero is comically and tragically turned into the
castrated, feminized, ‘‘Gothic’’ victim, trapped in the Castle: ‘‘This house
was a fortress,’’ Karl concludes at the end of his lengthy peregrination, ‘‘not
a mansion’’ ().
The point here is not simply to remark the incongruous presence of these
Gothic tropes in the ‘‘allermodernste’’ American setting, but to understand
their fundamental role in structuring the novel generally. The first is the
passive stance of narration, which unfolds largely through the eyes of a
boy who is a victim of events (starting with the seduction-rape that results
in his initial expulsion from Europe). The slow groping walk through the
labyrinth is a metonymic symbol for Karl’s passive ignorance of the reality
around him and of a narrative that only gradually reveals its secrets to him
and the reader. Karl is literally ‘‘in the dark’’ about the actual ‘‘property rela-
tions’’ governing this country house—who owns it, who is the lover of Miss
Klara, what is ‘‘really’’ going on between Klara, her father, and his shady
business associate Mr. Green. Semiotically, the labyrinth doubles the narra-
tive maze of complex sentences and mixed plot signals that are designed to
convey the disorienting effect of a vast, capitalistic, bureaucratic modernity.
Karl gets lost, feels anxious, vulnerable, and helpless, as does the reader who
has no choice but to experience the narrative through his passive, subjected
perspective, to read through a text that obsessively reenacts essentially the
same ‘‘deterritorializing’’ gesture of banishment and wandering in exile.
Critics have long noted the importance of Karl Rossmann’s naive, child-
like relation to his foreign, complex surroundings: his inability to learn
from his experiences, to develop according to a Bildungsroman logic, to be
caught in what Mark Spilka identified (with reference to Dickens’s child
protagonists) as a narrative perspective of ‘‘arrested childhood.’’18 But Karl
is not merely a child; he is a traumatized, ‘‘castrated’’ child who suffers
precisely from the kinds of sexual abuse at the hands of adults that often
underlie traditional Gothic novels. At the time he was writing Amerika,
Kafka had already developed this notion of filial castration in two other
texts: in ‘‘The Judgment,’’ where Georg Bendemann is transformed back
into a child by a father grotesquely mimicking a sexually aggressive woman,
and in ‘‘The Metamorphosis,’’ where a threatening fur-clad woman shakes
a fist at Gregor Samsa lying on his back while his multiple little legs flutter
helplessly. In Amerika, however, nothing less than the symbol of the new
world, the Statue of Liberty, plays this role of giant castrating female: ‘‘As
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Karl Rossmann, a boy of sixteen . . . stood on the liner slowly entering the
harbour of New York, a sudden burst of sunshine seemed to illumine the
Statue of Liberty. . . . The arm with the sword rose up as if newly stretched
aloft. . . . ‘So high!’ he said to himself, and was gradually edged to the very
rail by the swelling throng of porters pushing past him, since he was not
thinking at all of getting off the ship’’ (). Mesmerized by the sight of this
giant female cum sword, the boy protagonist stands as if paralyzed, as men-
tally absent as Emily gazing up at the Castle of Udolpho, while a ‘‘swelling
throng of porters’’ pushes him to the edge of the rail. The awe inspired by
this gendered icon, and not the mere fact of the modern urban crowd, is
what triggers Karl’s passive stance.
To be sure, the transformed Statue of Liberty serves as a palimpsest for
that other castrating woman in Karl’s past, Johanna Brummer, the maid
who ‘‘seduced’’ him and whose pregnancy resulted in his banishment from
home, and, proleptically, for the formidable Brunelda, into whose dominat-
ing, domestic clutches he will later fall. The incident with Brummer, how-
ever, is key, for it explains, with an explicitness that Kafka would later shy
away from, the traumatic sexual origin of Karl’s reduced faculties for effec-
tively remembering and learning from the past. The first mention of the
maid in the text comes fromKarl’s uncle; but Karl, we are told, ‘‘had no feel-
ings for that woman. Hemmed in by a vanishing past, she sat in her kitchen
beside the dresser . . .’’ (). It is not that Karl doesn’t have a past, but that
this past has vanished, has been repressed by the trauma of sexual aggres-
sion on the part of this much older, maternal woman () and, one sup-
poses, by the violence with which his parents repeated and aggravated this
aggression by packing him off to America. For a brief moment, prompted
by Brummer’s letter and his uncle’s evocation of her, this traumatizing past
resurfaces and we can see how the boy-child is undressed and forced to
have sex with a woman whose groping proves so ‘‘disgusting’’ to him ‘‘that
his head and neck started up from the pillows’’ and whose thrusting body
provokes in him ‘‘a terrible feeling of helplessness. With the tears running
down his cheeks he reached his bed at last . . .’’ (–).
This is the beginning, I would submit, of the Gothic in Amerika, the ori-
gin of the home as ‘‘unheimlich,’’ familiar and uncanny at once, as the place
of purported refuge that turns out instead to be a punishing, imprisoning
source of fear.19 Deprived of a secure sense of home and identity, Karl re-
peatedly makes his way in the American world by establishing inappropri-
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ately direct, personal relations with adult authority figures in the belief that
they might exercise a benevolent and protective role in his development.
But his actions are comically out of touch with reality. His relations are
either with weak, marginal, vulnerable figures, like the stoker and Therese,
or, more often, with capriciously malevolent figures, like his uncle, Klara,
Brunelda, Delamarche, and the hotel manager. These are not incidentally
evil figures. A student of Alfred Weber on bureaucracy, Kafka depicts the
malevolence in America as a structural aspect of the entire social, economic,
and political system. This, too, is in keeping with Gothic convention, where
evil is not just located in the haunted castle but constantly threatens to
pass into the ‘‘normal’’ world outside. For Karl, every attempt he makes to
reestablish his lost family ties, to reorient himself within a particular con-
figuration of personal and professional relations, results in the same initial
gesture of public humiliation, banishment, and wandering with which his
odyssey begins. If, as a recent commentator has suggested, ‘‘a fearful sense
of inheritance in time’’ lies at the center of the Gothic view,20 how not to
see Karl Rossmann’s story as the desperate attempt to escape from a past
that refuses to let go? There is surely more than irony at stake when, at the
end of the novel, he is turned away by every employment bureau of the
Nature Theater of Oklahoma until he is engaged as a ‘‘European intermedi-
ate pupil’’—precisely what he was in Prague before arriving in America. The
undead spirits of the Gothic mean precisely this: the past is never over, there
is no escape, the ‘‘American dream’’ will collapse back into the European
nightmare.

The above remarks have attempted to trace a Gothic paternity in two
very different literary productions of the fin de siècle, the one a potboiler
that has spawned countless imitations and spin-offs, the other an unfin-
ished, much less frequently read text that, insofar as it initiated what has
come to be called the ‘‘Kafkaesque,’’ has also permeated modern culture.
More a structure of relations than a set of specific themes or images, the
Gothic in this broad sense has a protean capacity for self-transformation
and reinvention in areas where one might not expect it or even recognize
it. Indeed, one of the more perplexing aspects of the Gothic—and per-
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haps a key to its uncanny ability to propagate itself—is the very spectral
nature of the media in which it is played out. For if the defining trope of
the Gothic is the ghost (or the shadow, or the double), this figure ultimately
implicates the category of representation itself: the ghost as the uncanny
space between presence and absence, reality and its simulacrum. Writing,
no less than photographic or cinematic representations, is a mediation, and
as such a kind of vampire sucking at the throat of the real—a specter that
can be held at bay in cultures where only a small elite is allowed the power
to read and write, but one that multiplies uncontrollably in technologi-
cally advanced democracies, with their large literate populations and mod-
ern means of communication. Perhaps this is what Kafka meant when he
likened the writing of letters to an ‘‘intercourse with ghosts.’’ Correspon-
dence, he continues in a passage that applies equally to writing and repre-
sentation per se,
means exposing oneself to the ghosts, who are greedily waiting precisely
for that. Written kisses never arrive at their destination; the ghosts drink
them up along the way. It is this ample nourishment which enables them
to multiply so enormously. People sense this and struggle against it; in
order to eliminate the ghostliness between people and to attain a natural
intercourse, a tranquility of soul, they have invented trains, cars, aero-
planes—but nothing helps anymore. . . . The opposing side is so much
calmer and stronger; after the postal system, the ghosts invented the
telegraph, the telephone, the wireless. They will not starve, but we will
perish.21
Kafka’s unfinished Gothic novels, as well as the unending proliferation of
Stoker’s vampire legend, continue to haunt the newly gendered modern
even as it enters the next millennium.
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